## Frédéric Allemand, Comparatifs des différentes versions de travail de l'accord international sur l'union économique renforcée

**Légende:** Dans cette étude, Frédéric Allemand, maître de conférences à Sciences Po et HEC, compare les différentes versions de travail de l'accord international sur l'union économique renforcée (Dernière mise à jour: 31 janvier 2012).

Source: Frédéric Allemand.

Copyright: (c) CVCE.EU by UNI.LU

Tous droits de reproduction, de communication au public, d'adaptation, de distribution ou de rediffusion, via Internet, un réseau interne ou tout autre moyen, strictement réservés pour tous pays.

Consultez l'avertissement juridique et les conditions d'utilisation du site.

## **URL:**

 $http://www.cvce.eu/obj/frederic\_allemand\_comparatifs\_des\_differentes\_versions\_de\_travail\_de\_l\_accord\_international\_sur\_l\_union\_economique\_renforcee-fr-ob6bc1bc-efea-44df-acb6-1050boa2dd5a.html$ 



Date de dernière mise à jour: 06/07/2016



## Comparatifs des différentes versions de travail de l'accord international sur l'union économique renforcée, Frédéric Allemand. Dernière mise à jour : 31 janvier 2012.

•	e par rapport à la version précéde	ente: : élé	ment supprimé dans la version s	suivante <u>European Unic</u>	n : formulation modifiée par rapp	oort à la version précédente		
éclaration des chefs d'Etat de gouvernement, 9 écembre 2011	Version du 16 décembre 2011	Version du 5 janvier 2012 – Présidence danoise	Version du 10 janvier 2012	Version du 19 janvier 2012	Version du 27 janvier 2012	Version finale	Dispositions de droit communautaire en vigueur ou en discussion	
CCCITIBLE 2011	DRAFT	DRAFT		DRAFT	DRAFT		CIT discussion	
	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON A REINFORCED ECONOMIC UNION	INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON A [REINFORCED ECONOMIC UNION]		TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION	TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION	TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION		
	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES		
	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,		
	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro areal,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,		Commentaire [f2]: Reprise de
	BEARING IN MIND that the coordination of the economic policies of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for storong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's objectives for sustainable growth and employment,	BEARING IN MIND that the coordination of the economic policies of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's objectives for sustainable growth and employment.	[supprimé]					formule exacte du 1 <sup>er</sup> considérant protocole sur l'Eurogroupe.
	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including the need to take necessary corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including the need to take necessary corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government defict becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,		
	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits remain below 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt is below, or sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices.	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits remain below 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt is below, or sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3% of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government det does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60% of their gross domestic product at market prices,		
	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,		
	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,		
	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union remains to incorporate the provisions of this Agreement as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union remains to incorporate the provisions of this Agreement as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Agreement as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Treaty as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Treaty as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Treaty as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,		
	TAKING NOTE, in this context, of the intention of the European Commission to present further legislative proposals within the framework of the Union Treaties regarding a mechanism of ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, a procedure of economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as a new coordination procedure at the level of the euro area for major economic policy reform plans,	TAKING NOTE, in this context, of the intention of the European Commission to present further legislative proposals within the framework of the Union Treaties regarding a mechanism of ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, a procedure of economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as a new coordination procedure at the level of the euro area for major economic policy reform plans,	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission within the framework of the European Union Treaties on 23 November 2011 and TAKING NOTE of its intention to present further legislative proposals regarding a mechanism of ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, a procedure of economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as a new coordination procedure at the level of the euro area for major economic policy reform plans,	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission within the framework of the European Union Treaties on 23 November 2011 and TAKING NOTE of its intention to present further legislative proposals <u>concerning</u> , in <u>particular</u> , ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as coordination of major economic policy reform plans for euro area Member States.	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission for the euro area within the framework of the European Union Treaties on 23 November 2011, pn the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing of their financial stability, and on commor provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States, and TAKING NOTE of the Commission's intention to present further legislative proposals concerning, in particular, ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission for the euro area within the framework of the European Union Treaties on 23 November 2011, on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, and on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States, and TAKING NOTE of the Commission's intention to present further legislative proposals to the european for the survey of the		



TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Agreement, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 NOTING in particular that, for the application of NO IIING in particular trait, for the application or the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Agreement, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific reference values and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,

TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Agreement, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

NOTING in particular that, for the application of NO IIIvs in particular trait, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Agreement, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific reference values and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,

TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

NOTING in particular that, for the application of NO INVs in particular trat, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Agreement, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party. Temporary deviation from the

NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems through binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

trainspose the Balancea Boulger Rule IIIIo national legal systems at constitutional or equivalent level should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified reduce a deficit which might be identified,

RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,

NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems at constitutional or equivalent level should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into

RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to notice a deficit which might be identified. RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a defirit which might be identified. o reduce a deficit which might be identified

RECALLING the need for those Contracting RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,

TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and IAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

NOTING in particular that, for the application of NO I ING in particular triat, for the application of he budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Treaty, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party, [Phrase suivante supprimée]

NOTING that sufficient progress towards the medium term objectives should be evaluated the basis of an overall assessme structural balance as a reference, including an

nalysis of expenditure net of discretionary

analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions specified under European Union law, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies, as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 16
November 2011 (hereinafter "the revised Stability

NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems through binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Furneau Union.

RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified.

o reduce a deficit which might be identified

RECALLING the need for those Contracting

Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,

and Growth Pact"),

NOTING that the medium term objectives should NOTING that the medium term objectives should NOTING that the medium term objectives shoul be updated regularly on the basis of a commonl agreed method, the main parameters of which are also to be reviewed regularly, reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact, be updated regularly on the basis of a commonly agreed method, the main parameters of which agreed method, are main paraffleters of which are also to be reviewed regularly, reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact,

States in excessive deficit procedure as well as

proposals which the Commission might present of further strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact by introducing, for Member States whose currency is the euro, a new range for medium erm objectives in line with the limits established

TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

NOTING in particular that, for the application of

NOTING in particular that, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Treaty, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,

coordination of major economic policy reform plans for euro area Member States,

NOTING that sufficient progress towards the medium term objectives should be evaluated the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions specified under European Union law, in particult Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance and budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies, as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the by Regulation (EO) No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 (hereinafter "the revised Stability and Growth Pact"),

NOTING that compliance with the obligation to NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems through binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Cour of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

RECALLING that Article 260 of the Treaty on the RECALLING that Article 260 of the Ireaty on the Functioning of the European Union empowers the Court of Justice of the European Union to impose the payment of a lump sum or penalty or a Member State of the European Union having failed to comply with one of its judgments and late in the European Commission has established.

RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption o RELALLING the need to facilitate the adoption or measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned reduce a deficit which might be identified

RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, procedure as well as coordination of major economic policy reform plans of Member States

EXPRESSING their readiness to support proposals which the Commission might present to further strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact by introducing, for Member States whose currency is the euro, a new range for med

TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,

NOTING in particular that, for the application of NO INIX in particular trat, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Treaty, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,

NOTING that the medium term objectives should be updated regularly on the basis of a common agreed method, the main parameters of which agreed interior, the main parameters of which are also to be reviewed regularly, reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact,

NOTING that sufficient progress towards the medium term objectives should be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the tructural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions specified under European Union law, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/87 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies, as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Partiament and of the Council of 16 Nucesober 2011 departs with the provision Stability. November 2011 (hereinafter "the revised Stability and Growth Pact"),


NOTING that the correction mechanism to be introduced by the Contracting Parties should aim at correcting deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path including their cumulated impact on government debt dynamics,

NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems through binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Furnosan Union.

RECALLING that Article 260 of the Treaty on the RECALLING that Article 280 of the I reaty on the Functioning of the European Union empowers the Court of Justice of the European Union to impose the payment of a lump sum or penalty on a Member State of the European Union having failed to comply with one of its judgments and that the European Commission has established criteria for the determination of the lump sum or enalty to be paid in the framework of that

RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified,

RECALLING the obligation for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average ate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,



		BEARING IN MIND the need to respect the role	BEARING IN MIND the need to respect, in the	BEARING IN MIND the need to respect, in the	BEARING IN MIND the need to respect, in the	
		of social partners, as it is foreseen in the law of each of the Contracting Parties, in the	implementation of this Treaty, the specific role of the social partners, as it is recognized in the laws	implementation of this Treaty, the specific role of the social partners, as it is recognized in the laws	implementation of this Treaty, the specific role of the social partners, as it is recognized in the laws	
		implementation of this Treaty,	or national systems of each of the Contracting Parties,	or national systems of each of the Contracting Parties,	or national systems of each of the Contracting Parties,	
		STRESSING that none of the provisions of this	STRESSING that none of the provisions of this	STRESSING that none of the provisions of this	STRESSING that none of the provisions of this	
		Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which	Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which	Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which	Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which	
		financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme	financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme	financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme	financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme	
		involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,	involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,	involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,	involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,	
			NOTING that the smooth functioning of the	NOTING that the smooth functioning of the	NOTING that the smooth functioning of the	
			Economic and Monetary Union makes it necessary that the Contracting Parties work	Economic and Monetary Union makes it necessary that the Contracting Parties work	Economic and Monetary Union makes it necessary that the Contracting Parties work	
			jointly towards an economic policy where, whilst building upon the mechanisms of economic	jointly towards an economic policy where, whilst building upon the mechanisms of economic	jointly towards an economic policy where, whilst building upon the mechanisms of economic	
			policy coordination as defined in the European Union Treaties, they take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are	policy coordination as defined in the European Union Treaties, they take the necessary actions	policy coordination as defined in the European Union Treaties, they take the necessary actions	
			essential to the good functioning of the euro	and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area.	and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area.	
			NOTING, in particular, the wish of the	NOTING, in particular, the wish of the	NOTING, in particular, the wish of the	
			Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article	Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article	Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article	
			20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the	20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the	20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the	
			Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to	Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to	Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to	
			make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro	make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro	make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro	
			pursuant to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a	pursuant to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a	pursuant to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a	
			procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties	procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties	procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties	
			whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to	whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to	whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to	
			benchmarking best practices,	benchmarking best practices,	benchmarking best practices,	
RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member	
States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the	States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the	States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the	States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the	States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the	States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the	
holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement of the Euro	holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement of the Euro	holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement of the Euro	holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement by the Heads	holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement by the Heads	holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, to be convened, unless justified by	
Plus Pact by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other	Plus Pact by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other	Plus Pact by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other	of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the	of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the	exceptional circumstances, immediately after meetings of the European Council or meetings	
Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011,	Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011,	Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011,	European Union on 25 March 2011 of the Euro Plus Pact which identifies the issues that are	European Union on 25 March 2011 of the Euro Plus Pact which identifies the issues that are	with the participation of all Contracting Parties having ratified this Treaty.	
			essential to fostering competitiveness in the euro area,	essential to fostering competitiveness in the euro area,	RECALLING also the endorsement by the Heads	Commentaire
STRESSING the importance of the Treaty					of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the	composant un
establishing the European Stability Mechanism as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union,					European Union on 25 March 2011 of the Euro Plus Pact which identifies the issues that are essential to fostering competitiveness in the euro	version finale.
the Economic and Monetary Official,					area,	
	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism	
	as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union,]	as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union and	as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union and	as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union and	as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union and	
	, ,	POINTING OUT that compliance with Article 3(2) shall be considered as a condition for the	POINTING OUT that the granting of assistance in the framework of new programmes under the	POINTING OUT that the granting of assistance in the framework of new programmes under the	POINTING OUT that the granting of assistance in the framework of new programmes under the	
		granting of assistance under the European Stability Mechanism as soon as the transposition	European Stability Mechanism will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification of this	European Stability Mechanism will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification of this	European Stability Mechanism will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification of this	
		period mentioned in Article 3(2) has expired,	Treaty by the Contracting Party concerned and, as soon as the transposition period mentioned in	Treaty by the Contracting Party concerned and, as soon as the transposition period mentioned in	Treaty by the Contracting Party concerned and, as soon as the transposition period mentioned in	
			Article 3(2) has expired, on compliance with the requirements of this Article.	Article 3(2) has expired, on compliance with the requirements of this Article,	Article 3(2) has expired, on compliance with the requirements of this Article,	
			NOTING that are Contracting Parties whose	NOTING that are Contracting Parties whose	NOTING that are Contracting Parties whose	
			currency is the euro and that, as such, they will be bound by the provisions of this Treaty from	currency is the euro and that, as such, they will be bound by the provisions of this Treaty from	currency is the euro and that, as such, they will be bound by the provisions of this Treaty from	
			the first day of the month following the deposit of their instrument of ratification if the Treaty is in	the first day of the month following the deposit of their instrument of ratification if the Treaty is in	the first day of the month following the deposit of their instrument of ratification if the Treaty is in	
			force at that date; NOTING ALSO that all other Contracting Parties are, at the date of signature	force at that date; NOTING ALSO that <u>are</u> Contracting Parties which, as Member States of	force at that date; NOTING ALSO that are Contracting Parties which, as Member States of	
			of this Treaty, Member States of the European Union with a derogation or an exemption from	the European Union, have, at the date of signature of this Treaty, a derogation or an	the European Union, have, at the date of signature of this Treaty, a derogation or an	
			participation in the single currency and may be bound, as long as this derogation or exemption is	exemption from participation in the single currency and may be bound, as long as this	exemption from participation in the single currency and may be bound, as long as this	
			not abrogated, only by those provisions of Titles III and IV by which they declare, on depositing their instrument of ratification or at a later date.	derogation or exemption is not abrogated, only by those provisions of Titles III and IV by which they declare, on depositing their instrument of	derogation or exemption is not abrogated, only by those provisions of Titles III and IV by which they declare, on depositing their instrument of	
			that they intend to be bound,	ratification or at a later date, that they intend to be bound,	ratification or at a later date, that they intend to be bound,	
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions,	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions,	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions:	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions:	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions:	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions:	
TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	
Article 1	Article 1	Article 1	Article 1	Article 1	Article 1	
By this Agreement, the Contracting Parties, which are Member States of the European Union,	By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties, as     Member States of the European Union, agree on	By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree, as Member States of the European Union, to	By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree, as Member States of the European Union, to	By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree, as Member States of the European Union, to	By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree, as Member States of the European Union,	
	a "fiscal compact" and on a stronger coordination	strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic	strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic	strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic	to strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic	
agree to strengthen their budgetary discipline						
agree to strengthen their budgetary discipline						
agree to strengthen their budgetary discipline						

4/10



	and to reinforce their economic policy coordination and governance.	of economic policies, involving an enhanced governance to foster fiscal discipline and deeper integration in the internal market as well as stronger growth, enhanced competitiveness and	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the	
		stronger grown, emanced compenieveness and social cohesion.	governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth and employment.	governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.	governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.	economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.	
	The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They may also apply to the other Contracting Parties, under the conditions set out in Article 14.	The provisions of this <u>Treaty</u> shall apply to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They may also apply to the other Contracting Parties, under the conditions set out in Article 14.	The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to The extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.	The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.	The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.	The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.	
	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	
	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	
It will rest on anenhanced governance to foster fiscal discipline and deeper integration in the internal market as well as stronger growth, enhanced competitiveness and social cohesion.	This Agreement shall be applied by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law.	This <u>Treaty</u> shall be applied by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law.	This Treaty shall be applied by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law.	This Treaty shall be applied and interpreted by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law, including procedural law whenever the adoption of secondary legislation is required.	This Treaty shall be applied and interpreted by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law, including procedural law whenever the adoption of secondary legislation is required.	This Treaty shall be applied and interpreted by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law, including procedural law whenever the adoption of secondary legislation is required.	
	The provisions of this Agreement shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union. In accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Union law has precedence over the provisions of this Agreement.	The provisions of this <u>Treaty</u> shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union. In accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Union law has precedence over the provisions of this Treaty.	The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Urion is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union. [Phrase supprimée]	The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union.	The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union.	2. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union.	
	TITLE III BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	
	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	
	The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition to and without prejudice to the obligations derived from Union Law:	The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition to and without prejudice to the obligations derived from Union Law:	The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition to and without prejudice to the obligations derived from Union law:	The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition and without prejudice to the obligations derived from European Union law:	The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition and without prejudice to the obligations derived from European Union law.	The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition and without prejudice to the obligations derived from European Union law:	
General government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus []	a) Revenues and expenditures of the general government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus. The Contracting Parties may temporarily incur deficits only to take into account the budgetary impact of the economic cycle and, beyond such impact, in case of exceptional economic circumstances, or in periods of a severe economic downtum, provided that this does not endanger budgetary sustainability in	a) The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus. The Contracting Parties may temporarily incur deficits only to take into account the budgetary impact of the economic cycle and, beyond such impact, in case of exceptional economic circumstances, or in periods of a severe economic downturn, provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in medium term [FA]	a) The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus. [Phrase supprimée]	a) The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.	The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.	a) The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.	Commentaire [f3]: Elément reproduit
[] this principle shall be deemed respected if, as a rule, the annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP.  Member States shall converge towards their	medium term.  b) The rule under point a) above shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural deficit of the general government does not exceed a countryspecific reference value, which ensures an adequate safety margin with respect to the 3 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the TFEU (hereinafter 'Protocol No 12') as well as rapid progress towards sustainability, also taking into account the budgetary impact of ageing. The Contracting	b) The rule under point a) above shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural deficit of the general government does not exceed a country-specific reference value, that is in line with the country-specific medium-term objective referred to in Article 2(a) of Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97, as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1175/2011, and which ensures an adequate safety margin with respect to the 3 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to	b) The rule under point a) above shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011) with a deficit not exceeding 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. Convergence shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a	b) The rule under point a) (mot supprime) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact (mots supprimes) with the annual structural deficit not exceeding 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The time trame for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking into consideration	The rule under point a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The time frame for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. Progress	b) The rule under point a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific mediumterm objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The time frame for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. Progress	dans le préambule de l'accord et isolé dans un littera spécifique c) de la version du 10 janvier. Cause autorisant la déviation élargie par rapport à la rédaction PSC.
specific reference level, according to a calendar proposed by the Commission	Parties shall ensure convergence towards their respective country-specific reference value. As a rule, the country specific reference value shall not exceed 0.5 % of nominal GDP.	the TFEU (hereinafter 'Protocol No 12') as well as rapid progress towards fiscal sustainability, also taking into account the budgetary impact of ageing. The Contracting Parties shall ensure convergence towards their respective country- specific reference value. [Mots supprimés] The country specific reference value shall not exceed 0.5 % of nominal GDP.	reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures. in line with the provisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	county-specific sustainability risks. Progress towards and respect of the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	towards and respect of the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	towards and respect of the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	
			c) The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective in case of an unusual event [Fa]-outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the government or in periods of a severe economic downturn as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term [FA]	c) The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances as defined in paragraph 3.	The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances as defined in paragraph 3.	c) The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances as defined in paragraph 3.	Commentaire [f5]: Notion d' « unusual event » définie en termes très larges. Notion renvoie à l'argument utilisé pour la mise en œuvre des dispositifs de soutien financier à la Grèce.  Commentaire [f6]: Définition
	c) Where the debt level is significantly below the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the country-specific reference value for the annual structural net deficit may take a higher value than specified under point b).	c) Where the debt level is significantly below the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the country-specific reference value for the annual structural net deficit may take a higher value than specified under point b), but in any case no more than 1.0% of nomina GDP.	d) Where the <u>ratio of government debt to gross</u> <u>domestic product at market prices</u> is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term <u>sustainability of upitic finances are low</u> [FA], the <u>lower limit of the medium-term objective specified</u> <u>under point b) can reach a deficit of maximum</u> 1,0 % of the gross domestic product at market	d) Where the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified under point b) can reach a structural deficit of at most 1.0 % of the gross domestic product at	Where the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified under point b) can reach a structural deficit of at most 1.0 % of the gross domestic product at	d) Where the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified under point b) can reach a structural deficit of at most 1.0 % of the gross domestic product at	déplacée à l'article 3, par. 3 dans la version du 19 janvier.  Commentaire [f7]: Notion de « long term sustainability » non définie dans le PSC et qui durcit le bénéfice d'un taux plancher de 1,0%.



			prices.	market prices.	market prices.	market prices.	
				e) In the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time.	In the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time.	e) In the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time.	
The rule will contain an automatic correction mechanism that shall be triggered in the event of deviation. It will be defined by each Member State on the basis of principles proposed by the Commission.	The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall be introduced in national binding provisions of a constitutional or equivalent nature. The Contracting Parties shall in particular put in place a correction mechanism to be triggered automatically in the event of significant deviations from the reference value or the adjustment path towards it. This mechanism shall be defined at national level, on the basis of commonly agreed principles. It shall include the obligation of the Contracting Parties to present a programme to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. It shall fully respect responsibilities of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall be introduced in national binding provisions of a constitutional or equivalent nature. The Contracting Parties shall in particular put in place at national level and on the basis of commonly agreed principles, a correction mechanism to be triggered automatically in the event of significant deviations from the reference value or the adjustment path towards it, as specified under the law of the Union. It shall include the obligation of the Contracting Parties to implement a programme to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. It shall fully respect responsibilities of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, that are guaranteed to be respected throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall in particular put in place at national level, on the basis of principles agreed on a proposal from the European Commission, a correction mechanism to be triggered automatically in the event of significant deviations from the medium term objective or the adjustment path towards it, as specified in the revised Stability and Growth Pact. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Parties to implement measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of filme, it shall fully respect the responsibilities of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be respected throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism mentioned in paragraph 1.e) on the basis of common principles to be proposed by the European Commission, boncerning in particular the nature, the size and the time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken and the role and independence of the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring the observance of the rules. This mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism mentioned in paragraph 1.e) on the basis of common principles to be proposed by the European Commission, concerning in particular the nature, the size and the time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken, Jason in the case of exceptional circumstances, and the role and independence of the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring the observance of the rules. This mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism mentioned in paragraph 1.e) on the basis of common principles to be proposed by the European Commission, concerning in particular the nature, the size and the time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken, also in the case of exceptional circumstances, and the role and independence of the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring the observance of the rules. This mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national	Commentaire [f17]: Nouvelle formulation écarte, semble-t-il, le principe de la présentation par la Commission d'une proposition d'acte juridique contraignant, pour privilégier la présentation d'une simple communication.
	For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol No 12 shall apply. In addition, the following definitions shall apply: -"annual structural deficit of the general government" means the annual cyclically-adjusted deficit net of one-off and temporary measures:  -"exceptional economic circumstances" means an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned, which has a major impact on the financial position of the government.	For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol No 12 shall apply. In addition, "annual structural deficit of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically-adjusted deficit net of one-off and temporary measures.  [supprime]	For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European Union Treaties shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures.	3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European Union Treaties shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures. "Exceptional circumstances" refer to the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or to periods of severe economic downturn as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that the temporary deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.	3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European Union Treaties shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures. "Exceptional circumstances" refer to the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or to periods of severe economic downtum as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that the temporary deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.	3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European Union Treaties shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures. "Exceptional circumstances" refer to the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or to periods of severe economic downtum as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that the temporary deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.	Commentaire [f8]: Déplacer pour constituer article 3, par. 2, littera e) dans la version du 19 janvier.
	Article 4	Article 4	Article 4	Article 4	Article 4	Article 4	
The specification of the debt criterion in terms of a numerical benchmark for debt reduction (1/20 rule) for Member States with a government debt in excess of 60% needs to be enshrined in the new provisions	When the ratio of their government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the Contracting Parties undertake to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark.	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the Contracting Parties shallreduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2(1a) of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1177/2011	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol (No 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol (No. 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on Speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficil procedure, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011.	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol (No 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011.	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol (No. 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011. The existence of an excessive deficit due to the breach of the debt criterion will be decided according to the procedure set forth in Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.	
	Article 5	Article 5	Article 5	Article 5	Article 5	Article 5	
Member States in Excessive Deficit Procedure shall submit to the Commission and the Council for endorsement, an economic partnership programme detailing the necessary structural reforms to ensure an effectively durable correction of excessive deficits. The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and the Council.	The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme with binding value including a detailed description of the structural reforms necessary to ensure an effectively durable correction of their excessive deficits. Such programmes shall be submitted to the European Commission and the Council.	The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms necessary to ensure an effectively durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in the law of the Union. They shall be submitted to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement.  The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the Council	The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in the law of the Union. Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoning will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact.	The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in European Union law. Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact.	The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in European Union law. Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact.	The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in European Union law. Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact.	
			The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the Council.	The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the Council.	The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the Council.	The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the Council.	
	Article 6	Article 6	Article 6	Article 6	Article 6	Article 6	
A mechanism will be put in place for the ex ante reporting by Member States of their national debt issuance plans.	The Contracting Parties shall improve the reporting of their national debt issuance. For that purpose, they shall report ex-ante on their national debt issuance plans to the European Commission and the Council.	The Contracting Parties shall coordinate their national debt issuance. For that purpose, they shall report ex-ante on their national debt issuance plans to the European Commission and to the Council.	With a view to better coordinating the planning of their national debt issuance [FA], the Contracting Parties shall report ex-ante on their public debt issuance plans to the European Commission and to the Council.	With a view to better coordinating the planning of their national debt issuance, the Contracting Parties shall report ex-ante on their public debt issuance plans to the European Commission and to the Council.	With a view to better coordinating the planning of their national debt issuance, the Contracting Parties shall report ex-ante on their public debt issuance plans to the European Commission and to the Council.	With a view to better coordinating the planning of their national debt issuance, the Contracting Parties shall report ex-ante on their public debt issuance plans to the European Commission and to the Council.	Commentaire [f9]: La coordination des émissions de dette n'est plus une obligation, mais un objectif.



				T	1		
As soon as a Member State is recognised to be in breach of the 3% ceiling by the Commission, there will be automatic consequences unless a qualified majority of euro area Member States is opposed. Steps and sanctions proposed or recommended by the Commission will be adopted unless a qualified majority of the euro area Member States is opposed.	Article 7  While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro undertake to support proposals or recommendations put forward by the European Commission where a Member State whose currency is the euro is recognised by the European Commission to be in breach of the 3 % ceiling in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure, unless a qualified majority shall be defined by analogy with Article 238(3)(a) TFEU and with Article 3 of Protocol N° 36 to the EU Treaties on transitional provisions and without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned.	Article 7  While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro undertake to support the proposals or recommendations put forward by the European Commission where a Member State whose currency is the euro is recognised by the European Commission to be in breach of the deficit of edbt criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure, unless a qualified majority of them is of another view. A qualified majority of them is of another view. A qualified 238(3)(a) TFEU and with Article 3 of Protocol N° 36 to the EU Treaties on transitional provisions and without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned.	Article 7  While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where a Member State whose currency is the euro is considered by the European Commission to be in breach of the deficit [mot supprime] criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation is not apply where it is apparent amond the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro [FA] that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is of another view.	Article 7  While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is apposed to the decision proposed or recommended.	Article 7  While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended.	Article 7  While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended.	
	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	
We recognise the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to verify the transposition of this rule [introduction of an automatic correction mechanism] at national level.	Any Contracting Party which considers that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2) may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by said Court. The implementation of the rules put in place by the Contracting Parties to comply with Article 3(2) will be subject to the review of the national Courts of the Contracting Parties.	Any Contracting Party which considers that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Title III may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The European Commission may on behalf of Contracting Parties, bring an action for an alleged infringement of Title III before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by said Court. The implementation of the rules put in place by the Contracting Parties to comply with Article 3(2) will be subject to the review of the national Courts of the Contracting Parties.	Any Contracting Party which considers that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2) may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union brinitie the European Commission to issue a report on the matter. In the latter case, if the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, confirms non compliance in its report, the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice by the Contracting Parties [FA]. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by said Court. [Dermière phrase supprimée]	The European Commission is Invited to present in due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the provisions adopted by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its report that a Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more of the Contracting Party considers, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3 (2), it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice, In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court.	The European Commission is invited to present in due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the provisions adopted by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its report that a Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more of the Contracting Parties. [mot supprime] Where a Contracting Party considers, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3 (2), it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court.	The European Commission is invited to present in due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the provisions adopted by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its report that a Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more of the Contracting Party ensides, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice which be brinding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court.	
				2. If, on the basis of its own assessment or of an assessment by the European Commission, a Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice. If the Court finds that the Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0.1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism.	2. If, on the basis of its own assessment or of an assessment by the European Commission, a Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice and request the imposition of financial sanctions following criteria established by the Commission in the framework of Article 280 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If the Court finds that the Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0.1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed on a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism. In other cases, payments shall be made to the general	2. If, on the basis of its own assessment or of an assessment by the European Commission, a Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice and request the imposition of financial sanctions following criteria established by the Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If the Court finds that the Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0,1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed on a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism. In other cases, payment shall be made to the general	
				This Article constitutes a special agreement between the Contracting Parties within the meaning of Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [FA]	budget of the European Union  3. This Article constitutes a special agreement between the Contracting Parties within the meaning of Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	budget of the European Union.  3. This Article constitutes a special agreement between the Contracting Parties within the meaning of Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	
	TITLE IV ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE	TITLE IV ECONOMIC COORDINATION	TITLE IV ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE	TITLE IV ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE	TITLE IV ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE	TITLE IV ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE	
	Article 9  Without prejudice to the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness and improving the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union. To this aim, they will take all necessary actions, including through the Euro Plus Pact.	Article 9  Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. In this context, particular attention shall be paid to all developments which, if allowed to persist, might threaten stability, competitiveness and future growth and job creation. To this aim, they will take all necessary actions, including through the Euro Plus Pact.	Article 9  Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards a common economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. [Phrase supprimée] To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area, as mentioned in the Euro Plus Pact.	Article 9  Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area in pursuil of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability [Fa]	Article 9  Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability.	Article 9  Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability.	
We agree to make more active use of enhanced cooperation on matters which are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	Article 10  While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to the enhanced cooperation on matters that are	Article 10  In accordance with the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in article 136 TFEU and to	Article 10  In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty	Article 10 In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty	Article 10 In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties will make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty on the	Article 10  In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties stand ready to make active use, whenever appropriate and necessary, of measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty	

Commentaire [f10]: Formulation ambigue car rien n'indique qu'il faille procéder à un vote pour constater l'opposition de la majorité qualifiée. Cela semble relever de l'appréciation souveraine du présidence de séance.

Commentaire [f18]: La formule demeure floue, puisque la forme passive employée ne permet pas de savoir si cette « invitation à agir » est faite par les auteurs du traité ou relève d'une décision préalable des Etats signataires. La liaison avec la version du 10 janvier invite à une lecture restrictive de la compétence (liée) de la Commission. Cependant, une interprétation fondée sur la nécessité de garantir l'application efficace des règles justifierait que la Commission dispose d'un mandat général pour agir. Considérant spécifique sur la mise en œuvre par la Commission des articles 121, 126 et 136 dans le préambule appuie cette interprétation.

Commentaire [f11]: Formulation ambigue. Il semble que ce soit à la communauté des Etats signataires de porter l'affaire devant la Cour. Il faut penser que la saisine émane soit du pays qui exerce la présidence de séance, soit par un mandataire. En fait, cette formulation n'exclut pas que la Commission agisse au nom des Etats membres, comme le prévoyait la version du 5 janvier.

Commentaire [f19]: Dispositif innovant à la jonction entre l'article 260 TFUE et l'article 126, par. 11 et règlement (CE) n°1467/97. La question est alors celle de la combinaison de cet article avec le système de sanction prévu par l'article 126, par. 11. A priori, la mise en œuvre de cet article excluera de fait celle de l'article du traité FUE. La question est alors de savoir si le refus du Conseil de prononcer des sanctions dans le cadre de l'article 126 TFUE empêchera le prononcé de sanction par cette disposition. Dans la mesure où le conflit peut être porté par un seul Etat, une telle possibilité est ouverte.

Commentaire [f20]: Précision évidente mais qui vient contrebalancer la mention de l'article 260 TFUE dans le préambule. Par cette référence, il est clairement rappelé que ce traité ne relève pas de l'ordre juridique communautaire, même s'il lui emprunte les règles procédurales et de nombreuses règles matérielles.

Commentaire [f21]: La liste des objectifs est plus fournie que celle indiquée à l'article 1, par. 1 du traité, cf. ajout du renforcemeent de la stabilité financière.



	essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	the enhanced cooperation on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	on the Functioning of the European Union and to the enhanced cooperation <u>as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and In Articles 326 to 334 of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [FA] on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the european, without undermining the internal market.</u>	on the Functioning of the European Union and to the enhanced cooperation as provided for in Articles 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	Functioning of the European Union and use the enhanced cooperation as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the european union on the treaty of the european union of the end of the smooth functioning of the european area, without undermining the internal market.	on the Functioning of the European Union and of enhanced cooperation as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.		Commentaire [f12]: Prise en compte des commentaires de la Commission.
We are committed to working towards a common economic policy. A procedure will be established to ensure that all major economic policy reforms planned by euro area Member States will be discussed and coordinated at the level of the euro area, with a view to benchmarking best practices.	Article 11  With a view to benchmarking best practices, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed and coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by the law of the Union.	Article 11  With a view to benchmarking best practices, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed exante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by the law of the Union.	Article 11  With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a common economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by the law of the	Article 11  With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by	Article 11  With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by	Article 11  With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by		Commentaire [f13]: Précision visant à limiter les fonctions des sommets
	Article 12  Representatives of the Committees in charge of economy and finance within the Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of the relevant Committee of the European Parliament.	[devenu l'article 13] Representatives of the competent Committees within the Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of the relevant Committee of the European Parliament.	Union. (voir article 13)	European Union law.	European Union law.	European Union law.		Zone euro aux seuls aspects de la zone.  Commentaire [f14]: Selon cette formulation, le « sommet de la zone euro » parait comme réserver un statut de membre de droit aux chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement. Le président de la Commission paraît un membre invité.
	TITLE V EURO SUMMIT MEETINGS	TITLE V GOVERNANCE	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA [FA]	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA	/	Le président de l'Eurogroupe et le commissaire en charge des affaires
	Article 13 [renuméroté article 12]	Article 12	Article 12	Article 12	Article 12	Article 12		économique et monétaire sont écartés
	1. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro, (hereinafter "the euro area Heads of State or Government") and the president of the European Commission shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such meetings. The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the euro area Heads of State or Government by simple majority at the	1. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro, (hereinafter 'the euro area Heads of State or Government'), the president of the European Commission, the president of the Euro Group and the Commissioner responsible for Economic and Monetary Affairs [FA] shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such meetings. The President of the Euro	1. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, toaether with the President of the European Commission [moits supprimes] [FA]. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such meetings. The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro	1. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together with the President of the European Commission. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in the meetings. The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the	1. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together with the President of the European Commission. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in the meetings. The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the	1. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together with the President of the European Commission. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in the meetings. The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the		<ul> <li>sans que rien n'empêche qu'ils soient invités de temps à autres. A l'inverse, le président de la BCE est invité à chaque réunion. Les chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement dont le pays est signataire de l'accord sans partager la monnaie unique ne participent pas à ces sommets</li> </ul>
In particular, regular Euro Summits will be held at least twice a year.	same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.  2. Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities those Member States share with regard to the single currency, other issues concerning the	Summit shall be appointed by the euro area heads of State or Government by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.  2. Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities those Member States share with regard to the single currency, other issues concerning the	by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.  2. Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities those Member States share with regard to the single currency, other issues concerning the	same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.  2. Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities which the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro [F-A] share with regard to the single	same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.  2. Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities which the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro share with regard to the single currency,	same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.  2. Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities which the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro share with regard to the single currency,		Commentaire [f4]: Formulation qui reproduit celle de l'article 15, par. 3, TUE, pour la dépasser car elle indique la qualité du commissaire chargé d'accompagner le président de la Commission.  Commentaire [f22]: Formulation plus
	governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.  3. Euro Summit meetings shall be prepared by the President of the Euro Summit, in close cooperation with the President of the European Commission, and by the Euro Group. The followup to the meetings shall be ensured in the same manner.	single currency, other issues concerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	single currency, other issues outcerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	are two the state with regard to the single currency, other issues concerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	other issues concerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	other issues concerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and (mots supprimes) strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies (mots supprimes) to increase convergence in the euro area.  3. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties, other than those whose currency is the euro, who have ratified this Treaty shall participate in discussions of Euro Summit meetings concerning competitiveness for the Contracting Parties, the modification of the global architecture of the euro area and the fundamental rules that will apply to it in the	précise qui réduit discussions aux p Etats membres d formulation du 10 l'interêt des Etats qui pouvait justifie Etats membres h signataires du tra l'adoption de la m	précise qui réduit le champ des discussions aux préoccupation des Etats membres de la zone euro. La formulation du 10 janvier retenait l'interêt des Etats membres à l'euro, ce qui pouvait justifier la revendication des Etats membres hors zone euro, signataires du traité, et engagés dans l'adoption de la monnaie unique, d'être présents à ces réunions au sommet de
	The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the preparation and outcome	Euro Summit meetings shall be prepared by the President of the Euro Summit, in close cooperation with the President of the European	Euro Summit meetings shall be prepared by the President of the Euro Summit, in close cooperation with the President of the European	The President of the Euro Summit shall ensure the preparation and continuity of Euro Summit meetings, in close cooperation with the President	The President of the Euro Summit shall ensure the preparation and continuity of Euro Summit meetings, in close cooperation with the President	the preparation and continuity of Euro Summit meetings, in close cooperation with the President		Commentaire [f23]: Le Président de l'Eurogroupe, dont la présence au sommet de la zone euro avait été supprimé dans la version du 10 janvier, voit ses fonctions renforcées dans la version du 19 janvier.
	of the Euro Summit meetings. The President will also inform the European Parliament of the outcome of the Euro Summit meetings.	Commission, and by the Euro Group. The follow- up to the meetings shall be ensured in the same manner.	Commission, and by the Euro Group. The follow- up to the meetings shall be ensured in the same manner.	of the European Commission. The Euro Group shall contribute to the preparation and follow up of the Euro Summit meetings and its president may be invited to attend the Euro Summit meetings for that purpose [FA].  4. The President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard. The President of the	of the European Commission. The body charged with the preparation and follow up of the Euro Summit meetings shall be the Euro Group and its president may be invited to attend the Euro Summit meetings for that purpose.  4. The President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard. The President of the	of the European Commission. The body charged with the preparation and follow up of the Euro Summit meetings shall be the Euro Group and its president may be invited to attend the Euro Summit meetings for that purpose.  5. The President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard. The President of the		Commentaire [f24]: Introduction d'un dispositif similaire en sa 2° partie à l'article 4, 3° alinéa, TUE. L'invitation du Président du PE est en revanche une innovation qui institutionnalise une pratique ancienne au Conseil
		The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the Europeanition and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings. The President will be a state of the Euro Summit meetings.	The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union [FA] closely informed of the	Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the Euro Summit [FA]  5. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the	Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the Euro Summit.  5. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the	Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the Euro Summit.  6. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the		européen.  Commentaire [f15]: La distinction opérée entre les Etats membres signataires et non membres de la zone euro d'une part, et les non signataires
		also inform the European Parliament of the outcome of the Euro Summit meetings. preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings. The President will also inform the	preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings. The President will also inform the European Parliament of the outcome of the Euro	preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings. [Phrase déplacée à l'article 12, par. 4]	preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings.	preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings.		et non membres d'autre part, emporte-t- elle une différence dans les modalités de la communication et dans le contenu de l'information transmise?



				In order to discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of this Treaty, the President of the Euro Summit will invite, when appropriate and at least once a year, the Heads of State or Government of Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro who have ratified this Treaty and have declared their intention to be	In order to discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of this Treaty, the President of the Euro Summit will invite, when appropriate and at least once a year, to a meeting of the Euro Summit the Heads of State or Government of Contracting Parties, other than those whose currency is the euro, who have ratified this Treaty (FGL).			
				bound by some of its provisions in accordance with Article 14(5) to a meeting of the Euro Summit.	Treaty. [FA]			<b>Commentaire [f26]:</b> Paragraphe déplacé au par. 3 dans version finale.
		Article 13	Article 13	Article 13	Article 13	Article 13		
		Representatives of the competent Committees within the Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of the relevant Committee of the European Parliament.	Representatives of (eléments supprimés) the Parliaments of the Contracting Parlies will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of (eléments supprimés) the European Parliament.	As foreseen in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parlies will together determine the organisation and oromotion of a conference of the chairs of the budget committees of the national Parliaments and the chairs of the relevant committees of the European Parliament.	As foreseen in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant committees of the national Parliaments and representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.	As foreseen in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant committees of the national Parliaments and representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.		
	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI General and final provisions		
	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14		
	This Agreement shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.	This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.	This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.	This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parlies in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.	This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.	This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.		
	This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of the ninth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro.	This Treaty shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro.	This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that [twelve] Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the [twelfth] instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.	This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that twelve Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.	This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that twelve Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.	This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that twelve Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.		
	This Agreement shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.		This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.		
	By derogation to Paragraph 3, Title V of this Agreement shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement.	By derogation to Paragraph 3, Title V of this Treaty shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of the Treaty.	By derogation to paragraph 3, Title V shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.	By derogation to paragraph 3, Article 12 shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.	By derogation to paragraph 3, Article 12 shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.	By derogation to paragraph 3, Article 12 shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.		
	5. This Agreement shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No. 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles IIII and IV of this Agreement [Fa].	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No. 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles IIII and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.		Comments in Fed 1 Comment
		-	Article 15	Article 15	Article 15	Article 15		Commentaire [f1]: Comment concilier les exclusions prévues par le
			This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties upon application that any such Member State may file with the Depositary. The Contracting parties shall approve the application by common agreement. Following such approval, the applicant Member State shall accede upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof. [FA]	This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties upon application that any such Member State may file with the Depostary. The Contracting parties shall approve the application by common agreement. Following such approval, the applicant Member State shall accede upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof.	This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties. (Supprime) Accession shall be effective upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof	This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties. Accession shall be effective upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof.		régime de dérogation en matière de discipline budgétaire et les inclusions possibles sous le régime du traité ?
			Article 16	Article 16	Article 16	Article 16	-	Commentaire [f16]: Quels critères déterminent l'acceptation par les Etats
The objective remains to incorporate these provisions into the treaties of the Union as soon as possible. The Heads of State or Government of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Sweden indicated the possibility to take part in this process after consulting their Parliaments where appropriate.		6. Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, an initiative shall be launched, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.		membres signataires de la participation du Royaume-Uni (et de la Croatie) ?
				Done at Brussels on the of in the year two thousand and twelve in a single original whose Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English,	Done at Brussels on the of in the year two thousand and twelve in a single original whose Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English,	Done at Brussels on the of in the year two thousand and twelve in a single original whose Bulgarian, [supprime], Danish, Dutch, English,		



Frédéric Allemand, 2012				
	Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish texts are	Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish texts are equally authentic, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary which will transmit a certified copy to each of the Contracting Parties.	Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish texts are equally authentic, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary which will transmit a certified copy to each of the Contracting Parties.	

