

Statement by Krzysztof Skubiszewski on Polish foreign policy (Warsaw, 26 April 1990)

Caption: On 26 April 1990, in Warsaw, in response to the geopolitical upheavals taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Polish Foreign Minister, outlines the main thrust of his country's foreign policy.

Source: Sejm Exposé by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RP, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Warsaw, April 26, 1990. [EN LIGNE]. [Warsaw]: Akademia Dyplomatyczna MSZ, [28.03.2006]. Disponible sur <http://www.zbiordokumentow.pl/1990/2/2.html>.

Copyright: (c) Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych

URL:

[http://www.cvce.eu/obj/statement_by_krzysztof_skubiszewski_on_polish_foreign_p
olicy_warsaw_26_april_1990-en-6a0b3b70-0545-43ce-be95-59e1c0cd825c.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/statement_by_krzysztof_skubiszewski_on_polish_foreign_policy_warsaw_26_april_1990-en-6a0b3b70-0545-43ce-be95-59e1c0cd825c.html)



Last updated: 14/10/2015

Sejm statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RP, Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Warsaw, 26 April 1990)

Mr President,
Mr Speaker,
Esteemed Chamber,

I. Internal and External Circumstances

Since the first days of its existence the government has been doing everything to restore full independence of the state as without independence there will be neither necessary creative powers in the nation and society nor great effort that Poland expects today from each of us.

The foundation of the foreign policy of our state is the national interest and the Polish reason of state implemented with respect for dictates of morality and for the international law. My exposé defines and explains our interests and our reason of state.

The government pursues its foreign policy in the circumstances characterized by fast and thorough changes going on in Poland and worldwide. The democratization of the state initiated in 1989, consolidated and extended today, provides a strong foundation for the foreign policy and makes it convergent with the national interest. Our policy serves independence. It supports political and economic transformations in Poland and strengthens this country's international position within the new European and international order now being created. The stability of the Polish state and its political order established in 1989 permits us to pursue the present policy. I think that we have achieved a good position both in our region and in Europe.

The transformations in Poland are accompanied by fundamental changes in Europe, especially in our nearest vicinity. They have a direct impact on our international situation and on our policy.

Through its policy the government ensures the security of the state, gains foreign assistance and sympathy for the transformations going on in the country, includes Poland in the organized system of European cooperation with a view to the unity of our continent, and transforms the contacts with our neighbour states and nations into good, partner-like and close relations.

We pursue an open policy, a policy which combines our interests with the ongoing dynamic changes in the world. We seek understanding and support on the part of public opinion, without which our foreign policy can be neither credible nor effective. The support from the Sejm and Senate is of major significance in this respect. Poland and emigration have united to support the government stand on this country's participation in the Conference of six states on German unification and on a treaty meant to confirm the final character of the Polish-German border. This example shows that, given all differences existing in Poland, there is a consensus as regards the main directions of the foreign policy.

Poland is different today, and so are the international surroundings we live in. Our impact on the course of events has its proportions and limits but the systemic transformation which has been taking place in Poland has shaped the face of today's Europe. It is in Poland, owing to Solidarity, that the movement emerged which eliminated totalitarianism in our region and made the West react to those transformations, both factors creating prospects for European unity in freedom and democracy.

At the same time ideological divisions become history. Democracy can considerably influence the foreign policy. The global rivalry between the superpowers is replaced by dialogue and cooperation, this meaning that a war threat is vanishing. Possibilities are opening up for independent, non-bloc cooperation between states on the European continent as a whole, the possibilities which have not existed so far. This makes it easier to materialize our national aspirations. We do not overlook world interdependences as well.

Thus, we are facing today great chances for Poland. Especially, there has appeared an opportunity to make our geostrategic and geopolitical position, which is very difficult, a source of strength and benefits, instead

of dependence and stagnation. At the same time the nature of transformations is such that they create many new challenges, uncertainties and even dangers. In any case, the new situation requires a very active foreign policy and I think, the government is meeting this requirement.

Esteemed Chamber,

Following these initial arrangements, I am passing to the concept of our foreign policy which I am going to present in the form of priority goals, activities and measures.

II. Priorities

The foreign policy of our state - seen as a coherent entity - is expressed in the following priorities:

1. We will co-create a system of European security and through this we will cooperate for the cause of unity of our continent. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is a significant plane and instrument of activity. We think that the role of the military force in European politics should be subject to a constant reduction. We will expand our links with European organizations and groupings, especially with the European Communities and Council of Europe.

2. At the same time and parallel with our European policy, in a strong connection with it, we will closely coexist with our mighty neighbours, namely, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany (I say: Germany, though there are still two separate states, but we have to look into the future as the unification of these states has already started). Thus, our policy will further restructure our relations with the USSR in the direction of an appropriate shaping of common interest, good-neighbourly cooperation and partnership based on equal rights. As goes for the Western neighbour, we have given a start to the Polish-German cooperation realizing common goals and interests. We will continue this work with the assumption that the unifying Germany and next the unified Germany will confirm our Western border as being the final one.

3. A significant supplement to the dualism: Europe - mighty neighbours is our policy of new regional links (the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in its European fragment, belong to the old and still existing links; I will speak about them separately). Here we are interested in the new future link, with special emphasis on integration in the Czecho-Slovakia-Poland-Hungary triangle. We are also interested in the direction farther to the South (Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy apart from Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic), as well as in the Baltic direction, which is very significant for us. Here I have in mind the Conference of Baltic States being organized by Poland and Sweden.

4. Expanding political, economic and cultural-civilizational ties with the countries of Western Europe and the United States, and in general with the civilized Western world.

5. Expansion of relations - recently neglected to a certain degree, with states on other continents, including Latin America and in general with non-aligned states.

6. The striving to reduce our huge foreign debt, both as concerns the principal and interest. The maintenance, coordination and effective use of economic and financial aid for Poland. Turning this aid into a foundation for mutually advantageous economic cooperation.

7. Cooperation with international organizations, particularly with the UN, especially in solving global problems. Natural environment protection ranks first in this respect. We are interested, of course, not only in moves on the global scale. We are interested in natural environment protection of both Poland and the region to which Poland belongs, in close association with the all-European ecological strategy.

8. In international relations we will strengthen law-abidingness, in other words we will boost the functions of international law, with special attention drawn to the protection of human rights and basic liberties.

9. Lifting barriers and creating facilitations in foreign travel, particularly as concerns the Poles' ties with the world and the Polonia's ties with the country.

Esteemed Chamber,

Some of the priorities of our foreign policy call for more careful consideration.

III. Policy of European Unity

The division of Europe into East and West exists as goes for the economy, in any case to a very high degree. On the other hand, as goes for political systems in Central Europe, this division can be considered as virtually eliminated. We are being faced with the task of creating the unity of our continent.

One must begin the construction of an all-European system of security. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is significant in this respect as an all-continental plane with the participation of both superpowers and Canada. The new tasks of this Conference require its certain institutionalization, which the project of setting up a Council for European Cooperation, forwarded by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki last January, is conducive to. The draft is currently being discussed in European chancelleries.

The Council for European Cooperation would be a permanent political body of the CSCE and play a consultative and coordinative function. In particular, the Council would review and assess current all-European problems in the field of political, military, economic, humanitarian and environmental cooperation with a view to increasing the effectiveness of CSCE decisions. The Council would work to solve common problems pertaining to the military aspects of security in Europe (including the functioning of confidence- and security-building measures), prevent potential threats, conflicts and disputes, and would accept and look into new proposals of development of cooperation and contacts in all fields.

The Council would then coordinate the activities of institutions set up within the CSCE process and support contacts and the increasingly broad inclusion of the CSCE system in the cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations of which there are many in Europe.

The Council would also prepare top-level conferences of CSCE member states, so-called summit-meetings, while itself it could also debate at the foreign ministers level.

The Council could operate through three commissions, namely the Commission for Political Relations and Security, the Commission for the Economy and Ecology, and the Commission for Humanitarian Affairs.

Thus our proposal offers an opportunity for coordination with the Czechoslovak project on the creation of a European Security Commission. We are counting on consultations in this respect.

The all-European system of security will in the long run replace the system of alliances in Europe. We will seek our state's external security precisely within the all-European system. But this system has yet to be created. Nonetheless, already today, in light of the waning - if not outright disappearance - of the threat of war in Europe, the role of military force in European relations is, as I have already said, changing. Hence, the role of alliances is changing too. This is clear progress.

In a revival of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe conceived this way, we see a chance of gradually arriving at a European Confederation, in other words, materialization of the idea of French President François Mitterrand.

The hardcore of endeavours for European unity remain the European coal and steel, economic, and nuclear energy communities. They have long had combined bodies. They therefore virtually make up one Community though under law they are divided into three. A single internal European market covering 12 states of the Community is to be introduced as of January 1, 1993. A union of these states is being formed. Thus, Poland's all-European policy is faced with an urgent task of signing an association agreement with the

Community. We have already tendered an appropriate application and are counting on talks being started.

At the same time we are expanding other links. First of all, I will mention the Council of Europe in Strasbourg where we are seeking to obtain membership. We have also made the first contact with the Western European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Naturally, this latter Organization exceeds the European region, nevertheless it concentrates on it.

We support the idea of a European economic area encompassing the whole continent.

Speaking about the all-European policy, in no way can we leave out disarmament. Our policy in this field has several goals. They are as follows:

- causing the reduction of conventional potentials in Europe as a result of the Vienna negotiations,
- starting negotiations on tactical nuclear weapon, in a group of states concerned,
- greater openness in military matters, namely, progress in the field of military measures of confidence-building and methods of verification,
- participation in government and non-government discussions on military doctrines and development of the Polish Defence Ministry's military contacts with foreign partners,
- participation in other disarmament negotiations (concerning chemical weapons, among other topics).

Esteemed Chamber,

As I have shown before, our European policy cannot be separated from our policy towards our neighbours, and the other way round.

IV. The Neighbours

First I will dwell upon Poland's dilemma between the Soviet Union and Germany.

Relations with the USSR continue to be the key task of our state strategy. These relations, like those with all other states, today are based on respect of independence and everything which independence entails. They are characterized by partnership based on equal rights, mutual respect for interests and for agreements made. These relations have been cleared of their tremendous ideological burden, of multifarious dependence and satellite-like relations stemming from this. At present these relations have to be goodneighbourly in the spirit of the new times.

The government will focus attention on the following tasks:

- ensuring supplies of raw materials, putting in order the problem of debt to the USSR, working out new principles of economic relations based on unconstrained trade,
- political cooperation on all topical common matters, especially in connection with the Polish stand on confirmation of our Western border by a united Germany and Poland's participation in the discussion of six states leading to Germany's unification. I state with satisfaction the full support of the USSR in this respect,
- settling matters which burden mutual relations. The recent statement by the Soviet Union on the Soviet responsibility for the war crimes committed on Polish officers, especially for the Katyn crime, constitutes great progress in this field,
- aid for Poles in the USSR and assistance in exacting their rights as a national minority - there is progress also here.

Another issue is that of the development of separate relations with the republics, in other words relations separate from those with the USSR as a whole, particularly, though not only, with the neighbouring republics. What I mean are the republics which voluntarily remain within the USSR. The case of secession from the Soviet Union is another category. The concept of these relations, especially in light of the fact that the republics are winning independence in certain matters, needs to be worked out. The flexibility of the whole process causes some difficulty but we are nonetheless working on such a concept.

The government is going to start negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our territory. It remains a hypothetical question to what extent the temporary stationing of these troops is and will be tied with the evolution of the German problem, the construction of a European system of security and progress in disarmament. In any case, in the long run, the government considers the withdrawal of the troops a foregone conclusion. Right now we are conducting and will continue to conduct negotiations on the reduction of the troops stationed in our country and on a revision of the agreement of December 17, 1956, on their legal status.

These are all very significant tasks. In speaking however of working out our strategy towards the USSR, one must take a different look and go farther than thus far. Poland needs an eastern policy with a broad vision and social support, one entailing a great activity in the sphere of culture and relations between people. While pursuing strictly European ties, especially with West European institutions, we will not distance ourselves from the USSR but will uphold an active eastern policy.

Our German neighbour, a united Germany, is in the process of being formed. For the time being there are still two German states and two governments but we shape our relations with them bearing unification in mind. This sets dual tasks before our German policy, as it were. One must also know where the limits of our influence are. Unification as a return to normalcy and the implementation of self-determination is a matter for the German nation to determine. On the other hand, some consequences of unification relate to all of Europe. This is because the role of a united Germany will be too important on our continent.

There can be no European unity with a divided Germany and all of us desire European unity. The unity of Germany should be accompanied by its inclusion in the integrational structures, the development of the Helsinki process, the elimination of the division into the poor and schizophrenic East and the rich and rational West. German unity is to be accompanied by stability encompassing the whole continent. We want to see German unity as a significant factor of stabilization. But definite consequences stem from this. One of them is the elimination of West German doubts and ambiguities about the Polish-German border, a border which is considered by all of Europe as a component of the European peace order. The recent parliamentary resolutions, particularly the resolution of the newly elected People's Chamber of the GDR, are a step forward. In order to end the unnecessary discussions about the alleged open character of the border issue - and not only discussion because there are also "legal positions" and legal consequences stemming from Bonn's stand which affect mutual relations between Poland and the FRG - in order to end all of this once and for all we need a Polish-German treaty. Such a treaty would be spelled out already now, during negotiations between Poland, the GDR and the FRG, initialled by these three states and next signed and ratified by Poland and a united Germany. This treaty will cause that Poland's relations with a united Germany would have a good beginning, one without a burden of the past. This is important for us, for Germans, and for Europe.

We expect much of the new government in the German Democratic Republic which is undergoing change. The first moves by this government justify our hopes. It especially displays great understanding for our concern over our economic ties with the GDR and the fate of these ties following the upcoming monetary and economic FRG-GDR union. This matter is exceptionally important for our foreign trade and industrial coproduction.

After many years of stagnation, Poland's relations with the Federal Republic of Germany have lived to see the so much needed enlivening and great progress. It is expressed in the series of treaties signed on last November 10, but first of all, this is expressed in the joint declaration of Prime Minister Tadeusz

Mazowiecki and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of November 14 . This latter document - the declaration - covers a great number of domains in which both states are to cooperate. The to-date implementation of the declaration's decisions goes well. The declaration has such a wide scope that it is this document which allows to speak about the beginning of a very close Polish-German cooperation and community of interests. We believe that the declaration will hold on also after the unification. As I understand, such is also the stand of Federal Chancellor Kohl and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

However, the declaration has not only a political function: it is one of the instruments of reconciliation after the atrocious experiences of the war.

The Polish-German reconciliation is significant to both nations, and to Europe. It is significant first of all in moral categories. In my opinion, this reconciliation has already taken place: otherwise that intensive flow of people in both directions, so many personal contacts, so many events in the sphere of spirit and common culture and civilization would not exist. The grave crimes and sufferings of the time of war are fading away into the past, especially in the prospect of the new young generations. This shame should be remembered as a great warning and not as a source of dislike, prejudice or even hatred. This breakthrough has taken place owing to the bold initiatives of the Church. Here I am particularly thinking of the stand of the Polish bishops in 1965. Their words about mutual forgiveness, being deeply Christian, belong to the treasury of the public life in today's Poland. At that time the nation did not wield power in the state, so the bishops spoke for the nation. Being so heavily tried by the war, we understand the suffering of those Germans who were deprived of their native land, homes, who experienced wrongs and injustice.

Now we need peace in our minds and our hearts. We want to finally close this whole chapter at the beginning of the unification of Germany. Our proposals, which I have already recalled, are of a political character but their dimension goes beyond politics. I think that both nations and the whole Europe will welcome the end of Yalta with relief.

Let us get back to our dilemma. How to see the possibilities of the Polish policy or a policy of the state having a unique position on the continent - between two giants?

Here the European cooperation and prospect for security system acquire top significance. The building of the security system depends on the redoubled effort of the Europeans. Like the German question finds its proper position in the European answer, so does the position of Poland become safe in the European peace order having a high degree of links and cooperation between states. In the years of the Second Polish Republic politicians had to think in the categories of alliances, changing pattern of forces, existence or non-existence of balance. The all-European cooperation is to constitute a different world, eliminating or reducing antagonisms and one without preparation for aggression and annexation. We set out hopes on this world and want to work to create such a world. This is not utopia but a real chance of the present day. It is up to us, Europeans, whether and how much we use it. Poland's role will be important in this respect.

Our southern neighbour, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, is a state with which we have been cooperating broadly, particularly in the economic area. Some questions emerged between us over the past few years - I mean, inter alia, the pollution of natural environment and limitations of travel. One should and can find solution to these questions, which will open up the road for cooperation and I see this road as a broad one. The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic is an important partner of regional agreements in our vision and I will return to the problem later on.

I would like to separately say a few words about Lithuania. We do not stand aside from what goes on in Lithuania. Immediately after the adoption of the Declaration on the restoration of the Lithuania State the Polish government voiced its support for national self-determination leading to gaining a separate statehood. A question so difficult, with various interdependencies and ramifications, should be treated both with courage and caution. I think that the government did not lack either the first or the second. The success of international and systemic changes in this part of Europe is important. And their success is conditioned by a certain amount of stability in our region. All the parties concerned should take cautious steps in this respect so as not to harm what has already been created and is continually created with so much difficulty in Central

and Eastern Europe, including Lithuania.

The Polish government side made an offer of both good offices and mediations and this was a pretty long time ago. Various contacts are being maintained on the Lithuanian question.

We adopted a clear stand on the unilateral closure of the border crossing at Ogrodniki and propose the USSR to start talks on this topic.

In the present state of the question, the crux of the matter lies not in the area of actions and responses of third states but in the talks between Moscow and Vilnius. Neither will economic steps bring a lasting solution. Various interests must be balanced and aspirations of the Lithuanian people should be realized.

V. Old and New Regionalism

Esteemed Chamber,

In today's discussion, we should focus our attention also on regional ties and there are two kinds of them: agreements inherited from the past years, that is, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the CMEA, and today's plans.

I will start with the former.

Poland is still a party to the Warsaw Treaty and member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. We look upon these links in the context of our European policy.

We treat the Warsaw Treaty as a defence alliance being in tune with the United Nations' Charter, not as an instrument for influencing the political and economic system and order of the contracting states. The Treaty has already lost its ideological role. Its functioning has to correspond to the international law. It should serve disarmament and cannot impede the unity of the continent.

Among the changes in the functioning of the Treaty, as long as it exists, it is necessary from the point of view of Poland's interests to convert its military-political character into a consultative-military one. We have departed from the military structure adjusted to the earlier fixed operational directions in case of war. It means that the Polish Army will be used exclusively on the Polish territory in defence of our state against the alien aggressor - our army has not and will not have other external tasks. Also the practice of combining the post of Commander-in-Chief of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization with the function of Vice-Minister for Defence of the USSR should be given up and introduced should be rotation of the managerial and higher posts based on equal rights of all states-parties. We will also strive at the reduction of the number of bodies and meetings going beyond the security matters of this part of Europe being looked upon in close connection with the all-European security.

As for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which by the way is not a strictly regional organization owing to its non-European members, I would like to recall that the government is taking part in talks on a radical restructuring of the Council. The very possibility of such a restructuring is problematic. In its present-day shape, the CMEA is a relict of the past era and adapting the Council to the new goals and needs will be very difficult, the more so as a new, de-formalized CMEA should absolutely favour and facilitate the inclusion of member states in the global economy. Regional economic ties do not need the CMEA. This issue of restructuring the CMEA is nonetheless being considered.

And now, Esteemed Chamber, a few words on our policy geared at new regional links.

We are interested in cooperation in the triangle of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic-Poland-Hungary. The meeting in Bratislava of March 9 was the first contact in this team and a review of some common problems. It is however necessary to bring about systematic and well-prepared work on the assumptions, essence and form of cooperation between the three states which have so much in common.

Through Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary we extend our interest in the southern direction, the more so as we have multifarious ties and a long tradition of cooperation as well as a common history with Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is examining possibilities of Poland's getting associated with the group of these five states one way or another.

For our part we are open to various associations, the more so that our geopolitical situation is in itself in contradiction to isolation. Along with Sweden we have invited Czecho-Slovakia to participate in a Conference of Baltic States which has been in the plans for a long time. It is to convene in September and deal with the protection of the Baltic's natural environment in the broad understanding of the issue. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its vision in this respect, too, and we would want more far-reaching cooperation. As always, it depends on the consent of states. Meanwhile, in the Baltic region, irrespectively of the very good relations we have here, it is a fact and presumably will remain a fact for some time to come that the states bordering on the Baltic are diverse, one need but look at the map. The bilateral factor is significant here once again, particularly as goes for our relations with Scandinavian states.

VI. Bilateral Relations with Non-Neighbour States or Those Belonging to Regional Groupings

Esteemed Chamber,

The government attaches great importance to bilateral relations with many states.

I begin with Western Europe. One should point to the great significance of our relations with France. I state with satisfaction that France supports our vital interests which was evidenced by the results of the meeting in Paris of March 9, 1990.

We are also happy at the far-reaching identity of views with Great Britain; allow me to point to Prime Minister Mazowiecki's visit in February. Our relations in the Mediterranean region are important; let me especially mention Italy and Spain. We value the convergence of views and multitude of contacts with Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Austria. I have already mentioned Scandinavian states; close relations with Finland are important for us. Our relations with Switzerland are traditionally friendly.

In recent months we tightened relations with North America, that is the United States and Canada.

The visit of Prime Minister Mazowiecki made a breakthrough in our relations with the American superpower - Poland is regaining its due position in the policy of that state. It ceases to be only a function of the policy of that state towards Russia.

Economic cooperation with Japan is of key importance for us.

We have of late tightened relations with Australia and New Zealand.

What do we seek in our relations with highly developed states of the West and other continents?

The key tasks are:

- maintaining the dynamics of political contacts,
- ensuring support for our vital interests,
- creating advantageous conditions for increasing economic and financial-capital cooperation, especially for the long-term solution of the Polish debt problem,
- upholding economic assistance for Poland,

- developing unconstrained cooperation in culture and science.

I will refer in short to relations with other states.

Taking advantage of our position of "guest" in the movement of non-aligned states we will support postulates on the restructuring of international relations forwarded by this movement, which are convergent with our stand.

One most state that there is no competition between Poland and developing states in getting foreign aid. We receive credits and other aid which would not have been directed anywhere else.

We are capitalizing on the possibilities stemming from the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea and some oil states of the Arab Peninsula (United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman). We attach great importance to our relations with the Arab world.

Following the recent normalization, we will develop cooperation with Israel and Chile. The resumption of relations with Israel should positively influence our economic and trade cooperation with both this state and the Jewish diaspora in the world. I assure you that our policy does not breach the interests of other states and nations in that region, particularly the interest of the Palestinian nation, and it does not alter our stand supporting the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East.

Of late, a drop was recorded in trade with China after the switch to hard currency clearings. We want to liquidate this negative phenomenon.

A very desirable animation of Poland's relations with the main states of Latin America, namely, with the so-called "Rio Group", that is, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Peru and Colombia is taking place. The Conference of the "Rio Group" with the states of Central and Eastern Europe in Budapest this April was extremely useful.

We do not lose Africa and its various problems out of our sight.

VII. Favourable Factors and Threats

Esteemed Chamber,

It is time to pass to conclusions. What is conducive to and what threatens such a broadly conceived policy?

Our policy is backed by many factors. These are:

- the interest of our neighbours, Western states and many other states in the success of our political and economic transformations,
- President Mikhail Gorbachev's maintaining a reformatory course in the USSR's internal and foreign policy,
- democratic transformations in Central and Eastern European states,
- a significant lowering if not outright disappearance of the threat of war in Europe, mainly as a result of a turn for the better in relations between the superpowers,
- firm progress along the road to European unity.

These are all significant moments. Let us not, however, forget about the threats. Thus, difficulties surface in the application of transformations in the USSR, and crisis phenomena in a superpower have global consequences, not to mention the closest region. Europe already today needs a cohesive system of collective security while we are a long way from achieving this goal. Cooperation and its structures leave much to be

desired. The to-date system, which we bid farewell to with relief, has not been replaced by mechanisms preventing disputes, and if a dispute is already there, ways of its effective solution practically do not exist. It was exactly in our part of Europe that nationalism surfaced and old frictions resurfaced with regard, for example, to the national minorities. Fortunately, there is no Polish participation in this but the very phenomenon shapes the political image of the region we belong to.

Summing up, despite freedom in determining our system and the directions of foreign policy we cannot feel free from potential threats, both political and economic ones. We will seek guarantees of our independence in a broader system of European security and in structures of multilateral and integrating cooperation. We will co-found one and the other. In foreign policy, as in internal one, we have carried out far-reaching changes over the past seven months, while maintaining significant stability. We will not depart from this road.

Source: Archives of "Zbiór Dokumentów"