

## Report by the WEU Assembly on a common security and defence strategy for Europe (Paris, 2 December 2008)

**Caption:** In a report submitted on 2 December 2008 to the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU), the Political Committee reviews the common security and defence strategy for Europe.

**Source:** A common security and defence strategy for Europe - reply to the annual report of the Council . Document A/2028. [ON-LINE]. [s.l.]: Assembly of Western European Union, [09.02.2009]. Disponible sur [http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions\\_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2028.pdf](http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2028.pdf).

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European Security and Defence Assembly  
Assembly of Western European Union

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2 December 2008

**FIFTY-FIFTH SESSION**

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A common security and defence strategy for Europe  
– reply to the annual report of the Council

**REPORT**

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee  
by Daniel Ducarme, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group)

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Report transmitted to: the President of the Council of WEU; the President of the Council of the European Union; the WEU Secretary-General/EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; the President of the European Commission; the EU Commissioner for institutional relations and communication strategy; the Presidents/Speakers of the 39 national parliaments represented in the Assembly; the Presidents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Baltic Assembly, the Nordic Council, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the CIS Parliamentary Assembly; the President of the European Parliament; the Secretaries General of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe, NATO and the OSCE.



Document A/2028

2 December 2008

*A common security and defence strategy for Europe  
– reply to the annual report of the Council*

**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**RECOMMENDATION 824**

on a common security and defence strategy for Europe – reply to the annual report of the Council

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM**

submitted by Daniel Ducarme, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group)

- I. Introduction
- II. Relations with third countries and international organisations
  - 1. The EU and Russia after the war in Georgia
  - 2. The EU, the United States and NATO
  - 3. EU-UN relations
- III. Internal and external aspects of security
  - 1. Introduction
  - 2. French Presidency initiatives
    - (a) The fight against terrorism
    - (b) The fight against organised crime – cyber crime
    - (c) The fight against drug trafficking
    - (d) Migration
  - 3. Disaster and crisis response
  - 4. Energy security and climate change
- IV. Permanent Structured Cooperation
- V. The case for an EU permanent operation headquarters (OHQ)
- VI. Mutual assistance and mutual defence
- VII. Concluding remarks

**APPENDIX**

Recommendation 816 on the revision of the European Security Strategy – reply to the annual report of the Council

**MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Committee on 2 December 2008.

**RECOMMENDATION 824<sup>2</sup>*****on a common security and defence strategy for Europe  
– reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) *Welcoming* the European Council's decision to launch a review of the European Security Strategy but *noting* that what is now to be submitted in 2008 is not a new strategy but rather a text complementing the existing one;
- (ii) *Confirming* that a number of multi-faceted challenges have arisen in the five years since the publication of the European Security Strategy in 2003 and *taking the view* that these need to be reflected in the new document;
- (iii) *Deeply concerned* about the global financial and economic crisis in the second half of 2008, the significant effects it has had on both European and global markets and its likely domino effect on other sectors such as that of ESDP;
- (iv) *Noting* that 23 civilian and military operations have been planned and conducted under the ESDP in its 10 years of existence, thereby creating and promoting a distinct European defence and foreign policy culture;
- (v) *Deeply concerned* about the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia and its effects on the local population and on the political relations between the two countries;
- (vi) *Welcoming*, however, the launch of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in this area and *stressing* the importance of granting the EU monitors unrestricted entry not only into Georgia proper but also into South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
- (vii) *Noting* that following the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 there was a brief interruption of the EU-Russia dialogue which has now been resumed;
- (viii) *Recalling* the 2003 European Security Strategy's description of the transatlantic relationship as irreplaceable and a core element of the international system and of NATO as an important expression of that relationship;
- (ix) *Stressing* that the improvement and further development of EU-UN cooperation will be beneficial for the foreign policy and operations of both organisations and conducive to their playing a positive role in world affairs;
- (x) *Welcoming* the French Presidency's initiatives in the security sector, in particular with regard to the fight against terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking, which have highlighted the importance of those threats for European security and stability and the fact that although much has been done to tackle them in the 10 years of the ESDP's existence further efforts are required;
- (xi) *Welcoming* the steps taken towards improving the EU's civilian and military capabilities such as the appointment of a Civilian Operations Commander to head the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and improvements in the planning and deployment of concurrent operations, to mention but a few examples;
- (xii) *Stressing* that energy security is a volatile sector that is central to the stability of the EU member states and *welcoming* therefore the adoption by the European Council in October 2008 of guidelines for limiting the effects of that volatility and improving the sector's stability;
- (xiii) *Taking the view* that although the Lisbon Treaty has not yet been ratified, the EU member states should as far as possible prepare the ground for permanent structured cooperation within the Union, given the positive effects it will have on a number of ESDP sectors and on the relations between the member states;

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<sup>2</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 2 December 2008 at the 1<sup>st</sup> sitting.

(xiv) *Taking the view* that the reassessment of the European Security Strategy is just the beginning of a more extensive strategic overhaul which will need to be supported by a military sub-strategy giving details of the means by which the EU intends to attain its objectives, so that the member states can achieve more harmonised capabilities planning;

(xv) *Taking into account* the different structures available to the EU today for the planning and conduct of ESDP operations and the lessons learnt from using those structures, and *convinced* that in order to be more efficient the Union needs to further develop its own planning and decision-making capabilities in this sector;

(xvi) *Noting with disappointment* that the French Presidency was unable, due to the lack of unanimity, to pursue plans for the creation of a permanent structure for the planning and conduct of EU operations;

(xvii) *Stressing* that while the mutual assistance clause of the Lisbon Treaty is important in that it introduces the concept of mutual assistance and solidarity into the EU Treaty, it still does not constitute an equivalent to the collective defence clause of the modified Brussels Treaty and therefore cannot replace it,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. Review and confirm the recommendation adopted by the Assembly on 3 June 2008 regarding the five essential pillars for the progressive formulation of a European security and defence policy and a strengthened European Security Strategy;<sup>3</sup>

2. Task the EU High Representative with the review of a Common Security and Defence Strategy for Europe, based on the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 complement, to include proposals for:

- drawing up a White Paper on European external, security and defence policy: or, alternatively, bearing in mind the sensitivity of certain nations in regard to such a policy, keeping open the option of publishing a Green Paper before taking matters forward any further (a Green Paper being a consultative document on a specific policy area addressed to the parties concerned who are invited to take part in the consultation process and debate, whilst a White Paper contains an official body of proposals for collective action in a specific policy area and also constitutes the instrument of their implementation);
- reconciling the mutual assistance provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty with the mutual defence clause of the modified Brussels Treaty, giving precedence to mutual defence as the ESDP and the European Security Strategy are put into practice over time;
- preparing the ground for permanent structured cooperation;
- defining precisely what joint action between the EU and NATO consists of, through the adoption of an ad hoc charter; also for defining the European Union's partnerships with Russia, the African Union and the Mediterranean countries;
- speeding up the introduction of an open and competitive European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM);

3. Improve on the coherence of the 2003 European Security Strategy by providing concrete details of the policies that the EU needs to adopt in order to strengthen the ESDP further, and how such policies are to be implemented;

4. Intensify the EU-UN dialogue with a view to improving operational cooperation in-theatre and establishing exactly where responsibility for the conduct of operations lies;

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<sup>3</sup> Appendix: Recommendation 816 on the revision of the European Security Strategy – reply to the annual report of the Council.

5. Enter into permanent dialogue with the new US Administration in order to further deepen and improve the transatlantic relationship, and EU-NATO relations in particular, and continue to demonstrate the added value that Europe can bring to the transatlantic community;
6. Engage in dialogue with Russia with a view to stabilising the EU's relations with that country and maintaining cooperation with it on the basis of mutual interdependence and common security interests so as to avoid isolating this eastern partner;
7. Seek through such dialogue to gain unlimited access for EU monitors to the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in order to fulfil the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) mandate;
8. Lay down a firm framework for a stronger permanent partnership between the EU and the African Union so as to contribute to peacekeeping and economic and social reconstruction and the rule of law in Africa by bringing together all instruments for coordinating diplomatic, civilian, humanitarian and military action;
9. Deepen the dialogue with the countries concerned on the borders of the European Union, particularly northern Europe, eastern Europe and the Mediterranean;
10. Continue improving the current capabilities for the planning and conduct of operations by drawing on the lessons learnt from the experience gathered so far with the existing multiple structures, with a view to speeding up the planning of operations and further enhancing their effectiveness on the ground, by specifying in detail the tactical role that might be entrusted to the European Union Military Staff;
11. Contribute to setting up a permanent arrangement whereby democratic European bodies involved in the ESDP can be part of a structured framework that encompasses the European Parliament, the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (CEAC/COSAC), national parliaments and the European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU (ESDA/AWEU);
12. Specifically follow up the efforts undertaken by the French Presidency of the European Union in the area of the ESDP and the ESS, taking account of:
  - (a) the conclusions on ESDP to emerge from the European Council on 10 and 11 November 2008;<sup>4</sup> and
  - (b) France's proposals in that area, namely to:
    - Give the European Union an ambition fitting to the new crises and threats;
    - seek flexible and innovative solutions to develop European capabilities;
    - reinforce civilian crisis-management capabilities;
    - ensure the future of the European defence industry;
    - create an effective internal defence market;
    - build up ESDP instruments;
    - develop security partnerships (EU-NATO, EU-UN, EU-Africa);
    - turn the European Union into a player that can spearhead the fight against WMD proliferation and terrorism;
13. Involve the public at large more closely, given its legitimate concerns about the implementation of the ESDP and strong attachment to democratic scrutiny of this European policy, having due regard for the powers of the European Parliament and national parliaments, and encourage the development of machinery for such democratic scrutiny by supporting the establishment of a common working arrangement for the European Parliament, CEAC/COSAC, national parliaments and ESDA/AWEU.

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<sup>4</sup> Council conclusions on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 2903rd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 10 and 11 November 2008. <http://consilium.europa.eu>

## EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

*submitted by Daniel Ducarme, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. There have been a number of significant developments since the adoption on 3 June 2008 of the Assembly's report entitled "Revision of the European Security Strategy – reply to the annual report of the Council".<sup>5</sup> This follow-up report has been drafted to take these on board. Indeed it is important to see how such developments may influence the new text which we now know will not be a revision of the 2003 Strategy, whose original text will remain intact, but rather a revision and improvement of its implementation to date and, if necessary, a possible complement to the original text.<sup>6</sup> A major one has been the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon during a national referendum on 13 June, echoing the "no" votes of France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005 respectively. Those referendums were followed by a period of reflection on how to proceed, and on how to amend the then Constitution. Today, despite numerous efforts by the current French Presidency to ameliorate the situation following the Irish "no" vote, there is no denying that a period of uncertainty and insecurity is once again setting in Europe. Because of the Irish 'no' the High Representative, Javier Solana, did not present, as planned, a first draft of the new Strategy at the 19 and 20 June 2008 European Council Summit in Brussels.

2. A further setback for European security and defence has been the developing global financial crisis in the second half of 2008, which indirectly affects the security and defence sector by diverting the attention of European governments and the principal policy-makers. It might be argued that such a temporary shift in their focus of attention is too trivial a matter to ponder in this report and that it is too soon to assess the long-term repercussions for the Union's security and defence sector of the deteriorating state of Europe's economies. However one cannot ignore the fact that this sector, like many others, is likely to feel the effects, in terms of defence budgets for example, and it is therefore not too early for governments to take steps to shield it from the brunt of the crisis. A common security and defence strategy must highlight the fact that the ESDP is a constantly evolving process designed to tackle emerging threats and that it too must be protected in order to ensure its successful and effective development.

3. This document takes stock of and follows on from the five central points which were analysed in the first report: to impart a doctrinal character to the Lisbon Treaty regarding the European Security and Defence Policy; to reconcile the mutual assistance provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty with the mutual defence clause of the modified Brussels Treaty, giving precedence to the latter; to encourage the use of permanent structured cooperation; to define a clear partnership between the EU and NATO – at a crucial time for NATO given the dual membership of the majority of its members and the fact that it is in the process of laying down the content of its new Strategic Concept – and to speed up the introduction of an open and competitive European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM).

4. The detailed reply of the Council to the recommendations contained in the report adopted by the Assembly in June 2008 was a most welcome contribution as it provided answers to and enlarged upon most of the points analysed in the report, as well as discussing other current challenges, resolution of which is crucial to global security and stability today: namely, human rights, gender equality, children involved in armed conflict, conflict prevention and climate change. However, the Council's reply was silent on one important issue, analysed both in the previous report to the Assembly and the current one, namely permanent structured cooperation. Another area dealt with in the present report is EU-UN relations, a subject referred to by the Council in its reply.

<sup>5</sup> Assembly document 2000 adopted on 3 June 2008: "Revision of the European Security Strategy – reply to the annual report of the Council" submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Daniel Ducarme, Rapporteur, (Belgium, Liberal Group).

<sup>6</sup> "This is the maximum that can be done under the current mandate", noted Helga Schmid, Director of the Policy Unit at the Council of the European Union, when meeting with your Rapporteur in Brussels on 20 November 2008.



5. The present document examines a number of aspects which need to be taken into account when formulating a common Security and Defence Strategy for Europe. The first is that of relations with third countries and with other international organisations such as the United Nations: in short, the EU's foreign policy. A second issue is that of security, of particular importance in today's world where the opening-up of borders has established a link between its internal and external aspects. The report also examines the case for a permanent EU headquarters and addresses further topical questions such as permanent structured cooperation and mutual defence versus mutual assistance.

6. If the EU wants to continue strengthening its role as a foreign policy actor and to achieve greater efficiency in the planning and conduct of its operations, it will need to take stock of the advances made by the Treaty of Lisbon, in the area of ESDP in particular. It must explore ways of improving cooperation among its member states for the purpose of such operations, particularly in the field of capabilities, and more effectively address serious challenges such as the environment, energy security and migration, to mention but a few. Your Rapporteur considers these and other issues in this report.

7. Europe is increasingly confronted by foreign and security challenges that require collective efforts and responses from the EU rather than the more traditional national approaches. A vastly changing world over the past decade has led to the emergence of markedly different geopolitical concerns and the rise of new serious threats, thereby creating a political and security environment in which it is impossible to ignore the value of team effort and the danger – irresponsibility even – of isolated and unilateral approaches. Today's world is a much less western world and is increasingly less regulated by the traditional international systems, the absence of the United States in certain areas creates an opportunity for the EU to become proactive.<sup>7</sup>

8. In an effort to reflect on, present and tackle the new challenges in 2003, the EU adopted a European Security Strategy (ESS). The document was concise, coherent and very much to the point. It set out ways for Europe to proceed in view of the new security architecture and the policy priorities its member states collectively should adopt for the future. Significantly different in structure and size from a defence white paper or from the United States' National Security Strategy, the ESS was neither cumbersome nor burdened with unnecessary detail likely to alienate its audience or the general public. Its scope and accuracy have since proved to be its merit and strength, winning it high praise and making it a European foreign policy reference over the past five years. It is a key document stating the European collective ambition of achieving "a secure Europe in a better world".

9. However, the ESS also came under considerable scrutiny and criticism. It was first perceived as vague. While its size and the detail it included were kept within strict limits, thus helping to make it accessible to a wider audience, the absence of specific policies also left a void in which Brussels was unable to operate. Critics of the Strategy also pointed out that while the document sought to create a genuine European strategic culture, it set out no clear goals to tackle the challenges it highlighted. The objectives were not clearly defined and were often perceived as abstract, while defence aspects were completely overlooked. Furthermore, the failure to include certain challenges which have since become paramount to security and stability (in Europe and beyond), namely energy security and dependency and climate change, has led to increasingly loud calls for a "fresher" – though not necessarily radically different – document.

10. The core ideas of the ESS published in December 2003 are to remain unchanged in the complementary document to be unveiled in December 2008. A paper published by the French Ministry of Defence on the security and defence objectives of the French Presidency furthermore cites as its goals: a modernised strategic vision for Europe; a reflection on major and new threats and a suggested approach on how to deal with them and the ability to define the civilian and military means member states require to overcome the current challenges and strengthen European citizens' security.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Nicole Gnesotto, Professor of the European Union Chair, Centre national des arts et metiers (CNAM), Paris.

<sup>8</sup> Objectives of the French Presidency of the European Union Council 2008 in terms of security and defence, French Ministry of Defence.

11. Additionally, in the wider field of security and defence, it is stressed that the EU must better organise its intervention capabilities by deploying a whole range of military and civilian tools, including in a rapid response context, without prejudice to its ability to deploy major operations (60 000 personnel deployable within one month and over one year); develop and improve its capabilities; improve industrial synergies to ensure the future of the European Defence Industry and create an effective internal defence market; and, last but not least, build-up the ESDP's institutional tools and education and training.

12. The present report will consider both the importance of the objectives outlined above and the progress made in the past six months in achieving them. The list put forward by the French Presidency is an ambitious one. However only by taking steps to achieve these objectives, can Europe become an effective and credible global foreign policy actor, able to operate on an equal basis with other international organisations such as NATO and the UN, and with the United States. The nature and number of today's global challenges create an environment where it is both impossible for the US to be present and react everywhere and where the EU has a definite role to fulfil if it is able to overcome hurdles facing it at home.

## *II. Relations with third countries and international organisations*

### *1. The EU and Russia after the war in Georgia*

13. In formulating a security strategy, Europe needs to give thought to its relations with its eastern neighbour, Russia. The Union's partners are indispensable to its stability and to the security of its member states, and vice versa. It has often required a finely balanced juggling act to keep relations smooth between East and West. The recent war in Georgia resulted in a significant "downgrading" of the EU's relations with Russia and highlighted the fact that unpredictable and unforeseen circumstances needed to be met decisively and without delay by the member states. However, unanimity among the 27 often poses the greatest challenge.

14. After the outbreak of the war on 8 August 2008, the EU's relationship with Russia changed drastically. Following intensive diplomatic talks and a swift response by the French EU Presidency (French President Nicolas Sarkozy was in Moscow four days after the start of the conflict) a six-point Agreement was reached on 12 August with Georgia and Russia which undertook to refrain from the use of force and to return all troops to the positions occupied before the start of the conflict. President Sarkozy later stated<sup>9</sup> that the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon would create the necessary institutional elements for tackling international crises such as this one: a stable Council President working in close consultation with the heads of state and government, a genuine diplomatic service and the requisite financial resources. EU leaders met on 1 September amid fears of Europe being unable to achieve unanimity in dealing with the war in Georgia. Surprisingly, a unanimous document did surface from Brussels and action on a number of points was taken, though not to the full satisfaction of all member states, particularly those seeking more severe punishment for Russia and its leadership. More precisely, at its extraordinary summit on 1 September 2008 the EU condemned Russia's actions in Georgia and declared that all new partnership talks between the EU and its eastern neighbour would cease until Russian troops pulled out of Georgia back to their original 6 August positions. Following the summit, on 15 September the EU Council approved the launch of an EU autonomous civilian monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM).<sup>10</sup> As Helga Schmid, Director of the Policy Unit at the Council of the European Union, observed, here was a time of crisis when Europe came together and acted. It is this kind of coherence and coordination that must be included and reflected in the European Security Strategy.<sup>11</sup>

15. The EUMM was deployed on 1 October 2008. Its primary aim is to help bring stability to the region, while in the short term it will contribute to the stabilisation of the situation, in accordance with the six-point Agreement and the subsequent implementing measures. The EUMM's main tasks will include: monitoring and analysing the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process, centred on full

<sup>9</sup> "La Russie doit se retirer sans délai de Géorgie", *le Figaro*, 17 August 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP, 15 September 2008. [concilium.europa.eu](http://concilium.europa.eu)

<sup>11</sup> Speaking at an EUISS seminar in Paris on implementing the European Security Strategy, 3 October 2008.



compliance with the six-point Agreement; monitoring and analysing efforts to bring the situation back to normal and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees; and, contributing to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence-building measures. Yet at the present time the only areas being monitored are within Georgia proper and not inside the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two regions whose independence has been recognised solely by Russia and which are under the control of Russian forces/authorities. The head of the EUMM, Hansjorg Haber, has stated that monitors have not yet been allowed into these areas although it has been made clear to the Russian authorities that they are considered to be under the EUMM's mandate.<sup>12</sup> In order for the EU and its mission to remain credible, it must be allowed to monitor these regions.

16. Although the EU showed unity, it was also widely agreed in Europe and beyond that the response to a crisis described by some as a “wider turning point in world affairs than that of 11 September 2001”<sup>13</sup> was weak and the EU has now resumed talks with its eastern neighbour. It is notable that a number of EU member states had requested that sanctions be imposed against Russia. Consequently it could be argued that the greatest casualty of this war, for Europe at least, was the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Without a “crisis plan”, therefore, it was difficult for the 27 to act as needed.

17. Moreover, the EU's response was centred first on diplomacy and negotiations and secondly on setting up a monitoring mission in the area. What was lacking was a dialogue with a view to creating the European instruments and capabilities that would provide the EU with a more automatic capacity for tackling similar situations in the future, making for a quicker response and greater autonomy. Looking with a few months' hindsight at the lessons learnt in Georgia, the need for such a dialogue is clear: for one thing we can be sure of is that the possibility of another crisis developing in the future in Europe's neighbourhood cannot be ruled out.

## *2. The EU, the United States and NATO*

18. Europe's transatlantic relationship has not been free of worries in recent years. In the first quarter of 2003 the EU held an extraordinary summit to discuss the situation and the war in Iraq. At the time many EU member states were forced to re-evaluate their relationship with the United States, their strongest NATO ally. A new ESS and a common security and defence strategy for Europe would doubtless seek to preserve the transatlantic relationship, but depending on the document's ambitions and the EU members' will to realise them, it may also strain ties with the United States.

19. The gradual development of the ESDP over the years made for a nervous ally across the Atlantic. Those fears have now been largely allayed, since it has become clear that the key phrase for the United States and NATO in the St Malo Declaration, which states that the EU can act militarily “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged”, has indeed been put into practice – in short, Europe has not stepped on any toes in the past decade. The most recent example of this is the EUMM in Georgia: the United States was unlikely to get involved in this crisis by sending monitors or any personnel on the ground. Other examples over the years include the EU member states' evacuation efforts in Lebanon in 2006 and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina which took over from NATO's SFOR mission. This reinforces the reality that Europe can act in areas where the United States and NATO cannot or do not wish to get involved, a view which was strongly reiterated in Paris in February 2008 by the then US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, who said, “Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs a stronger, more capable European defence capacity. An ESDP with only soft power is not enough. As we look to the French EU Presidency, we hope France will lead an effort to strengthen European defence spending, upgrade European military capabilities [...]. Because Mr Sarkozy is right, NATO cannot be everywhere”. The very fact that the US has heavy commitments and is overstretched in other theatres creates a void

<sup>12</sup> EU Observer, 13 October 2008. [www.euobserver.com](http://www.euobserver.com)

<sup>13</sup> Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, addressing the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Toronto, Canada, on 19 September 2008.



which the EU needs to fill as well as an environment which encourages cooperation, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Sudan.

20. A new ESS will need to address Europe's transatlantic relationship and the EU's relations with NATO much more clearly. Antonio Missiroli, from the European Policy Centre in Brussels, notes that this will not be enough, however, and an improvement in relations will also largely depend on the success of the renewed Cyprus negotiations. Whilst the 2003 ESS mentions the transatlantic relationship as being irreplaceable and a core element of the international system, and NATO as an "important expression of this relationship", it does not provide sufficient information on the development of that relationship in tackling particular crises, notably those closer to home or especially sensitive for Europe's security where the EU will need to take a leading role.

21. Europe's ties with the United States are also likely to come under scrutiny following the inauguration of the Obama Administration in Washington in January 2009. Many people on both sides of the Atlantic are hoping for a re-evaluation and amelioration of those relations. However, Marcin Zaborowski, a specialist on US politics from the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), notes that while the new President will be more willing to work with America's allies he, like George W. Bush, will be unlikely to accept any agreements that are damaging to American interests. Hence elements of continuity in America's foreign policy are to be expected.<sup>14</sup>

22. Meeting in Marseilles on 3 November 2008 on the eve of the US elections, the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed to address a joint message to the new US President highlighting various ways in which to strengthen the transatlantic relationship and tackle global challenges together. A stronger transatlantic link is needed in order to tackle the economic crisis, the Middle East conflict and long-standing crises such as the one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Europe is therefore calling for a more equal and balanced relationship with the United States.

23. President Obama will almost certainly welcome such a move, particularly since it will give his Administration the chance to call for a more resolute Europe willing to come to the aid of its American ally and partner in areas in which it desperately needs assistance, namely Afghanistan. This is a highly contentious matter for Europe; it wants and needs to assume greater responsibility for global affairs but there is no knowing whether it will show the same unity of purpose when issues like this are introduced into the equation. One thing is certain: Europe has rarely been so united in addressing the US. However, the state of world affairs today calls for unconventional measures which may lead to the first positive steps towards a much stronger transatlantic relationship.

24. France's decision fully to join the NATO military structures next year, at a time when it is working hard to strengthen European defence, is likely to complement both the Union and the Alliance and further strengthen their relationship. German Defence Minister Josef Jung made some noteworthy comments at the Munich Security Conference in February 2008: "We want to see France fully integrated into the Alliance's military structures, and that includes the defence planning process. This will strengthen the European pillar and consolidate North America's partnership with Europe". France has been a long-standing troop-contributor to NATO operations (notably in the Balkans since 1995 and Afghanistan since 2003, with a boost in the number of troops in 2008) and ranks fifth in terms of its financial contribution to the Alliance.

25. One existing "forum" for EU-NATO discussion which has certainly not been used to its full and beneficial potential is the North Atlantic Council (NAC)-Political and Security Committee (PSC) meetings where direct NATO-EU talks take place. These have too often been criticised as being mere presentations followed by rather hollow discussions, and the Berlin Plus arrangements have already proved too narrow a structure for an effective partnership to develop. As Dr Mark Webber of the University of Loughborough notes in his evidence to the Defence Committee of the House of Commons on 9 October 2007,<sup>15</sup> this problem is potentially further aggravated by the lack of any working relationship between NATO and the European Commission which is responsible for releasing

<sup>14</sup> "Bush's legacy and America's next foreign policy", Marcin Zaborowski, Chaillot Paper 111, September 2008, EUISS. [www.iss.europa.eu](http://www.iss.europa.eu)

<sup>15</sup> "The Future of NATO and European Defence". <http://www.parliament.uk>

funds for civil ESDP missions and managing EU reconstruction and development aid funds. The need “for closer cooperation and greater efficiency and for the avoidance of unnecessary duplication, in a spirit of transparency and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations”<sup>16</sup> hence remains as strong as ever.

26. At its forthcoming 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary summit in Strasbourg-Kehl in April 2009, NATO is expected to initiate discussions with a view eventually to updating its 1999 Strategic Concept. This is a crucial time for the Alliance: it is hoped that a New Strategic Concept will provide impetus and direction and breathe new life into the organisation. It is also expected to give serious thought to the transatlantic relationship and offer the chance to strengthen it. A report published by the former Chiefs of Defence Staff of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States in December 2007<sup>17</sup> focuses in particular on how a new strategic concept could stress the importance of the transatlantic link and call for greater cooperation between Europe and the US. Although this is an interesting and useful exercise, the report comes up with some unrealistic conclusions regarding, for example, the creation of a US-EU-NATO steering directorate at the highest political level with the main aim of coordinating responses to crises and action in common areas of interest. Europe would be highly unlikely to accept that disproportional representation of the US in such a body. However, one cannot overemphasise that it would be unrealistic of the Alliance not to consider the positive global impact of a stronger transatlantic relationship as it is highlighted in the ESS and to seek ways of making the current relationship work better.

### 3. EU-UN relations

27. The 2003 ESS stresses the global importance of the United Nations and notes that the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations and equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority.

28. The two organisations cooperate in a range of areas, from conflict prevention and peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance, development, climate change, health and human rights, HIV/AIDS, gender and migration issues, and more recently, the food crisis. The relationship between the two organisations was formalised in a joint declaration on 24 September 2003 which outlined four main areas of cooperation in the field of crisis management: planning, training, communication and best practices.<sup>18</sup> This relationship is further enhanced by the twice-yearly meetings of the EU-UN Steering Committee which is co-chaired by the EU Council Secretariat and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It is also noteworthy that the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations – currently Mr Alain Le Roy – addresses the EU Political and Security Committee twice a year.

29. Significant steps have been taken to improve the relationship between the two organisations, in the past the main focus of cooperation has centred on operations. In the years to come, however, as new challenges emerge, particularly in areas where both organisations are active, the relationship will have to be deepened. One major challenge at the present time is of course the crisis in the DRC. The UN currently has 17 000 troops in the country. However, less than 1 000 of these are stationed in the crisis zone and they have been unable to deal effectively with the situation. Calls for EU troops to enter the region in order create safe corridors for humanitarian aid have largely gone unanswered due to a lack of political will. The French Presidency has drawn attention to the need in such cases for different kinds of troops and rules of engagement with more emphasis on offensive capabilities. A deeper EU-UN dialogue could focus precisely on the ways and means of eliminating the delays and uncertainty that have hampered the handling of the crisis in the DRC and determine what kind of action – civilian, military or a combination of both – is needed in the future and which organisation

<sup>16</sup> “Riga Summit Declaration”, North Atlantic Council, 29 September 2006. <http://www.nato.int>

<sup>17</sup> “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World – Renewing Transatlantic Partnership”, December 2007, Noaber Foundation.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management, 19 September 2003. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>



should take the lead in a given crisis or country. In July 2007, for instance, a new joint declaration was adopted proposing stronger cooperation in capacity-building for African peacekeeping capabilities, information sharing between the two organisations' situation centres, cooperation with the EU Satellite Centre, and further cooperation in aspects of peacekeeping such as law enforcement, security sector reform and rule of law<sup>19</sup>.

30. This is a particularly important time for the EU and the UN to further cement their relationship and find ways of improving it in order to tackle existing problems and emerging challenges. Greater cooperation would also boost EU influence in promoting human rights and its vision of a rules-based world order. A recent report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) stated that in those two areas the EU's leverage had dramatically declined over the past decade.<sup>20</sup> The EU has now joined the group of leading world powers whose influence through the UN is in decline. This not only poses a problem for the EU but for the UN as well, as it could devalue the relationship between the two and severely affect the interdependent areas in which both organisations have a history of positive and efficient cooperation.

31. To improve their relationship, they should look first to their common beliefs and foundations, the most important of which are: their belief in the power of multilateralism, shared norms and values, and their commitment to collective approaches. Practical ways in which they might deepen cooperation include aiming for greater coherence, specifically in expressing their objectives and outlining their efforts, better information sharing to prevent situations from turning into crises, clarifying common objectives in crises, and involving the wider international community so as to avoid the creation of "private clubs". In 2005, when presenting a report aimed at tackling poverty, security threats and human rights abuses,<sup>21</sup> the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, famously said "we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development".

### *III. Internal and external aspects of security*

#### *1. Introduction*

32. The 2003 European Security Strategy draws attention to the new security environment that has arisen since the end of the cold war as a result of the opening-up of borders and the increased vulnerability that comes from Europe's dependence on "an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy and information and other fields". In this new environment the internal and external aspects of security are inextricably linked. As a result, the traditional model of collective defence relying to a large extent on NATO power and focused on external security aspects no longer offers the EU member states sufficient protection in the face of the numerous and diverse threats.

33. The problem with collective defence remaining the responsibility of NATO, as Jean-Pierre Maulny, the deputy Director of the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) in Paris observed when addressing the members of the Assembly's Political Committee, is that it creates the impression that the ESDP is not for protecting European citizens. This difficulty, he feels, cannot not be sidestepped simply by pointing out that the ESDP will henceforth tackle terrorism, natural disasters and the issue of civil protection – all in fact matters relating to internal security.

34. Wider concepts of security are not a new idea: in the 10 years of the ESDP's existence the EU has gone to considerable lengths to make sure that Europe's internal and outer borders are secure, not only through its many civilian and military operations but also through the instruments and agencies at its disposal. However, the additional programmes set up in order to tackle particular internal security issues do not necessarily fall under the CFSP/ESDP. The counter-terrorism roadmap which is regularly updated by the Council and the Commission is a case in point: the relevant policy areas

<sup>19</sup> Joint statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, 7 June 2007. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>

<sup>20</sup> A global force for Human Rights? An audit of European power at the UN, Richard Gowan and Franzisca Brantner. [www.ecfr.eu](http://www.ecfr.eu)

<sup>21</sup> "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All", report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, September 2005. [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

include security of supply and energy reserves, GALILEO, the protection of critical infrastructure, cyber crime, air transport and aircraft security.

35. Although the EU Council notes that such policy areas relating to the improvement of the EU's internal security are also regularly discussed with external partners like the United States with a view to exchanging experience and enhancing coordination, much remains to be done, as stated above, in order to improve EU-NATO relations and dialogue.

36. Relations with third countries and deeper cooperation with the wider international community are paramount for tackling both external and internal security issues, an aspect which must be highlighted in the future European security and defence strategy. In an address to the European Parliament in July 2008, French Interior Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie explained that under the French EU Presidency actions targeting the western Balkans would be proposed in the context of the fight against organised crime and underlined the need for the EU to pursue its rule-of-law efforts in third countries in order to prevent insecurity. She also stressed that the EU would pay special attention to cooperation with the countries of the Maghreb and the sub-Saharan zone in order to combat terrorism. The Presidency should be commended for its initiatives to relaunch the debate on Euro-Mediterranean relations, stalled for more than a decade, and for proposing the creation of a "Union for the Mediterranean" to tackle a multitude of challenges and, more importantly, to establish political, economic and social links between the southern and northern Mediterranean.

## *2. French Presidency initiatives*

37. Following the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, the French Presidency put forward a number of proposals in the security sector with the principal aim of regaining citizens' trust. Specifically, the three key features of the Presidency are:

- its ambition: to reconcile Europeans with Europe;
- its realism: making proposals for action;
- its modesty: the current Presidency is just one link in the long-term chain of building Europe.

38. Key internal/external security-related challenges resulting from open borders and which the Presidency is tackling include terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking. More specifically, four concepts being implemented are:<sup>22</sup>

- the creation of a culture of feedback within the community to show what works well, what does not work and what can be improved upon;
- closer cooperation between operational forces on the "principles of convergence" – such as the exchange of a larger number of police officers between member states during their training;
- the setting-up of pilot projects between member states;
- advancement in the promotion of the rule of law in third countries in order to enhance the external dimension of security.

### *(a) The fight against terrorism*

39. To enable specialist services to work together better, the Presidency has proposed the creation of a common database focusing on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. Furthermore, in order to more effectively tackle the phenomenon of radicalisation and recruitment, it has announced the compilation of a manual of best practices.

<sup>22</sup> French Interior Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, addressing the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) of the European Parliament on 15 July 2008. [www.eu2008.fr](http://www.eu2008.fr)



*(b) The fight against organised crime – cyber crime*

40. This new phenomenon of cyber crime concerns not only terrorism but also other forms of crime, in particular child pornography. In conjunction with Europol it has been proposed to create a European reporting centre for illegal Internet content.

*(c) The fight against drug trafficking*

41. The newly established Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre Narcotics (MAOC-N) in Lisbon has had considerable success in the Atlantic. As a result drug-trafficking routes have changed. It has been proposed to set up a Mediterranean Anti-Drug Coordination Centre (CECLAD-M) in response to this phenomenon.

*(d) Migration*

42. Additionally, both the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU Global Approach to Migration can play a crucial role in further developing political and economic relations with the EU's immediate neighbours (with the focus on security and migration) and ensuring an open and transparent dialogue with a view to the end goal of establishing security, stability and the economic prosperity of the countries on the EU's borders.

43. Migration today is a key aspect of the link between external and internal security. The EU's approach to migration policy has shifted in the past few years from a primarily security-based approach to the current Global Approach to Migration centred upon reducing migratory pressures through a more balanced and transparent policy that tackles all aspects of migration. By further developing this approach, the EU can give a more multidimensional character to its efforts to tackle migration issues.

### *3. Disaster and crisis response*

44. In the wake of the Asian tsunami, the Commission adopted a communication on reinforcing EU disaster and crisis response. In January 2006, the EU Presidency and the President of the Commission tasked Michel Barnier with undertaking a study of the EU's role in responding to disasters and crises. His report recommended setting up a European Civil Protection Force. The December 2006 European Council invited future presidencies to take work forward on all aspects of the Union's capacity to act. A task force was set up to enable the Commission to deliver the most effective response to emergencies, crises and disasters both inside and outside the Union. The communication deliberately uses the notion of "disaster" in a broad sense to cover both natural and man-made disasters, taking place within and/or outside the EU.

45. More recently, the French State Secretary for European Affairs, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, identified the strengthening of EU civilian and military crisis-management capabilities as a central priority for the French EU Presidency. The development of a capability for evacuating European nationals in situations such as the 2006 conflict in Lebanon was deemed fundamental.<sup>23</sup> The Lebanon evacuation experience is a recent example of a situation in which unpreparedness and the lack of policy initially left EU member states scrambling and baffled as to how to evacuate their citizens who were trapped in the conflict zone. European nations resorted to informal and ad-hoc cooperation between themselves in order to evacuate their citizens at a time then described by External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner as "one of the most dangerous moments Europe has seen in many years".

46. In March 2008, the European Commission adopted a Communication on Reinforcing the Union's Disaster Response Capacity.<sup>24</sup> Commission President José Manuel Barroso stated that "when helping tsunami victims in south Asia, evacuating EU citizens from war-torn Lebanon or fighting floods and forest fires in Europe – we can only protect our citizens and help others if we act together

<sup>23</sup> [www.ambafrance-uk.org](http://www.ambafrance-uk.org)

<sup>24</sup> COM(2008) 130.

in solidarity. When responding to such disasters, Europe, as in so many other ways, is strongest when we combine our capacities and profit from our diversity and different expertise”.<sup>25</sup>

47. The March 2008 Communication further addressed a number of weaknesses and lessons learnt from Lebanon and called for a united and powerful EU response.<sup>26</sup> It stated: “European citizens expect the Union to protect their lives and assets inside the EU, and at the same time deliver effective disaster assistance in other parts of the world as an important expression of EU solidarity”.<sup>27</sup>

48. The following proposals were put forward:

- to transform the Community’s civil protection mechanism (Monitoring and Information Centre-MIC) into a genuine operational centre and beef it up with reserve resources, i.e. stand-by modules or complementary European resources.
- to reinforce humanitarian aid by filling existing delivery gaps, strengthening the global response capacity (in particular the UN and Red Cross Movement) and improving coordination with the various humanitarian actors.
- to set up a Europe-wide Disaster Response Training Network building on the experience of the member states in civil protection training.
- to improve disaster preparedness measures both within the EU and in third countries, early warning systems (e.g. for tsunamis in the Mediterranean) and use of the single European Emergency System 112.
- a strong call for enhanced inter-institutional cooperation with deployment, where appropriate, of joint planning and operational teams to deal with particular disasters involving different instruments.

49. Moreover, with increasing calls for effective disaster response, in particular due to the rising frequency of climate change-related disasters occurring worldwide, it is crucial for the EU to enhance its prevention, preparedness, response and recovery measures. The Commission’s contribution included, for example, a specific annex on forest fires that aimed to negotiate improved prevention, preparedness, response and recovery in the event of forest or wild fires.<sup>28</sup>

50. Significant steps have been taken under the French Presidency towards improving the EU’s civilian and military capabilities, as confirmed in the European Council conclusions on the ESDP on 10 and 11 November 2008<sup>29</sup>. The most important of which include:

- the appointment of a Civilian Operations Commander<sup>30</sup> to head the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in an effort to achieve more coherence and cooperation amongst the contributing member states and establish realistic planning procedures;
- agreement among 12 EU member states to create a European Air Transport Fleet to pool A400M and C-130 airplanes and, under NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability initiative, agreement among 12 countries to acquire the C-17 transport aircraft for use in EU, NATO and UN operations or for national needs;
- considerable advances in coordinating the maintenance and use of transport aircraft, satellite intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance amongst EU member states; and agreement among those member states with aircraft carriers<sup>31</sup> to carry out joint exercises;

<sup>25</sup> Press release: A coordinated and stronger EU Disaster Response at Home and Abroad, Brussels, 5 March 2008. <http://ec.europa.eu>

<sup>26</sup> A Coordinated and Stronger EU Disaster Response at Home and Abroad, Brussels, 5 March 2008.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Council conclusions on the ESDP. 10 and 11 November 2008. <http://ec.europa.eu>

<sup>30</sup> Mr Kees Klompenhouwer.

<sup>31</sup> France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.



- the promotion of a NATO trust fund which could be used by NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) members to pay for helicopter upgrades and for the training of troops, aiding deployment over a wider range of terrains in EU, NATO and UN missions. British traditional scepticism on EU defence cooperation could be coming to an end: UK Defence Secretary John Hutton recently noted “I think we’ve got to be pragmatic about these things, France is one of our closest allies and the French believe very strongly about this kind of role for the EU. If we can support it, we should”.<sup>32</sup>
- approval for the launching of a military Erasmus aimed at developing exchanges between national officers in order to reinforce the ability of the European armed forces to work together and their interoperability.

51. Furthermore, the lessons learnt in Georgia, Rafah and Aceh have been an important source of knowledge and led to improvements in the planning and deployment of concurrent operations. With a view to enhancing the effectiveness of civilian missions, Defence Ministers agreed on 10 November, following a “Jumbo Council” on defence, to improve the training of personnel and strengthen civilian intervention teams, as well as to develop national strategies in order to facilitate the deployment of personnel.

52. In September 2008, the French Presidency also held a seminar in Aix-en-Provence (in line with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and the 5 March 2008 Communication from the Commission on Reinforcing the Union’s Disaster Response Capacity) to discuss the relationship between the EU and the UN in responding to crises and disasters, with the aim of enhancing the international community’s capacity.

#### *4. Energy security and climate change*

53. The 2003 European Security Strategy touched only very lightly on the issue of energy security and dependence whilst there was no mention at all of climate change. Today it is inconceivable that an updated ESS and a common security and defence strategy for Europe should not take on board these two crucial issues in light of the significant developments in both areas over the past five years. Many of these concerns were explicitly addressed in the paper from the High Representative and the European Commission entitled “Climate change and international security”.<sup>33</sup>

54. While it is not the objective of your Rapporteur to analyse energy security and climate change issues in this document, it should however be stressed that these are areas the EU must further address, not solely in individual energy and environmental policies but also in a document such as the European Security Strategy which is primarily concerned with adopting a security stance vis-à-vis those challenges. At the same time as building on its relationships and increasing cooperation with the international community, it is also important for the EU to assess the efforts of other international organisations in these areas. For example:

- The UN has been very active in promoting awareness and decision making in the area of climate change. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Bali Roadmap in December 2007, a two-year process which is to lead to a binding agreement on tackling climate change. The December 2008 UNFCCC is set to further strengthen international action in this area before final negotiations are scheduled to take place in Denmark next year.
- Energy security was explicitly addressed at NATO’s Bucharest summit. In the Bucharest Declaration of 3 April 2008, the Alliance stated that despite the increasing complexity of emerging challenges and threats, it is prepared to address energy security issues and in particular to project stability, protect critical infrastructure, increase intelligence sharing and further international and regional cooperation in order to ensure energy security.

<sup>32</sup> “John Hutton backs European Army”, The Sunday Times, 26 October 2008.

<sup>33</sup> Climate Change and International Security, (S113/08), 14 March 2008. <http://consilium.europa.eu>

55. On 15 and 16 October 2008 the European Council, meeting in Brussels, defined security of energy supplies as an EU priority. It adopted a number of guidelines taking into account the Presidency paper on energy security. In particular, it decided to step up its work in progress and asked the Commission to submit proposals or initiatives, where necessary, in order to:<sup>34</sup>

- “finalise the legislative package on the internal market in electricity and gas before the end of the legislative period;
- expedite the implementation of the European Energy Efficiency Action Plan and the Strategic Energy Technology Plan;
- pursue with determination the diversification of energy sources, to which the measures in the energy/climate package contribute directly;
- promote improvement in the working of the market, in particular through greater transparency on flows and stockpiles and through sharing information on long-term requirements and resources;
- develop crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruptions to supplies;
- strengthen and add to critical infrastructure, particularly trans-European energy transport networks and liquefied natural gas terminals. Particular attention will be paid to interconnections and to the connection of the most isolated European countries, to the interface of European networks with supply infrastructure and to the need to diversify both sources and routes. The European Council supports the Commission initiative of establishing a plan of action to speed up interconnections in the Baltic region. A schedule of work will be drawn up for this purpose before the end of the year;
- develop the Union’s energy relations with producer and transit countries with a view to securing stability of supply and diversifying its energy sources and supply routes. In this connection, the European Council welcomes the energy security initiatives taken by several Member States and, in particular, the meeting with the Caspian Sea countries and transit countries which will be organised by the Czech Presidency in the spring of 2009”.

56. These initiatives further highlight the importance of long-term energy security for the EU and its member states, many of which rely on third countries for their oil and gas supplies. Today Europe imports approximately 50% of the energy it consumes and this figure is set to rise to 64% by 2030. Yet instability and unpredictability at the points of origin of these natural resources have demonstrated the fragility of consumer nations’ positions. The EU cannot be held hostage to rising prices and the fear of having supplies cut off. With combined energy and climate change concerns – which are linked to a multitude of challenges – the EU is increasingly confronted with multifaceted and continuously evolving global security concerns which need to be addressed through concrete policies and strategies as well as through greater international cooperation and unity.

#### *IV. Permanent Structured Cooperation*

57. The significance of permanent structured cooperation in the EU is reflected in the Lisbon Treaty. The new provisions are intended to facilitate the military capability-building process among willing member states. The three articles of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation firstly outline the main objectives, those being for member states to proceed “more intensively” with capability development and to supply a battlegroup by 2010. Secondly, more specific details are given of the commitments to be undertaken by those member states willing to take part in permanent structured cooperation; and thirdly it is stipulated that the European Defence Agency (EDA) should contribute to the regular assessment of participating member states’ contributions with regard to capabilities, in particular contributions made in accordance with the criteria to be established.

<sup>34</sup> European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 2008, Doc. 14368/08.  
<http://consilium.europa.eu>



58. As Dr Sven Biscop, Senior Research Fellow of the Egmont Institute states, the absence of any particular details or figures in the treaty means that the most important decisions to be made lie ahead. However, what is crucial is that permanent structured cooperation needs to be inclusive and allow as many member states as possible to participate. Whilst a more exclusive club of a few willing and able states, or even the big six,<sup>35</sup> would probably also achieve better and faster results thanks to deeper integration, this would also risk alienating the remaining smaller states, many of which are active ESDP contributors, and would doubtlessly create political friction and divisions within the Union.

59. Additionally, it has been pointed out that the smaller member states have important niche capabilities, in the area of nuclear, biological and chemical protection and demining for example, and special forces. Here in particular, the advantage of the battlegroup concept is that it brings together different kinds of member states, big and small, and pools their respective capacities. In practice, however, the battlegroup system is a form of Russian roulette, because the member states providing troops for a future “slot” do not know what kind of operation they will be asked to take part in when their turn comes. The permanent structured cooperation mechanism is therefore about the next step in capability building, one backed by a deeper consensus on the political conditions for making use of the capabilities.

60. As there are no specific figures or details for implementing the ambitious objectives laid out in the Lisbon Treaty, much is left open to interpretation. Past experience shows that overambitious plans often lead to dead-ends and delays – a prime example being the never realised 1999 Headline Goal of achieving a 60 000 strong force. The very fact that defence spending and deployments remain very much under national scrutiny automatically means that without quantifiable criteria permanent structured cooperation will not get off the ground. For example, setting a relatively high defence budget, deployability and sustainability levels, or a plethora of criteria to be achieved at the moment of entry into permanent structured cooperation will only serve to alienate the smaller states which have weaker defence capabilities and will in all likelihood lead to the creation of elite groups.

61. It is therefore clear that focusing on states’ niche capabilities and establishing realistic results-oriented rather than input-oriented goals will produce faster and more efficient results than those achieved to date. The basic aim is to create a constructive framework for capability development within the EU which will also have a positive impact on operations. It is argued that although permanent structured cooperation is not an instrument for operations as such, participating countries that achieve favourable results will also be more willing to take part in EU operations.

62. Another important point your Rapporteur would like to stress is that developing efficient permanent structured cooperation will also have a positive “domino effect” on other areas of ESDP, not to mention the fact that it would improve the political climate within the Union. For example, initiatives could include the development of a permanent capability for the planning and conduct of civil and military operations, with rapid deployability of intervention forces, both on the territory of the EU and beyond; the development of an operations funding system whereby costs would be more widely shared among all the member states, regardless of whether they contribute troops to operations or not; tasking the European Union Military Committee and European Defence Agency with drafting a military sub-strategy to the European Security Strategy which would outline possible scenarios for EU intervention, detail the necessary capabilities, and create multi-year programmes for the development of military capabilities based on those scenarios. Other initiatives which could be launched through positive permanent structured cooperation include the establishment of an early warning system for the protection of European citizens at home and abroad as well as for rapid humanitarian intervention and the creation of a “military Erasmus” training and exchange programme for the European armed forces.

#### *V. The case for an EU permanent operation headquarters (OHQ)*

63. Today the EU has three options for an operation headquarters for planning and conducting a crisis-management operation. It can use NATO structures (SHAPE), one of the OHQs proposed by

<sup>35</sup> France, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy, Poland. Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP: Transformation and Integration, Sven Biscop. [www.egmontinstitute.be](http://www.egmontinstitute.be)

five EU member states under the framework nation<sup>36</sup> concept or the EU Operations Centre recently established in Brussels. Each of these options presents a number of challenges and drawbacks for the member states when planning and conducting operations, and therefore to a certain extent limits the efficiency of the operation at some point during its lifetime.

64. Firstly, as regards NATO structures, for each EU operation requiring the implementation of the Berlin Plus agreements the NATO chain of command needs to be adapted. For example, in the case of Operation Althea, the negotiations lasted eight months overall; it is therefore evident that if a rapid response was required, the Berlin Plus arrangements would not be appropriate. In addition, the Deputy SACEUR, who is the operation commander at SHAPE, is not in direct contact with the Force Headquarters based in Sarajevo which falls under the responsibility of the CINCSOUTH Headquarters in Naples. Nor does NATO possess civil instruments and it is not equipped to launch and support civil and military operations under the political control of the EU. Lastly, the link with NATO may not always prove beneficial as it has become persona non grata in a number of regions across the globe.

65. On the other hand, the NATO structures are organised for the planning and command of large-scale operations: its long-standing hands-on experience make this multinational structure second to none in this area. Hence for operations where a rapid response is not required, recourse by the EU to the Berlin Plus agreements may be an efficient and advantageous solution.

66. In the case of the framework nation concept, a number of difficulties were encountered as an OHQ had not yet been designated when the political decisions regarding the operational planning and the composition of the force were being discussed. The idea of selecting the headquarters on a case-by-case basis depending on the framework nation instead of using a permanent structure is clearly quite incompatible with the EU's ambitions to launch an operation within five days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council and have forces deployed on the ground 10 days later.<sup>37</sup>

67. Every time a framework nation is selected for a particular operation, a new team of officers and staff has to be selected. As a result, time is wasted, experienced teams which have worked on other operations are not used and valuable lessons learnt are lost. This was the case recently for EUFOR Chad where it was pointed out that the EUFOR RD Congo OHQ in Potsdam could have been used instead of Mont Valérien. It is often the way that when new OHQs are set up, member states send officers with little or no experience in planning operations.

68. Politically this concept can also serve to alienate other states that do not count among the five framework nations. These member states become increasingly unfamiliar with the concepts and experiences gained when conducting operations and are therefore reluctant to participate in the force generation conferences. They therefore tend not to second officers to OHQs under the present system, while they could second a number of staff to a permanent structure. This setup also puts added pressure on the five framework states. In the recent case of Lebanon, none of these states wanted to assume the lead responsibility. This would not have posed a problem if a permanent structure had been in place, as a single state would not have been taking overall responsibility, but the EU. Nor is this system cost-effective for the lead nation: it has to bear the lion's share of the wage burden for the OHQ, which may discourage it from shouldering that responsibility.

69. There is added stress under the framework nation system when different OHQs have to be selected for simultaneous ongoing operations. As a result there is no coordination and communication between the different headquarters, a task that now falls to the EU Military Staff (EUMS), although this is not formally part of its role. Nor do the various OHQs have any competence in the civil domain.

70. Lastly, in the case of the EU Operations Centre, the EUMS is charged with assigning some 40 of its staff to the centre during a period of crisis for up to two weeks, causing significant disruption to the smooth running of the EUMS. It is also a limited, almost ad hoc, way of working and the centre is not fully capable of planning and conducting a large scale EU-led operation. On the other hand, it is for the moment the EU's only genuine operations centre with direct links to member states'

<sup>36</sup> The five framework nations are: France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK.

<sup>37</sup> These problems were experienced in the EUFOR RD Congo Operation.

governments and military. Its reinforcement, which has yet to materialise, would doubtless be highly valuable for the planning and conduct of EU operations.

71. The French Presidency has sent a “non-paper” to the EU Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers with proposals for improving the planning capabilities for EU operations should that reinforcement not take place<sup>38</sup>. The main thrust of those proposals is an internal reorganisation of the Council Secretariat-General, with a merger of the Directorates General responsible for civil and military planning capabilities. Strengthening the planning and conduct of operations, argues Olivier Jehin of Europe Diplomacy and Defence, could also have a positive knock-on effect for the development of permanent cooperation amongst the EU’s diplomatic, civilian and military personnel.<sup>39</sup>

72. Further ideas and initiatives for improving the three OHQ options currently available to the EU include:

- using the Berlin Plus arrangements in the NATO framework solely for large-scale operations, given that they have been proven to be inefficient for urgent small-scale operations;
- ruling out the use of the framework nation concept, given the time it often takes to get off the ground, in situations calling for swift action, as in the case of the battlegroups, for example.

73. But the argument for a permanent structure remains one of the most convincing and logical. Firstly, the participating states would contribute permanent staff to a headquarters which would be augmented on a case-by-case basis depending on the number and size of concurrent operations. Secondly, costs would be shared at the OHQ instead of being assumed by a lead nation. Thirdly, the planning and conduct capability of a permanent headquarters co-located with the civil authorities and having the Civ/Mil Cell in its midst would be second to none in Europe. Lastly, it would bring us one step nearer to a true European strategic and military culture, encouraging closer cooperation and thereby increasing trust and confidence and effectively raising the profile of EU operations not only in Europe but in the rest of the world as well.

74. There is a long way to go before achieving this goal. Due to considerable opposition and lack of consensus within the Union, the French EU Presidency did not proceed with preliminary plans for the creation of a joint EU headquarters in Brussels, a point also stressed by French Defence Minister Herve Morin in an interview with the Financial Times.<sup>40</sup> However, an initial step that could be taken in this area is the reinforcement and streamlining within the European Council of Directorate VIII, responsible for defence aspects, and Directorate IX for civilian crisis management, with the primary aim of increasing cooperation and communication between the two in order to achieve faster and more efficient operational planning.

## *VI. Mutual assistance and mutual defence*

75. There has been much debate on whether the solidarity and mutual assistance clauses contained in the Treaty of Lisbon measure up to the mutual defence commitment of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty and whether the latter treaty still has a useful role to play or whether its 10 signatory states might decide to denounce it. These questions and the relevant provisions were discussed in detail by your Rapporteur in his earlier report,<sup>41</sup> in which the Assembly urged governments to make full use of the potential offered by the Protocol, appended to the Treaty of Lisbon, on Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, which calls upon the EU and WEU to “draw up arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them”.

76. Opinions diverge: in Finland for example, a recent parliamentary review led by Defence Committee Chairman Juha Korkeaoja in connection with the drafting of a new White Paper on

<sup>38</sup> Europe Diplomacy and Defence, No 169, 18 October 2008.

<sup>39</sup> Europe Diplomacy and Defence, No. 147, 15 July 2008.

<sup>40</sup> “EU moves forward on common defence plans”, Financial Times, 3 November 2008.

<sup>41</sup> Assembly Document 2000: “Revision of the European Security Strategy – reply to the annual report of the Council” submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Daniel Ducarme, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group).



defence called for Finland to “improve the capabilities to receive and provide military assistance” – without this implying membership of NATO. Both the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses of the Treaty of Lisbon would seem, then, to be deemed sufficient and to apply to Finland.<sup>42</sup>

77. On the other hand, EU Military Committee (EUMC) Chairman General Henri Bentégeat, addressing members of the Assembly during a meeting in Brussels on 22 September 2008, said that issues such as missile defence were not matters of European defence, although they concerned it indirectly given the likely consequences for EU member states. The agreements that two countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) had with the United States were, he said, collective defence choices. He pointed out that although the Lisbon Treaty contained primary elements of solidarity and mutual assistance among the EU member states, it also stipulated that, for the 21 EU member states that were also members of NATO, such issues belonged in the Alliance framework. Helga Schmid, from the European Council, said when addressing the European Parliament Sub-Committee on Security and Defence on 13 November 2008 that the Lisbon Treaty contained a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause to the effect that “if one member state was under attack, *the others must see how to assist*”.

78. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that although the mutual assistance clause of the Lisbon Treaty has the advantage of introducing the idea of mutual assistance and solidarity into the EU Treaty it still does not constitute an equivalent to the collective defence clause of the modified Brussels Treaty and therefore cannot replace it.

## VII. Concluding remarks

79. The primary objective of a common security and defence strategy for Europe must be the protection of the EU member states and their citizens. This report has focused on some of the main global challenges faced by those states today: these range from direct threats to their security, such as terrorism, to others with indirect but serious implications for security, such as climate change, or those like the financial crisis which affect the workings of the institutions and instruments set up to protect them.

80. Europe faces a further challenge stemming from its history marked by the sovereignty, power and precedence of the nation state. In each major crisis in recent years the member states have fallen back on inward-looking policies and given priority to national over European interests. It has almost become a pattern in times of crisis for member states either to be divided in their perceptions and responses or simply to ignore Europe and go it alone. The EU was split over the Iraq crisis in 2003, with some member states joining the United States’ coalition of the willing, and the majority deciding against it. A similar rift occurred over the independence of Kosovo, recognised by some member states but still not by others. More recently opinions and policies have again diverged with regard to the financial crisis, with Europe functioning not as a single bloc but rather as 27 independent states scrambling to protect their own economies.

81. This report does not provide the answer as to which – European or national policy – is the most effective: indeed one may be more appropriate than the other, according to the circumstances. For the purpose of formulating a security and defence strategy, however, the EU must bear in mind that it is not a United States of Europe, but a combination of 27 foreign policies, defence policies and security strategies. At the same time, when tackling threats and challenges – like terrorist attacks against member states or deploying troops abroad to protect refugee camps – it must remember that the keys to success are speed and efficiency: when lives are at risk there is no time for inward-looking policies or stalling. At such times the EU can prove that it stands united against global threats; by speaking with a single voice in response to those challenges it will increase its weight as a global player and place itself on a more equal footing vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. This is why the EU’s Security and Defence Strategy must give due consideration to the national policies of its members while also stressing the need in certain cases to relinquish some of them for the greater good.

<sup>42</sup> Assembly Document 2016: “Europe’s northern security dimension”, submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Paul Wille, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group), and Odd Einar Dørum, co-Rapporteur (Norway, Liberal Group).

82. One way of increasing the EU's experience and added value is to engage in an enhanced dialogue with the elected members of the national parliaments, for they are the ones who vote on defence budgets or troop deployments. Our Assembly provides a specialised forum in which parliamentarians from the 27 member states, a number of them members or chairmen of their national defence or foreign affairs committees can discuss their security and defence policies. This makes for greater interparliamentary scrutiny and cooperation and a two-way exchange of ideas, knowledge and expertise, which the members can take back home with them but which can also be exported to Brussels.

83. To quote Stephan Keukeleire of the College of Europe, "effective foreign policy will from henceforth depend not so much upon the international players being able to pursue strategies that yield direct advantages and allow them to tackle such traditional challenges as a diplomatic crisis or armed conflict; but on the ability to shape influence and define viable structures".<sup>43</sup> The EU should therefore be looking at long-term policies which can be adapted to situations as they arise and which have clear end goals: to guarantee peace and stability within the EU and its neighbourhood and enable it to respond swiftly and effectively to the different crises around the world in which it is called upon to intervene. Such policies can only be realised by a united Europe and not one in which its member states become inward-looking in times of crisis and outward-looking only when it is to their national advantage.

84. Europe's military power today certainly does not reflect the 207 billion euros being spent annually on defence: while too much is spent on national policies and maintaining troops, too little is going into procurement and research and development. Here in particular, some of the aims outlined in the French White Paper on Defence and National Security could provide valuable input towards solving the challenges facing the European defence sector. The paper not only took the view that flexibility, interoperability and deployability were central to effective operations, but also proposed keeping defence spending at approximately 2% of GDP, with reductions in personnel and increased spending on equipment; in other words it is "how" rather than "how much" money is being spent that is important.

85. Perhaps the notion of a European white paper on security and defence – rarely discussed in official EU circles today – is too premature for certain EU members. However, a step in the right direction might be a preliminary study which could begin by tackling issues on which Europeans are prepared to cooperate and which need moving forward in order to strengthen ESDP at the same time as reduce costs and duplication as described above. Such a paper would be a "litmus test" for the EU, stimulating debate and bringing out all the arguments concerning the ESDP and its development; not only would it be a pragmatic and valuable exercise whereby a pan-European view might be formed, but it would also determine whether or not a white paper is a realistic option.

86. Once again, a broad EU discussion with the involvement of national parliaments and the forums they attend to discuss security and defence could play an invaluable role in developing an EU paper much like a Commission green paper in this area. To this effect the ESDA, which has a significant degree of expertise both in interparliamentary relations and more importantly in the ESDP, remains a very viable option. Alternatively, a working group devoted to discussing, analysing and contributing to European security and defence could be created within the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the EU – better known as COSAC – which would comprise the ESDA, the European Parliament and national parliamentarians who sit on defence and foreign affairs committees.

87. Moreover, such a discussion should aim to keep the public better informed of these issues and raise awareness about the EU's CFSP and ESDP. Public opinion is crucial to the future of the ESDP. Recent Eurobarometer surveys have shown overwhelming public support for the ESDP. According to a survey published in February 2007,<sup>44</sup> "European public opinion remains very upbeat on issues

<sup>43</sup> "Solana's security review should introduce 'structural' foreign policy", Stephan Keukeleire, Europe's World. [www.europesworld.org](http://www.europesworld.org)

<sup>44</sup> "The role of the EU in justice, freedom and security policy areas" – fieldwork June-July 2006, Special Eurobarometer 266/Wave 65.4, February 2007. <http://ec.europa.eu>

relating to ESDP. On average, three out of four EU citizens are in favour of a common security and defence policy". 75% of citizens in the EU of 25 supported the ESDP, while 68% were in favour of a common foreign policy. It is quite significant that these high figures have remained relatively stable (never falling below 60%) in all Eurobarometer surveys since 1999, showing not only that public opinion is keeping abreast of developments in ESDP, but also that ESDP is working and that the public is demanding more of it. On the other hand, this favourable attitude cannot necessarily be relied on, as public support tends to fall away when issues pertaining to military intervention reach the point of decision, since an overwhelming majority tend to feel that such decisions should be taken by national governments.<sup>45</sup>

88. More effective and greater public diplomacy on European security and defence issues is also crucial, as it is primarily these areas that come under scrutiny when the public is misinformed and that can in turn have a significant impact on EU policies in other areas. A recent example of this is the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the Irish referendum in June 2008, where terminology such as the "mutual assistance clause" raised fears about the creation of a "European army", leading to unfounded concerns regarding Ireland's neutrality in the EU at the same time as making a strong case for the "no" camp which appeared more convincing to voters.

89. However, the prospects of an Irish ratification of the Lisbon Treaty are improving as greater attention is being paid to the matter at home and in Brussels and more information is reaching politicians and voters. A report by the House of Oireachtas Subcommittee on Ireland's future in the EU refers to the possibility of a second referendum on the Treaty in 2009, most probably after the European elections in June. It states there are no legal obstacles to a second Irish referendum, but that ratification through parliament alone would most likely not be constitutionally possible. A survey published in the Irish Times on 17 November suggests that there has been a shift of mood among Irish voters, with 43% now supporting the Treaty, 39% against it and 18% with no opinion. Voters were asked during the poll whether they would approve a modified treaty allowing Ireland to keep its Commissioner and guaranteeing its neutrality and its right to rule on issues such as abortion and taxation.

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<sup>45</sup> Eurobarometer Survey 146, Public Opinion and European Defence July 2001. <http://ec.europa.eu>



## APPENDIX

*Recommendation 816<sup>46</sup>**on the revision of the European Security Strategy  
– reply to the annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) *Taking the view* that the European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, is a good and compelling document, not least because it is short and readable and provides a convincing guideline to the European Union's external action and because of its focus on crisis management and its transformational purpose;
- (ii) *Reaffirming* the deeply-rooted fundamental consensus among EU member states, reflected in the European Security Strategy, about their foreign policy approach drawing on a range of instruments, including aid, trade, diplomacy and military means;
- (iii) *Confirming* the objectives of the European Security Strategy which invites the European Union to be more active, capable and coherent and to work with partners; *welcoming* progress made in implementing those objectives but *convinced* that further effort is needed in view of the evolving strategic environment and complex challenges ahead;
- (iv) *Recalling* that the European Security Strategy provides no information about the civil and military capabilities that the Union needs to achieve its objectives;
- (v) *Aware* of the changing relative weight of the European Union in terms of demography, economy and trade and *convinced* that only a Europe which is more active on the international scene can compensate for its anticipated loss of global influence;
- (vi) *Welcoming* the decision by the European Council to launch a re-examination of the European Security Strategy and *encouraging* EU High Representative and WEU Secretary-General Javier Solana to lead the way in providing the Union with a foreign, security and defence policy vision to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century;
- (vii) *Encouraging* the French Government to support the High Representative and WEU Secretary-General carry out a full re-examination of the European Security Strategy, using the dual EU-WEU Presidency to pave the way for a further deepening and widening of the strategic framework for the Union's foreign, security and defence policy action;
- (viii) *Taking the view* that the process of reassessing the European Security Strategy is just the beginning of a more extensive strategic overhaul that needs to be supported by the development of a military sub-strategy, detailing the means whereby the EU intends to attain its objectives, so as to enable member states to achieve more harmonised capabilities planning;
- (ix) *Noting* that the European Security Strategy and past and present EU civil and military operations have contributed to establishing a collective and distinctively European strategic culture, increasingly perceived as the hallmark of Europe's foreign policy approach, inspiring international organisations such as NATO, the African Union and others to adopt parts of its discourse, methods and structures;
- (x) *Aware* that in the fields of coercive action, use of military force and collective defence, the differences between the strategic cultures of EU member states are widest and consensus is at its most difficult to achieve, hence the failure to include in the Treaty of Lisbon a mutual defence commitment equivalent to that contained in the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (xi) *Noting* that the European Security Strategy and the Treaty of Lisbon offer no guidelines on the means of self-defence that might be required if diplomacy, non-proliferation and conflict prevention and management fail to achieve peace and stability;

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<sup>46</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on 3 June 2008 at the 1<sup>st</sup> sitting.

- (xii) *Underlining* the fact that the EU is entering upon a crucial period of transition – with the completion of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the nomination of the new EU political leadership, the forthcoming European Parliament elections and the arrival in office of a new President of the United States – and one that will be decisive for the further development of European foreign, security and defence policy;
- (xiii) *Taking the view* that the competences of the new High Representative (who will at one and the same time be Vice-President of the European Commission), supported by a newly-established European External Action Service, will contribute to making EU external action more coherent but *recalling* also that certain questions about the role of each member of the new political leadership of the EU executive remain to be clarified;
- (xiv) *Considering* that the lessons learned from the Union's past and ongoing civil and military operations are a rich source to draw on for developing relevant and justifiable proposals calculated to make the future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) more responsive;
- (xv) *Convinced* that in order to be more active the EU needs to develop further its capability for planning and making decisions and to have the possibility of preplanning civil and military operations available to it on a permanent basis;
- (xvi) *Convinced* that permanent structured cooperation offers the potential for a thorough transformation of EU member states' capabilities and for delivering more and better capabilities;
- (xvii) *Convinced* equally that permanent structured cooperation should lead to deeper solidarity among member states with respect to their participation in ESDP operations and the funding thereof;
- (xviii) *Welcoming* France's intention to normalise its relations with NATO and *convinced* that such a move will make for deeper Euro-Atlantic cooperation, strengthen NATO and the Common Security and Defence Policy and facilitate the progressive shaping of a mutually reinforcing strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, thus helping to promote shared values and safeguard and protect our citizens' freedom and way of life;
- (xix) *Regretting* the obstacles which continue to stand in the way of substantial dialogue between the European Union and NATO going beyond matters under the Berlin Plus arrangements and which threaten to reduce the effectiveness of EU and NATO operations in the western Balkans and Afghanistan where the two organisations work side by side without recourse to Berlin Plus and where there is need for close cooperation between them both in the field and at headquarters level;
- (xx) *Welcoming* the fact that, for the first time ever, the United States is to deploy personnel to an ESDP operation – namely, EULEX Kosovo;
- (xxi) *Recalling* the complementary constitutional and treaty-based competences of national parliaments, the WEU Assembly (national parliaments' interparliamentary tool at the European level) and the European Parliament, with respect to European security and defence matters;
- (xxii) *Convinced* that it is the combination of forms of parliamentary scrutiny provided by national parliaments, the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament that can offer the most comprehensive link between intergovernmental action and Europe's citizens and give maximum democratic legitimacy to civil and military operations;
- (xxiii) *Regretting* the European Parliament's current unwillingness to engage in cooperation with the Assembly and exploit the potential for the two to reinforce one another mutually in improving parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental action in the field of foreign, security and defence policy;
- (xxiv) *Noting* a renewed interest among European citizens in security in its broader sense, together with an increased awareness of the link between internal and external security, both of which invite consideration as to the use of ESDP capabilities in support of other Union policies,



RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU NATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO TO

**1. Impart a doctrinal character to the Lisbon Treaty as far as the European Security and Defence Policy is concerned,** making reference to Article 21 of the Treaty in order to clarify the European Union's external, security and defence policy;

Ensure that the European Security and Defence Policy and European Security Strategy are readable and fully comprehensible to the peoples of Europe and the international community, setting out clearly the scope of their commitment to intervene;

Take this as the basis for future work by the Union, bearing in mind that the Union's external, security and defence doctrine rests on fundamental principles whose objectives are:

1.1 The furtherance of democracy, the rule of law, universal and indivisible human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality, solidarity and those enshrined in the United Nations Charter and international law;

1.2 The preservation of the values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity of the Union;

1.3 Maintaining peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security;

1.4 Promoting an international order founded on strong multilateral cooperation and good world governance;

Appropriate to such purpose would be:

1.5 The creation of an informal group of EU countries with the aim of developing close working relations between them and strengthening the action of the European institutions, which all Union member states are invited to join;

1.6 Mandating the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission to draw up by 15 June 2009 a White Paper on European external, security and defence policy – ways and means (2009-2019) presenting a set of thoroughly-argued proposals for community actions, taking account of the Union's budget strategy and covering the transversal dimension of that policy across all relevant sectors, including development aid, agriculture, international trade, industry and energy;

1.7 Furthering dialogue with national parliaments through the holding of regular meetings between the Assembly's committees (bearing in mind the potential offered by the Assembly as an instrument of interparliamentary dialogue on the Common Security and Defence Policy) and the Ambassadors of the WEU Permanent Council and the EU Political and Security Committee, in recognition both of parliamentarians' constitutional role in their home parliaments and their function as a link with the general public;

1.8 Defining an operational framework for parliamentary scrutiny which takes account of institutional developments and including from the outset among the staff that form the European External Action Service personnel drawn from national parliaments, the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament able to address the specific needs of parliaments and provide a parliamentary liaison service;

1.9 Commissioning a wide-ranging survey of the views of EU citizens, including those resident in non-European Union countries, about their security preoccupations, how they see

the Union's role in the world and their expectations of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

2. **Reconcile the mutual assistance provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty with the mutual defence clause of the modified Brussels Treaty, giving precedence to mutual defence as the ESDP and the European Security Strategy are put into practice over time** and in this way making it possible to:

2.1 Envisage the extension of this pre-arranged guarantee of automatic intervention so as to protect the security of European citizens under threat, whether they are resident on European soil or outside the European Union;

2.2 Implement the Protocol on cooperation between the European Union and WEU appended to the Treaty of Lisbon in as much as the European collective defence commitment contained in the modified Brussels Treaty retains its full strategic importance;

2.3 Provide the operational means for an ongoing, real-time action under the Union's counterterrorism policy.

3. **Encourage the use of permanent structured cooperation** as the means whereby all member states, in the first instance of WEU and in due course of the European Union, can participate according to their capabilities and where appropriate bring their security and defence efforts together under one roof;

In order to set in train this strategic choice which should be the central concern of the report by the Union High Representative requested at the December 2007 Brussels European Council:

3.1 Ensure that the potential of permanent structured cooperation is fully exploited while respecting the working principle that, subject to their meeting the requirements of the implementation process, all member states are free to participate;

3.2 Develop a permanent capability to plan and conduct civil and military operations, with rapid deployability of intervention forces, both on the territory of the Union and beyond;

3.3 Have recourse to permanent structured cooperation to develop a funding system allowing for the cost of operations to be shared more widely among all the member states supporting an ESDP operation, independently of whether they actually contribute troops and other personnel;

3.4 Develop a European early warning system with civil and military intervention capabilities to protect, safeguard and, if necessary, evacuate European citizens in danger both in and outside the European Union such that such force may be used for humanitarian intervention to the benefit of any people not part of the European Union;

3.5 Task the European Union Military Committee and European Defence Agency with drafting a military sub-strategy to the European Security Strategy presenting scenarios for possible EU intervention and detailing the necessary capabilities, and with launching multiyear programmes for the development of military capabilities based on those scenarios;

3.6 Create a European "military Erasmus" training and exchange programme for members of the armed forces to foster greater familiarity with the military cultures of the various member states and facilitate increased interoperability in the future between European armed forces.

4. **Define a clear partnership between the EU and NATO. At a time when NATO is in the process of laying down the content of its new Strategic Concept, and given the dual membership of the majority of its members, the substance of its essential partnership with the EU must also be clearly specified, and the European Union must therefore:**

4.1 Specify the degree of autonomy, freedom and burden-sharing it needs in order to assume responsibility for its security and defence;

4.2 Set up a European chain of command with all the capabilities required for gathering and controlling the information and intelligence needed for a free and independent assessment of all situations pertaining to security and defence;

4.3 Establish regular, direct dialogue with the new US Administration on the future development of ESDP and cooperation between it and NATO, current security matters and the obstacles preventing the EU and NATO taking up issues above and beyond those concerning ongoing operations under the Berlin Plus arrangements;

4.4 Seek more in-depth cooperation with Russia on ESDP operations, taking into account the specific aspects relating to the northern dimension of its neighbourhood policy;

4.5 Step up security cooperation with Turkey, an EU candidate country which has actively supported and contributed to the development of ESDP, including through participation in ESDP operations;

4.6 Determine, in partnership with the African Union, the objectives of the EU presence in Africa.

5. **Speed up the introduction of an open and competitive European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) in order to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, bringing in European Commission initiatives;**

And to that end:

5.1 Envisage the launch of a defence equipment and technology framework programme for the period 2009-2014 to facilitate cooperation in this area leading to better interoperability between national equipment and weapons programmes;

5.2 Speed up the application of single European market and competition rules to this industrial sector;

5.3 Draw up a space operationality concept for the ESDP based on the use of existing national and European space assets and resources and those in the making, one that envisages the development of new capabilities such as a space-based early warning system and includes the provision and funding of guaranteed access to existing tools as well as to those, such as Galileo, that are in the process of being developed.

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Mr Konstantinos VRETTOS (GR) (Soc)  
Mr Paul WILLE (BE) (Lib)  
Mr Marco ZACCHERA (IT) (Fed)

Mr Ingo SCHMITT, MdB (DE) (Fed)  
Mr Stanislaw SZWED (PL) (Fed)  
Mr Bruno TOBBACK (BE) (Soc)  
Mrs Özlem TURKONE (TR) (Fed)  
Mr Karim VAN OVERMEIRE (BE) (n-a)  
Ms Tanja VRBAT (HR)  
Mr Robert WALTER, MP (UK) (Fed)  
Mrs Betty WILLIAMS, MP (UK) (Soc)

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