

## Conclusions from the Three Wise Men Committee (Dublin, 29 and 30 November 1979)

**Caption:** During the Dublin European Council of 29 and 30 November 1979, the Committee of the Three Wise Men - composed of Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell and Robert Marjolin - officially submits its Report on the European Institutions, an overview of which had already been passed to the Foreign Ministers of the Nine during their meeting of 20 and 21 October in Ashford Castle (Ireland).

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**URL:** [http://www.cvce.eu/obj/conclusions\\_from\\_the\\_three\\_wise\\_men\\_committee\\_dublin\\_29\\_and\\_30\\_november\\_1979-en-8e184e74-01ba-404e-a427-3e244a86bcc8.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/conclusions_from_the_three_wise_men_committee_dublin_29_and_30_november_1979-en-8e184e74-01ba-404e-a427-3e244a86bcc8.html)

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## Conclusions from the Three Wise Men Committee

The European Council has asked us to make proposals on adjustments to the machinery and procedures of the Community institutions. We are well aware that the most fundamental causes of weakness in the functioning of the Community do not arise from mechanisms and procedures. The latter play, in fact, only a secondary role. The more serious obstacles are the economic difficulties and divergences of interests and views among the Member States.

The Community is likely to find itself facing real and fundamental problems in the coming years. Moreover, the number of Member States is to be increased during the same period. We must at least ensure that the institutions, rather than aggravating the difficulties by their inefficiency and the dispersion of effort, provide all the conditions for tackling them with the maximum chance of success.

We have tried not so much to fix new detailed rules for the functioning of a Community of Twelve as to propose practical adjustments which can be made here and now to the activities of Community institutions. If these recommendations are adopted, we believe they will result in the new members entering a Community that is more dynamic, more efficient and better prepared to receive them.

Due credit must be given to the Community's achievements. The greater part of the Treaties has already been implemented. Cooperation among Member States has been extended well beyond the letter of the Treaties. But the Community faces difficulties in building new common policies, often without precise Treaty guidelines. Moreover, the multiplication of the Community's tasks and their growing diversity have considerably increased the *lourdeur* of the Community's institutional apparatus. The latter has become both more complex and less efficient.

Our proposal is to improve the functioning of the apparatus by means of the definition of priorities and the clear identification of responsibilities. In our report we have deliberately set aside any kind of ideological approach. The intention is not to modify the institutional balance. Instead we suggest practical ways of improving the functioning of each institution.

The creation of the *European Council* was in itself a pragmatic response to the Community's institutional difficulties. It has become an effective source of political guidance in the Community.

The task is to find the right balance between freedom and discipline in the European Council's proceedings. The operational solutions already developed to this end should be reaffirmed and reinforced: limited agendas, limited attendance, coherent preparation and follow-up, early circulation of documents, Presidency responsibility for drafting clear and accurate conclusions. We have examined the idea of a longer-term Presidency for the European Council and it seems to us that it would present real difficulties in the present state of the Community.

There is considerable scope for improvement in the European Council's relations with the Treaty institutions. Our specific suggestions for preserving the role of the Council of Ministers, strengthening the Commission in its collaboration with Heads of Government, and establishing direct relations between the European Council and Parliament, are designed to integrate the European Council so far as possible within the normal framework of inter-institutional relations. To make full use of its potential for political guidance, we propose that the European Council should adopt before 1981, in collaboration with the Commission, a master plan of *priorities* indicating the main tasks and directions for progress for the Community as a whole. This master plan must be precise and practical, a declaration of intent rather than a pious hope.

The European Council is responsible for reviewing the whole range of Member States' common action, whether it has a strictly Community character or not—as is the case notably for Political Cooperation. It has, therefore, a certain choice among the procedures to be used particularly for new actions. Priority must be given to the application of Article 235. But if it appears impracticable to apply this procedure, action in common by other methods which allow the Community to make progress should not be ruled out *a priori*.

The *Council of Ministers* in its various formations, and the associated machinery, are producing results which do not match up to the amount of effort deployed. The burden of work is becoming impossible to handle and the efforts of the various subordinate bodies and of the specialized formations of the Council are insufficiently coordinated. To tackle these problems, the clearer definition and more efficient execution of the responsibilities of the Presidency seem to us essential. Each Presidency should establish its work programme, respecting the priorities defined by the European Council, and should report on the execution of the programme at the end of its term. The authority of the Presidency in enforcing procedures, and in establishing the agenda, should be clearly recognized. The Presidency should be free to lighten its own load by entrusting particular dossiers to other members of the European Council, the Council of Ministers or subordinate organs. Other options, such as a change in the rotation of the Presidency and the 'troika' formula, are rejected.

The Council itself must be free to concentrate on the genuinely political issues. This means making wider use of delegation to the Commission, and giving more room for manoeuvre to the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the lower-level bodies. We do not recommend altering the status of Permanent Representatives. Procedures for taking decisions must be as economical as possible. The 'Luxembourg Compromise' has become a fact of life in the Community. Each State must be the judge of where its very important interests lie. But if all States feel sure they will not be overruled on matters involving such interests for them, they should all accept voting as the normal practice in all cases where the Treaty does not impose unanimity and no very important interests are involved.

The working groups below Coreper should not, as too often happens, be left to their own devices. The Presidency, helped by the Council Secretariat and in liaison with the Commission, has special responsibility for coordinating their work within the framework of agreed priorities and for avoiding unnecessary delays.

Horizontal coordination is also essential to counteract the fragmentation and dispersion of Community activities. While it cannot retrieve the dominant position it held in the early years, the Council of Foreign Ministers should continue to play a central role. Certain specialized Councils might hold less frequent meetings.

National administrations can make a further, very significant contribution to the proper functioning of the Communities. Coordination of Community affairs is carried out by very different methods from one capital to another. We do not seek to impose a single stock model on practices which have been shaped by tradition and on structures which are often highly diverse. But it is vital that the capacity should exist in all Member States to produce, in good time, instructions which are both considered and coherent. The Permanent Representative can play a helpful role in this respect.

Finally, the Council does not operate in isolation. The Commission makes a contribution which is vital for its good functioning, and the Presidency should look after the quality of its relations with the Parliament.

The role and authority of the *Commission* have declined in recent years. The exercise of its right of initiative and its role as guardian of the Treaties, together with its management and implementing tasks, need to be made more effective and adapted to current circumstances. The number of Commissioners in the enlarged Community should be limited to twelve—one per Member State. The number of Directorates-General should be reduced and brought in line with that of Commissioners. The college of Commissioners should be more homogeneous and should act more as a collective body. Coordination between departments should be strengthened and the central services—budget, personnel, administration—grouped under the authority of the President. The President of the Commission's authority must be reinforced within the institution of which he is the head. He should be chosen by the European Council six months before the renewal of the Commission. He should be consulted by Governments on the selection of Members of the Commission, and should have the last word on the allocation of portfolios.

It is essential that the Commission should maintain an active role in the Community. It represents the interests of Europe as a whole and not a compromise between different points of view. It should set up at the start of its term of office a general programme which can be revised at least once a year, in harmony with

priorities defined by the European Council. It should organize the application of its resources on the basis of this programme, taking account of the capacity of the Council machine. The production and handling of 'harmonization' proposals need careful planning. The Commission should consult States, where necessary, at a high political level and should avoid repeated low-level consultations on the policy aspects of its drafts. It should participate actively in the work of the Council, modifying its proposals and suggesting compromises.

The Council, for its part, must delegate more of the implementation of new policies to the Commission. Ways must be found, for example by the development of stock formulae and political understandings between the institutions, to eliminate the obstacles which have blocked certain delegations in the past.

This report makes no claim to pronounce on the process of evolution which the *European Parliament* may go through following its election by direct universal suffrage. But we can suggest certain adjustments which are necessary in relations between the Parliament and the other institutions. In this context, closer contacts must be developed between the Parliament and the Commission. The latter must present its programme to the Parliament for debate. It must work out with the Parliament a six-monthly programme for consultative work. Above all, the Commission must make a more serious response to the Parliament's Resolutions. The Council, too, should take these Resolutions more seriously. It is up to the Presidency to draw them to Member States' attention and to develop personal contacts with the Parliament. The institutions should try to agree on practical improvements to tackle the difficulties arising in the implementation of the 'conciliation' procedure. Finally, the President of the European Council should appear once every six months before the Parliament, so as to achieve a direct dialogue at the highest level between the two organs. In the interests of the Community, balanced relations need to be maintained between the three points of the Commission-Council-Parliament triangle.

The *Court of Justice* has presented suggestions itself for resolving its problems. Solutions should be found by discussion between the institutions. The same applies to the *Court of Auditors*. The *Economic and Social Committee* faces more serious difficulties. In these times of crisis, the Community needs an efficient mechanism for consultation with the social partners. We make some suggestions for reaffirming the Economic and social Committee's role in socio-economic consultations in the Community, and also for increasing the effectiveness of the Tripartite Conference, the Standing Committee on Employment and the Joint Committee system.

In this whole study, we have taken account of the prospective *enlargement* of the Community to twelve members. Our technical proposals designed to improve the transparency, coherence and efficiency of the Community institutions are based on experience of a Community of nine members, but they can do much to ease the functioning of a Community of Twelve.

However, enlargement will not add only to the *lourdeur* of the institutions. It will also extend the range of differing circumstances and interests among Member States. Any system of a 'two-speed' Europe which created differences of status between Member States must in our view be rejected. *Differentiated* solutions for the application to Member States of policies decided in common may however prove useful in some cases, as they have in the present-day Community. Certain safeguards should be applied whenever they are used.

The Community of Twelve will have nine official *languages*. Any attempt to limit systematically and by compulsion the use of any national language would be unjust as well as politically impractical. But the costs and complications will be on a scale to make it essential that pragmatic arrangements are found allowing the number of interpreters to be reduced according to the nature of each meeting.

We have also reflected on the *problems likely to face Europe* in the next few years. This period will be a difficult one for Europe. Everything points to a relatively low rate of economic growth, accompanied and aggravated by monetary disturbances and difficulties in the energy market. The unemployment problem will lead to social and political tensions. The prospects for the Community's future, and for progress towards European Union, will depend on how it copes with this continuing crisis. The Community's Member States must maintain their solidarity both in the active sense, i.e. mutual aid, and in the passive sense of abstaining

wherever possible from action likely to cause problems for other members. Much resolve and political intelligence will be needed to counter the pressures for protectionism which are bound to arise both in the enlarged Community's internal trade and in its dealings with the outside world.

The priorities which the Community sets itself in dealing with these challenges must be flexible enough to allow adjustment to changing circumstances. They must be based on a realistic appreciation of the scope for Community action. The first and greatest task is the maintenance and consolidation of the *acquis*, with any adjustments that modern conditions may demand. In dealings with the outside world the Community and its Member States must act in the most united way possible both on the economic and on the political front. The solidarity between States must be given practical expression, whether it be in joint action to face up to the energy crisis, in mutual aid for other emergencies, or in the development of efforts for greater monetary stability such as are reflected in the European Monetary System. Priorities of this kind should help the Community not only to survive the immediate dangers, but also to lay the practical foundations for progress in the longer term.