

Report by the WEU Assembly on the policy of its Member States (1 July 1958)

Caption: In a report submitted to the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) on 1 July 1958, the General Affairs Committee emphasises that the WEU Member States have hitherto not pursued a common policy, contrary to what they concluded when they ratified the Paris Agreements.

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1st July, 1958

The Policy of Member States of Western European Union¹**REPORT²**

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee³
by General Corniglion-Molinier, Rapporteur***

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on the policy of member States

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***Draft Recommendation
on the policy of member States***

The Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction the Council Reply to Recommendation No. 11, and especially the Council's favourable view of the Assembly's proposals in the political field;

Considering the need to reach agreement in a conciliatory spirit when differences arise between member States;

Recalling the satisfactory settlement of the Franco-German dispute over the Saar through the efforts of the Council of Western European Union in particular;

Recalling the undertaking of member States contained in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, an undertaking binding the member States of Western European Union in conformity with the Brussels Treaty;

Recalling the declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany of 3rd October, 1954, in Part

1. Cf. Documents 65 (1957) and 79 (1958).

2. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 3 with 1 abstention.

3. Members of the Committee : Mr. Gaborit (Acting Chairman); Mr. Kiesinger (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alric, Badini Confalonieri (Substitute: Basile), Bettoli, Dehouze, Sir Thomas Dugdale, MM. Finch (Substitute: Randall), Furley, Hale, Dame Florence Horsbrugh, MM. van Kau-

venbergh, Kopf, Lord Lansdowne, MM. Legendre, Metzger, Meyer (Substitute: Kuhn), Montini, Motz, Ninine (Substitute: Moutet), Patijn, Santero (Substitute: Sibille), Schmal, Senghor (Substitute: Corniglion-Molinier), Spallacci, Mme Stoffels-van Haaften, Mr. Struye.

N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.

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V of the Final Act of the London Conference, by which this country renounced the use of armed force to modify its Eastern frontiers;

Considering that the idea of European union may lead to a lessening of tension in central Europe,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it prepare a protocol under the terms of which member States would mutually guarantee military non-intervention in each other's internal affairs and to which third states maintaining forces on their territory would adhere;
2. That it invite the central and eastern European states to undertake simultaneously the same commitments in an identical protocol to which the state maintaining forces on their territory would adhere;
3. That it provide for the creation of an international control commission with the task of verifying that the commitments undertaken in the two protocols are observed.

Explanatory Memorandum

**(submitted by General Corniglion-Molinier,
Rapporteur)**

Introduction

1. Since the signing of the Paris Agreements the States of Western European Union have not followed a common policy. During the last four years national attitudes have reflected the personal interests of member States.

2. In signing and ratifying these agreements the seven States of Western European Union did not intend to solve only one dispute or to make possible such and such a statutory modification. They had deliberately set out in a treaty their desire to constitute a community. This community is directed by a Council, one statutory task of which is to encourage the progressive integration of Europe¹. In order to define a com-

mon attitude the treaty also provided that the Council should be immediately convened on the request of one of its member States in order to permit them to consult "with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability"².

3. Member States therefore gave themselves the means to implement a policy which they have not followed. In the Report he had prepared, Mr. Willey had criticised this attitude and proposed a remedy.

Part One

4. In these circumstances why has Western European Union not been more active in the political field? It may be noted that other organisations — the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Council — also have the co-ordination of foreign policies as one of their objectives. What is the use of Western European Union? Why should European parliamentarians, who already have more and more engrossing claims on their time, urge a Council of Ministers and their Deputies, the ambassadors of the Permanent Council, to undertake a task which they have not undertaken on their own initiative? Why repeat identical debates in each Assembly? Why encourage competition and rivalry which Europe can very well do without between organisations which should work for the same aim?

5. The overhaul of European institutions which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had hoped to further in his Grand Design project was a genuine need. If no results have been obtained, the fault cannot be attributed to European parliamentarians. It was not possible to overlook the political realities which were too readily set aside in the Grand Design.

6. The conviction is now beginning to gain ground that countries having closer ties with each other, through their history, geography and economy, can more speedily and better reach agreement. The unification of Europe is certainly not retarded by partial agreements being reached between European states. Quite the contrary.

1. Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty.

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7. As far as Western European Union is concerned it is not because the seven countries have specific requirements in defence matters that they weaken the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary their closer union brings greater cohesion to the alliance as a whole. This is the spirit of the political co-operation conceived in Western European Union.

8. At the time of the signing of the treaties this co-operation was called for by the Consultative Assembly. It should be remembered that the day after the signing of the Paris Agreements it had expressed the hope¹ that the Council of W.E.U. "will be given sufficient means of action for taking the steps necessary to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe". The position taken here was further confirmed by the Explanatory Memorandum submitted by Mr. Bohy who added that:

"By 'direction of policy', the Assembly understood more than a co-ordination of the foreign policy of the member States, an essential precondition for the creation of an instrument of common defence. What the Assembly visualised was an organisation with powers which would give it more the character of a 'European Political Authority with limited functions but real powers', such as the Assembly has been advocating since 1949. It should be the duty of the new body to direct the pace and guide developments in every field of European unification. From what is known at present of its Statute, it is to be feared that the W.E.U. Council is in no position to play such a role. It would be desirable, therefore, that the W.E.U. Council should possess the appropriate structure and machinery for taking the necessary measures to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe²."

Perhaps the ambitions Mr. Bohy nursed for Western European Union were too great. Four years of hesitation make us more prudent and more considered in our demands.

1. Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 66 of 11th December, 1954, adopted by 82 votes to 7 with 14 abstentions (Document 321).

2. Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 321, paragraph 64.

9. Your General Affairs Committee has studied the future role of the organisation ever since it came into being. In Recommendation No. 11³ the Assembly was notably of the opinion that the Council on major issues affecting European interests, should hold more frequent meetings, especially before meetings of the North Atlantic Council. The Council was also invited to seek to co-ordinate the instructions given to the permanent delegates of member States in the United Nations. On these two points, as we already know, the Council has satisfied the Assembly⁴. The fact is that these proposals were both logical, concrete and modest. The Assembly was in favour of Defence Ministers participating in Council meetings at Ministerial level. The seven Defence Ministers of Western European Union met in April⁵. The Defence Ministers shared the opinion of the Assembly as to the need for such a meeting. Finally the Council pointed out that it intended following up the other two proposals the Assembly had made in the political field⁶.

10. The foregoing reference to the position taken by the Consultative Assembly and the examination of the action taken on the chief political recommendation of the Assembly clearly show that Western European Union has its place in the effort for European political co-operation.

11. The lack of co-operation had become apparent at the time of the Suez crisis in October 1956. On this occasion two member States had acted without informing the Council of Western European Union, and acted in a way which could have created a threat to world peace. This is a well-known example and Mr. Willey in his report had based the whole of his argument on this historical event. He had reached the conclusion that member States should take no decision whatsoever affecting the interests of another member State without prior consultation within the Council of Western European Union. This proposal remains entirely valid.

3. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th May, 1957, on the Reports by MM. Senghor and Montini.

4. Document 79, Chapter II, section 3.

5. 15th April in the Palais de Chaillot.

6. The presence of civil servants at meetings of the Council and the internal organisation of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Document 65).

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12. It is important to turn more than in the past to a policy of settling disputes within Western European Union. However, the negative aspect of a policy is not sufficient. It is not by avoiding disputes or by settling them when they arise that a community spirit can be fostered.

13. Member States must act together politically, and this co-operation must be evident in the relationships of the European countries with third countries or in closer understanding in their internal relationships. It is certainly not our intention to ask the States of Western European Union to take up a position different from that of the other members of the Council of Europe and of the Atlantic community; but the European States can contribute to the general policy of the whole Atlantic community and it is their duty to do so whenever it is in the general interest.

14. Thus they must become fully aware that as the trustees of the idea of European integration, they are committed to the defence of one of the most important political principles of Western Europe and of the Atlantic Alliance.

15. The governments and peoples of western Europe are now conscious of the need to unify Europe. This movement for unification is accompanied by reconciliation between the European peoples who henceforth consider their old quarrels to be outdated. They feel that their salvation depends on their unity and that which draws them together is more important than that which separates them.

16. In a Europe still divided by the aftermath of war, the idea of European unity is most likely to contribute to bringing a solution to the present difficulties. This idea can also be as fruitful for the countries of eastern Europe as for those of western Europe. The former must realise that the unity of Europe is not directed against them, and that it would be more desirable if it could be achieved with them. Co-operation between all European states over and beyond frontiers and ideologies with a view to greater unity would lead to a reduction of tension. Thus this political initiative centred around the European idea would facilitate the reunification of Germany.

17. Western European Union is not the only European organisation competent in the political

field. Grouping the main powers of western Europe which only yesterday were rivals or enemies, it can contribute to general agreement. In putting forward the proposals which are to follow, the Assembly of Western European Union only wishes to draw attention to what it deems to be the conditions necessary for a solution.

Part Two

18. Certain objectives must be fixed now; means to attain them are proposed by the Assembly for the consideration of the Council, the governments of member States and the Consultative Assembly.

THE OBJECTIVES

19. Fear must be banished from the relationships between the States of Europe. The principal obstacle to a general agreement leading to a reduction of tension in Europe is the question of the eastern frontiers of Germany. The eastern frontiers of Germany, which were laid down provisionally, are neither just nor satisfactory. They create a territorial conflict between Germany and Poland more serious than that left by the Treaty of Versailles.

20. A general settlement concerning the relationships between Germany and her eastern neighbours and their territorial disputes will facilitate the reunification of this country which is a crucial problem in central Europe. Failing agreement, the eastern countries might find that their interests lie in opposing Germany's reunification, fearing an increase in tension between them and the reunified state.

21. Agreement on German-Polish relations and the solution of the reunification problem must be included in the framework of a European arrangement, itself a factor in the European unification project. Consequently in this matter the aim is to reassure eastern European powers of the peaceful nature of German intentions and to give them a guarantee that the problem of relations in eastern Europe will be conditional upon the idea of European unification.

22. The first stage would be to reassure the countries of eastern Europe of the intentions of Germany and of western Europe in the event of a general European settlement. Subsequently it

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should be made possible for the countries of Europe — especially those of eastern Europe — to achieve limited but real evolution in European policy.

23. The Polish plan known as the Rapacki Plan for regional and limited disarmament was an attempt in this direction; the Defence Committee has already adopted a report stating the reasons that make it unacceptable. The Rapacki Plan provided for a special status for certain central European states in military matters intended to reduce tension in Europe. The true cause of tension however does not lie in the accumulation of weapons on both sides of the frontier but in the existence of political difficulties. The countries of Europe must obtain recognition of their right to negotiate and settle among themselves the problems raised by European unification. Thus the countries of eastern Europe could again entertain the hope of being associated in European unification.

THE MEANS

The relations between Germany and its eastern neighbours

24. Franco-German reconciliation was the first step and the *sine qua non* for the unification of western Europe. This reconciliation is of value as an example. In particular it was possible to solve the Saar affair within the context of a European policy associating a certain number of west European states with France and Germany. In order to remove the obstacles in the way of reconciliation between Germany and its neighbours in the east this State has made a declaration guaranteed by the member States of Western European Union, which, as is known, has retained a non-discriminatory control over the rearming of Germany through the limitation of armaments of its member States¹. In this solemn declaration, Germany confirmed what its government has already affirmed on several occasions: that it would not seek to obtain by military force any modification of its eastern frontiers.

Non-intervention in the internal affairs of European states

25. To enable European states to participate to an ever-increasing extent in the movement towards unity in Europe, in spite of opposition from

the two blocs, it would be desirable for them to be able to take any decision they deem necessary without running the risk of foreign military intervention on the part of their neighbours.

26. A protocol would be proposed to all the States of Europe desirous of acceding to it, by the States of Western European Union, who would mutually guarantee military non-intervention in their internal affairs. This protocol would specify that the stationing of foreign forces in the signatory states would not be affected by this protocol. Nonetheless these forces would not have the right to intervene directly in the internal affairs of the country upon whose territory they were stationed.

27. The United States and Canada on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other hand, by the fact that they maintain forces on European territory, should be invited to adhere to this protocol.

28. The European protocol on military non-intervention in the internal affairs of European states would have to be supervised by an international commission which would annually carry out enquiries on the way in which the protocol is respected, and which could be called upon in cases of emergency on the request of a member State, to take note of non-respect of the protocol. For example it could be agreed that the result of the inspection, of the observations of the commission in cases of flagrant non-observance of the protocol, would be addressed to the Security Council, and the matter automatically brought before it.

Conclusion

29. By the declaration renouncing recourse to military intervention for modifying the frontiers of Germany established by a peace treaty and by the European Protocol on mutual non-intervention in internal affairs, an evolution of political regime, of foreign policy and of the public opinion of European states free from the fear of armed intervention, would enable the idea of European unification to gain ground in the states situated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This procedure could be proposed to the eastern partners at the Summit Conference. This would be the contribution of Western European Union to the reduction of tension in Europe and to the achievement of the policy, the main trends of which were contained in the Mackay Protocol in 1950.

I. Protocol No. III of the Paris Agreements.