

'The OSCE suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' from the Helsinki Monitor

Caption: In an article published in 1998 in the quarterly publication Helsinki Monitor, Valery Perry, a doctoral student at George Mason University in Virginia, USA, analyses the pros and cons of one of the most controversial decisions taken by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since it was established, namely the suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992.

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The OSCE suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Valery Perry

Introduction

The suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)⁽¹⁾ was one of the most difficult, and in some ways, controversial decisions the OSCE has made since its establishment. The decision entailed consideration of several different issues, including the notion of consensus and ‘consensus minus one’, humanitarian crisis response and responsibility, and national sovereignty. The decision has also forced the OSCE to consider the most effective and appropriate method of dealing with crises occurring within the borders of participating States. As informal discussions regarding the status of the FRY’S suspension and possible full-reinstatement into the OSCE have become more frequent in 1998, and in light of the crisis in the Kosovo region of the FRY, a review of the debate leading up to the suspension, the terms of the suspension, and the issues surrounding the re-evaluation of the suspension will provide useful and necessary background information for analysis and decision.

Decision-makers within the OSCE must ask a wide variety of questions pertaining to this issue. Should the OSCE continue the suspension, allowing the FRY’s chair at Permanent Council meetings to remain empty, as a statement against the FRY’s violations of OSCE principles and norms? Or is this status quo an empty symbol of a flawed past decision that has proven to be ineffective? Should the OSCE continue to speak out against regional atrocities and policies in the absence of authorities from Belgrade? Or would it be more effective to engage FRY representatives in the OSCE forum, so that the concerns and statements made by the participating States reach the appropriate audience?

While immediately relevant to the particular relationship between the OSCE and the FRY, answers to these questions can help to define the nature of the OSCE’s role in regional crises on a broader level, while at the same time framing a problem currently faced by many international organizations (IOs). As IOs (such as the UN, Council or Europe, or the OSCE) have increased their membership and expanded their definition of security in the post-Cold War world, how can they begin to build relationships with states that have questionable track records in areas such as human rights or other considerations elemental in the basic principles of these organizations? Should prospective new participants be admitted on a provisional trial basis, with a clear understanding of the expected improvements in human rights records? Or should there be no wavering at all by the international organizations, and a strong message that there are certain norms and principles that must be respected in order to enjoy participation? It is as of yet unclear what the optimal strategy for dealing with this type of state should be, but as the strained relationship between the FRY and the OSCE illustrates, these are questions that reflect immediate IO policy concerns.

Events leading to the suspension

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) began monitoring the deteriorating stability situation in the former Yugoslavia in the 1970s, increasing its attention in the region as the situation worsened in the late 1980s. In addition to expressing its concerns regarding human rights violations, border disputes, and the emerging political power vacuum, the CSCE became involved on the ground in the region through the CSCE Missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina (deployed in September 1992). The CSCE repeatedly expressed its concern in a variety of capacities, through the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), Personal Representatives of the CiO, and through individual CSCE delegations. Throughout its involvement, the CSCE repeatedly called on the parties involved, and especially the authorities in Belgrade, the regional center of power, to resolve their conflicts by peaceful means. The CSCE reiterated the commitment that all CSCE participating States agree to uphold, regarding the protection of minority rights, freedom of movement, and basic human rights. However, it became increasingly clear that consensus on potential CSCE responses would be difficult to achieve without the co-operation of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the offending state, and that such organizational paralysis would not improve the regional situation.

There was an option that allowed the CSCE to take effective action in response to the growing crisis in the Balkans in the absence of agreement by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The provision for ‘consensus minus one’ was initially agreed upon at the Prague Council Meeting held from 30-31 January 1992. ‘Consensus minus one’ allows for action to be taken by the CSCE in the absence of consensus, so that one participating State cannot by itself block CSCE actions. This policy cannot be invoked indiscriminately, but can be used in cases of clear violations of CSCE norms and principles. Part 4, Paragraph 16 of the Prague Council Meeting decisions states that ‘appropriate action may be taken by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments’.⁽²⁾ This provision was adopted by the CSCE as the nature of regional conflicts shifted from one dominated by the risk of traditional inter-state conflicts, to one driven by internal conflicts and subsequent domestic human rights violations. The growing Yugoslav crisis directly signalled the need for an effective response capability by the CSCE in such situations. A decision based on the ‘consensus minus one’ provision was determined to be an appropriate response to situations in which the safeguarding of human rights and the rule of law had to be protected within the CSCE region, regardless of the opposition of one state (presumably the nation accused of the violations).

The decision to suspend

The OSCE made a precedent-setting move in the spring of 1992, when it decided to exercise the consensus minus one option for the first time. On May 12, 1992, the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) issued a declaration on Bosnia- Herzegovina (BiH). In this declaration, the CSO condemned the perpetrators of hostilities in BiH, and Belgrade’s lack of commitment and resolve in seeking an end to the violence. The CSO decided that ‘in the view of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments appropriate action on matters relating to the crisis will until 30 June be taken in the absence of the consent of the delegation of Yugoslavia’.⁽³⁾ This initial suspension allowed for the principle of consensus minus one to be applied specifically in those discussions of issues pertaining to the Yugoslav crisis.

The regional situation did not improve after this preliminary measure by the CSCE. On July 10, 1992, at the 4th Plenary Meeting of the CSCE Helsinki Summit, the preliminary suspension was extended as the decision was made that no representative of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) would be permitted to participate in the CSCE Helsinki Summit or subsequent meetings. The decision to continue this suspension has since been upheld on several occasions⁽⁴⁾, with the understanding that full participatory status could be granted once a renewed respect for human rights and the principles of the OSCE is demonstrated.

Terms of the suspension

Under the terms of the suspension initiated in July 1992, the FRY is suspended from all activities of the OSCE. OSCE participation is politically binding, and although no legal means exist to compel compliance, the diplomatic agreement is considered to be held in force despite the suspension. Therefore, under the suspension, the FRY is still expected to comply with OSCE terms and principles. The FRY delegation is not allowed to attend OSCE meetings or functions, or to participate in OSCE discussions or debates. The OSCE upholds its commitments to the FRY through continuing communications with the FRY, short of participation. The FRY delegation does still receive all OSCE documents, have a pigeon-hole for receiving relevant materials, and maintains an embassy contact point. The delegation may also circulate documents to the OSCE member delegations. The FRY is expected to continue to pay their OSCE obligations, which, as of 1993, is an amount of .55% of the overall budget (until 1993, Yugoslavia’s obligation was .80%, as established in Helsinki in 1973).⁽⁵⁾

The July 1992 decision to suspend the FRY contained only general references pertaining to terms necessary to lift the suspension. The criteria for review of the decision was primarily based on FRY compliance with CSCE principles, commitments, and provisions, including the acceptance by and cooperation of FRY authorities with CSCE missions to Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak, as well as other missions to Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that might be put into place by the CSCE.⁽⁶⁾ Compliance with these terms was reiterated each time the decision was made to continue the suspension. An exchange of letters between the Swedish Chairman-in-Office in the summer of 1993 and the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that

the basic condition for eventual re- admittance was the resumption of the CSCE missions in the region.

While the suspension made a general impact on the FRY's position in the international community, there were no specific repercussions regarding the FRY's relationship with other international organizations resulting directly from the suspension. Sanctions had been imposed on the FRY in decisions independent of the OSCE suspension. Cooperation among the OSCE and other IOs continued in BiH without regard to the suspension. In September 1992, the CSO noted that it would continue to support humanitarian efforts by the UN Security Council, and that it would continue to evaluate the changing regional situation and related UN Security Council and General Assembly decisions.⁽⁷⁾ The Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly noted the need for continued cooperation with UNPROFOR and other UN authorities in the region.⁽⁸⁾ At the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the view was expressed that the FRY should be integrated into sub-regional cooperation initiatives that could facilitate the growth of economic and democratic structures.⁽⁹⁾ And in a July 1998 meeting of the Contact Group regarding the situation in Kosovo, the Group noted its support for eventual full integration of the FRY into the international community, including the OSCE, if talks on the status of the Kosovo region showed substantive progress.⁽¹⁰⁾ Therefore, although the OSCE suspension terms limited FRY activity in the Organization, it did not by itself alienate the country from the international community.

Suspension pros and cons

There are differing views concerning the suspension among OSCE participating States. It is difficult to find formal statements from participating States in the official OSCE record, as the major statements from the Permanent Council are issued in the singular voice of OSCE consensus. Further, the absence of a formal discussion dedicated to this issue has minimized the opportunity for on-the-record delegation statements. However, policy preferences exist and are acknowledged. Traditional allies of the FRY, most notably Russia, have generally supported renewed formal engagement between the OSCE and the FRY through reinstatement of the FRY's status as a participating State. Other participating States, including the other Yugoslav successor states, have questioned the right of the FRY to simply assume Yugoslavia's OSCE seat, rather than reapplying as a new member.⁽¹¹⁾ Albania shared this view, as early on in discussions pertaining to the region the delegation stated on the record that the use of the term 'Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)' does not create a precedent or confer recognition of the entity as the successor state.⁽¹²⁾ In light of the wide range of views concerning this issue, the following overview does not constitute a complete set of reasonings behind the varying viewpoints, but serves as an introduction to the complex considerations involved in the debate.

Supporters of a reaffirmation of the suspension argue that the FRY has continued to violate the standards and principles of human rights and peaceful conflict resolution espoused by OSCE participating States. Humanitarian considerations fueled the initial decision to suspend participation, and recent aggression by the Belgrade authorities in Kosovo continues to demonstrate a lack of commitment to OSCE principles. The decision to continue the suspension from full OSCE participation is aimed toward modification of the behavior of the Belgrade leadership, and to remind Belgrade that the OSCE agreements are diplomatically binding and must be respected. Therefore, ending the suspension without first seeing a demonstrated change in activities and behavior could send a signal that OSCE participating States are under little obligation to adhere to the terms of the Organization. Further, there is concern that OSCE actions in the region could be hampered by FRY opposition if the rules of consensus inhibit effective response.

Opponents of the suspension argue that it is necessary to truly engage the FRY in order to have any impact on the government's actions or behavior. In this view, the current situation in which the FRY Representative's seat at the Permanent Council or other OSCE meetings is empty is ineffective. Rather than addressing an empty chair with regionally relevant statements or declarations, it would be more effective to direct all comments and criticism to a FRY Representative. Only by engaging the FRY within the OSCE — a forum into which they have voluntarily entered and sought re-entry — can the OSCE hope to have a real impact on policy in the region. Lifting the suspension would not constitute a simple reversal of OSCE policy, but would reflect a new political atmosphere that has evolved in the 6 years since the initial suspension.

There is also an argument that can be made in support of the status quo — to allow the suspension to continue without squarely reaffirming or addressing the issue. At first glance a decision to continue the status quo might simply seem like the path of least resistance, or another attempt to avoid making a difficult decision. In reality, however, this decision would also constitute a conscious, reasoned decision by the OSCE. It is likely that active consideration of the two options described above would result in highly contentious debates among participating States, and it is possible that, due to the complicated nature of the issue, consensus would be impossible. A formal public debate that ended with no clear consensus would risk a disunited body, and such a visible discord could serve to weaken the OSCE's position in future talks with the FRY. To avoid such potential division, continuation of the status quo would afford the Organization the flexibility it needs to deal with issues as they come along, adjusting to the political environment of the moment. Rather than being a weak or 'soft' policy option, keeping the status quo would signal that the unity of the Organization is the OSCE's most important strength.

Suspension status technicalities

Even if a decision is made concerning the status of the FRY within the OSCE, there are additional technicalities regarding its status that must be addressed. This concerns the method by which successor states of the former Yugoslavia gained recognition and were invited to become participating States in the OSCE. After the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), and Bosnia-Herzegovina each applied to the OSCE as a new prospective participating State. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) did not reapply as a new national entity, but continued on as a participating State in the chair formerly held by the former Yugoslavia. Some critics (particularly the other Yugoslav successor states) question this action, noting that the former Yugoslavia was a different national entity than the new state, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This interpretation would necessitate that the FRY reapply to the OSCE as a new state in order to resume participating status. In response to this issue, the FRY has noted that it does not claim to be the sole successor state of the former Yugoslavia, but that it does claim to be the continuing state of Serbia and Montenegro as established by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and is therefore legitimately assuming its rightful seat with the Organization. It further claims that Croatia and FYROM, through signing agreements with the FRY relating to a normalization of relations, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the signing of a Joint Communiqué between Presidents Milosevic and Izetbegovic in Annex 1 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, accepted the continuity of the FRY.⁽¹³⁾ In exploratory talks between the OSCE and the FRY in July 1998, the OSCE suggested that the FRY would have to go through the normal application procedure, but did not elaborate on the process.⁽¹⁴⁾ These issues concerning the name of the state and the status of its past and potential future OSCE participation must be fully addressed as the status of the suspension is discussed.

Current status

An OSCE Technical Assessment Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia visited the FRY from 14-22 July 1998. This mission had several tasks and responsibilities, including fact-finding in order to make the necessary observations and assessments for potential re-evaluation of the suspension of the FRY. While the entire mission was a delicate exercise in constructive diplomacy, this part of the mission was particularly sensitive.

The assessment mission noted varying degrees of support for renewed participation among the FRY government, Serbian opposition, Kosovo Albanians, and Montenegrin representatives. Of the key issues addressed in discussions related to renewed FRY participation in the OSCE, issues concerning the conditionality of renewed participatory status were of primary importance. Demonstrated compliance with OSCE norms and principles and renewed FRY participation have been variously linked to the return of the OSCE Missions of Long Duration to Sandjak, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, support from Belgrade for the mission of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (Mr. Felipe Gonzalez), and significant progress in peacefully addressing the conflict in Kosovo. The talks revealed a sort of 'chicken and egg' scenario regarding which actions needed to precede reinstatement of full participation; the OSCE continually noted that resumption of the Missions of Long Duration was a necessary (though not sufficient)

precursor to lifting the suspension, while the FRY suggested that the Missions would be permitted after the suspension was lifted, noting that the other OSCE Missions all take place within OSCE participating States.

A second round of exploratory talks was held in Warsaw on August 4, 1998. The FRY delegation suggested that the best solution would be for the Missions of Long Duration to be resumed at the same time as the suspension is lifted, basing this suggestion in part on their interpretation of provisions reached in the 16 June Milosevic-Yeltsin agreement.⁽¹⁵⁾ The OSCE insisted that this approach was not sufficient, pointed out the need for acceptance of the Gonzalez mission⁽¹⁶⁾, and noted that it would be necessary for the FRY to go through the normal application procedure. The FRY expressed interest in developing a plan for reinstatement that would not involve the question of succession, and the possibility of an exchange of letters confirming and formalizing compliance was left open. No date was set for the next round of exploratory talks.

As international attention on the FRY has increased in relation to events in Kosovo in September 1998, the relations between the OSCE and the FRY will be a key ingredient in any short-term and long-term agreements. The terms of the agreement on Kosovo reached between Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic in October envisions a significant role for the OSCE in establishing a presence in the region and overseeing the work of 2,000 unarmed verifiers who will ensure that the agreement is implemented. Although the OSCE will be the key player in the implementation of the agreement and will have a significant presence in Kosovo, no specific terms regarding the formal relationship between the OSCE and the FRY were articulated in the agreement.

Options

The OSCE essentially has three options regarding the status of the relationship between the Organization and the FRY: collectively decide to reaffirm the suspension, collectively decide to end the suspension, or continue with the status quo. The first two of these options would require a concerted effort by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Permanent Council, by raising the issue and opening the topic for debate. The third option would allow the status quo to continue without formal discussion. Each policy option has its strengths and weaknesses. A decision to take an active stance on the issue, by publicly announcing either a continuance or the end of the suspension, would on the one hand send a signal that the OSCE is prepared to address tough issues in a determined fashion. However, an active approach could also backfire by revealing divisions within the Organization during the search for consensus. Similarly, a decision to continue with the status quo could have negative and positive repercussions. While some may view this decision as a prudent move in a sensitive environment which ensures the unified action of the Organization, others may point to such a decision as an example of the ineffectiveness of a body which is hamstrung by consensus rules and incapable of making tough political decisions.

If the OSCE decides to play an active role in addressing this issue by opting to pursue one of the first two options, as a first step the OSCE should hold a special informal meeting on this issue, in order to put the issue on every delegation's agenda. A review of the current policy, regional security and stability goals, and input and opinions from the delegations would serve to re-ignite the debate. A united position should be developed concerning issues of conditionality, in which the reinstatement of OSCE Missions to Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina or support for the Gonzalez Mission would be tied to renewed full participatory status of the FRY. These preliminary, informal discussions should then be followed by one or more Permanent Council meetings in which this topic is on the agenda for discussion.

If the decision is made to continue the suspension, the Permanent Council should clearly address the issues that influenced such a decision. This should include an assessment of the suspension over the past 6 years, an explanation of what the OSCE wishes to accomplish by continuing the suspension, a precise set of terms to be met by the FRY if it is to regain full status, and a date set within which the Permanent Council will review the regional situation and the suspension decision. It would be worth considering whether or not the FRY Delegate should be invited to this meeting, so that the statement could be made to the most relevant audience possible.

If the decision is made to end the suspension and permit participation by the FRY in OSCE activities, a definitive and comprehensive plan should be outlined to guide the formal ending of the suspension. This should include several statements. One statement should address any terms or conditions the OSCE might intend to link to the lifting of the suspension (for instance, continued participation based on real progress on the Kosovo conflict within a defined amount of time, or temporary admittance on a probationary level, with an additional status review planned for a specified date). Another statement should address the issue of whether the FRY must re-apply for participatory status, or whether it has the right to continue on in the chair formerly occupied by the former Yugoslavia. If it is determined that the FRY must re-apply, reference should be made to the formal application process. It will be very important that this statement definitively ends the debate on the FRY's right to the chair and clearly states the OSCE's position on the status of the successor state. Finally, a date should be set for the Permanent Council to formally review and assess this decision.

If the OSCE decides it is in its best interest to continue with the status quo, there are still steps the Organization should take in order to influence this issue in the long-term. A continued status quo should be accompanied by periodic informal meetings of the delegations in order to initiate discussions on the issue of the FRY's relationship with the OSCE. These meetings would give the delegations an opportunity to state their opinions and concerns on the issue, and would enable the Organization to determine whether or not there might be any decisions on the issue that could gain consensus and approval. These informal discussions would also keep the issue on the agendas of the delegations, ensuring that there is no perception, from either inside or outside the Organization, that the issue had been purposefully neglected.

Recommendations

One potentially effective move by the OSCE would be to allow the FRY to re-apply to the OSCE as a new member, basing this decision on the fact that the other successor states to the former Yugoslavia gained their own entry in this manner, and that there is not a strong contemporary argument to be made for the FRY's assumption of the dissolved state's seat. FRY objections to this decision could be countered by legal arguments in order to deflect potential charges of unfair punishment or discrimination. The application process should not be tied solely to the reinstatement of the OSCE Missions to Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina, or to other conditions proposed by Belgrade; they should be treated as distinct issues, and full participatory status should be determined by the OSCE based on the application and acceptance of OSCE norms and principles.

After an objective review of the application, if the FRY is accepted as a participating State it should immediately be granted full rights while at the same time being immediately held accountable to its newly accepted obligations. With the renewed participation of the FRY, the OSCE as a whole should fully and directly engage the FRY delegation on issues of concern in the region. If it is determined that potential OSCE actions are being hindered by FRY opposition (and therefore lack of consensus), the Prague Document's consensus minus one option could be activated, but only for issues pertaining to the region, not for OSCE activities as a whole. In this manner the OSCE could continually engage the Belgrade authorities in pursuit of overall OSCE regional aims and start the process of rebuilding the severed relationship between the OSCE and the FRY, while not limiting the Organization's response to situations in which serious violations of OSCE principles are observed.

Conclusions

While this case study of the difficult relationship between the OSCE and the FRY is particularly relevant to the role of the OSCE in regional crises, it also serves as a general example of a problem faced by all international organizations: the challenges of integrating or interacting with states which play a role in regional issues but which have contentious or questionable domestic policies and practices. Examples of these strained relationships range from obviously antagonistic relations with rogue states, such as that between the UN and Iraq and the continuing debate over sanctions, to more subtle examples, such as the debate over Turkey's entrance into the European Union, the recent debate regarding the entry of Russia and Croatia into the Council of Europe, and the status of the FRY vis-à-vis the Council of Europe. In these cases

membership in the organizations is sought, but due to questionable adherence to the principles of the organizations, perceived difficulties in integrating the prospective states, or political opposition among some current members, admission procedures and practices are not clear-cut.

In each of these cases the debate concerns the best way to influence the states in question, and the difficulties inherent in finding a balance between the mandates of IOs, and a respect for domestic national sovereignty among individual states. Is it more important to make a strong statement on human rights and democracy by denying entry into the IOs until such time as demonstrated changes have been made? Or is it more effective for IOs to seek to influence the domestic behavior of these states through engagement and persistent reference to the norms and principles of the IO? Whether pertaining to Iraq, Myanmar, Turkey, the FRY, or other countries, these challenges facing IOs will play a key role in their continued organizational evolution and development.

While it remains to be seen what course the OSCE will choose to take, an honest assessment of the suspension policy until now reveals that under the current policy the suspension has achieved little, other than possibly establishing the OSCE's moral high ground in regard to its principles and commitments. Belgrade's behavior has not been significantly modified by this OSCE decision. The current situation in Kosovo serves to highlight the ineffectiveness of the status quo, as OSCE States repeatedly address their concerns about the region in a forum absent the party most able to change the situation. Without a representative from Belgrade present to *personally* engage in the debate and discussion, all of the Permanent Council statements condemning the situation in Kosovo amount to no more than preaching to the converted.

These issues will be difficult to address, no matter which option is ultimately chosen by the OSCE. The reason this issue has remained in diplomatic limbo for so many years is precisely due to the sensitive and complex nature of the situation. However, for the OSCE not to address the suspension of the FRY in some manner would be tantamount to burying its head in the sand. The 1992 decision to suspend, whether a good or poor decision, was at the very least a coordinated statement by the OSCE which illuminated its position and presented its policy goals. A review of this decision in light of the changed political environment over six years later should aspire to a similar coherent statement regarding the role of participating States within the organization, and of the role of the OSCE in Europe as a whole.

⁽¹⁾In the Balkans, where nothing is clear-cut or simple, there can be a considerable amount of confusion related to the proper name of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, particularly concerning the regions of Serbia and Montenegro. Within the OSCE itself there have been no formal statements made regarding the name of this region, though a review of proceedings in past years reveals an unspoken acceptance of certain conventions. Until July 1992 the region of Serbia and Montenegro was referred to in CSCE documentation as 'Yugoslavia.' On 12 July 1992 (at the 13th Committee of Senior Officials Meeting in Helsinki, where the suspension was decided) the reference 'Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)' appeared for the first time. (It is interesting to note that at this time, the Albanian Delegation asserted that use of this term did not create a precedent.) However, despite the introduction of this new term, it was also noted that the nameplate 'Yugoslavia' would continue to be used at CSCE meetings. In the 1996 Review Meeting Report of the Chairman-in-Office (CiO) to the Lisbon Summit (29 November 1996), the term 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)' was used. In recent documents the term 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' has become part of OSCE common usage. In an attempt to simplify matters in this article, the region in question will be called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the FRY, throughout, unless referring to events where specific use of another term is necessary in a certain context.

⁽²⁾ *Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council — Summary of Conclusions*, Part 4, Paragraph 16, 30-31 January 1992.

⁽³⁾ *CSCE Second Emergency Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials — Journal Proceedings Annex*, 12 May 1992.

⁽⁴⁾ Decisions to maintain the suspension were made at the following CSCE/OSCE meetings: 16th Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials (September 1992); 17th Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials (November 1992); 18th Meeting of Committee of Senior Officials (December 1992); and the 23rd Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials (August 1993).

⁽⁵⁾ As of August 1998, the FRY owes approximately ATS 13,300,000 to the OSCE. A payment has not been received from the country since 1994.

⁽⁶⁾ *13th Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials — Proceedings, Journal No. 7 Annex*, Helsinki, July 1992.

⁽⁷⁾ *16th Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials — Proceedings*, September 1992.

⁽⁸⁾ *Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly*, 9 July 1993.

⁽⁹⁾ *1996 Review Meeting, Report of the Chairman-in-Office to the Lisbon Summit*, 29 November 1996.

⁽¹⁰⁾ *Contact Group Statement, Bonn Meeting*, 8 July 1998.

⁽¹¹⁾ *3rd Meeting of the Senior Council, Annex 2 to (SC(3/95), Journal No. 2*, 1995.

⁽¹²⁾ *13th Meeting of the Committee of Senior Official, Helsinki, Journal No. 7*, July 1992.

⁽¹³⁾ Exchange of letters between the FRY Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chairman-in- Office, July/August 1998.

⁽¹⁴⁾ *OSCE Chairman-in-Office Report on the Exploratory Talks with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, 4 August 1998.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Ibid.

⁽¹⁶⁾ While the FRY's facilitation of the Mission of Mr. Felipe Gonzalez as the Chairman-in- Office's Personal Representative was not an original term for lifting the suspension, it was one of the key agenda items in the summer 1998 exploratory talks between the OSCE and the FRY. The FRY representatives stated that the Gonzalez Mission of 1996 had been completed, and that they had not been informed of a second mission, or of a continuation in the mission. For a review of the 1996 Gonzalez Mission and its impact on OSCE/FRY relations, see the article by Branislav Milinkovic, 'The OSCE and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Chances and Challenges', *Helsinki Monitor* , vol. 8, no. 2, 1997.