

Report by the WEU Assembly on the policy of WEU (3 May 1960)

Caption: In a report submitted to the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) on 3 May 1960, the General Affairs Committee analyses the varying fortunes of the building of Europe and concludes by suggesting proposals to address the issues raised.

Source: Proceedings. Sixth ordinary session. First part, I. Assembly documents. Paris: Assembly of Western European Union, July 1960. 193 p.

Copyright: (c) WEU Assembly - Assemblée de l'UEO

URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/report_by_the_weu_assembly_on_the_policy_of_weu_3_may_1960-en-7bb2126c-f549-4881-b8e1-ee25754e2f2b.html

Publication date: 05/09/2012

Document 168

3rd May, 1960

The policy of Western European Union***The varying fortunes of the building of Europe*****REPORT ¹**

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Arthur Conte, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION	on the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Atomic Energy Community
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION	on the policy of Western European Union
DRAFT DIRECTIVE	on relations between Europe and Africa
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM	submitted by Mr. Arthur Conte, Rapporteur
	Introduction
	I. Origins and aims of Western European Union
	II. The work of W. E. U.
	III. Critical period in the growth of Europe
	IV. What can be done ?

I***Draft Recommendation******on the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Atomic Energy Community***

The Assembly,

Recalling its Recommendation No. 7 on the relations between Euratom and Western European Union;

Considering the co-operation in Europe in the field of nuclear energy, carried out by the European Organisation for Nuclear Research in

Geneva and by the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the O.E.E.C.;

Considering the importance of joint action by European countries in the field of nuclear energy,

RECOMMENDS

That the governments of the seven member States which form the Council examine together the possibility of the United Kingdom acceding as a full member of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Patijn (Chairman); MM. Junot, Heye (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abdesselam, Alric, Bettiol, Cravatte, Dehousse, Delargy (Substitute: Hynd), Lady Horsbrugh (Substitute: Mathew), MM. Kirk, Kliesing, Kühn, Marchese Lucifero d'Aprigliano (Substitute: Basile), MM. Meyer, Montini, Motz, N'Gounio

(Substitute: Michard), Sir Hendrie Oakshott, MM. Piccioni, Ponti, Schmal, Seidl (Substitute: Höfler), Slater, Sourbet (Substitute: Conte), Mme Stoffels-van Haaften, MM. Struye, Zimmer.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

DOCUMENT 168

II

Draft Recommendation**on the policy of Western European Union**

The Assembly,

Considering the task of political unification of Europe laid on Western European Union by the signatories of the Paris Agreements;

Considering the problems facing members of Western European Union owing to the existence of the European Communities, and having examined the relations between the member States;

Considering that the political and military links formed by Western European Union should be in no way weakened;

Convinced that the reconciliation of the economic interests of Europe can be explored in the political framework of Western European Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Should use its good offices to facilitate the successful conclusion of the negotiations at present being conducted in the Committee on Trade Questions of the Twenty-one with a view to achieving a practical agreement between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association.

III

Draft Order**on relations between Europe and Africa**

The Assembly,

Having debated the report on the varying fortunes of the building of Europe,

DIRECTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To report to it at the Second Part of its Sixth Ordinary Session on the repercussions of European construction on those African countries

having particular links with certain European States.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Arthur Conte, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. When the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union decided, at its meeting on 18th March, 1960, to prepare a report which would be a faithful and all-embracing reflection of Europe in 1960, the main object it had in mind was to review the relations between the countries which are now habitually known as "the Six" on the one hand and Great Britain on the other.

2. From the beginning of its discussion, it was, however, unwilling to restrict its examination to this very special aspect of European questions, notwithstanding its importance. It supported the British Representatives, who refused to give such a study the very conspicuous title "London and the Six", and elected to consider all European problems as a whole and in detail.

3. It likewise requested its Rapporteur to go to the root of every problem not sparing severe criticism in making a candid analysis, his duty being to produce an objective report.

The Rapporteur has endeavoured to meet these requirements.

4. Europe in the making has met with some setbacks. What? And who is responsible for them?

5. Europe, feeling its way here, or impatient there, still has great hopes. What are they? And what body is best suited for encouraging this new growth?

6. Such are the principal questions in a report which could therefore be entitled "the varying fortunes of the building of Europe" and which, after examination and analysis, justifies its existence only insofar as it is constructive and is not content with merely noting what is satisfactory or what is not, but concludes with short and long-term proposals which are both realistic and constructive.

DOCUMENT 168

7. First, therefore, let us describe the first moments of awareness of Europe, and define clearly the meaning of our own Union — Western European Union.

**I. Origins and aims
of Western European Union**

8. Western European Union is a direct descendant of the Brussels Treaty, which itself was an extension and prolongation of the defensive pact concluded between the United Kingdom and France on 4th March, 1947, defining and instituting mutual assistance in the event of any future aggression against one or other of the two countries, and providing for joint action against any renewal of Hitlerite militarism.

9. The unfolding of events — failure of the Moscow Conference on demilitarisation; the institution of Western Germany as an economic unit and its rapid advance towards full political independence; the refusal of the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples' Republics, that of Prague being the most dramatic and spectacular, to accept the offer of economic assistance extended by General Marshall; the creation of the Kominform; the realisation of the relentless aims of Stalinist hegemony — made it rapidly evident to certain statesmen, and particularly Ernest Bevin, that it was necessary on the one hand to extend the Franco-British co-operation as described in the Dunkirk Treaty to the three Benelux countries, and on the other hand to consider extending the field of application of the Alliance beyond the limitations imposed by memories of the last World War to cover events other than aggression or the threat of aggression from Germany alone. Together, Paris and London discovered new dangers, greater than the Hitlerite ghost, in the very realistic plans of Stalin.

10. This was the spirit of the Brussels Treaty, valid for fifty years, signed on 17th March, 1948, by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

11. This Treaty was intended to defend democratic principles and stood not only as a means of protection against future aggression by Germany, which would not have been able to achieve democracy nor rid itself of the Hitlerite demon, but also as a pact for mutual assistance with an automatic clause to cover armed aggression

against one of the signatory powers in Europe, and as pact for cultural, social and economic co-operation. It also made provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes which may arise between the member countries of the coalition who were required to give proof in every field of the good faith which united them in this new Holy Alliance.

12. In 1954, on the eve of the Paris Agreements, part of the rôle of the Brussels Treaty Organisation was played by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which had absorbed the military committees in particular, whilst political and economic co-operation were being developed on parallel lines in the Council of Europe and the O.E.E.C.

13. Although weakened in fact, the scope of the Treaty remained intact legally and, moreover, was to be the cornerstone of Western European Union.

14. Then came the idea of having German troops contribute to the defence of the West.

15. British statesmen proclaimed this need before American statesman, and the idea was only accepted by French statesmen with great reluctance.

16. The undoubted success of democracy in Bonn, the party spirit which had succeeded in bringing to the fore such men as the Christian-Democrat Conrad Adenauer, the Socialist Kurt Schumacher and the Liberal Theodor Heuss, and the fondness of freedom which was undeniably discovered in German youth, gave the leading western statesmen confidence. They were also deeply concerned not to leave Germany too much in isolation, and hence more exposed to a revival of aggressive militarism or tempted to seek in the East a degree of understanding and even alliances which the West might refuse to offer. Without doubt their main concern was to link or to "bind" Germany to the West.

17. It was decided to organise a European defence community — a European army in which German soldiers would be integrated.

18. Everyone knows the circumstances in which the French parliament rejected this at an unforgettable sitting: the primary reason was the United Kingdom's refusal to participate from the start of the discussions.

19. After the downfall of the E.D.C., European military co-operation and the rapprochement of

DOCUMENT 168

the United Kingdom, France, Benelux and Germany were pursued in three directions: acknowledgement of the military sovereignty of Federal Germany; extension of the Brussels Treaty to include German participation; association with N.A.T.O.

20. The Paris Agreements signed on 23rd October, 1954, were concluded after a series of conferences held in the British and French capitals and negotiations between France and Germany. They included Franco-German agreements settling various points such as the status of the Saar, agreements between the United States, France and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other on the restoration of German military sovereignty and *inter alia* the termination of the occupation régime, agreements between the Seven (the five signatory powers of the Brussels Treaty, Italy and Germany who were invited to accede to that Treaty) amending and completing the Brussels Treaty extended to these seven countries; finally, a protocol for the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

21. Born of these texts, Western European Union represents a strengthening of the structure of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and a close link with N.A.T.O.

22. And, like the Brussels Treaty Organisation, W.E.U. was formed as a system of economic, cultural, social and military co-operation. Additionally a fundamental provision is that it has a task to fulfil in controlling the level and armaments of military forces of the member States in Europe. Under the agreements, it may even take joint action in the latter field.

23. Further, W.E.U. has strong connections with N.A.T.O.: there is close co-operation with equivalent bodies in N.A.T.O.; the military forces of its member States are included in the Atlantic Organisation without W.E.U. constituting a separate level; finally, WEU forces come under the NATO military authorities.

24. In a general description of W.E.U. it must first be acknowledged that it succeeded in solving the military aspects of the German problem and avoided the major error of the Treaty of Versailles: placing conquered Germany in quarantine, the result of which was to drive it to seek revenge. Next it must be recognised that it gave

expression to the need felt by many western statesmen to bring the European States closer together for joint action in a century of continents and large groupings.

25. Other distinctive characteristics: it is an organisation of the conventional alliance type as opposed to integrationist approaches such as the Coal and Steel Community and even N.A.T.O.; it is an organisation with a limited number of members which constitutes both its weakness and its strength, its weakness because it is often compelled to fall in with larger bodies (O.E.E.C., the Council of Europe or N.A.T.O.), its strength because within the wider European framework it unites the six countries which are moving towards European integration and the United Kingdom which is more inclined to follow the road of co-operation while at the same time having obligations outside Europe.

26. These general characteristics and distinctive features explain the achievements of W.E.U. over the last five years.

II. The work of W. E. U.

27. Since its implementation, the rôle of W.E.U. has been either technical because of the special responsibilities devolving upon it under the Paris Agreements, or political because of the discussions which have taken place in its Assembly or in the Council of Ministers on the concept of joint action to follow consultation between the member States on problems concerning their common security.

28. On the technical level it cannot be denied that the rôle of W.E.U. — regrettably or not — has lost much of its substance,

— either because the purpose no longer exists: this was the case of the European Commission for the Saar Referendum which had to supervise the preparations for the referendum and the referendum itself; it was also the case of the Tribunal of International Composition set up to ensure that no-one would suffer because of the political attitude adopted during the period of preparation or during the Saar elections themselves following the referendum and whose mandate came to an end in 1959;

- or because of the transfer of its activities to other organisations; this was the case of the cultural and social activities which were transferred to the Council of Europe in 1959 for reasons of rationalisation; the same applies to the work of the Standing Committee on Naval Forces which was transferred to N.A.T.O. in 1958 and also the work on air forces which was suspended to avoid duplication with N.A.T.O.
29. Its technical activities have been mainly military with the work of the Standing Armaments Committee in the field of ground forces and the control activities of the Armaments Agency.
30. The Committee has been able to proceed with exchanges of information on existing equipment and exchanges of scientific information and the definition and production of equipment items, a field in which it has been possible to reach agreement on the characteristics of certain types of modern weapons.
31. From 1956 to 1959 the number of controls carried out by the Agency has increased considerably, but because the legal convention provided for in Protocol No. IV has not yet come into force it has only been possible to exercise field controls in factories with the agreement of the manufacturers and this reduces its effectiveness.
32. It should also be noted that hitherto controls have been limited to conventional arms. Control methods for guided missiles and chemical and biological weapons are only just being prepared. Finally, with regard to atomic weapons, technical difficulties (experts, definitions, etc.) have prevented even the study of control methods being commenced.
33. To sum up, the main interest of Western European Union is much more its non-technical rôle. This interest lies in the now accepted practice of meeting to endeavour to define a joint line of action for the WEU countries on items on the agenda of other international organisations. It also stems from the general discussions which have been held in this Assembly and finally from the fact that the Union is an excellent meeting place for the United Kingdom and the six member States of the integrated communities.
34. An outcome of circumstances, partly due at the outset to a conventional concept of European policy inherited from the nineteenth century — the Europe of Metternich without Metternich — and resulting from the need to avoid the disorder which might have arisen after the rejection of the E.D.C., W.E.U. must adapt itself to the changing circumstances of European political life. Whilst many of the competences of W.E.U. have disappeared in latter years, either because the original purpose has been abolished or through the transfer of responsibilities, two still remain which are primordial and which may lead to constructive action by the organisation, i.e. participation in joint policy and the standardisation of armaments with particular regard to ground forces.
35. The future rôle of W.E.U. therefore lies in the formulation of a European policy.
- ### III. Critical period in the growth of Europe
36. The trend of WEU policy is faced with a problem because the creation of Europe is passing through a critical period.
37. For several years, other aspects of European policy have gradually taken shape, relegating the original aim of W.E.U., i.e. the question of disarming Germany — or of rearming Germany according to one's particular point of view — to second place, or even further.
38. The idea of European co-operation which has been developed in various forms, for instance in O.E.E.C. set up in 1948, or in the Coal and Steel Community formed in 1953, has changed the outlook of European evolution.
39. Parallel with a programme of collaboration for facilitating exchanges between European countries (eighteen in O.E.E.C.) by freeing quotas and lowering customs duties, thus enabling them to develop their respective economies, a far more audacious programme of economic integration has been drawn up which is to produce a common market governed by identical rules for all the participants and even requiring them to relinquish part of their national sovereignty. Limited in the first place to coal and steel, this programme became general when France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Rome Treaty in 1957 which stipulated that within 15 years

DOCUMENT 168

the six signatory countries should introduce the free movement of persons, goods and capital and impose a common external tariff.

40. An attempt was made to include the six-power Common Market — to which the United Kingdom refused to adhere — in a wider free trade area including the countries of the O.E.E.C. with which it would be linked. In December 1958, the work of the committee set up for this purpose, under the chairmanship of Mr. Maudling, met with failure, perhaps because too much attention was paid to tariff problems without, moreover, resolving the ambiguous nature of these problems, perhaps because they were unable to surmount certain technical difficulties, particularly agricultural ones. This failure compromised even relations between the Six and the other OEEC countries and was a basic reason for the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland setting up a European Free Trade Association signed in Stockholm on 20th November, 1959. For its part, the European Community Commission prepared a programme for speeding up the implementation of the Common Market which has just been submitted by its President, Mr. Hallstein, and approved by the Assembly of the Community after a wide discussion.

41. Sandwiched between these different programmes, the one based mainly on commercial co-operation, and the other admitting the concept of integration, Europe is trying to find its feet and each of the European countries, more or less tied down to commercial or political traditions, is wondering where to turn.

This is the cause of some disturbance.

There may be grave consequences, even on the political level.

How has this delicate situation arisen?

42. In order to understand this the better, an analysis must be made of the feelings dominant in the United Kingdom on the one hand and in the continental six on the other.

(a) *The questions raised in the United Kingdom*

43. The United Kingdom of 1960 is quite different to the United Kingdom of 1945.

44. Its position in 1945 was identical to that of France in 1919, victorious but exhausted, morally great but economically weak, faced without transition with one of the greatest events

of our century — scattered empires being replaced by grouped empires, the world-wide empire of Victoria and French or Dutch colonies being replaced by closely unified and geographically-linked empires of the American, Russian or Chinese type — Great Britain has stood up to this with a praiseworthy degree of courage. It found a radical solution to the problem of its empire by being the first to decolonise, a move which began with India and has spread ever since. It has dressed its sores and healed its wounds. It has provided itself with the basis of an atomic force.

45. However, national conscience has not progressed so quickly as events. Far too used to exercising a preponderating influence over the European Continent, the United Kingdom has not fully realised what is happening across the Channel: there too are countries on the way to recovery, tired of too many civil wars, eager to work together at last.

46. Immediately after the war, the United Kingdom admittedly took part in the organisations set up to promote the economic recovery and political reconciliation of the European countries: O.E.E.C. and the Council of Europe. And Winston Churchill, like the leaders of the Labour Party, has appealed for the building of Europe. Great Britain remained outside the institutions and projects set up by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries from 1950 onwards: E.C.S.C., E.E.C., Euratom. It has even been implied that it did not adhere to them for lack of confidence: it did not believe the communities set up by the Six would last. A house of cards was being built which would collapse at the slightest breath of air. It was certain that on the incorrigible continent of Napoleon and Bismarck the events of the nineteenth century would soon be repeated. It wished to stand aside from these upheavals and the incessant dramas arising from too many unstable frontiers. To some extent the part it played was that of a consulting engineer who did not trust the builders.

And there is the Commonwealth.

47. It is in vain that the formulas for political association have been stretched sometimes to the point of weakening certain links between London and its old colonies.

48. Great Britain has a touching faith in its Commonwealth which prevents it, more than

DOCUMENT 168

anything else, from believing in the rising "Europeanwealth".

49. It is true that the Dominions still play a dominant rôle in the economic balance of the United Kingdom. Two examples may be quoted: London exports more to Australia and New Zealand than to the six Common Market countries and more than half of world trade is transacted in sterling. But psychologically the problem is more pathetic: Britain is afraid of losing for ever the old house it has inherited from the empire if it moves into the new house continental Europeans wish to build for themselves.

50. Continental opinion too often believes Britain to be sulking when in fact it has simply failed to recognise the new situation in Europe, too often sees bad faith instead of what is above all legitimate faith in the Dominion system.

(b) *Continental impatience*

51. It is easy to understand the state of mind of the Six — except for their communist parties which will not profess to being European before receiving word from Moscow, or members of certain nationalist groups who, moreover, are often anti-British or followers of Maurras or d'Annunzio and dream of an English Europe without the English, or again certain parties or senior officials who dislike the idea of integration but who have agreed to stand by the commitments of their countries when the treaties setting up Communities have been signed.

52. First, the new generations do not want to follow the errors of previous generations "My great-grandfather fought a war" says the average Frenchman in 1960 — "my grandfather also. My father did too and now myself. The best I can do is to avoid such horrors for my son. To do that one must put an end to what is now purely secular hatred; a fraternal community must be formed with our old enemies." This is the way the average German thinks in 1960, and the average Italian, Belgian, the Dutchman or Luxembourger who do not want their countries to go through the misfortunes of 1940 again. This is a dominating thought which leads to the birth of true European patriotism, a new and major factor in present and coming years. Reasoning has led to faith: awareness of common security has led to a realisation of a common destiny. At the outset, the same thoughts prevailed

in the united states of France, the united provinces of Germany and the united principalities of Italy as well as between the Walloons and the Flemings in Belgium.

53. Another dominating idea: in the era of giants why remain weak and isolated? What is the value of single European nations as opposed to political and economic groups such as those directed by the White House, the Red Kremlin or the Yellow Communists in Peking. Thus the concept of the European Continent is making rapid progress. There is the American Continent, the Communist Universe, Asia which is striving for unity. Why should the European Continent not be built? For what petty little quarrels?

54. The third dominating idea: in the Big Three discussions, a United Europe will find it easier to make itself heard and stand up for its interests. It will command far more respect and attention, will better defend its rights, security and the well-being of its inheritance only if it ceases to be balkanised.

55. Hence the impatience and sometimes irritability or injustice on the part of friendly and admired European countries, who do not appear to understand the depth and reality of such hopes and stubbornly follow the concepts of an era which has come to a close.

56. Yet to be objective, the exaggerated nature of the interpretations of British policy which are only too often current in the six continental countries united in three Communities should be recognised and stressed.

57. They failed to see that, after the world war, Britain, victorious, could not cast aside its various rôles: that of a great European power, coupled with that of a great industrial and commercial power with ties in the Commonwealth and a feeling of Anglo-Saxon intimacy which caused it to turn unflinchingly towards the United States of America. Whilst recording the effects of their economic reconstruction, they were unable to see that these effects were less noticed outside than at home and did not realise that Britain had to be given time to realise how important such transformations were. There was also a tendency to believe that, of all its rôles, Britain would choose its European rôle in the end without realising how difficult and even painful it might be to choose, and that in any case time would be required, it being impossible to reach such a decision

DOCUMENT 168

in a few days. Finally, they were inclined to oversimplify the British attitude, believing it to be guided by commercial considerations alone, rather than endeavouring to understand the reason for its scruples and the legitimacy of its hesitations.

58. Before sketching out the possible lines of action in different fields it is therefore necessary, in throwing light on so many unfortunate misunderstandings which may be exaggerated even more if they are not cleared up, to recall plainly the concepts of those concerned, as expressed by recent statements of representative statesmen.

59. The Ministers in the Foreign Office, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Profumo, the first speaking in Strasbourg on 21st January, 1960, and the other in the Assembly of W.E.U. in Paris on 30th November, 1959, left no doubt as to their feeling that the United Kingdom was an integral part of Europe; they also said how concerned they were about a division of Western Europe into two opposing factions and their wish to achieve a *modus vivendi* which would put an end to all quarrels. Mr. Profumo in particular recalled that "Britain is now part of Europe, and if we, of Western Europe, are to continue to be a real influence for peace and order in the world, then somehow we have got to unite." He added, "Whereas when W.E.U. came into being we in Britain were determined to draw Europe closer together, now we are determined to draw closer to Europe". Continental Europeans should not doubt the sincerity of such statements and should no longer doubt the willingness of the United Kingdom expressed in such solemn terms, to come closer to Europe. It is unthinkable, as some suspect, that it would wish to join the continental Communities only to bring about their downfall or, to repeat one expression, to "sabotage them" from the inside. The British know as well as the Americans that failure to create Europe would lead in a few years to indescribable anarchy in the whole of Europe, the defeat of the free world and redoubled dangers. Our common enemies would then be able to rejoice and, if this happened, Britain would have fought only against herself. Such a thought cannot even have crossed the mind of the Government in London, nor yet of the Opposition, which is at one with the majority in this respect.

60. On the other hand the British, for their part, must realise the truth of the fact that the doors of the six-power Communities remain open to them and that they are not exclusive organisations. Nor are they infernal machines intended solely to overthrow every system of exchange and bring ruin to the City. The offer extended to the United Kingdom was not made grudgingly: there are countless continental Europeans who are convinced that Europe will never be a true Europe if Britain is to be for ever absent.

61. Moreover, are not the recent statements by President Hallstein a firm guarantee of the sincerity of the intentions of the Six and of their will to co-operate? "There will not be a European trade war" he has stated, adding that as long as an economic Community embracing the whole of Europe could not be founded the most important task would be to reach agreement with the Stockholm Seven on urgent and concrete problems. And President Guy Mollet gave expression to a feeling which is widespread in "Little Europe" when he wrote in the November 1959 edition of the magazine "Western World":

"Seen from this angle, Britain's association might seem easy, as it was for the Coal and Steel Community. Exports to the "Six" represent hardly one-seventh of British exports, and everyone on the continent is prepared, in the friendliest of interests, to help in the solving of problems which might conceivably beset British economy. Why then this agitation, pressure, or even threat?"

62. Whilst the Six are enthusiastic about pursuing the work of building Europe they have courageously undertaken because they believe this is an era in which the persistent rancour passed down through history has to be wiped out like leprosy, and because new life has to be encouraged no matter how painful the treatment might be, they lay no claim to autarky, neither economically nor politically. Their aim is to facilitate exchanges between themselves and with the rest of the world and not to erect a barrier of commercial barbed-wire along their external frontiers. To speak in terms dear to Bergson they wish to create "an open world" and not "a closed world". In January 1959, moreover, they gave proof of this when they extended to third coun-

DOCUMENT 168

tries the lowering of customs duties agreed between the signatories of the Common Market.

63. Only if an end is put to past misunderstandings and if the position of each nation is clear and without ulterior motives, will it be possible to seek together a means of overcoming these difficulties in the growth of Europe.

64. Wholehearted sincerity on both sides is a *sine qua non* of the success of the attempts which may be made in this respect.

IV. What can be done?

65. In view of the present situation, which is delicate for the future of Europe, what action may be undertaken to develop the spirit of co-operation between the seven WEU countries, what positive rôle can be played in this sense by Western European Union, the linchpin between the United Kingdom and the six Common Market countries?

66. As the President of the Assembly said with praiseworthy lucidity on 4th February, now is the time to seek the elements of a positive seven-power policy and to seek the fields in which the Seven have joint interests and the means of achieving them together.

A. In the economic field

67. In the economic field, W.E.U. can provide a most valuable forum in which we can strive for two goals: first, to overcome the difficulties in Europe which may arise from the simultaneous existence of the European Free Trade Association and the European Economic Community by forming a link between them; second, taking a resolute view of the future, to seek the means of developing jointly the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to study jointly the construction of rockets for stratosphere research.

(a) A bridge between the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A.

68. The economic situation in Western Europe as a whole has undergone profound changes over the last two years.

69. The reconstruction and the revaluation of national economies have permitted a return to external convertibility of currency. Secondly, the

freeing of inter-European exchanges which has been pursued so tenaciously and successfully by O.E.E.C. is now practically completed everywhere. Finally, the United States together with Canada have gone through difficulties which have brought them to consider their joint economic and political problems together with the European countries, a decision which led to the meetings held in the Hotel Majestic in Paris in January last, the setting up of a Committee of Four and the setting up of the O.E.C.D. in place of the O.E.E.C., which may prove to be an institution of great importance..., proof being the application for adhesion, which was unexpected to say the least, made by Moscow.

70. Hence, in this new context, the problem arises of the relations of the Common Market with the Seven, with the United States and with the western world as a whole.

71. The WEU approach obviously cannot be so widespread. For its action to be of any use at all in this framework, it must be restricted to the more modest field of relations between the continental Six and the Stockholm Seven, and to be even more precise, for this is fundamental, that of relations between the Common Market and Great Britain.

72. At the outset, it is essential to recall the main characteristics of the Common Market and of the European Free Trade Association.

73. The six-power Market and the seven-power Association both provide machinery — spread over a period of time — for abolishing quotas and lowering customs duties, and rules governing competition and planning, but two factors make a distinction between them :

- the existence in the six-power Market of a common external tariff which does not exist in the seven-power Association;
- the absence of harmonisation of economic and trade policies in the Association, each member country retaining the right to set the level of its tariffs with regard to third countries, which makes it necessary to provide a system for checking the origin of products.

74. This last point is of particular importance to the United Kingdom because of the magnitude of exchanges with the Commonwealth countries

DOCUMENT 168

— foodstuffs account for a major part of these exchanges — this being a situation which applies to none of the other six countries in the Association nor to any of the six countries in the Common Market: the exchanges between France and the franc area and the exchanges between Belgium and the Belgian Congo are in fact similar neither in volume nor nature.

75. Account being taken of the system of preferences between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, the main problem therefore is to find a means of conciliating the existence and the maintenance of the common external tariff with Britain's wish to continue economic support in its relations with the Commonwealth. Likewise, the possibility of diversions of trade must be avoided, particularly in some areas which are even more prone to this than others, both at the outset and later, because of possible variations in the tariffs with third countries.

76. Although these questions must be mentioned and some emphasis given to them so that the difficulties to be overcome might be appreciated, they raise such highly technical problems that no claim can be laid to finding a solution in a general report. They are dealt with in detailed reports such as the one prepared for the Consultative Assembly by Mr. Heckscher and are the subject of negotiations such as those pursued in the Committee of Twenty-one.

77. However, a general line of approach might be suggested which would be to develop simultaneously, in a complementary way as far as possible, the common external tariff and the preferential tariffs between the Commonwealth and Britain so that the opening of new markets benefits both the United Kingdom and the Six.

78. On the other hand, and to allay the qualms of some sectors of public opinion and official circles in the United Kingdom when the common tariff is implemented, perhaps it would be desirable to invite the E.E.C. to consider limited adaptations of this tariff in very particular cases which in fact give rise to anomalies: present British opposition to the acceleration of the provisions of the Common Market does not appear to be effective, will only put the backs of the Six up even more, will lead to no tangible result, and vain defiance will lead only to more trouble

and suspicion. A means of reconciliation can never be found in such negative attitudes.

79. The framework of W.E.U. seems quite adequate for exploring the ground in the sense described above. It would permit frank discussion of these problems between people who are accustomed to meeting each other and who are the most directly concerned with finding concrete solutions.

80. This exploration might be carried out as an extension of the discussions between the seven Ministers, possibly assisted by a representative of the European Economic Community Commission. At the outset, and for practical reasons, these discussions should not be over-institutionalised. No doubt there is a risk in friendly discussion of opinions being freely expressed which are not always within the reach of technical agreement. But this risk seems to be of minor importance compared with the advantages of initiating spontaneous discussions which might be paralysed by the existence of a framework which is too institutional. All necessary details are given in the remarkable report by Mr. Michaud which accompanies this one.

(b) Joint development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

81. In Europe, research in the nuclear field is basically carried out by two States, the United Kingdom and France, which have organised specialised authorities for this purpose with the necessary industrial infrastructure and three co-operative bodies: the European Nuclear Research Centre in Geneva, primarily concerned with basic research; the Nuclear Energy Agency of the O.E.E.C.; and Euratom instituted by the six Common Market countries, its programme covering research, the circulation of information and the setting up of joint concerns as necessary.

82. It may be noted that the principal factors of European co-operation in the nuclear field fall within the geographical area of W.E.U. It is obvious that in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which requires the mobilisation of considerable financial, technical and intellectual resources, the different WEU countries have

DOCUMENT 168

everything to gain by obtaining the speedy development of nuclear industries at least expense.

83. The ideal solution would be: *the accession of the United Kingdom to Euratom as a full member*. The seven governments should give frank consideration to the steps which might be taken to provide for this accession. It is absolutely essential for the British to make a gesture of real value and because it will cost them something to do this, it would convince the six continental countries that the United Kingdom is politically capable of changing its attitude. In the nuclear energy field Britain is still a long way ahead of the Six even if obliged to slow down, and in pooling its resources the Six, today, will easily come in first. This should first take place in the field of peaceful uses and later in the military field itself. The nuclear energy field will give Britain full participation in the European Parliamentary Assembly when nuclear questions are debated, in the Euratom Commission and in the Euratom Council of Ministers. This adherence would firmly convince the Six that there is a fundamental change of opinion with regard to Europe at the other end of the possible tunnel under the Channel, and this may later lead to more healthy discussions between the United Kingdom and the Six on the problems raised for all concerned by the commitments and future prospects of the Common Market.

84. We are caught up in a cycle where science reigns. To help Britain to convince itself that in modern times the Channel is no wider than the Rhine, our awareness of belonging to a single continent might also bring us to consider a seven-power European organisation to seek and take stock of fields holding out great hopes for the future such as the manufacture of rockets for stratosphere research, or the development of European supersonic aircraft, or the use and exploitation of solar energy. Science offers an unlimited field of activity for our joint work: we must beware, in view of the requirements of our time which are understood and accepted by other continents, of approaching this problem with the mentality of the stage-coach era, the timidity of the mentally retarded or the oppressive spirit of jealous Middle-Age strongholds. Europe, including the United Kingdom, must

seek and achieve its unity by means of every audacity permitted by science and progress.

B. In the military field

85. The Paris Agreements of 1954 organised a system of European security providing for the participation of Federal Germany in the western defence effort in Europe. The signatory States, however, sought certain guarantees regarding German rearmament, and within Western European Union the presence of the United Kingdom was to ensure the balance of forces so that the French army alone would not be left to counter-balance the Bundeswehr.

86. W.E.U. has been built on two pillars: the first is the presence of British forces on the Continent; the second is the guarantees accompanying the acceptance of German rearmament, i.e. the Bonn Republic's agreement to the non-production of certain weapons or the compulsory limitations imposed on the manufacture of certain heavy conventional weapons.

(a) Presence of British forces on the Continent

87. The latter is at present the subject of highly specialised studies and discussions and need not therefore be considered in a general report.

88. The former gave rise to great concern in 1957 when the member States of W.E.U. were informed of the London proposals to effect considerable reductions in conventional forces, particularly on the Continent. The new trend which has become evident in the United Kingdom in latter months in favour of the maintenance of efficient, highly mobile conventional forces gives reason to hope that the British presence on the Continent will not be called in question again for some time, or at least for as long as international policy calls for extreme prudence. On 29th September, 1954, Mr. Eden made a solemn declaration on the maintenance of British forces on the European Continent. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who then was also Prime Minister, Mr. Mendès-France, the true promoter of the Paris Agreements, immediately replied that he had heard "with emotion" a statement which was "an essential element" in the implementation of a European military alliance. The British undertaking, repeated in Article VI,

DOCUMENT 168

Protocol No. II of the amended Brussels Treaty, played a decisive rôle, a rôle of honour one might say, in the conclusion and ratification of the Paris Agreements and in the acceptance of German rearmament, particularly in France, where the major grievance against the E.D.C. was that it did not include British troops.

89. That is why the government in London caused great concern in the Council and in the Assembly of W.E.U. when, on 14th February, 1957, it made public its plans for the reorganisation of the armed forces in order to lighten the burden of the defence budget on the national economy. In fact the London plan made provision for considerable reductions in the number of ground forces in the Army of the Rhine beginning in the second half of 1957 : 50,000 men instead of 77,000, in addition, a strategic reserve of 5,000 men should remain in the United Kingdom for assignment to Germany. In other words, the four divisions mentioned in Article VI, Protocol No. II were reduced to one armoured brigade, five infantry brigades, three tactical divisional headquarters and one corps headquarters. As for the Second Tactical Air Force, while its strength remained in the region of 12,500 men, it was to include no more than 18 squadrons (216 aircraft) instead of 33 (466 aircraft).

90. In view of the concern expressed, first by the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, who according to Protocol No. II should be consulted and who was concerned at the thinning out of the shield in the north German plain area, then by France and Belgium and finally by Germany which is particularly affected by any weakening of the political and psychological deterrent constituted by the presence of American, Canadian, French and British troops on its territory, London decided to amend its initial plan and proposed a compromise.

91. On 18th March, 1957, the WEU Ministers agreed to a solution based on the views of SACEUR : a first slice of 13,500 men should be withdrawn between 1st April, 1957, and 1st April, 1958, but any further reduction in the form of a second slice, also of 13,500 men, would require the agreement of the Council of W.E.U. Further it was agreed to commence the study in N.A.T.O. of joint problems concerning members of the Alliance with particular regard to the financial

difficulties arising from stationing troops in other member States.

92. Thanks to the financial arrangements concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, the British proposals submitted to the WEU Council at the beginning of 1958 suggested the withdrawal of only 8,500 men which left the following ground forces in Germany : 55,000 men including 5,000 in the strategic reserve. On 29th January, 1958, the WEU Council agreed to these proposals and they were included in the framework laid down in March 1957. The Army of the Rhine was therefore to be composed of seven brigades and three tactical divisional headquarters for ground forces, at least until the end of 1958, since the British did not hide their intention of later maintaining only five brigades, or 45,000 men, up to May 1961 if new provisions were not made for easing the burden on their foreign currency. In any case, W.E.U. upheld the principle that any withdrawal should be subject to the procedure laid down in the Paris Agreements.

93. At the present time, in view of its improved balance of payments situation, it would appear that London is no longer thinking of requesting permission to reduce the Army of the Rhine to 45,000 men. At the beginning of 1960, the British Government even announced that it was postponing the withdrawal of three squadrons of the 2nd ATAF until the end of the year.

94. This is very fortunate. All the friends of Britain on the Continent who wish to work side by side with her in the defence of their freedom welcome the United Kingdom attitude as a sign of new and significant awareness of Europe.

95. It should be understood that the considerations contained in this report would be quite different if the Summit Conference or Conferences were to lead to a complete reversal of international life as a whole. They are fully valid only in the event of a continuation of the cold war in which the West would have to continue to watch over its security, prepared to meet common threats unflinchingly.

That is quite evident.

It is also clear that the withdrawal of British forces from their stations over the Rhine would

DOCUMENT 168

strike a serious blow at the cause of European unity.

(b) Joint production of armaments

96. The position of the United Kingdom has undergone changes with regard to the joint production of armaments, which is highly desirable for obvious reasons.

97. It should be recalled that in the opinion of the French delegation to the nine-power conference in London in 1954, the joint organisation of armaments production was of major importance.

98. But the results obtained by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee have not come up to these expectations. In this Committee, the British Delegation has been very reticent about the idea of producing weapons jointly and showed its preference for a system of providing equipment through commercial channels. The British even expressed concern when they felt that several continental countries were endeavouring to obtain real joint production without waiting for the United Kingdom to take part : this happened in November 1957 when co-operation between France, Italy and Germany improved.

99. It should, however, be noted that, over the last few months, the United Kingdom Defence Minister seemed prepared to revise his country's armaments production policy with a view to increasing co-operation. But it is still difficult to see exactly what the United Kingdom's true aims and intentions are today with regard to co-operation in the field of armaments. The wish should be expressed that the British Ministers provide clear and detailed information in the near future so as to remove any uncertainty. In such an important field the "wait and see" procedure cannot last for ever.

100. There is nothing to indicate the possibility of a change in the present American attitude towards Europe. Let us suppose that a deficit in the American balance of payments, added to certain protectionist tendencies, together with the development of long-range missiles, combine to make the Pentagon revise the whole of its defence policy. Just imagine the situation. So many years lost by every one of the European nations ! Then they would unite, but it would be too late. However legitimate their present hesitations or their commercial interests may be,

why cannot they unite today to standardise and produce jointly weapons which are ruinously expensive if manufactured by each country at the national level ?

(c) The European striking force

101. Mr. Mulley, a British member of parliament, has submitted an outstanding report on this most important subject to the Assembly of W.E.U.

102. There is no point in reverting to his arguments and his studies only six months later.

103. The terms of the recommendation adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December, 1959, however, should be recalled :

"The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Base regional policy for European security within the NATO Alliance on the following two factors :

(a) the creation of a Joint European Strategic Nuclear Force as a deterrent to strategic aggressions on Western Europe and as a complement to the US Strategic Air Command ;

(b) the improvement of ground, tactical air and air defence, as well as naval forces in Europe, with a view to creating a modern, efficient, overall balanced collective force as a deterrent to all kinds of minor aggressions which do not warrant strategic nuclear retaliation, equipped with weapons produced in common, these forces to be capable of opposing effectively by conventional or nuclear means any form of attack ;"

.....

C. Euro-African co-operation

104. A few hours' flight south of industrial Europe, on the other side of the Mediterranean, stretches Africa, a powerful continent in the throes of evolution.

DOCUMENT 168

105. As they pass from the colonial era to the era of independence, the young African States are discovering the problems of a scientific and technical world and the requirements of economic growth at the same time as the advantages of political sovereignty.

106. Yet this transition is not being accomplished at the same rhythm or in the same way everywhere. There is hardly time for a legal structure to be designed and erected before it is surpassed and the architect has to revise his plans, assuming the architect himself is not changed.

107. In this Africa of unstable frontiers, where firm ground turns into quicksand, dedicated to the unknown and rapid metamorphoses, romantically aware of a common soul, seeking to define it and impatient to teach it but fearful of the dangers of balkanisation as much as of a return to the era of mediaeval cruelty, nurturing hopes of producing a race of people like Ralph Bunche whose example incarnates success or humanism, proof that there is only one human condition, but already terrified of the return of a hundred Samories, black Burgraves, and of plans for the domination of certain races or even an Asian invasion — in this continent where everything is possible, for better or for worse, European civilisation can play a valuable rôle as a friendly guide and counsellor once the fear of colonialism is dissipated.

108. Except for Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Sudan and the Spanish and Portuguese Colonies, two main blocs cover the west and all the centre of the continent : French-speaking Africa and English-speaking Africa.

109. The French-speaking countries include :

- (i) the French departments of Algeria, Oasis and Saoura ; the overseas territory of the Somali Coast under the direct administration of the French Republic ;
- (ii) the States of the Community : the Islam Republic of Mauritania, the Upper Volta Republic, the Dahomey Republic, the Ivory Coast Republic, the Republic of Nigeria, the Gabon Republic, the Congo Republic, the Central African Republic, the Chad Republic and the Mali Federation (Senegal and Sudan Republics) and the

Republic of Madagascar, the independence of which is imminent ;

- (iii) the independent States linked to the franc area : the Cameroon Republic, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Tunisia and the Togo Republic (since April 1960) ;
- (iv) other French-speaking countries : Guinea, the Belgian Congo and the Runda-Urundi Territory (under Belgian mandate).

110. The English-speaking countries include :

- (i) British Crown territories, protectorates and colonies: Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Kenya, Uganda and British Somaliland;
- (ii) territories under mandate: Tanganyika and Togoland (British mandate) ; South West Africa (South African mandate);
- (iii) the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland;
- (iv) independent States which are also members of the Commonwealth: the Union of South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria (which will become independent in October);
- (v) independent States which are not members of the Commonwealth: Liberia.

111. However different they may be from the political, economic and ethnical viewpoint, these two main groups have reached more or less the same stage, that of young States seeking their way towards a balanced future and paying close attention to the problems of their economic development.

112. Indeed for these countries which only yesterday were caught up in definite trade currents, and today are still included in vast currency areas, these problems of economic growth are absolutely essential.

113. They are also essential to the whole of Europe, because as the young African States recognise their problems and overcome them, with or without the assistance of Europeans, in a spirit based on the principles of Western culture

DOCUMENT 168

or in a totally different spirit, Europe either will find friends in Africa who will voluntarily offer their friendship, or only neutrals will be found, quite indifferent towards Europe and skilful at striking a bargain for the advantages they may owe to their geographical position, or else opponents may be encountered, ready to combine their forces in their hatred of the white races, ex-colonial States or dealers in raw materials.

114. One dominating aspect, on which W.E.U. might well examine joint action is that of raw materials.

There are two main reasons for this.

115. First, because the stability of the prices of foodstuffs or industrial raw materials, which are the main products of the countries concerned, is essential for the continuity of the economic policy of these young States, for which they provide a steady source of income. Since the prices of the main raw materials may vary by a factor of between one and four it is easy to realise that the stabilisation of these prices can do far more than any direct grant which may be made.

116. Second, because some of the European powers who are members of W.E.U. had, as ex-colonialists in the countries of Africa, provided machinery for adjusting prices in the form of support funds and price guarantees, to mention only two forms. Could not the experience thus acquired be used to organise means such as this on both sides, being equally valid for both the English-speaking countries and the French-speaking countries? Failing this, could not the different WEU countries at least conclude a kind of "charter of procedure" between them to avoid unusual commercial activity gaining advantage from the present circumstances? As a corollary to this the African countries should agree to support such action.

117. It is no doubt difficult to solve these questions because of the complexity of all the economic currents between Europe and Africa, a complexity which is worthy of special study, and also because the WEU countries are not the only ones to play a rôle in the African raw material market and their attempts might be thwarted by action by third parties, no-one gaining any benefit.

118. Yet it would be worth-while for the Assembly of W.E.U. to instruct its General Affairs Committee to prepare a report on this question, which is of capital importance for the future, and for the WEU Ministers likewise to make a joint examination so that a series of concrete measures might be proposed at a future session of the Assembly in harmony with a more general action on the wider level of the new O.E.C.D.

D. In the political field

119. The unification of European political thought is a vast problem.

It would be vain to attempt to tackle this problem here.

120. In the immediate future, it is essential for European statesmen to maintain an atmosphere of friendship and trust particularly when their political choices differ. Our recommendations are quite simple.

121. First, avoid futile mistrust or petty suspicion which may disturb relations between all the Western European nations, ensure that differences which may arise between them with regard to particular problems are not exacerbated, beware that incipient disputes are not allowed to become acrimonious. It is impossible to work properly in an atmosphere of suspicion or hypocrisy. Europe is a large family spurned by many enemies, envied by the jealous, loathed by many tyrants, obliged to face many difficulties and many dangers: its primary duty is to avoid adding to the dangers without, the danger of dissension within its own walls, from which no European would have anything at all to gain. Europe is a great thought stemming from a long and exceptionally rich civilisation and, more than any other continent, commands the unfailing attention of the world as a whole through its books, musicians and works; it is watched by millions of men who would wish to experience its freedom and taste its humanism, it is quoted as an example by millions of men who from the depths of despair, servitude or fear are grateful to it for pointing to the human side of life and for untiringly striving to teach respect for conscience and human rights: Europe does not have the right to let them down by letting them see weak, superficial, internal quarrels which in no way convey

DOCUMENT 168

a true picture of its real self nor an indication of its message.

122. Our next recommendation is to fight against the balkanisation of Europe. It is, no doubt, unfortunate that at the present time Europe is divided between the Community of the Six and the Association of the Seven. Better divided than balkanised however. A two-sided discussion is easier than a thirteen-sided one. This Community and this Association, moreover, cannot allow themselves to act as entities, transposing to the community level some nationalistic jealousy or other, closing in on themselves like new self-centred strongholds: their only wish should be to form embryos of the greater Europe of the future which will one day take its place shoulder to shoulder with America, Asia and Africa. The association of the countries of Shakespeare, Ibsen and Mozart, the community of the countries of Descartes, Goethe, Rembrandt and Dante can be nothing other than the first manifestations of the great Europe which will inevitably obtain the adherence, perhaps in ten months, perhaps in ten years, of Hungary and Poland and the land of Tolstoy. Our little Europes are not closed worlds, we can, we must, consider them only as open worlds. If this thought can be retained in our minds, we shall despise ourselves even more if the temporary discussion between the Six and the Seven were allowed to become embittered.

123. Finally, for the happiness of the young people under our responsibility, and so that we may spur them to serve the great cause, so as not to leave them disillusioned and without ideals in face of the blinding communist mirage or sparkling dreams which are poured out to millions of young people in Asia, we must learn to believe in Europe, not lose our trust in her and not withdraw from the positions prepared by the first statesmen to plan its construction.

124. "The first step in the recreation of the European family" said one of the most famous Europeans 14 years ago, "must be a partnership between France and Germany ... within the United Nations we must recreate the European family in a regional structure called, it may be,

the United States of Europe. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia — for then indeed all would be well — *must be the friends and sponsors* of the new Europe."

125. The man who spoke in these noble terms in Zurich in September 1946 is an Englishman.

He is called Sir Winston Churchill.

126. Many of his hopes have been achieved: Franco-German reconciliation is a fact; the protection of the United States of America, from the Atlantic Pact and the Marshall Plan up to the recent events which led to the work in the Hotel Majestic, has never been absent from the first European achievements.

Only the sponsorship of Moscow has been lacking. Who knows, one day with the assistance of China...

127. The United Kingdom has not withheld its sponsorship either, but Europe is seeking its accession.

128. Monsieur Paul Reynaud once said: "Some say to us, 'Frenchmen, take the risk and shoot first. Overcome all the difficulties in building the House of Europe, and if it proves comfortable, we shall come and install ourselves in the room which you have reserved for us. If the House collapses over your head, we shall attend your funeral with all sympathy'."

129. In the humorous way so dear to the British, those words gave expression to very serious matters and conveyed this profound feeling: all Europeans call on the United Kingdom to join them and they must ensure that it is not impossible for her to find in the great common dwelling-place a room as friendly and as well-heated as in a club.

130. No effort must be spared to reach this end, which is the dream of all true disciples of the European cause and of all the United Kingdom's best friends on the Continent. It would suffice for each European country to contribute a minimum of good will for the dream to have a chance of quickly coming true.

Document 168
Amendment No. 1

2nd June, 1960

Policy of Western European Union

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Montini

Add the following to the substantive text of the first draft Recommendation on the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Atomic Energy Community :

“which would represent adherence to the aims of the six-power Communities, leading subsequently to joint action in pursuance of the European policy symbolised by the Council of Europe.”

Signed : Montini

1. See 6th Sitting, 2nd June, 1960 (Amendment withdrawn).