

# Address given by Gaetano Martino on the ratification of the EEC and EAEC Treaties (Rome, 26 July 1957)


**Caption:** On 26 July 1957, Gaetano Martino, Italian Foreign Minister, delivers an address to the Italian Chamber of Deputies in which he calls for the adoption of the bill authorising Giovanni Gronchi, President of the Italian Republic, to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the annexes thereto, the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) and the Convention on certain institutions common to the European Communities, signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 by the representatives of the six Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

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Mr President, Honourable Members, the bill authorising ratification of the European treaties now seems to have the approval of such a large majority in this House that I could, perhaps, refrain from speaking in deference to the higher law of making the best use of our time, particularly since the views of group on whose behalf I speak have already been clearly set out by Mr Giovanni Malagodi. And I would gladly do so were it not that I shouldered much of the responsibility for preparing, negotiating, drafting and obtaining final government approval for the diplomatic instruments we are now discussing. As one of the principal authors of these treaties, I clearly cannot shirk the duty of speaking in their defence, even if that is now more the remit of my eminent successor as foreign minister and even if I am persuaded — as indeed I am — that he will be more competent and more effective in that task.

These treaties, which are now called the Rome treaties since they were signed in Rome on 25 March of this year, were actually conceived — as several speakers have mentioned — in my birthplace, Messina, in early June 1955. That is a date which I believe will be seen as critical in the history of the development of the process of uniting Europe, because it was at the conference of the six foreign ministers of the Coal and Steel Community, which took place in Messina on 1 and 2 June 1955, that the prerequisites were stated for relaunching the process of reunifying Europe, the very process that had appeared to have been halted for ever after the failure of the European Defence Community.

At the time, the conference was not appreciated at its true value. In fact, it was treated with some scepticism or — and this has also been mentioned in the House — almost mockery, particularly by people who, having been more anxious to achieve progress towards the unification of Europe, were more disappointed and distressed than others when the French National Assembly failed to ratify earlier proposals that had cost such hard work. Economic integration seemed too long and difficult — not to say utopian — a process as a means towards future political unification. It appeared more likely that it would keep an aspiration alive than to turn it into a reality.

But I think we should now acknowledge that the Messina Conference really set out the problem clearly and correctly.

It is true that a great deal of hard work, determination and courage has been needed. It is true that it has taken two years of lengthy negotiations among experts meeting in Brussels. From this side of the House, I would like to extend heartfelt praise to those experts for the patient, methodical and really valuable work they have done with such enthusiasm and selflessness. It is true that it took all the ability, skill, intelligence, tenacity and energy of Belgium's foreign minister Paul Henri Spaak to orchestrate and coordinate the work of the experts. But those treaties are now finally before us. And those who were sceptical or mocking of the Messina Conference at the time now ought — I think — to recognise that it is thanks to the Conference that the idea of European unity, having long remained in the realms of the abstract, has finally become a real possibility.

The diplomatic instruments we are discussing are largely economic in content, but the reasons behind them and the main clauses that are to govern the organisation and operation of the Community bodies for which they provide are entirely political in nature.

We can therefore say that it is through these treaties that we shall finally achieve the effective unification of little Europe, albeit at a gradual pace that is bound to be unwelcome to the more ardent champions of European unity, among whom we must now, for that very reason, include Mr Riccardo Lombardi. The unification of Europe is vital for the political and economic reasons with which we are all familiar. After 2 500 years during which this part of Europe was always the real source of world politics, we now have to acknowledge, not without a sense of mortification, that it — by which I mean Western Europe — is no longer the generator but the object of international politics. The concert of world politics has now turned into a duet of two giants, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and we Europeans are squeezed between them. No country in Western Europe is any longer able to make its voice heard.

There is much talk nowadays of countries that are economically underdeveloped — a reference intended to point to the more backward countries of Asia or Africa. But it is clear that compared, for instance, to the United States of America, even the countries of little Europe have to be considered underdeveloped. And they will increasingly fall behind unless they soon set about introducing the appropriate remedies in line with technical progress, as it brings about ever more radical changes in human work and production.

The April 1956 report, compiled by the experts meeting in Brussels and generally known as the ‘Spaak report’, states in that connection that none of the countries of little Europe is currently in a position to build large transport aircraft; none of them currently possesses big industrial plants for the mass production of cars on a par with American car plants; none has yet commenced the production of nuclear energy for non-military purposes, nor have they even researched it in any detail.

There is no doubt that this new energy source, which has made war far more terrifying by spreading the threat of terror over a wider area, will play a major role in the construction of the peaceful world of the future, when man’s power to combat suffering and poverty will be vastly increased. But the development and production of nuclear power require a great concentration of resources — far greater than any country in Western Europe can make available, except for Great Britain. We must therefore join together, if we wish to avoid a fatal decline. Let us remember the age-old lesson of history: while the decline of nations may take various forms, it always involves, first and foremost, the loss of national freedom.

Let us for a moment imagine what would have happened in a world revolutionised by the discovery and use of electricity in the industrial field if some countries had been unable to produce or use that new energy source. There would clearly have been marked differences between countries that might have been described as ‘electrified’ and ‘non-electrified’ countries. Well, it is easy to foresee that there will be a far greater difference between countries able to produce and use nuclear power, which is going to determine the whole shape of life in the future, and those countries that cannot produce or use it, that is to say the difference between what we can define as ‘thermonuclear’ and ‘non-thermonuclear’ countries.

That is why it is absolutely vital that the nations of Europe should pool their resources and their strengths through the instruments of EURATOM and the European Economic Community, bearing in mind that those instruments are interdependent — as Mr Nicolò Di Bernardo has rightly pointed out — and cannot therefore be easily separated.

We can cite some statistics to give a better illustration of the situation regarding the development of and further research on nuclear power. So far, the United States of America has devoted some \$ 15 thousand million to it, that is to say some LIT 10 000 000 000 000 in round figures; the United Kingdom \$ 1 500 million, while France, which is in the forefront here in Western Europe, has spent only \$ 200 million. And, to spare our national blushes, the least said about what Italy has so far done in this field the better ...

We must unite or perish. All that Europe lacks is unity. The six countries now wishing to unite within the European Economic Community and the Atomic Energy Community, and which are already united in the Coal and Steel Community, have a total population of 162 million and produce in total, as has been mentioned, 55 million tonnes of steel, 350 million tonnes of coal and lignite and 250 thousand million kilowatts of electricity, thereby outstripping the Soviet Union itself in some sectors. Those six countries’ exports total \$15 800 million a year, that is to say \$ 500 million more than the United States of America.

The world we live in is characterised by the existence of large economic areas in which the economy can be organised only by applying the criterion of maximum productivity, but Europe is still divided into many small economic areas. Only by joining those small areas together will we achieve the conditions that will give Europe’s economy the potential to become comparable with that of the United States or the Soviet Union.

Mr Lombardi has said, in that connection, that a united Europe will never be economically comparable with those countries because it will never be able to achieve their self-sufficiency, as it will always have to import

the raw materials it lacks, whereas the Soviet Union and the United States of America have abundant supplies within their own borders.

But when we speak of the possibility of achieving economic comparability between a united Europe and the United States or the Soviet Union, we are certainly not talking about self-sufficiency. What we mean is that, properly stimulated by the existence of a large economic area, Europe's extraordinary capacity to change — one of its essential features — could make it possible for manufacturing in Europe's associated states to compete with manufacturing in the United States or the Soviet Union.

A short time ago, Mr Randolfo Pacciardi reminded us of what Carlo Cattaneo wrote in 1848. I would like to remind you of something slightly earlier. In 1843, Cattaneo wrote that the more extensive the area of production and marketing, the more varied, large, vigorous and bold was industry. Were England to be divided into eight, ten or more customs areas, and were each allotted a proportionate share in current British commerce, all its industrial superiority would simply be fragmented and would drain away. The sum of the new parts would not equal the previous whole.

That is the point: the value of the whole is vastly greater than the sum of the parts! That is the significance of establishing the large economic area.

It has been said that this Europe, organised in communities superimposed on the nation-states and functioning discretely, creates not order but disorder. Those who take that approach show that they have a static rather than a dynamic vision of this development. The communities into which Europe is currently attempting to integrate are an indication of the difficult path of our history, and are simply the components of a far broader, more close to perfect, more comprehensive future organisation. If the life of Europe were to become permanently fixed within those communities, we too would have our doubts. The reason we are not doubtful is that we are convinced that the process is not set in stone, nor can it be.

We believe that the path we have chosen is the only option. We have to cross the river if we want to get to the other side. Those who are afraid and are unwilling to risk crossing mid-current will have to halt at the river, able only to look from afar at the object of their aspirations.

But we want to reach the other bank, where we will find a more united and harmonious Europe, and we cannot reject the means we are offered by the turn history itself has taken. It is not as a result of a whim, nor is it by chance, that we have opted for the path of economic integration. Necessity dictates it, given that the direct route to political integration was, at least temporarily, already closed and no longer passable.

The perception of these treaties differs, both within and outside this House, depending on people's aspirations. Those who genuinely desire European unity consider the chosen path too long (and we are well aware how long and difficult it is) and bewail the fact that there is no supranational organisation, nor indeed any organisation similar to the body set up within the European Coal and Steel Community. Meantime, those who fear or dislike European unification consider progress towards it too rapid and they object to the existence of excessive supranational powers which, in their opinion, would undermine our national sovereignty.

It must be said that both are wrong, but both, in a sense, are also right. It is true that there is no supranational body comparable to the ECSC High Authority; but substantial supranational powers have been assigned to the Community institutions. And it is in fact clear (as indeed Mr Pacciardi has pointed out) that where a Community body is able, by majority vote, to adopt rules valid for all the countries of the Community, it is undoubtedly exercising a supranational power.

Like the bodies of the European Coal and Steel Community, and in contrast to any other body provided for in existing international law, the new Community institutions are in fact an innovation, because they inherently contain a new element: the innovation resides not only in the transfer of specific powers from the individual states to the Community bodies, but also in the fact that those Community bodies are independent of the nation-states and, politically speaking, their independence is irrevocable.

Like the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the treaties we are discussing do not in fact require action by any national authority for their implementation, nor do they require action through the intermediary of the nation-states. They are directly incorporated into the legal orders of the nation-states, and, in a sense, complement and overarch the individual legal orders.

The supranational powers provided for under the treaties we are discussing here relate not only to the implementation of the treaties but also to their formation. We must bear in mind that the common market was envisaged as the culmination of the process of harmonising the economic policies of the states which is to take place during the transitional period, in other words the period when the individual national economies will adapt to the requirements of the market. During that period, the Community institutions will have to adopt rules applicable to all of the states, designed specifically to harmonise economic policies.

The Community bodies are therefore creating the instruments that will shape the Community. They are ensuring that the treaty itself lays down the premises and conditions for the Community's future development — the Community will therefore build upon itself. Hence there is provision not only for an executive authority, so to speak, with a constitution that already exists, but also for entrusting those bodies with a genuine constituent power, the power to establish institutions and rules.

It is for that reason, and for that reason alone, that unanimity is required during a stage in the transitional period: because of the exercise of that constituent power. As the transitional period progresses, we shall move from the criterion of unanimity to majority voting, very often weighted majority voting, but sometimes simple majority voting. And that shift from the criterion of unanimity to majority voting actually signifies the change in the Community itself, as it moves from an intergovernmental body and becomes a supranational body.

In 1787 — about 200 years ago — when it was decided to bring together in a new structure the sovereign states of North America, the Philadelphia Convention made a complete and final break with the old European tradition of the oneness, indivisibility and unlimited nature of sovereignty: the dogmatic pillars underpinning the theory and practice of the nation-states. And so a new and as yet untried and untested system came into being, characterised by the courageous or indeed audacious attempt to unite diverse states, preserving their diversity within a unified political approach. United but not uniform: that was the criterion inspiring the federal state.

And what we are creating today is not very dissimilar. In this innovation I have been describing we can basically perceive the primitive nucleus of a federal structure designed to evolve into more perfect and complete form. Postulating European unity, it is not our intention (and anyone thinking this would be wrong) to abolish the national bodies. We do not in fact intend to undermine the principle of nationality. Far from it: we look back to the tradition of the thinkers of the last century — a century dominated by the concept of nationality — who were constantly fired by an eager search for universally valid supranational rules. We also look back to the authors and prophets of the Italian Risorgimento, who wanted a united Italy but within the broader vision of a Europe itself united by common traditions and the common law of freedom, and we seek to build a new Europe in which the special traits of the individual are not crushed but revive, blossom and flourish. Just as happened due to the institution of the North American Federal State following the deliberations of the Philadelphia Convention 200 years ago, we seek to create the kind of unity that maintains unchanged, indeed protects, the independence, freedom, traditional characteristics and particular attitudes of individual nations.

So is this new system, this proposed economic integration we are facing, really something that is going to jeopardise our sovereignty? That is an issue that has been raised. I have to tell you sincerely that, as far as my own political party is concerned, we are not among those who recoil at the mere thought of limiting national sovereignty. We are in fact among those who, at the time, proposed the approval by the Constituent Assembly of Article 11 of our Constitution, which actually provides for, and permits, that limitation in specific instances. Let me add that the myth of national sovereignty has now been dispelled by time. Moreover, as I said, in the past too there was always a search for supranational rules; the concept of

nationhood was always construed within the framework of a moral law of general application. If there was a time in history when the concept of nationhood was accentuated, or indeed exaggerated, to the detriment of the supranational moral law, that does not imply that it has not always existed — in its pure state, I mean — and that is precisely what we are referring to today.

It has been claimed that this Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is conservative in its structure. The term seems to me to be inaccurate to say the least. From a strictly economic point of view, in fact, it seems clear to me that this is a profoundly innovative structure since the proposal is to abolish the constraints and restrictions imposed by the new chauvinistic feudalism. The effect of those constraints and restrictions has been to leave significant parts of the economy of Europe's countries in a state of advantage that is rigid almost to the point of petrification. This is therefore not a conservative but a liberal vision of a future that is open to the freedom of peoples and individuals to act.

To say this does not mean that the treaty is merely a free trade treaty. Moreover, I see no point in discussing whether it is a free trade or a *dirigiste* treaty. The experts, who have been working in Brussels for two years, and the politicians, who have met in some eight conferences at prime ministerial level, were never ruled by dogma; they were not pursuing the empty dream of a specific ideological approach in drafting the articles of the treaty. The treaty — I have said this elsewhere, I repeat it here and, moreover, it is clear from the text of the ministerial report that I myself had the honour of presenting to the House — is designed to be neither a free trade nor a *dirigiste* act. But that does not mean that we should not acknowledge that the treaty is permeated throughout by the intention to affirm and defend free enterprise as a vital tool for economic progress.

Nor do I feel it is correct to say, as some have claimed, that the treaty on the Common Market is in some way ambivalent, in the sense that it operates as a free trade treaty within the confines of the market but is protectionist in relation to third parties, in that there is a common external tariff. It is clear that the common external tariff is needed. The dream of all those in favour of free trade should be to dismantle all barriers throughout the world, but that requires agreements with all of the states. Until such agreements are brought into being, I do not believe that any advocate of free trade seriously thinks it feasible to dismantle his own customs barriers in a world that leaves others standing.

That, then, is not the problem; the problem, if problem there is, is how to set the common external tariff. And basically, if you look carefully, it is not even that. The real problem is how to administer the common external tariff; that is to say, what kind of agreements will have to be set in place between the European Community and third countries.

In that connection, I should like to make the point that none of the authors of the treaty ever thought of building an autarky. None of them ever thought of the treaty as a means of enabling Europe to prolong a gentle and tranquil decline by pooling its weakened forces. We always thought in terms of creating a new Europe, a young Europe, full of confidence in itself and its future and determined to resume its role as a driving force in world history.

That is why I believe there is no reason for concern here. The agreements already reached within the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation for the liberalisation of trade are certainly not going to be abandoned by the Community in its dealings with third countries. In fact, there will be an absolute commitment to continued liberalisation.

On reviewing the treaty, Mr Ugo La Malfa thought he identified signs of protectionist tendencies in the rules on agriculture. I have to say, in that context, that the minimum prices discussed for agriculture have to be seen as applicable only for the transitional period and that they will have to be brought into line with the objective criteria the Community will have to set, within the first two years. It is true that — as Mr La Malfa has pointed out — unanimity is required for the purpose of determining those objective criteria, as a result of which it might theoretically happen that, failing agreement, they would not be fixed. But in that case, and as of the third phase, the minimum prices already adopted by some countries could be modified *ex officio* and by a qualified majority decision. And if, at the end of the transitional period, there were minimum prices



remaining, the Community would have to decide on them, by a simple weighted majority of nine out of a total of 17 votes.

The majority can also decide, in certain cases, to make an exception to the rule, as there may be objective reasons in the common interest of the whole Community that lead it to do so. But the criterion that should be the rule is that at the end of the transitional period there should be complete harmonisation of the agricultural policies of the Six. At the end of that period there would therefore be no reason to retain minimum prices in agriculture.

It therefore seems to me truly exaggerated to claim with such certainty, as has Mr La Malfa, that once the transitional period is at an end, Belgium will continue to consume grapes grown under glass instead of importing grapes from Italy. We have to remember that in the field of agriculture greater caution and a more gradual process of integration will be required, justifying even that minor example of automatism of which Mr La Malfa has complained. In point of fact, the kind of conversion that will possibly be needed proceeds rather more slowly in agriculture than in industry. This is a point made, and made well, by Mr Giancarlo Matteotti in his speech. In agriculture, it often takes many years to produce new crops. We cannot therefore expect conversion to proceed at the same pace as it may proceed in industry. That is why we have to have minimum prices, not just for the other countries but also for Italy, because we too will have to convert certain sectors of agriculture and need to ensure that this takes place at a proper gradual pace, avoiding senseless and damaging upheaval.

Once the transitional period is at an end, the market will have to be regulated by the rules of competition, with the consequent liberalisation not only of the movement of persons, goods and capital, but also of the provision of services. And the liberalisation of services is conceived not as an offshoot of the liberalisation of goods, but as a separate element of the economic integration we wish to achieve.

We are well aware of not only the advantages but also the disadvantages of the rules on competition. But we are not among those who pessimistically anticipate great disasters for our economy, those who consider our economic operators less suited than those of other countries to being subject to the rules of competition.

When the treaty establishing the ECSC was discussed, the pessimists warned of the most damaging prospects for the future of our iron and steel industry. But, as has been rightly pointed out, if I am not mistaken by Mr Armando Sabatini, we have actually seen a vigorous revival in Italy's iron and steel industry. Steel production, which at the time was less than 3 million tonnes per annum, is now at about 6 million tonnes and still rising.

But, as I said, we are also aware of the disadvantages of the rules on competition. The market economy presupposes that the basic conditions are the same for all operators, and it would be truly unfair and absurd to claim that our operators were not aided by the watchful protection of the state, subject to the limits within which protection permitted under the rules of the Treaty may have been accorded in other Community countries. In that sense, we can share the concerns voiced by others, and call on the Government for an assurance.

The pre-eminence of the rules of competition has naturally also alarmed a number of zealous but perhaps impromptu experts on Southern Italy, who thought they saw in the union of Europe and, therefore, market enlargement, a source of greater impoverishment of the people of Southern Italy, even going so far, to set the cat among the pigeons, as to blame the unification of Italy for a deterioration in the economic circumstances of Southern Italy and the islands.

Clearly, none of that reflects historical reality. In fact, Italian unification made it possible to set under way a process of renewal in the southern Italian economy, even though it has to be acknowledged that the process was not as swift and harmonious as was required. Had it not been for the unification of Italy, the people of Southern Italy would still be far more impoverished than they were before, back in the days before Italy was unified.

The problems besetting life in Southern Italy are the product of centuries of civil neglect, as well as of other natural factors, such as an inclement and unfavourable territory, and it is therefore impossible to imagine that they could be resolved overnight. There is everything to indicate that the modernisation of Southern Italy, which began with national unification, is destined to receive a boost from European unity and to reach completion within its framework.

The real problems afflicting Southern Italy, that is to say the problems of a surplus labour force and lack of capital, will inevitably and gradually be diminished as a result of the instruments provided for by the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the Atomic Energy Community. They will then be resolved gradually but permanently at a more rapid pace than would be possible within the context of national unity alone.

The investment bank and the fund for the training of workers not taken on for normal productive activities are instruments that will be of greater help to Southern Italy than to other parts of the Community. And, in that connection, I should remind you of something very interesting, which may have escaped many of you.

When, in Messina, it was decided to set up a vocational training fund, it was envisaged only for workers who would be made redundant as a result of the conversions that would occur once the common market came into force. But, as a result of the energetic and intelligent activity of our experts at the Brussels conference, those original ideas were radically transformed, and, in the end, the principle was adopted — as proposed by the Italian side — of creating a vocational training fund for all unemployed workers, regardless of whether their unemployment results from the entry into force of the common market, or whether they were already unemployed.

And that was because it was recognised that the special circumstances of the depressed regions of Italy needed more aid than had been envisaged at the start. It was specifically to meet the needs of Southern Italy that this instrument was set up in such a form: this indicates the intention behind the treaty in relation to Italy's depressed regions.

It is therefore to be anticipated — as I have said — that the modernisation of Southern Italy will take place much more rapidly against a background of European economic integration. Southern Italy suffers from a surplus of agricultural workers: 49 % of the population is employed in agriculture, compared with the Italian average of 41 % and the average for the future Community, 29 %.

According to economic forecasts, that 29 % will fall significantly by the end of the transitional period. A reduction to 21 % is in fact anticipated, and clearly that reduction is bound to mean an exodus of workers from agriculture to industry or, at any rate, to other areas of activity. It is natural that this exodus of workers from the land should be more marked in Southern Italy, where the percentage of workers employed in agriculture is higher. Finally, it is to be anticipated that in the broader area within which the Southern Italian economy will be able to operate, in the broader area of the Common Market in which it will be easier for capital and labour to come together, it will also be easier to industrialise the depressed areas of Italy, and particularly Southern Italy and the islands. Consequently, Italy has nothing to fear as regards the future of its depressed regions, but has every reason to look confidently and optimistically to the future.

Honourable Members, I have already alluded to the fact (and others have said the same) that we see these agreements for Europe's economic integration above all as instruments for future political unification. We cannot and should not resign ourselves to the idea of no longer being the generators but the objects of international politics. We cannot and should not resign ourselves to the idea that the world should remain divided into two spheres of influence dominated by the giants between which we find ourselves. But saying that — and I should at once make this very clear — does not mean, as far as we are concerned at least, that we want to create a third force, that we want to relinquish our links with the United States. We are not supporters of that kind of European isolationism that some call for, to counterbalance the Atlantic Alliance. I have already had occasion to say that this European isolationism is nothing but an attempt to rewrite, after the event, a page in the history book that is closed once and for all. The coming together of Europe and America, at a time when both had to summon all their forces to safeguard the common values of the



civilisation they share, is no longer open to question: it is irrevocable. Therefore, while we welcome the support — albeit limited, partial and hesitant — that the Italian Socialist Party is prepared to offer these instruments of European economic integration, let us say, as clearly and firmly as possible, that we cannot accept the conditions that the Italian Socialist Party seems to place on Europe's political unification. I am not only referring here to what Mr Luigi Cacciatore had to say yesterday. I refer above all to what Mr Pietro Nenni wrote in his party newspaper, *l'Avanti*: political integration is conceivable as a consequence of economic integration only if we move beyond the system of two opposing blocs. By this euphemism he means 'only if we abandon the Atlantic Alliance'. Now it is clear that Mr Giuseppe Saragat is right to object, as he has done, that the threat to Europe does not reside in the alliances between the Soviet Union and Poland or between the Soviet Union and Hungary, and that, consequently, any withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance would not be met by the Soviet Union's simultaneous withdrawal from its alliances with those countries, because the real threat lies in Soviet imperialism, backed by huge military force. Mr Nenni quite frequently talks of moving beyond the military blocs. He talked about it recently, a few days ago, at his party's central committee. He clearly forgets the reasons for the creation of the Atlantic Alliance; the Soviet Union's total failure to comply with all the agreements among the victors in the war — the Yalta, Potsdam and Paris agreements — has slipped his mind. The countries subject to Soviet military control were supposed to be guaranteed self-determination and a system of democracy (Yalta agreement); Germany was supposed to be reunited on the basis of free elections (Potsdam agreement); the countries of the Danube were supposed to be cleared of foreign military forces immediately after the signing of the peace agreements (Paris agreement). But what has happened? Communist regimes have been installed by force or by intrigue in all of the territories subject to Soviet military occupation and, as a result of a series of bilateral agreements with those new regimes, the military occupation has ceased to be temporary and has become permanent. No self-determination for those peoples, no democratic system, no free elections, no reunification for Germany.

Mr Nenni will not be telling us that what happened occurred because the countries concerned so wished and still wish it. He himself spoke out in protest against the brutal and cynical oppression of the will of the Hungarian people — attention: of all the Hungarian people — under the tracks of the Soviet tanks.

We cannot therefore accept the conditions that the Italian Socialist Party seems to be placing on Europe's political unification. Born in one of the darkest and most threatening periods in world history, the Atlantic Alliance has enabled Europe to rebuild itself materially and spiritually. It is thanks to the Atlantic Alliance that peace has not been disrupted in Europe; it is thanks to the Atlantic Alliance that freedom has not been more seriously and more widely jeopardised. It has been possible to dispel the climate of terror that pervaded Western Europe in the immediate aftermath of the war specifically because of the acts of unity among the nations of Western Europe that gave birth to the Atlantic Alliance.

It has been said that the six countries of little Europe, the six Messina countries, as you heard them described today ...

Giancarlo Pajetta: That is what they say in Messina.

Gaetano Martino: Look, Mr Pajetta, I forgive your ignorance because you are not very familiar with the Western European background. If you were, you would know that 'Messina countries' is an expression current not in my city or in Italy, but in the territory of the other European countries.

Giancarlo Pajetta: I congratulate you for having managed to make Messina a household name.

Gaetano Martino: When I convened the six foreign ministers of the Coal and Steel Community to meet in Messina — I beg the indulgence of the House for this aside and personal recollection — I was the target of criticism and accusations by the Communist party in the electoral campaign then under way for the elections to the Sicilian Regional Assembly. They accused me, on street posters and elsewhere, of having summoned the six foreign ministers of the Coal and Steel Community for electioneering purposes, and of having burdened my commune's budget with some millions of lire in spending on hospitality and receptions in honour of the conference. In so doing, the Communist party of course paid me a great compliment, by claiming — albeit indirectly — that such was the prestige of Italy's foreign minister that he was able to

persuade five colleagues, and such eminent colleagues at that, from other European countries to come to Messina to support his election campaign.

Giancarlo Pajetta: We lost 2 000 votes in Messina!

Gaetano Martino: I lost more on that occasion. I do not, however, believe that Mr Pajetta can now continue to maintain that claim of electioneering: events have demonstrated that there was a very serious purpose behind our meeting in Messina.

It has been said that this Europe, the Europe of the Six, little Europe or the Europe of Messina (as it is now styled) was the product of the cold war climate and that, consequently, it is more likely to divide than to unite. That is not the case! The integration of Europe predates the cold war and extends beyond it. That claim is all the more inaccurate if it is true — as we hope and sincerely desire — that we have now embarked on a new stage in relations among nations that is more apt to promote cooperation and agreement.

And so I believe that those who want to be rid of the system of two military blocs should not be discouraged by the continuing effort to achieve European integration. In point of fact, it is clear that an honest understanding of the problems that at present divide the world — the kind of understanding that alone can restore the trust currently dented, if not indeed destroyed, in relations between nations — will naturally enable us to do away with the military blocs.

But in current circumstances, and until such an understanding is achieved, it is clear that we cannot abandon the Atlantic Alliance, which is the only genuine, stable and effective guarantee of our security. Anyone who, perhaps inclined to optimism as a result of obscure internal events in the Soviet Union that we cannot easily assess, believed that the ship of western solidarity was already securely berthed, would be making a serious mistake. No, that vessel is still being tossed by the waves that may drag it out to sea. We cannot therefore give up our joint efforts. In fact, we must — if needs be — intensify them.

Honourable Members, it is an age-old law of the progress of humanity that the development of nations is commensurate with their ability to take part in the process of common development. Therefore, this little Europe, this Europe that we want to create using the instruments now before us for ratification, must represent for us just the primitive nucleus of a broader community. We, and by that I mean we Liberals, view very sympathetically and with great hope the efforts already under way to establish a free trade area that will enable the United Kingdom to take an active part in the life of Europe — a Europe that will become integrated on the basis of these agreements. We have understood the difficulties the United Kingdom Government has experienced in relation to the issue of Europe's economic integration, but we cannot conceive of a Europe without Great Britain. Just as we cannot imagine Great Britain without Europe. We therefore believe that, exercising the necessary caution of course, the Government should pursue with the utmost commitment the efforts already under way to contribute to the creation of the free trade area. That will allow not only the United Kingdom but also other European countries to take part in the life of little Europe, based on mutual support and harmony.

Mr Attilio Bartole has expressed regret that the doors to the European Common Market have been closed to the Scandinavian countries. That is not true, Mr Bartole. The doors have always been left open, from Messina to Venice and from Venice to Rome. They are still open today and will be open in the future. The Europe we want to construct today is not a closed and self-centred Europe; it is an open and generous Europe. It is not a Europe that divides but a unifying Europe, a Europe, then, that aspires towards the complete unity of its different parts in the certainty that this unity alone will give the peoples of this continent the ability to advance ever further and ever more effectively on the path to civil progress and peace.

Mr President, Honourable Members, in this Parliament we clearly have a great majority in favour of the economic integration of Europe. Neither the Government nor we need to resort to solemn declarations to give credence to Italy's belief in Europe. Mr Pacciardi is right to tell us that Italy reigns ideologically supreme in the endeavours to bring about European unification. Italy is well known, as a result of its past

and recent actions, as the most willing, keenest and most determined champion of all initiatives to promote unification. As far as the initiative we are discussing here is more particularly concerned, I see the fact that it was conceived in Messina and concluded in Rome, after passing through a number of stages — Venice being a crucial one — as irrefutable proof of our contribution. A government that has devoted no small part — in fact a very substantial part — of its work to making that contribution can now declare itself satisfied, and justifiably proud, of having followed in the footsteps of its predecessors who wanted the reconstruction of Italy to be indissolubly linked with Europe's unification. The war brought bloodshed and destruction to our country, and was a tragic and sober demonstration of what happens when the rule of freedom in international relations breaks down. We have worked on the ruins of that breakdown, in the precise knowledge of its causes. It has taught us that it is not enough to rebuild internal order; we have also to create a new international order based on enduring and continuing cooperation among nations. And so to think of abandoning the multilateral instruments for cooperation established in this post-war era, or even to contemplate returning to what I dubbed 'the rule of freedom', that is to say the bilateral systems of pre-war diplomacy in international relations, is really to have all too soon forgotten the tragic and sobering lesson of history. Europe will be able to survive only on the basis of stable and resolute cooperation among its peoples. Only on the basis of such stable and resolute cooperation will Europe be able to survive as a spiritual homeland, as a permanent source of inspiration for those values, beliefs and ideals that we have a duty to uphold for ourselves, for our human condition and dignity and for the continuation and development of our own civilisation.

That, Honourable Members, is the goal, nourished, so to speak, by our own liberal beliefs, which have led us actively and enthusiastically to cooperate in creating the instruments for a new Europe. With that same goal in mind and in those same beliefs, we on this side of the House will continue to cooperate in the process of further development, because only in a Europe rendered more united and harmonious by effective and close cooperation among its peoples can Italy live freely and securely within its democratic institutions and progress confidently towards a better future.