

Report by the WEU Assembly on the operational links between NATO, WEU and the EU (9 November 1998)

Caption: On 9 November 1998, on behalf of the Defence Committee, Armand De Decker submits a detailed report to the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) on the organisation of operational links between the Atlantic Alliance, WEU and the European Union, to encourage the strengthening of cooperation between these three organisations.

Source: Proceedings. Forty-fourth session. Second part, III. Assembly Documents. Paris: Assembly of Western European Union, November-December 1998. 448 p.

Copyright: (c) WEU Assembly - Assemblée de l'UEO

URL:

http://www.cvce.eu/obj/report_by_the_weu_assembly_on_the_operational_links_between_nato_weu_and_the_eu_9_november_1998-en-871ba5b7-6330-41e2-84aa-0b7f9bed6595.html

Publication date: 10/09/2012

Document 1624

9 November 1998

*The organisation of operational links between NATO, WEU and the EU***REPORT¹***submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee²
by Mr De Decker, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the organisation of operational links between NATO, WEU and the EU

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr De Decker, Chairman and Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The European Security and Defence Identity in the Atlantic Alliance
- III. Cooperation between WEU and NATO and the CJTF concept
- IV. Multinational forces and their relations with NATO and WEU
- V. A European security and defence policy
- VI. The EU, WEU and NATO in the European Security and Defence Identity
- VII. Conclusions

¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

² *Members of the Committee:* Mr De Decker (Chairman); MM Schloten, Marten (Vice-Chairmen); MM Alloncle, Baumel, Beaufays, Mrs Beer, Mr Blaauw, Mrs Calleja, MM Cioni, Cox (Alternate: Lord Judd), MM Davis, Díaz de Mera (Alternate: López Henares), MM Horn, Dhaille, Leers, Lemoine, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Magginas, Mardones Sevilla, McNamara, Medeiros Ferreira, Micheloyiannis, Mitterrand, Mota Amaral, Lord Newall (Alternate: Townsend), MM Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Robles Fraga (Alternate: Puche Rodriguez), Lord Russell-Johnston, MM Selva, Speroni, Valk, Valkeniers, Verivakis, Zierer, N ...

Associate members: MM Godal, Gul (Alternate: Akçali), MM Kiratlioglu, Sungur, Yürür.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Draft Recommendation**on the organisation of operational links between NATO, WEU and the EU*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that WEU today is a fully operational crisis-management organisation equipped with a Planning Cell, a Situation Centre, a Satellite Centre, a Military Committee and forces answerable to WEU upon which it can call independently of the assets and capabilities NATO may make available to it on a case-by case basis;
- (ii) Welcoming the impressive progress which has been made in cooperation between NATO and WEU since NATO's 1996 Berlin summit and its Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation of July 1997;
- (iii) Noting, however, that the European Union has not yet given substance to its common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for which the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties make provision;
- (iv) Noting also that the EU has not yet endeavoured to define, in conjunction with WEU, the strategic ambitions and goals for its foreign, security and defence policy which should be the basis for an effective European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI);
- (v) Pointing out that with the imminent enlargement of the EU, development of the ESDI should take account of the foreign policy, security and defence interests of the aspirant states which should therefore be closely involved in this process even if they do not yet meet the criteria for economic integration;
- (vi) Considering that in the light of the above, the Council should consider elaborating at 28 an updated version of its 1995 document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" which could constitute the security and defence part of a European "strategic concept";
- (vii) Considering that without a clear definition of such a policy, the European defence industry, which urgently needs to be restructured, will have difficulty in taking strategic decisions on the military programmes it should develop for the future;
- (viii) Considering also that cooperation and restructuring in the field of armaments procurement should contribute to the establishment of common foundations for a genuine European armaments policy, guaranteeing Europe's strategic independence;
- (ix) Aware that the United States considers a stronger ESDI as a means of addressing its concern over insufficient burden-sharing on the part of its European allies, while at the same time confirming that European and US security interests must remain linked;
- (x) Hoping that the current development of the ESDI within NATO will also serve as the basis for a step-by-step process of rapprochement between France and NATO's military structure;
- (xi) Emphasising that the European NATO members should seize the opportunity to give sufficient military substance to the ESDI by generating the increased European capabilities needed for force projection and sustainability;
- (xii) Aware that if its European allies fail to meet this challenge, the United States will again shoulder a disproportionate share of the responsibility whereas the interests and policies of Europe and the United States will not always coincide;
- (xiii) Recalling that for the United States, the development of an enhanced capability for the European members of the Alliance to undertake security missions on their own, where appropriate, is essential for sustaining American support for the Alliance as a whole;

- (xiv) Considering in general that if WEU is to be an “integral part of the development of the Union” as provided for in Article J.7.1 of the Amsterdam Treaty, a great deal of work to bring the two organisations closer together needs to be done as quickly as possible;
- (xv) Considering that the conclusion of a security agreement between the EU and WEU is essential for effective cooperation between the EU, WEU and NATO;
- (xvi) Considering that, with a view to WEU working effectively to the advantage of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, the WEU Secretary-General should be invited to attend meetings of the EU Council of Ministers and of the European Commission that deal with CFSP matters;
- (xvii) Considering that application in the EU of the principle of constructive abstention in foreign and security policy issues, whereby a majority is able to take action if a minority is unwilling or unable to participate in that action, is essential for a rapid and decisive response in the event of crises or potential conflict situations;
- (xviii) Emphasising that the new possibilities offered to WEU as a result of its cooperation with NATO should not lead WEU to deny its specifically European purpose and abandon the idea of taking action using its own assets;
- (xix) Regretting that in spite of the existing European decision-making procedures and military operational capabilities, the EU-WEU tandem has still not been able to agree on decisive common positions and joint actions in demanding crisis situations requiring operations of a larger scale which are still within the remit of these organisations;
- (xx) Convinced that the EU’s position as an economic superpower makes it necessary to develop a credible common foreign and security policy in order to defend its vital interests and carry out peace-support and humanitarian operations, knowing that it will not always be able to count on the United States and may have to act alone;
- (xxi) Emphasising that the important roles of Russia and Ukraine in the European security equation require special attention in the development of the ESDI, bearing in mind that in the long run solutions should be found which allow for their integration as free and democratic countries into European structures;
- (xxii) Considering that the combination of the EU and WEU can provide an effective tool for crisis management in view of the fact that joint action by both organisations integrates diplomatic, political, economic and military instruments in a genuinely multi-dimensional and highly flexible strategy;
- (xxiii) Stressing that purely and simply integrating WEU in the EU will not be possible for as long as certain EU member countries refuse to contemplate a common defence policy for the European Union;
- (xxiv) Wondering whether the current development of the ESDI with its increasing dependence on NATO will produce a fair balance between the undeniable force of NATO and a credible European involvement, and whether it will indeed give Europe the role to which it aspires;
- (xxv) Welcoming the formation of multinational forces since they not only allow for the pooling of national funds, reducing the financial burden on each individual nation, but also bring together different countries in political solidarity, helping to overcome individual reservations and dividing the political risk among them;
- (xxvi) Noting that in this context WEU member countries should work together to set up a WEU multinational strategic airlift force and to strengthen the European intelligence and communication satellite programme;
- (xxvii) Recalling that, unlike NATO and the EU, WEU has offered central European countries the highest possible degree of integration short of membership, enabling them to participate in discussions on security and defence issues on an equal footing;

(xxviii) Stressing that flexibility and tolerance are needed for the development of an ESDI in order to allow the different categories of non-member or non-aligned countries to become part of the new structures through a step-by-step process;

(xxix) Recalling that Europe cannot overlook the importance of the civilian component that is necessary in any military intervention,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give fresh political impetus to rapprochement between the bodies of WEU and the European Union respectively;
2. Suggest to the EU Council of Ministers that the WEU Secretary-General be invited to attend its meetings and those of the European Commission that deal with matters concerning the common foreign and security policy (CFSP);
3. Speed up its reflection on implementation of the principle of constructive abstention in WEU and the EU;
4. Conclude a security agreement between WEU and the EU at the earliest possible opportunity in order to facilitate the flow of classified information between the two organisations, thus rendering their cooperation more effective;
5. Allow the Planning Cell to engage in more detailed contingency planning as regards possible crises which may constitute a threat to peace and security, and keep both the WEU Permanent Council and the EU Council of Ministers informed of its work in this respect;
6. Promote enhanced cooperation between WEU and the EU and between WEU and NATO as regards planning, logistics and intelligence, drawing in the first instance on informal structures for the analysis of specific crisis situations;
7. Ensure that NATO's new strategic concept, to be adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999, will leave ample room for Europeans to take military action in the framework of the ESDI;
8. Cooperate closely with NATO in drafting a suitable definition of the new tasks of the European Deputy SACEUR, to be adopted by NATO, which will enable him to perform his task as a key figure in the ESDI, being in charge of CJTF and acting as the operations commander of WEU missions using NATO assets;
9. Intensify efforts, together with the European Union, on the elaboration of a common European strategic concept including Europe's common values and strategic interests and integrating all instruments at the disposal of its common foreign, security and defence policy, while making the fullest possible use of WEU's unique position as an organisation in which not only the full members of the EU but also the aspirant EU members and the European NATO members which are not EU members, discuss security and defence issues on an equal footing;
10. Intensify the dialogue with both the Russian Federation, which is bound to remain a major factor in the European security equation as was demonstrated in the recent crises in former Yugoslavia, and also with Ukraine;
11. Promote, through the pooling of national funds, the establishment of a WEU multinational strategic airlift unit directed by WEU and made available to the member countries;
12. Speed up and strengthen the European intelligence and communication satellite system;
13. Continue its efforts with a view to regrouping on a European scale the armaments industries of the countries participating in WEU.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr De Decker, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997 and NATO's Madrid summit in November 1997, the WEU Assembly, wishing to take stock of the new situation, organised a colloquy, with NATO's support, on the European Security and Defence Identity, which was held on 4-6 May 1998 in Madrid.

2. Although both the Madrid and Amsterdam summits and the earlier NATO Council meeting in Berlin apparently established a clear course to be followed for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity, elaboration of the agreed principles will take time and numerous hurdles are still to be overcome.

3. Many questions remain to be answered. Do all the EU member states share the same opinion on the development of an ESDI? Do they have the necessary will to assume their responsibilities? How are they going to overcome the lack of credibility of Europe's security policy which failed to deliver effectively in the crises in Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo? What is the state of affairs in relations between WEU, the EU and NATO? Under the present circumstances, the development of an ESDI cannot take place without taking into account the attitude of the United States and those European states that are not members of the European Union.

4. Since the colloquy in Madrid, new developments have taken place in the continuing debate on the ESDI. On 12 May 1998, the Council adopted the Rhodes Declaration and recently the British Prime Minister suggested that European nations should "think more boldly and imaginatively" about defence and be able to "speak and act more effectively"¹. No specific proposals have been made but apparently the debate on the ESDI has been given a new boost. These developments are taken into account in Chapters VI and VIII of the present report².

¹ *International Herald Tribune*, 23 October 1998.

² In drafting these chapters, account was taken of the stimulating publication of the WEU Institute for Security Studies "WEU at fifty" (1998), and in particular the following contributions: Martin Ortega "Some questions

II. The European Security and Defence Identity in the Atlantic Alliance

5. Mr Perrakis (Secretary-General, European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece) recalled that the Brussels Declaration stated that:

"the development of a European Security and Defence Identity, reflected in a strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through WEU, will consolidate the integrity and efficacy of the Alliance as a whole, strengthen the transatlantic link and enable the European Allies to shoulder greater responsibilities for their collective security and defence".

He noted that:

"A decade-long debate on whether Europe should acquire its own defence capability, or use that of NATO, was brought to an end in June 1996, when the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Berlin, opted in favour of developing the ESDI within the Alliance. This solution was finally chosen because were WEU to acquire its own capability, separate from that of the Alliance, this would represent an enormous financial burden for Europeans and also weaken the transatlantic link, which was not what the European Allies wanted."

He also stressed that:

"While no one would deny the need to develop the European Security and Defence

on legal aspects"; Stephan de Spiegeleire "From mutually assured debilitation to flexible response: a new menu of options for European crisis management"; Antonio Missiroli "Enhanced cooperation and flexibility in the second pillar: an obstructed path?"; Gordon Wilson "WEU's operational capability - delusion or reality?"; Guido Lenzi "WEU's future: from subcontractor to conveyor belt?". Reference is also made to "WEU and NATO" by Alyson J.K. Bailes in *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 1998 special supplement and "What news of European defence?" by the same author in *RUSI Journal*, October 1998, and to "Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union in *Europäische Sicherheit*, No.7, 1998.

Identity within the Alliance, given that such an identity is directly linked with WEU's operational development, WEU's development as the defence component of the European Union is, for a majority of member states, including Greece, the *raison d'être* of this Organisation."

6. Mr Grudzinski (Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland) addressed the question of what sort of role "Europe" should play as a unitary actor on the world stage. He ventured that the Amsterdam Treaty did not add any new objectives to the modest vision reflected in the list of rather unexceptional objectives cited in the Maastricht Treaty for the European Union's CFSP. Article J.1.2 mentions the following:

"the safeguarding of common values; strengthening the unity of the Union; preserving peace and stability; promoting international cooperation; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms".

7. There was no indication of whether Europe is striving to become a "superpower" with a global range of interests and the political and military capabilities to pursue these worldwide, a regional power with limited instruments for crisis management and peacekeeping in neighbouring regions, or a civil power with no ambition of developing European military capabilities beyond what exists now on a national level within the framework of NATO and WEU.

8. Without well defined strategic ambitions and goals for the foreign policy, security and defence role of the EU and WEU, it would be difficult for European defence companies to make strategic decisions on what sort of military project should be developed.

9. Mr Grudzinski noted that the complex institutional web of NATO-EU-WEU relations had not yet been satisfactorily structured and organised.

10. The imminent enlargement of European institutions was a complicating factor for the development of the ESDI. Should this identity reflect the EU in its current or future composition, or even the whole WEU family? Mr Grudzinski indicated that the process of ESDI's

development should be an "instrument of early reaching" to the aspirant countries, involving them in work on the EU's foreign and security policy before they were able to meet the economic criteria of membership.

11. He said that in widening the European "security community", the EU was bound to play a more central role than NATO since, as a "modern" security organisation, it was building cooperation on a high level of interconnectedness, if not interdependence. By its nature, the EU created what he called a "sphere of affluence" which was not threatening, but rather incited others to join.

12. Mr Vershbow (Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO) recalled that President Clinton had embraced the idea of a stronger ESDI as a means of addressing traditional concerns in the United States about insufficient burden-sharing on the part of the European members of the Alliance, provided that it was based on the concept of "separable but not separate" European capabilities. Implicit in this approach was that US and European security interests remained linked. Situations could, however, occur where American interests were less directly engaged and where American capabilities were not essential to the success of low-intensity operations. In such cases, it could make sense to enhance the potential for the European Alliance members to act, using WEU, with the United States in a largely supporting role. The main elements of the ESDI from the NATO perspective were:

- enhanced responsibilities for the Deputy SACEUR in preparing for and commanding WEU-led missions;
- more European officers in command positions within the NATO command structure;
- harmonisation of WEU's and NATO's planning and decision-making procedures so as to facilitate the transfer of NATO assets when there was a political decision to do so;
- implementation of the CJTF concept, which would both enhance NATO's flexibility for crisis-management operations and serve as the mechanism for WEU-led operations.

13. Mr Vershbow said he hoped that the present development of the ESDI would also serve as the basis for a step-by-step process of *rap-prochement* between France and the NATO military structure. Given France's capabilities, this would make the ESDI within NATO even stronger.

14. The question of how to develop and make use of the ESDI was a central issue in the present review of NATO's strategic concept. Mr Vershbow noted that "while the European members of the Alliance have made a lot of progress in creating additional capabilities for mobility and for force projection over the past decade, there is still some way to go".

15. He argued that from the US point of view, there is still "... a real danger that the European members of the Alliance could fail to seize the opportunity to give sufficient military substance to the ESDI. If the revision of the strategic concept fails to generate the increased European capabilities needed for force projection and for sustainability, then the United States will end up shouldering a disproportionate share of the responsibility, as it does today". This, he said, "would leave the ESDI as something of an empty shell. That would not be good for NATO or for those who sincerely hope to see the ESDI become a reality. For the United States, development of an enhanced capability for the European members of the Alliance to undertake security missions on their own, when this is appropriate, is essential to sustaining American support for the Alliance as a whole."

III. Cooperation between WEU and NATO and the CJTF concept

16. Mr Tsohatzopoulos (Minister for Defence of Greece) stated that, apart from NATO and WEU, Greece supported the creation of a third concentric circle composed of regional security structures in Europe. This should help to solve the problem of the collective security of European peoples in regions such as the Balkans and the Baltics, quite independently of their possible accession to NATO.

17. Among other things, Admiral Torrente (Director General for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Spain) gave an account of the state of affairs in the development of CJTF. He

started by referring to the Alliance's decisions to establish a new and streamlined command structure, replacing the former rigid, static military command structure with one that is more flexible and adaptable, the main goal being to be able to project stability.

18. As regards CJTF, Admiral Torrente first of all emphasised that it was a non-standing multinational force. It was an instrument whereby, once the Alliance had decided to intervene, forces would be assembled for a particular operation with each of the allied countries deciding individually what forces it would contribute. A CJTF was supposed to be able to operate for extended periods without Alliance backup and also without host country support.

19. Another factor increasing the effectiveness of the CJTF concept was the possibility of channelling third-country contributions, which was facilitated through the working relations established under the PfP programme.

20. CJTF were a key concept in future conflicts because they made it possible to deploy, within the shortest possible time-span, over the maximum required distance, units that were small but effective in tackling conflicts that posed risks for stability and security.

21. The Alliance was gaining valuable experience in this type of multinational context in its widest sense through operations in former Yugoslavia and through the CJTF exercises carried out to date (Allied Effort 97 and Strong Resolve 98).

22. Admiral Torrente then mentioned the following factors which, apart from the CJTF concept, could facilitate cooperation between WEU and NATO:

1. *The Multinational European Command.* Arrangements had been approved allowing for the designation of a chain of command and NATO HQs to prepare, support and conduct a WEU operation.

They also took in ESDI-related aspects of the terms of reference of the Deputy SACEUR, who, as the embodiment of NATO's European command, played a major part in NATO-supported WEU operations, either as Operations Commander

or as guarantor of strategic support in the preparation/execution of the operation.

2. *The illustrative profiles drawn up by WEU and submitted to the Alliance.* These provided a characteristic picture of the types of mission that WEU itself might decide to undertake, all of them based on the general principles set out in WEU's 1992 Petersberg Ministerial Declaration.

The Alliance had begun studying three of them and military authorities had carried out the relevant strategic evaluations. They were now being used to plan exercises and possible WEU missions.

WEU had finalised its response to the evaluations and passed it back to the Alliance together with principles drawn up by WEU for continuing the work along existing lines. The Alliance military authorities had set in train the process for incorporating those requirements into operational planning.

3. *Forces planning.* Both organisations were at present fully engaged on work relating to forces planning to reflect the ESDI. The Alliance had embarked on its review of the existing planning process, *inter alia* to accommodate the ESDI. WEU was involved in the review process, contributing its own views on the arrangements for its involvement in the NATO planning process, including the sensitive area of involvement of WEU observer nations that were not members of the Alliance. Good progress had been made towards achieving an agreement allowing them to participate, taking maximum advantage of Partnership for Peace planning possibilities, bearing in mind always that ESDI visibility meant that something more was needed.

4. *Transfer of Alliance assets and capabilities for a given WEU operation.* A framework agreement was in the process of being drawn up which would govern the conditions of the temporary transfer of such assets, including financial and legal aspects. Such an agreement would regulate various general aspects common to all WEU-led operations, leaving the details of

specific agreements to be settled when an actual case arose.

5. *NATO/WEU consultation.* Both organisations had drafted preliminary documents on the NATO/WEU consultation machinery to ensure rapid, coordinated action by both organisations in the event of crisis or potential conflict situations. Joint meetings of the groups involved had been held and the secretariats were working together on bringing documentary content into line, as differences of substance and in terminology had become apparent which suggested it might be advisable not to adopt a single overarching document but to adapt the internal documents of each organisation. Nevertheless, procedural questions should not detract from the essential point of the exercise which was to achieve effective consultation machinery that gave Europeans greater responsibility in practice in genuinely European crisis situations.

23. Mr Rentmeister (Deputy Director of the Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany) recalled the decisions regarding a European CFSP as taken at the Amsterdam summit in October 1997:

- the tasks defined in the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 were integrated in the Treaty on European Union;
- the European Union was to have a policy planning and early warning unit at its disposal;
- agreement had been reached on the principle of constructive abstention which enabled a majority to take action even if a minority was unwilling or unable to participate in that action;
- the EU now had competence to set guidelines for Western European Union and had thus created for itself an instrument for international crisis management;
- the conditions for the long-term integration of WEU in the EU had at last been established.

24. He attached great importance to the conclusion of a framework agreement on the use of NATO assets for WEU-led operations, which would make sure that no valuable time was lost in reacting to crisis situations. In particular, the legal and financial issues, questions of liability and “recall modalities” had to be clearly worked out before countries could take the decision to conduct WEU-led operations using NATO assets.

25. Finally, Mr Rentmeister ventured that if forces were deployed, they must have a clear mandate and there must be a coherent plan for finding a political solution to the conflict, to which they could contribute. Any deployment of forces should comply fully with the UN Charter.

26. Captain Dufourcq (International relations, Armed Forces Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, France) recognised that “WEU had certainly acquired new possibilities as a result of its cooperation with NATO. These new possibilities should not, however, lead WEU to abandon the idea of taking action using its own assets”.

27. Cooperation with NATO, which had recently been stepped up, therefore also had its limitations:

“Those limitations largely relate to the different purposes of the two organisations: WEU is European and deals with low- and medium-intensity crisis management, while NATO is transatlantic and has responsibility for collective defence and acute crises. While the disparity between the resources of the two organisations easily explains the difference in the assets they are able to deploy, and hence the level of crisis each is able to manage, it is worth drawing attention once again to WEU’s specifically European purpose.”

28. Recalling the text of Articles J.4.2 and J.7.3 of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties respectively, Captain Dufourcq noted that “the relationship between WEU and the European Union is a factor that has to be taken into account in any study of the relationship between WEU and NATO”.

29. In his view, cooperation between WEU and NATO had to respect the identity and autonomy of each of these organisations. Duplication should be avoided and the organisations should

be encouraged to work in such a way as to complement each other.

30. Mr de Wijk (Clingendael Institute, Netherlands) noted that European defence initiatives, including the development of the CJTF concept, reflected a constant struggle between Europeanists and Atlanticists and he saw this as an obstacle to cooperation between NATO and WEU. He admitted that on paper, there was nothing to prevent credible and effective European-led operations. On the other hand, he argued that the incredibly complicated flow chart on the decision-making procedures involving the EU, NATO and WEU reflected their complicated inter-relationship which, in his view, could not be solved easily.

31. The other hurdle was Europe’s indecisiveness. It had still not been able to agree on decisive common positions and joint actions in demanding crisis situations which required larger-scale operations. In such cases, it seemed to wait for the United States to take the lead, which used the Contact Group as a vehicle, ignoring the European institutions.

32. Mr de Wijk then came back to the existing controversy between Atlanticists and Europeanists, which in his view dominated the implementation of the CJTF concept, the ESDI and the CFSP. He believed that some politicians did not really want a working CFSP or ESDI because of the cost of developing European capabilities and because they were afraid of an erosion of transatlantic relations. Some European countries, he said, might even consider the United States a useful ally in the balance of power politics.

33. He considered there were two different options which would influence the future of European defence cooperation:

- to continue developing a credible CFSP, including implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty.

Arguments in favour of this option were firstly the need for the EU as an economic superpower to have a credible CFSP in order to defend its vital interests and carry out peace-support and humanitarian operations. Secondly, Europe should realise that it could not always count on the United States and might have to act alone.

- to develop a European security architecture of interlocking institutions, with NATO as the military backbone of a system of cooperative security. The OSCE would be the basis of this system with NATO carrying out *all* military operations within the OSCE area under its command. In that case, the Contact Group should be institutionalised as a “European Security Council”. Within the OSCE area, the CFSP would largely be limited to economic sanctions, and the EU could use WEU for military operations outside the OSCE area.
34. During the extensive debate which took place after these presentations, many interesting contributions were made by various participants. Your Rapporteur can mention only some of the many issues touched upon during the debate.
35. Mr Estrella (Vice President and Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels) insisted on the need, if the ESDI were to succeed, for more theoretical and political debate among Europeans in order to clearly define their security interests. Europe should also make a specific input to NATO’s new strategic concept which would include peace-support operations.
36. According to Mr Pascu (Romania, associate partner), Europe had to define its tasks in guaranteeing the security of the entire continent. In particular it had to decide whether to act mainly for crisis-prevention purposes, which required an identity of interest and unity of action, or to crises, which required individual operational capabilities.
37. Russia, he said, was a major factor in Europe’s effort to establish an independent security and defence identity and he ventured that its final place and role would be influenced by the individual approaches of Europe’s major powers and by the impact of Russia’s own divisive tactics with regard to both transatlantic and intra-European relations.
38. Time and again, mention was made of the lack of political will on the part of European governments to act independently with political or military means in order to prevent or manage crises.
39. Mr Tsohatzopoulos explained that conditions were not ripe for this because the EU was not ready to take on the cost of a CFSP. Mr de Wijk suggested that there were too many institutions and that in each crisis this led to a drawn-out debate as to which organisation should deal with it. Differing national interests also played a role.
40. Mr Rentmeister explained the lack of political will with reference to the history of each country. He considered national interests legitimate, adding that there was a need for consensus. Common policies were also needed and there was no alternative to Europeans acting together to defend their interests. Mr Pastusiak asked if France’s different degree of involvement in WEU and NATO would allow both organisations to cooperate effectively, including the proper functioning of the CJTF concept. Captain Dufourcq said the process of French rapprochement with NATO, which had started in 1995, had for the time been suspended. France now continued to be closely involved in the various NATO activities such as developing the new strategic concept and refining the CJTF concept. France considered that the point had not yet been reached where it could join NATO’s new military structures without restriction. Its objective was to secure a shift in the balance of all European and transatlantic interests within the Alliance. Europe’s common strategic interests had not yet been defined and this was an area to which parliamentary assemblies could give some thought.
41. Mr Rentmeister emphasised that without a European capability for action, it would not be possible to secure European interests in the long term and it was evident that without such a capability or a willingness to assume responsibility, pay costs and make structures available, it would not be possible to count on the readiness of the United States.

IV. Multinational forces and their relations with NATO and WEU

42. On the subject of WEU’s relations with NATO, Admiral de Morales (Director of the WEU Planning Cell, Brussels) mentioned three areas in particular in which very substantial progress had been achieved: defence planning, operational planning and exercises.

43. As regards defence planning he said that in future, joint work with NATO should be improved by increasing WEU's dialogue with the major NATO commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR, as they developed their force proposals. It was also necessary to determine how WEU mission profiles could best be included in NATO planning situations. This would also show which capabilities Europeans needed to carry out Petersberg missions.

44. In the operational planning area, WEU was ready to contribute to NATO's follow-on work on WEU's illustrative mission profiles.

45. WEU/NATO exercise coordination was going reasonably well, but there was a need for a joint crisis-management exercise planning group for specific work on joint WEU/NATO exercises, such as the one planned for the year 2000.

46. Admiral de Morales said WEU could, in particular, take advantage of elements of NATO, or the assets of NATO nations such as airlift, communication and information systems, as well as IFOR/SFOR experience in coalition operations. He emphasised that the headquarters and multinational forces which were designated as forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) constituted the backbone of a WEU military command chain. For these national and multinational headquarters and forces, close cooperation with the military side of WEU and regular training were of great importance – even more so because these HQs were not tied into a permanent command structure as was the case in NATO. WEU had intensive contacts at working level and had only recently held the first-ever FAWEU HQ conference, which provided valuable inputs for its planning work.

47. During the frequent contacts the WEU Planning Cell had with multinational formations, it concentrated its efforts on the following topics: WEU crisis-management procedures, command and control structures, the role and task of the Operations Commander and the operational headquarters, communications, logistics and intelligence.

48. Admiral de Morales concluded that WEU was now ready to carry out military operations and conduct Petersberg tasks with or without NATO support.

49. General Oliver (First Deputy to the Commander, European Corps, Strasbourg) argued that WEU had several characteristics different from those of NATO, which made it an interesting alternative for crisis-management missions. Its close relationship with the European Union opened up the prospect of WEU's military actions being integrated with the diplomatic, political and economic instruments of the Union for a true multi-dimensional crisis strategy.

50. The multiple changes in Europe's security situation, the need for a common defence and security policy and the reduction in national defence budgets had led to the creation of different bilateral or multinational formations capable of accomplishing the new missions. At the moment, seven of these formations existed in Europe. All of them had been declared as forces answerable to WEU and, by means of other arrangements, could also be engaged under NATO command or control.

51. These seven formations were:

- the European Corps (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain) with 80 000 men at full strength;
- the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force, a rapidly deployable landing force of about 6 000 men;
- the Multinational Division Centre (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, UK) with two airborne and two airmobile brigades;
- the Rapid Deployment Euroforce (Eurofor with units from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) consisting of easily deployable light forces at division level and operating under the control of an interministerial committee (CIMIN);
- Euromarfor (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain), a non-standing, pre-configured and multinational maritime force with both maritime and amphibious capabilities;
- the 1st German-Netherlands Corps: its Corps HQ in Münster, if employed by WEU for Petersberg tasks, could provide support in the planning and preparation of operations, including the de-

ployment of the appropriate command and control assets;

- the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, a pre-structured, non-permanent force whose national amphibious components would retain their operational and organic chains of command; a small nucleus of officers was the only permanent element.

52. General Oliver then explained in detail the various measures taken to make Eurocorps work as an effective instrument to carry out Petersberg missions. A Memorandum of Understanding between the European Corps and WEU developed the general rules and procedural guidelines applicable to the Corps as a FAWEU.

53. Among other things, the MOU stipulated that the Eurocorps staff planning capability would support the Planning Cell, particularly when the Cell was tasked by the Permanent Council to develop contingency plans which might involve Eurocorps.

54. Once the WEU Permanent Council decided to take action, it also took decisions on the force mission and composition, on the selection of the Operational Headquarters as well as the Commander, and on the nation that was to nominate the Force Commander. The Council also designated a Point of Contact to serve as the Operations Commander permanent correspondent at WEU Headquarters.

55. As regards the command structure, the General said that within the framework of peace-support operations and/or humanitarian missions under a UN or OSCE mandate, the operations command could be assured by either a NATO command or an *ad hoc* WEU HQ. In the latter case, the Eurocorps Commander could be appointed as Force Commander.

56. Within the framework of peace-enforcement missions, in a medium- to high-intensity context and conducted as a joint campaign, the Force Commander would in future most likely be provided by a regional or subregional NATO command, while the Eurocorps Commanding General might act as Land Component Commander. The Eurocorps command post system was flexible and adapted to the broad variety of potential missions.

57. The Corps had submitted to the nations a requirement for the shelterisation of parts of its command posts in order to achieve higher mobility, increased protection and greater independence of infrastructure. At present, the Corps forward command post HARPON could be ready for deployment by tactical airlift within 72 hours and had seven-day sustainability.

58. As regards the force structure, two generic concepts had been developed for the deployment of task forces. The first concept involved the Immediate Mechanised Force – Eurocorps acronym “FIM” – for crisis-reaction and peace-support operations to include peace-enforcement missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The second concerned the Immediate Light Force – Eurocorps acronym “FIL” – for peace-support operations at the lower end of the spectrum or humanitarian operations.

59. The FIM could be built up gradually within 20 to 60 days based upon a nucleus of five brigades. In FIM’s mobile operations within a complex environment, the use of divisional headquarters as an intermediate level of command was provided.

60. The basic FIL, especially related to the Petersberg missions, consisted of a nucleus of four combat battalions tailored to the specific mission. A brigade headquarters assured the intermediate command between the Land Component Commander and the force deployed.

61. As regards the roles and missions of the European Corps in the framework of NATO, the General stated that within the framework of main defence forces under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Eurocorps would be made available to SACEUR for defence operations primarily in the Central Region, especially for an early deployment close to the threatened borders. Within the framework of reaction forces, Eurocorps was available to SACEUR as a reaction force for any kind of operation throughout his area of responsibility to prevent war or to defend a threatened NATO territory. In operations not covered by Article 5, Eurocorps could be deployed – on a case-by-case basis – for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations as well as for humanitarian actions in support of other organisations.

62. SACEUR or the nations could take the initiative to request or offer the deployment of the

Corps. However, the decisions to engage the Corps would always remain the responsibility of the five member nations. Eurocorps could only be committed by a consensual, uniform decision after deliberation in the Joint Committee which was composed of the CHODs and the political directors of the foreign affairs ministries. As from June 1998, the European Corps would be providing the SFOR HQ with a contingent of about 150 men including officers, NCOs and soldiers.

63. Finally, General Oliver argued that the multinational formations presented considerable advantages, considering that the current world situation demanded well trained and equipped forces disposing of a high degree of mobility which were very expensive. The contribution every member nation made to a multinational formation with its elite units, and the pooling of national funds to enable the operational budget meet common costs, considerably reduced the economic burden on each individual nation.

64. Another important fact was the European common defence culture that was being created and implemented through mutual knowledge and shared responsibilities among the members of armies from different nations. Multinational co-operation served as a catalyst for stability and security.

65. Mr Baumel (Chairman of the Political Committee, WEU Assembly) said the question of the political objectives of the multinational forces remained to be clarified. He was concerned about the emergence of an ESDI which did not give Europe the role to which it aspired. WEU, in his view, provided a forum in which to discuss the ways and means of achieving a fair balance between the undeniable force represented by NATO and credible European participation, which had to be through WEU. Quoting Henry Kissinger, he said the essential question facing Europe was whether it had an instinct for power.

66. Mr van Eekelen (Senator, Former Secretary-General of WEU, Netherlands) said the need for mandates should not be exaggerated and argued that in at least three situations a mandate was not necessary: where a state requested help in self-defence in pursuance of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; the case of preventive deployment with the agreement of the country to which troops were deployed, and the case of

peacekeeping in the traditional mode with the agreement of the parties.

67. Problems occurred when there was a need for enforcement action where the states involved had to proceed very carefully. He had always felt that WEU would have been able to undertake the Bosnia operation because it had not been very sophisticated and Europe could have managed it with its own aircraft, without satellite intelligence and certainly without strategic lift.

68. Mr van Eekelen saw multinational forces as the answer for NATO and particularly for WEU in the future. They brought together large and small countries in political solidarity. They enabled them to overcome individual reservations and take action together because the political risk was divided among them.

V. A European security and defence policy

69. Admiral Lopez (Commander-in-Chief, AFSOUTH, Naples) argued that instability, in particular in NATO's southern region, was the new strategic challenge to the western Alliance. Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina had reaffirmed the importance of military alliances and coalitions in ensuring stability and the ability of all countries involved to work in concert. Military downsizing taking place almost everywhere was a challenge that demanded cooperation among nations if their objective was to have peace promote stability. He said there were more than 40 nations in AFSOUTH's area of responsibility which included the Black Sea and the Mediterranean regions. Declining resources and smaller force structures imposed an obligation to make choices and focus on the most threatening trouble spots.

70. After enumerating the many well known factors which may cause instability, Admiral Lopez named a number of potential "hot spots" in the AFSOUTH region: the Maghreb, Egypt, the Levant, the Black Sea/Transcaucasus area and the Balkans. Arguing that NATO's southern region was faced with significant instability to its south and east, he believed that the Alliance should focus its attention and resources in that direction, hoping that WEU would address the situation in much the same way. He maintained that what he called forward engagement was a key tool for promoting stability. While maintain-

ing defensive capabilities there was a need to be proactive in the sense of adapting to the changing environment of the mission. Crisis-management skills had to be developed and one had to prepare for new kinds of missions such as peace-support operations.

71. The Admiral pointed out that Mr Solana had emphasised the importance of cooperation and dialogue throughout the southern region. In his view, security and stability in that region were linked in a way which did not depend on military factors alone, but required a comprehensive strategy to be dealt with by all European organisations in a complementary way. The Partnership for Peace and NATO's Mediterranean initiative were stability-oriented activities.

72. As regards the development of the CJTF concept, the Admiral recalled that a CJTF exercise had recently been concluded in the southern region, in which eight nations had participated. This exercise was the first to activate fully the CJTF headquarters both afloat and then ashore. It was the first to be tailored for out-of-area peace-support operations. WEU observers had been present at a number of key NATO exercises over the past year to familiarise themselves with NATO procedures in order to enhance mutual interoperability.

73. Admiral Lopez said that as WEU developed into an organisation fully capable of conducting large-scale CJTF operations in its own right, the need for close NATO/WEU cooperation would become paramount. A common understanding of each other's tactics, techniques and procedures was critical. Compatible command, control and communications might prove even more important. This would be vital for interaction, coordination, synchronisation and, eventually, synergism.

74. Finally, Admiral Lopez said there should be an ongoing dialogue between NATO and WEU so that Petersberg operations could be accomplished by WEU alone, without the need for NATO or another organisation to duplicate them. The formation of a coalition of the willing was another option.

75. Mr Björck (Member of Parliament, former Defence Minister, Sweden) recalled that in the northern part of Europe, there had never been such a clear division into two blocs as there was

in central Europe. Different countries had found different solutions for their security and defence and the results of that split were still reflected in the present situation when it came to membership of organisations. Nevertheless, all Nordic countries were now going European and Mr Björck strongly believed that Sweden would apply for full membership of NATO in perhaps six or seven years' time. For the Baltic countries and their accession to the EU and NATO, there were still questions regarding the timetable and the Russian reaction.

76. He argued that in shaping Europe's new security it was important to find solutions which in the long run could also integrate a free and democratic Russia into European structures, because otherwise Europe would never have the stability it wanted.

77. Looking at European security from a northern perspective, Mr Björck first pointed out that no major decision about military activities in Europe could be taken without the approval and support of the United States.

78. If Europe wanted to create an independent security and defence capability, it should improve coordination of its military power. In this field, some areas such as intelligence, transport and communications needed to be improved, but otherwise the basic resources were available. There should also be a more autonomous military command structure with some kind of European supreme commander. Once the political leadership gave its instructions to the military to conduct a military operation, the commanders should have enough room for manoeuvre to go ahead with the operation and not be obliged to wait for further intermediate political instructions. The main issue was that Europe had to streamline its political decision-making process in order to be able to react quickly and efficiently.

79. The other important problem to be solved was Europe's defence industry, which needed to be restructured urgently. Mergers and cooperative programmes should not be designed to please political leaders and meet their ambitions but rather to meet the real needs of the armed forces and that process should be based on business considerations and input.

80. Finally, there should be a proper system for funding security and defence activities and operations.

81. General Raffenne (Deputy, Under Chief-of-Staff for International Relations, Armed Forces Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, France) argued that while the threat of a major conflict in Europe had evaporated, Europe remained exposed to three types of threat and risk in particular: regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and the financial and Mafia-style drugs and terrorism networks.

82. While security and stability in the core of Europe had been consolidated, crises and conflicts were causing great instability in south-eastern Europe.

83. The General believed that apart from Europe itself, the United States would, for the foreseeable future, continue to play a pre-eminent role in shaping the development of a new single order. On the other hand, he noted the uncertainty over US policy, one effect of which could be a change in the balance of its defence spending. Russia, with its large nuclear arsenal, was a third major player in Europe and its contribution to European security was a crucial one. It was going through a very painful process of economic and political restructuring and needed the support of the western world. It should not be excluded from the new international order or from Europe's new security arrangements.

84. In view of the globalisation of trade and economic interdependence, Europe's security zone tended to extend towards the Middle East, but also towards Africa and Asia. Different security organisations each had their own specific role to play in Europe.

85. The UN had to retain its pre-eminent and permanent role because of the Security Council, which provided the international political legitimacy essential to any multinational military operation outside Europe.

86. NATO was proving to be the preferred instrument for crisis management, cooperation and stability promotion with such elements as the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine Charter and the Partnership for Peace. France supported all those activities and considered that NATO had to retain its central role in Europe provided it could acquire renewed legitimacy, which meant rebalancing the transatlantic link and taking account of its own enlargement

process. The strategic concept review provided an opportunity to redefine its role and tasks.

87. The European Union and WEU had considerable potential which should be exploited and the Treaty of Amsterdam had opened up new possibilities for taking forward European security and defence. The introduction of the euro, a first tangible element of shared sovereignty, would have a direct impact on the construction of a common defence policy.

88. The OSCE, with its more global approach to security, should retain its role as the larger forum in which to develop the legal framework of European security, such as the CFE Treaty. It could reinforce its own role as the guardian of certain regional initiatives.

89. Important bi- and multilateral initiatives were complementing the current institutional set-up. Multinational forces had a role to play in taking part in joint missions under the auspices of NATO or WEU. Cooperation and restructuring in the field of armaments should provide the European instruments which were lacking and contribute to the establishment of common foundations for a genuine European armaments policy, guaranteeing Europe's strategic independence.

90. According to the General, managing security in Europe for the future would require tailored responses, with varying levels of engagement, in terms of both scale and technology. In new kinds of mission the military were faced with policing and public security responsibilities, the management of civilian and military affairs and coordination with non-governmental organisations.

91. Multinational missions had become the rule because of the need for legitimacy, which only international endorsement could provide, the growing number of shared interests and the need to control costs by sharing capabilities.

92. For Mr Roman (President of the Romanian Senate, Romania), the diversity of WEU's components and the nature of its objectives gave it a special role in integrating new democracies in the EU and NATO. In his opinion, the participation of WEU associate partners in the political dialogue and the process of developing the operational side of the Organisation would substantiate the process of expanding stability and

security. To this end, CFSP and ESDI-related activities could be enhanced by taking in the WEU associate partners in the process of framing and building up a European security and defence policy.

93. Mr Roman said the new democracies were a source of inspiration. One of the main ways to improve the overall situation was to assist the countries in the region develop their bi- and multilateral relations and build confidence.

94. With regard to WEU's integratory mission, in the current context WEU credibility as a dynamic factor in building stability and security on our continent was shaped by the nature of its relationship with the EU. Mr Roman tended to support the point of view according to which including WEU in the EU should be achieved not by eliminating the former, but by efficiently using existing resources and ensuring there was a capability for credible and prompt reaction. Both the operational capability of WEU and the evolution of the EU CFSP pillar were essential in shaping a political profile for the Union, corresponding to its weight and responsibilities in the European context. As far as the CFSP was concerned, the Amsterdam Treaty's common strategy, high representative and planning unit were prerequisites for arriving at a reasonable compromise on WEU's role and place within the EU. To be precise, a more flexible approach within the CFSP to the "major national interest" clause as well as a well-conceived operational profile for the CFSP high representative and the planning unit could bring substantial contributions to defining that new role and place.

95. Mr Roman considered that WEU's contribution to the rebuilding of a united Europe remained essential. Its mission was to harmonise security policies at the level of a united Europe through at least two main features: the diversity of participants and the combination of the defence component of the EU with NATO's pivotal role in Europe. Furthermore, unlike NATO and the EU, WEU offered countries in central and eastern Europe a higher degree of integration. This approach was, from the point of view of candidates for admission to the Euro-Atlantic structures, congruent with the criteria that they wished to see promoted in qualifying for the respective structures.

96. He agreed with Mr Björck that an early warning and rapid reaction system should be established for future needs in the region. This could be a training and crisis-management centre at the regional level under the auspices of WEU.

97. In the following discussion, Mr Colvin (Member of Parliament, United Kingdom) emphasised that a European security and defence policy was not much use without a coherent defence industrial policy. The idea behind restructuring, however, should not be to create a fortress Europe because transatlantic cooperation was also very important. The major difficulty lay in the state ownership of many of the continental European defence industries and if there were to be real transfrontier mergers, privatisation of potential partner companies had to take place first. WEU had a major task to perform in pushing for this to happen.

98. Mr Katkus (Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Lithuanian Parliament) noted that in 1994 Lithuania had started preparing for the CJTF by forming a special unit with a view to securing interoperability with similar structures of WEU and NATO. In all possible fields, cooperation between associate partners and WEU should be intensified.

99. Mr Fuentes (Permanent Representative of Spain to WEU) pointed out that it would in no way be possible to marginalise NATO or WEU *vis-à-vis* the OSCE. WEU should have a say in the ESDI. According to Mr Fuentes, it was very important to define the specific areas of competence of WEU and, if they were the Petersberg tasks, these should be recognised as being the responsibility of WEU alone.

100. Mr Antretter (Member of the Bundestag, Germany) wondered how non-aligned WEU states with a neutral tradition and WEU's associate partners would be involved in the ESDI, of which WEU was an essential element, while also participating in NATO's planning process. He noted that the relationship between the ESDI and the European Union's CFSP was not very clear. If the EU availed itself of WEU for a specific task, did the EU Council have competence to set guidelines for WEU's associate members who were not EU members? If WEU was only a tool for crisis management with NATO being re-

sponsible for the defence of European territory, what would remain of the ESDI as the embodiment of Europe's common defence? Would it make sense to stick to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty?

101. Mr Baumel emphasised the importance of the civilian component of military intervention, a field in which the Europeans were lagging far behind the Americans. He proposed organising a debate and drafting a special report on this subject.

102. Mr Björck argued that the current non-aligned countries should not be forced to make a choice between being a fully-fledged WEU member and abiding by Article V or staying out. Flexibility and tolerance were needed. If a joint European security and defence structure was going to be created, it would have to be a step-by-step process for some countries including his own.

103. General Raffenne recognised that the United States had often deployed civilian affairs units in the framework of military intervention. Europe had so far been unable to organise such units. They required the creation of a special legal status so that the necessary personnel could be seconded from companies which would be reluctant to lose these members of their staff for six months.

104. Mr Roman argued that the role of the new democracies in Europe in the Euro-Atlantic crisis-resolution structures could be divided into three parts: (i) military interoperability, a process which was under way and would be completed in three or four years' time; (ii) confidence-building measures, which were also making good progress, as was evident among other things from the involvement of parliamentarians from these new democracies in western institutions, and from the enlargement of WEU and NATO; (iii) political will, which was far from having been achieved. There had to be a stronger political resolve on the part of the present European and American leadership to build the new European architecture. Stability was like an immense ship under construction and needing two anchors, one in the East and one in the West. The contribution of the new European democracies deserved more recognition.

VI. The EU, WEU and NATO in the European Security and Defence Identity

105. At the colloquy in Madrid, there was no debate on relations between the EU and WEU, partly because no representative of the EU was able to participate.

106. In several recent reports³, the Assembly has discussed the development of relations between the EU and WEU following the Amsterdam Treaty and the Erfurt Declaration.

107. A reading of the Council's Declaration adopted in Rhodes on 11 and 12 May 1998, and the first part of the 44th annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the activities of the Council (for the period 1 January to 30 June 1998), provide an understanding of recent achievements in this field. In the Rhodes Declaration, Ministers tasked the Permanent Council to draw up further arrangements for enhanced cooperation between WEU and the EU, bearing in mind the working priorities set out in paragraph 7 of the 22 July 1997 Declaration of WEU.

108. Work continued on a *modus operandi* for cases in which the EU avails itself of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union with defence implications (Article J.7.3 of the Amsterdam Treaty). An exercise-type seminar held at a WEU-EU *ad hoc* meeting on 18 June confirmed in general terms the applicability of work already accomplished on a *modus operandi* for the implementation of the abovementioned article, as well as of the illustrative practical model linking the decision-making processes of both organisations when this article is applied.

109. Ministers further tasked the Permanent Council to pursue work on the reflection on the framing of a common European defence policy. Ministers considered that the reflection on the interface between civilian/military aspects in crisis management, one of the building blocks of this reflection, could lead to the adoption of concrete measures of cooperation between the EU and WEU. As a result of the work already

³ Security in a wider Europe – reply to the annual report of the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Antretter, Rapporteur (Document 1602) and Documents 1581 and 1584.

achieved, a checklist of practical areas for developing cooperation in this field will be examined in each organisation.

110. Joint WEU/EU *ad hoc* groups were considered a useful tool facilitating practical cooperation between the two organisations. Progress has been made in the field of cooperation between the WEU Secretariat and the EU Council Secretariat, improving further working relations between the two organisations. Ministers asked the Secretary-General to submit proposals to the Permanent Council for closer “coordination of the work of the staff of the Secretariat-General of WEU with the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, taking into account progress in establishing the EU’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, including the exchange and secondment of personnel”. WEU, they said, should cooperate effectively with and contribute to the future Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.

111. In Rhodes, Ministers also reaffirmed “the significance of concluding improved security arrangements with the European Union, aiming *inter alia* at facilitating the flow of classified information between the two organisations, thus rendering their cooperation more effective. They noted with satisfaction the EU Council decision on security clearance for officials of the EU Council Secretariat who are required to handle classified information. To this end, they tasked the Permanent Council to pursue the matter and examine all possibilities for the early conclusion of improved security arrangements between the two Organisations.”

112. The Permanent Council was further tasked to draw up practical arrangements for WEU’s cooperation with the European Commission. The Secretary-General was asked to prepare an early report for the Permanent Council which would serve as a starting point for this work.

113. Finally, the Permanent Council’s decision to offer to the EU image interpretation products produced by the WEU Satellite Centre is an important step to enhance relations with the EU.

114. Although in the institutional field, progress is being made on cooperation, it should be noted that relations between the EU and WEU are only at the beginning of a long process.

115. The signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, followed by WEU’s Brussels Declaration of 22 July

1997 has marked the beginning of a new year in EU-WEU relations.

116. The flow chart on the decision-making process in these matters makes it clear that the EU can decide not only on actions with defence implications, but that it can also decide to terminate operations. The flow chart distinguishes broadly between three phases of a developing crisis:

- emergence of a crisis and initial evaluation process;
- decision on action and development of an operational plan;
- execution, monitoring, and in due course, termination of the operation.

117. In each phase, there will be interaction between the EU and WEU, including such activities as WEU providing assistance to the EU in monitoring a crisis situation, and assessing the possibilities for a military operation. In the first phase the Planning Cell would also evaluate whether NATO assets might be needed and whether CJTF procedures should be activated. In the second phase, once a decision has been taken to act, the WEU Council will approve the command arrangements and designate the operation commander. During the third phase, there will need to be intense exchanges of information on the WEU operational plan and the complementary actions being taken by the EU. The WEU Council will exercise politico-military control of the military operation, but in all three phases the EU maintains responsibility for overall policy. Clearly, the EU has to decide on a coherent, effective overall strategy in which WEU is given responsibility for implementing the defence aspect.

118. The Amsterdam Treaty and the WEU Brussels Declaration appended to it leave no doubt that once the EU has decided to avail itself of WEU, the latter cannot choose not to accept that decision.

119. On the other hand, the modified Brussels Treaty still leaves the WEU Council the possibility to act autonomously. This fact, making WEU an important asset in the European security and defence policy, deserves attention. The early stages of recent crises, both in south-eastern Europe and in Africa, have demonstrated that

European countries do not easily achieve consensus on the action to be taken. In these early stages, WEU is the only institutional framework in which politico-military discussions can take place between European countries in parallel, with the generation of military options and the provision of plans as provided by WEU's operational staff. The Planning Cell can activate its planning capabilities for any operations before the Council has taken a decision to act. A Council decision to start monitoring a crisis is enough to prompt WEU's operational components to start providing information that is indispensable for the assessment of possibilities for action.

120. If the WEU Council decides in favour of WEU intervention, a full array of standing WEU operational procedures can be set in motion enabling European countries to act militarily if they wish to do so, drawing on existing national and multinational capabilities answerable to WEU.

121. For decisions on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the Amsterdam Treaty introduced case-by-case flexibility in the decision-making procedure, which is known as "constructive abstention", a mode of interpretation which allows a member state to abstain from voting on a decision by formally declaring that it will not contribute to the decision, whilst at the same time accepting that the decision commits the entire European Union (Article J.13). If, however, for "important and stated reasons of national policy, a member state declares that it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision, a vote will not be taken. The matter may then be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity". On the other hand, it is to be noted that constructive abstention cannot be applied to decisions having military and defence implications (Article J.13.24).

122. It is only right to question how far constructive abstention can be applied without undermining the credibility of the decision and its implementation.

123. Once again, it should be stressed that the ESDI only makes sense if the CFSP is strengthened and made effective and if Europeans are willing to act in a crisis which requires military action.

124. The ESDI does not coincide with WEU, it can only work if the EU, WEU and NATO each assume their responsibility to develop their share in the concept.

125. WEU as an essential element for the development of the ESDI plays a pivotal role in that it has a political link with the EU and an operational link with NATO.

126. The present situation, however, is less clear than one would wish. NATO is expanding its role beyond the traditional Article 5 mission to defend the territory of the Alliance. WEU is concentrating on Petersberg missions, a type of operation which NATO is also expected to include in its new strategic concept, to be adopted in April 1999. At the same time, according to the modified Brussels Treaty, WEU also has a mutual defence commitment in Article V and intends to stick to it, which is logical in the light of the Amsterdam Treaty which speaks of the "progressive framing of a common defence policy (...) which might lead to a common defence".

127. Where the European Union avails itself of WEU to implement the military aspect of its decisions, it will be relatively easy – as we have seen – for WEU to provide a response where it can confine itself to using its own means (FAWEU). Conversely, WEU's operational response will be a far more complex matter in cases where it will need to have recourse to NATO assets in order to be effective.

128. NATO is not a purely military organisation, it also has its political machinery and decision-making process. Therefore, existing provisions enabling WEU to make use of NATO resources can never operate automatically. A request by WEU merely sets in train the NATO decision-making process, which may or may not provide a positive response. NATO will make its assets available to WEU only when it is fully satisfied about details concerning the resources WEU is ready to mobilise and the objectives and strategies it intends to pursue. NATO, in other words, never acts simply as somebody else's executive agency. In particular, NATO has never accepted delegating the development of an ESDI to the EU or WEU.

129. For mutual defence missions (Article 5), WEU relies on NATO in operational terms and this is currently causing one of the problems for

the development of an ESDI within the EU. The three non-aligned EU member states – Austria, Finland and Sweden – are keen on developing the potential of the Union in the field of security, but are not ready to join a common defence policy and therefore subscribe to the obligations of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty which calls for parallel participation in NATO.

130. In the future, an ESDI could be more effective and react more rapidly in times of crisis if EU-WEU decisions in the field of foreign, security and defence policy that require NATO assets for their implementation could be presented in NATO through a European caucus. Until now this idea has always been firmly rejected by the United States, which insists on the need for flexibility in European positions and which is afraid of Europe adopting a take-it-or-leave-it attitude reached after a complicated internal debate.

131. It is known that the Europeans have a shortage of strategic assets, in particular in communications, intelligence, heavy lift and transport, as a result of which they may have to ask NATO or the United States for assistance. On the other hand, there is a tendency to exaggerate the need for US support, because most Petersberg operations will be relatively small-scale.

132. It should also be noted that in recent years, Europe has been taking action to overcome some of its main operational deficiencies in the area of Petersberg missions. WEU has established its Satellite Centre in Torrejón with access to commercial satellite imagery and to Helios 1, a European military intelligence-gathering satellite. It also concluded an agreement with Rosvooruzhnie to obtain Russian satellite imagery. In the field of airlift, WEU has an agreement with Ukraine and is hoping to conclude one with Russia for leasing wide-bodied ramp-fitted transport aircraft. In the framework of the illustrative mission profiles submitted to NATO for planning purposes, WEU has been planning military operations ranging from a smaller brigade-sized humanitarian support mission to a division-plus-sized mission to separate conflicting parties by force, with some 85 000 troops on the ground, deployed over a distance of 6 000 kilometres and for a duration of up to a year.

133. For the management of peace-support operations, European countries have a broad range of options at their disposal:

- *national military responses for very low-level Petersberg operations* such as evacuation operations which can be WEU-supported without WEU exercising politico-military control;
- *ad hoc multinational operations* in which the national command structures remain intact and operate in parallel to each other under a single coordination centre with staff and liaison officers from the participating nations. Needless to say, such operations, while having the advantage of providing a solution in certain crisis situations, undermine the authority and credibility of the ESDI, EU and WEU;
- *WEU “framework nation” or “lead nation” operations*, as defined in the 1996 Paris Declaration. This option enables WEU to mount multinational operations at relatively short notice by using a national headquarters while at the same time emphasising the multinational nature of the operation by ensuring broad representation of the coalition on the lead-nation headquarters staff;
- *autonomous WEU operations*: under this option recourse may be had to FAWEU (Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euro-marfor, etc.) and forces of the member, associate member, observer and associate partner countries, under the politico-military direction of the WEU Council and the control of WEU’s Military Committee which itself can draw on the work of the Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Torrejón Satellite Centre. WEU could have availed itself of this option for Operation Alba just as it could also take sole responsibility for management of the Kosovo crisis if we Europeans really wanted it to;
- *WEU-led CJTF*: such operations take place in cases where Europe’s transatlantic allies in NATO are willing to allow WEU to use NATO assets and ca-

pabilities for a European-led operation, which will most likely be a CJTF operation under the “strategic direction and political control” of WEU. In the CJTF context, political control means that the WEU Council, with the support of the relevant WEU bodies, will provide politico-military guidance to an Operations Commander from the NATO chain of command on the conduct of the ongoing operation. Strategic direction refers to the translation of those political objectives into precise directives which, in the CJTF context, implies that the WEU Council will be making the key strategic decisions in accordance with its standing procedures (selecting an Operations HQ, appointing an Operations Commander and approving his choice of a Force Commander, approving the operation plan prepared by the Operations Commander as well as the rules of engagement, etc.).

134. Europe does have the capability and potential to deploy an effective military force. In order to use it where the need arise, the EU in particular must now develop an effective mechanism. If it fails to do this, it will lose existing American support for the ESDI and leave the field to a United States which will lose interest because of Europe’s refusal to assume its responsibilities, and to NATO which, as a consequence, will be less effective.

VII. Conclusions

135. The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is at a crossroads. Its operational and political reality will depend in the long run on the development of three institutions, namely, the EU, WEU and NATO. In the shorter term, the ESDI can be realised by these three major institutions interconnecting and cooperating without making any prior assumptions.

136. The most important innovation consists of the inclusion of Petersberg missions in the Treaty on European Union and of Article J.7.1 of the Amsterdam Treaty which stipulates that WEU, as an integral part of the development of the Union, will provide the Union “with access to an

operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2”.

137. This is why the WEU Secretary-General was right when he said at the Madrid colloquy that the question of WEU’s position had been resolved. In his opinion, WEU is the instrument of crisis management available to Europeans for operations in which the North Americans do not wish to become directly involved. In your Rapporteur’s view, it is first and foremost the instrument that must allow the Europeans to defend their vital interests.

138. Despite the reservations expressed by some who appear to cast doubt on the compromise embodied in the Amsterdam Treaty, even before it has been ratified and enters into force, there is no doubt that it emerges from the Treaty that the EU and WEU together form a unique foreign and security policy instrument in the hands of Europeans, in which the EU’s economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian capabilities are complemented by direct access to WEU’s politico-military crisis-management capability.

139. In this respect, it is important to stress the considerable efforts WEU has made in order to become, six years after the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, a fully operational crisis-management organisation equipped with a Planning Cell, a Situation Centre, a Satellite Centre, a Military Committee and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) upon which it can call independently of the assets and capabilities NATO may make available on a case-by case basis.

140. Apart from its ability to perform the whole range of Petersberg missions, WEU has also extended its activities to operations of a less traditional nature such as blockade and embargo enforcement, minesweeping on land or at sea and police duties. While emphasising that WEU should not be confined to the performance of such tasks, it is to be noted that it remains one of the few organisations in which military and non-military aspects of a mission can be addressed under a single operational authority.

141. An important feature of WEU is its relationship with different categories of countries which allows them to participate in most of its activities. The ten central European associate partners join the Permanent Council every second

week and at these meetings they discuss all issues on the agenda, ranging from possible operations to relations with Russia, on an equal footing with the member states. The three associate members (Iceland, Norway and Turkey) which are non-EU but full NATO members, and the five observers (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) four of which are non-NATO but full EU members, are now involved in all WEU's dealings with the EU and NATO on the same footing as the WEU member states. Since the WEU Council's decisions in Erfurt in November 1997, associate members can participate in WEU operations for the EU, while observers can take part in WEU's operations using CJTF. WEU's Brussels Declaration of 22 July 1997 stipulates that when the EU avails itself of WEU, it will entitle members of the EU, who are not members of WEU (observers), to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning, decision-taking and actions carried out by WEU.

142. It is also important to stress that as WEU has gradually been transformed in recent years into a truly operational instrument at the disposal of the member countries, it has seemed logical to look for ways of avoiding the political blockages which have so far prevented WEU from being used for real crisis management. Thus, in 1996 the WEU Council accepted the "framework nation" concept, making it possible to set up an operation rapidly by having recourse to the headquarters staff of a nation particularly concerned by a specific crisis, while ensuring broad representation of the multinational coalition on that staff.

143. It is with the same concern for greater political flexibility within the Organisation that, since the WEU Council of Ministers' meeting in Erfurt, the debate has continued on "*constructive abstention*" which would allow certain countries to support a decision taken by others to launch an operation without having to participate in it themselves, while authorising countries in the coalition to use WEU's joint assets and procedures.

144. As has been seen, WEU has made huge progress both in political terms and as regards its operational reorganisation. Today, it has a set-up enabling it to implement, alone or in collaboration with NATO, the whole series of Petersberg missions ranging from a modest brigade-sized

humanitarian support mission to a large-scale peace-enforcement operation requiring as many as 85 000 troops on the ground, deployed over a distance of 6 000 kilometres and for a duration of one year.

145. And yet there are still some problems to be overcome. Europe appears reluctant to take responsibilities. The debate on European security is still highly political and takes place in an atmosphere charged with emotion that often brings "Atlanticists" and "Europeanists" into conflict. In your Rapporteur's opinion, there is absolutely no point in pursuing this quarrel.

146. Indeed, Europe cannot ignore the realities of its situation and will have to face up to certain facts, namely:

- threats continue to persist at its borders;
- it needs to be capable of defending its vital interests – this has become even more important now that the euro is about to become a reality and will have to be defended;
- even the largest European countries can no longer take military action on their own;
- it knows that the Americans are reluctant to intervene in Europe when the direct security of their allies is not in question;
- it knows from its debate with the United States on burden-sharing that there is an American disengagement from Europe, in the framework of NATO's new strategic concept;
- the refusal of some EU member states to allow the European Union to take on a common defence policy;
- the crucial need to keep intact the key element of European security, namely, Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- it is morally and strategically impossible for Europe to hand over its entire operational capability to NATO where its deployment will always depend on the outcome of the transatlantic dia-

logue and the agreement of countries that are not members of the European Union.

147. For all these reasons, it is clear to your Rapporteur that:

- the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to develop for a long time to come both within and outside the Atlantic Alliance;
- WEU will have to draw much closer to the European Union so that it can act as the EU's defence component in a climate of mutual trust;
- more than ever before, only countries that are members of both the European Union and NATO can be invited to become members of WEU.

148. In this context, the Assembly of WEU can only welcome France's return to NATO's military structures and it is also in favour of proposing, through its President, regular meetings of the defence ministers of EU member countries, which would help to define Europe's armaments requirements.

149. Furthermore, the Assembly of WEU should also welcome the comments made by the British Prime Minister at the European summit in Pörtschach where he expressed his desire for

Europe to have a greater security and defence capability while saying he was open to a whole range of institutional solutions to help achieve that objective.

150. Europe certainly has a lot more work to do before it reaches a degree of political unification sufficient for its voice to be heard and respected in the world of increasing globalisation in which we live. However, it is moving in the right direction. Over the months ahead, it is essential for WEU, which has now established its operational links with NATO, to work hard to forge close political and practical ties with the EU Council of Ministers and the Commission. It is the quality of that collaboration that will generate a resolve for Europe to play its part on the international stage in a spirit of "European sovereignty".

151. Your Rapporteur would remind those who do not wish to acknowledge the exceptional contribution WEU is making to the development of the ESDI and do not want WEU's operational capabilities to be transferred to NATO alone, of the words of Ms Alyson Bailes, WEU's Political Director, in an address to a seminar in Riga on 6 December 1997: "For as long as WEU exists, NATO will not need to split itself in two in order to meet the European need for a separate defence identity".