


Transcription of the interview with Carlos María Bru Purón (San Sebastián de los Reyes, 13 January 2010)

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1. Professional career. The origins and development of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement in Franco’s Spain

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] I’d like to begin by asking you to explain how you became interested in Europe, particularly at the crucial time of the Second World War, which you call the ‘European Civil War’. How did your personal sympathy for the Allies and the gradual conclusion that democracy was the only future for Spain develop?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Hello. I would also like to thank the Centre for its courtesy not only towards myself as a person but also as a Spanish pro-European, because I think it’s very good to promote these accounts, these interviews, which ultimately bear witness to why many of us adhere to the spirit of Europe and why this needs to be broadcast to ensure a genuine European consciousness and commitment to citizenship. So for what my testimony is worth, if anything, I think it’s positive in that because of my age — I’m getting on now — I lived through those times. I have to tell you that it might be a touch of Spanish idiosyncrasy: we also became very pro-European as a way of rebelling, it was rebelliousness, it was a certain rebellion against faintheartedness, mean-spiritedness, the mental constriction of Francoism. So Francoism — people tend to forget — Francoism favoured the German–Italian axis, it was on the side of the Axis powers (and Japan). So because of what we had read and because of our families too, just a few of us felt that we sympathised with the Allies, we sided with the Allies, this was around 1944 or 1945. I’ve always belonged to a, let’s say, bourgeois middle class, and I went to what could be called an elite school, the Marianists, where I remember that out of 40 pupils in my year, just three or four of us sided with the Allies, and the others hounded us and we were vilified by the teachers and when they forced us — obviously you won’t know what it was like under a dictatorship and the mental oppression it involved — when they forced us to march with our arm raised, four or five of us in the class rebelled, so when the Fascist axis collapsed the Franco regime realised it had nowhere to turn, since they thought the solution was the United States; the United States, because of the new situation of the Cold War, because rather than offering protection it offered a certain benevolence. But the truth is that we ourselves, in terms of the future of Europe, in terms of both the victor and the vanquished,

we compared France and Germany, which were beginning to come to an understanding with each other. We heard news from abroad on the radio, and I and some other friends had been educated in French, so we listened to French radio stations and the BBC, and we saw that a new world was emerging and that that new world was exactly what, at continental level, made up for what had not happened at Spanish level. At Spanish level there was a Civil War, there was a victor and a vanquished and the phenomenon, which I've written about somewhere, in response to what tends to happen: the victor's bitterness was worse than the bitterness of the vanquished. For 40 years — 39, in fact — from the end of the Civil War until the dictator's death, the victor always wanted to crush the vanquished. Against this, those of us who saw what had happened in families, what had happened with firing squads, prisons, etc., when we saw that in Europe, both victor and vanquished actually began to get along with each other, when we heard Churchill's magnificent speech in Zurich, when afterwards, some three years later, the Hague Congress took place, we truly saw that that was the way forward. I have to tell you about my personal circumstances at the time: oddly enough when there was a dictatorial regime like Franco's, the French Embassy was open and it was kind enough to award grants; the Alliance Française awarded a number of grants to some young Spaniards, and several of us went. So I went with Francisco Benet, who was later to be a hero of the Resistance, we went to Paris on grants. We were in a hall of residence at the university, where I met — and this was very important for me — I met people whose parents were exiles from the regime, they were in exile because of the Civil War, and for me one young man — my roommate — was crucial, I don't know whether he's still alive, his name was Cruz Salido, he was the son of an exiled politician. And it's a curious fact, there were three people: Cruz Salido, Zugazagoitia and Companys, that Franco asked the Gestapo to repatriate from France to Spain to have them shot, and they were executed in Spain. And that's when I really saw the close relations between Francoism and the Axis and the Gestapo, going as far as to commit that horrible crime. For me, Cruz Salido was ... that lad, that account made me see, I'll say it again, that in order to allay the bitterness of the victor we had to seek another way, and that other way is an understanding between victor and vanquished. What better example could there be than the Schuman Declaration: Churchill's declaration previously at the Hague Congress in 1948, and then the Schuman Declaration! That's what made us see, on the one hand, that division could be replaced by unity, respecting differences, and it made us realise on the other that those of us who were fighting Francoism — and I wasn't a hero, but I was always anti-Franco, and I've suffered the consequences, but I can't compare myself to people who've been executed by firing squad or who've spent years and years in prison — but anyway, those of us who have also had to suffer the repression of Francoism realised that the Spanish situation was only going to be settled by joining something greater, and that was Europe.

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] And with respect to your professional career, what decision did you take when you were young to be able to realise that European dream?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] That year in Paris on a grant was a very formative year, and I got the grant because it was my milieu, it was my family, it was the *modus vivendi*. When the French border with Spain was closed I had to come back, but we realised there was a reaction in the form of a United Nations declaration, and a forceful reaction — whether universally accepted or not I don't know — but a forceful reaction by the French Government to close the border. So obviously there was nothing else we could do, when the few of us who did return got back to Spain — others remained in exile — we grant holders realised that we had to fight for Spanish democracy from the inside, because at that time, in that almost year that we lived in Paris, we realised what freedom was, what it is to live in freedom, what it is to live in the streets, in the city, making political statements, well, the contrast in what has been called the way of thinking and acting was possible; my reading — I brought back a pile of books, as many as I could, I saved money on other things so I could buy books — and among those books I brought back one that I love the most: this little book, which as you can see is a very old copy, it's by Thomas Mann, who during the Nazi regime in 1938, before the World War had broken out, went to the United States and was already talking about

the final victory of democracy, and, persecuted by Nazism, he says: ‘In the future we will have democracy and a union of peoples’; he says that the solution will be the union of peoples. That had a huge influence on me, and it made me appreciate the testimony of an eminent person such as Thomas Mann, who, although he was from a country dominated by a dictatorship, nevertheless sought a solution in democracy and the union of peoples, because he believed that the people will ensure that democracy will win and that people will come to understand each other. So when we got back here we realised that there was a solution, and that small solution ... I began by going to Estoril, where there was a pretender to the throne, Don Juan de Borbón y de Battenberg, son of the dethroned king Alfonso XIII, who made it very clear that he supported the Allies, democracy and freedom. And there were other battles in another arena, the proletarians, the rural workers fought too, and their fight was really valuable, there were strikes, there was severe repression, etc. But many other middle-class people such as ourselves thought that the solution lay in that vision of Juan de Borbón, so we went to Estoril, because we were being influenced, we were adhering to a liberal spirit according to which, in order to win the Civil War against what could be a continuation of the dictatorship — which we didn’t want — or a return of the Republic — which could be dangerous — since the solution of the monarchy, which those of us involved in the Munich conspiracy (which I have to tell you about), since in the ‘Munich conspiracy’ we felt that the monarchy was a possible solution. So why did this Munich conspiracy come about? Well, in 1955–56, when the Franco regime couldn’t go on as a dictatorship for economic reasons, there was a policy known as autocracy, which maintained that Spanish production was self-sufficient; it was totally disastrous, with all manner of untruths, all manner of ridiculous claims ... Franco himself was misled by a self-styled wise man — I think he was Bulgarian — who persuaded him that we had a huge stock of oil in Spain: it was all lies and Franco allowed himself to be taken in by it, and they were looking for the oil shale deposits — which produced very little — because our economic situation was terrible. In Tangier they handled more money than the Bank of Spain, it’s as simple as that, in Tangier it was decided that the Spanish currency was to depreciate increasingly every day: it was an unsustainable situation. Well anyway, then they decided to tone the policy of autocracy down and open up trade with the European countries and with North America, etc. as well. But the truth is that that solution wasn’t sufficient because there were no political avenues. So they allowed some cultural associations to talk about Europeanism. Anyway, if you want me to tell you what the official position was, you already know: at the time of the Schuman Declaration and when the Treaty for the European Economic Community was signed the following year, Franco said that it was an indication of the decline of the European democracies. And I remember that in the controlled press as a whole, ABC, YA, etc., it was suggested that they were vague utopian democracies that were doomed to perish, that was the Franco regime’s official position. It had pinned its hopes and its illusions on the United States, Eisenhower’s visit, US bases, etc., but the United States did nothing for democratisation and nothing economically. Another path they sought was the Latin American solution, but I remember in the offices of the Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea [AECE — Spanish Association for European Cooperation], the Latin Americans themselves who were here, grant holders, academics and teachers, came here and told us that in economic terms the relationship had to be Spain with Europe, because that was where imports and exports were crucial. The production that helped us a great deal was wheat from Perón’s Argentina, but it was only for eating, it wasn’t for trade; so for trade, the Latin Americans themselves and all the fairly well-informed economists that were in Spain made us realise that we had to establish relations with the European Union, which was our direct import-export link. So that’s why the regime allowed some ‘cultural’ associations to be formed to study the European phenomenon, and an association known as the Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea came into being, with offices in the Gran Vía and now based in the offices of the Spanish European Movement, and they were to take a cultural approach to the study of European unification rather than a political approach, they didn’t allow us to make political statements. They also allowed a number of research centres in universities — in Zaragoza, Salamanca (overseen by Professor Tierno), Seville (under Carrillo Salcedo), etc. — to carry out a little research into what the political phenomenon of European unification was, but I

have to stress that it was only from a scientific and cultural perspective rather than a political perspective. But in the AECE, which I was Vice-Secretary of, political turmoil soon developed. We met in a small room in its offices that has now been preserved even down to the same furniture because it interests us, it's a historic centre: liberals, Christian democrats, socialists, etc. began to gather there. I was a Christian democrat at the time so I coincided with Mr Gil Robles senior,^[1] a conservative but liberal and democratic person who had come back to Spain and was Chairman of the AECE. There were liberals and socialists but no communists yet, because — as you know — they weren't interested at that time, because Comecon members weren't in favour of European integration, or at least that was the party line. I say it was the party line, because afterwards in Munich I personally witnessed the interest Spanish communists had in the incipient Eurocommunism and the phenomenon of Spanish integration, but I'll come back to that. The fact is that it had become a centre of opposition, an opposition that we had of course experienced, because when I was a student, for example, I had to put up with persecution and beatings just because I wore the badge of Juan III, who was to be Juan de Borbón, the possible King of Spain. Just for that the Falangists persecuted and mistreated us. I was in hospital for several days once because of a Falangist beating. After that I concentrated on my law studies, and then on the competitive examination to become a notary, which is very difficult in Spain, and it took me several years. And subsequently my European vocation flourished again because of a very significant phenomenon: I visited several little villages in deepest rural Spain, in Andalusia and Castilla y León, which is real deepest rural Spain: I was the notary in Fontiveros, the birthplace of San Juan de la Cruz. San Juan de la Cruz, as you know, persecuted by the Inquisition, that's what happens in Spain, even though he was a saint ... I experienced deepest rural Spain with its hunger, its difficulties, the vicious class divide, etc. And a little later I came to this notary office in Alcobendas, near Madrid, where I was able to witness another phenomenon that made me even more pro-European: Spanish emigrants. Spanish emigrants who left in order to eat, so that they could eat, or send some money home; first to eat and work elsewhere and then to send some money back to their families; they were my clients, but above all they were my friends. So in this village of Alcobendas I dealt with a lot of people, people who've been caricatured, who've been portrayed in films with their cardboard suitcases, those Spaniards who went all over Europe, it must be remembered, to Luxembourg for example, where they were welcomed, but also to Switzerland and France, and to Germany, which was growing at the time, and so on. They went to earn a living and send money back to their families, and then they started saving a little to buy a flat or something. I started to deal with them and I saw how much those Spaniards had to put up with, and why? Because the Europe that was being built had something very important: the European social model — the welfare state — in other words, male emigrants who were arriving and female emigrants (there were a lot of them too, many women worked in domestic service and in factories, etc. as well), since while they were there they had social protection, even though they were foreigners, they were Spanish, but they still had their social protection, and that made me realise how Europe was being built and what the European social model was. All this naturally meant that those of us who wanted democracy in Spain realised that the only way was through European integration. There was an about-turn, just as the system of autocracy was brought to a close, and in order to ensure trade with what was then the European Economic Community. There was a political about-turn and those Opus Dei politicians arrived, who you know, and who were called technocrats, who really had a more open position in economic terms, but when they wanted a certain political contact they saw it was impossible. A scathing Birkelbach Report from the European Parliament stated that in order to join what was then the embryonic European Union, the Communities, certain democratic requirements had to be fulfilled. And nowadays this is what has happened with all the treaties, and what is still happening with the Treaty of Lisbon; it originated with the Birkelbach Report, which served as a lesson to us, and by virtue of the Birkelbach Report, by virtue of the contact we began to establish with the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement in exile. The Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement — which I now have the honour to chair — was the Spanish branch of the European Movement. How did it come about? Do you want me to tell you how it came about? Well, it came

about because of four men in The Hague: Salvador de Madariaga, a liberal; Indalecio Prieto, a socialist; Doctor Trueta, apolitical but 100 % democrat, and Doctor Xirau, a Valencian and a regionalist. These four were at the Hague Congress in 1948. And Salvador de Madariaga, as you know, had been Ambassador to the League of Nations, and when the Civil War began he stayed out of it, he didn't want to know about what was happening in Spain, he got on with his studies and his novels, he was a great writer, a great liberal, he chaired the Culture Committee of the Hague Congress. There were three committees: political with Daladier, economic with Van Zeeland, and culture with Madariaga; so we began to have contacts. Then just a short while later, as a result of, you already know, of what really happened: 20-odd — I think there were 23 of them — pro-European associations joined the European Movement. The European Movement, as you know very well, but it's worth remembering — by means of the Hague Congress the European Movement produced the dossier of what had been, or the memorandum of what could be, the basis of the Council of Europe, which the Treaty of London subsequently gave rise to, because once those 23 organisations had united and joined the European Movement, some European Movement emissaries produced that dossier and went to the Foreign Offices saying that a treaty had to be drawn up. And the model the European Movement produced was the one that subsequently gave rise to the literal text of the treaty. Well, the four Spaniards who had been at the Hague Congress thought that they should form a Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, just as there was a German, French, Italian, etc. Council. So at number 9, avenue Marceau, in Paris, in a historic building that was owned by Basque exiles — the Basque Government in exile — they invited the political forces in exile to set up the Council and, precisely because Spain has always had a problem of identity communities, undeniable historic communities that can't be denied: the identity, the personality of Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, etc., so the invitations were sent out, but they said that it was going to be along federal lines. So the important and wonderful thing about all this — something I'm proud of — is that the statutes of the European Movement International include the federal project, yet it's not called federal, while the Spanish branch, of the 42 branches of the European Movement International, the only one whose name includes the word 'federal' is ours — which I think is marvellous. It's been federal from the outset because there was an understanding between Catalans and Basques, with both governments in exile, but also with the republican government in exile and with the socialists and liberals in particular, so that's how this movement was built: the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, which people obviously couldn't talk about in Spain, it was top secret, but we were in on the secret, we made some personal visits, we went to see them and we dealt with them. There was an extraordinary man, a socialist who was Secretary General of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement for a long time, Eribert [Enric Adroher i Pascual], Gironella they called him, they knew him as Gironella, in contact with the Secretary General of the European Movement International, Robert Van Schendel. So we were in touch with them, our Chairman of the AECE was José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones, the Secretary was Fernando Álvarez de Miranda Torres and I was Vice-Secretary. So we established relations with the Movement in exile, which was also us, except that we could talk about it there, while here we had to conceal things by calling it culture. Through the European Movement International we tried to set up a meeting in the Balearic Islands to talk about the conditions — the economic, cultural but also political conditions — that would allow Spain to join the European Economic Community (this was around 1961–62), but the government banned the Balearic Islands meeting. And that's when we realised we'd have to hold it in exile, we'd have to hold it in Europe, outside Spain, and we met in Munich. Mr Edgar Faure personally invited us Spaniards from outside and inside Spain; there were 128 of us from inside Spain — if I'm not mistaken — and around 80 from outside turned up, so these 200 or so Spaniards went to the meeting of the Fourth International Congress of the European Movement, by which I mean the Munich meeting, which was very important; it was very important because of something that hasn't been considered in purely European terms: the European Movement International Congress in Munich in 1962 established for the first time the need for direct elections to the Assembly, the Assembly of the European Communities, now the European Parliament. That was the meeting that called for the direct

universal suffrage that prevails today and that was a long time in the making, from 1962 to 1979. It was the European Movement that declared it, but in particular it raised the Spanish issue. And a small committee that was going to address Spain's conditions, since the coming together of Spaniards from within and outside Spain was so important that it developed into the major phenomenon of Munich in June 1962. And I think we gave a lesson in understanding there, we took a declaration from the Spaniards from within Spain, the AECE took a declaration, there was some reluctance on the part of the Spaniards in exile, but we ended up by discussing it at one point and two committees were set up: the exiles committee and the internal committee. Out of curiosity and in order to fraternise, I immediately joined the exiles committee, while some of the exiles joined the internal committee, and so on, and we ended up by merging, we ended up by making what Madariaga said that day come true: 'The two halves of the orange have joined together.' We were the same, we all had our European calling, Spaniards from within Spain and Spaniards in exile. And I remember an important unscheduled meeting, at night, at which the Spaniards in exile asked why some of us supported the monarchy for the future. And it was a notable liberal monarchist and anti-Francoist, Joaquín Satrústegui — who is remembered very fondly in Spain and who was subsequently a democratic senator, now sadly deceased — who explained how the advantages of the monarchist path of Juan de Borbón or his successor, now our King Juan Carlos de Borbón, could facilitate mutual understanding among Spaniards to ensure a peaceful and pro-European transition. And I remember that the socialists, led by Mr Llopis, said: 'We will continue to declare ourselves republicans, but if ever a future Spanish democratic chamber debates the form of state, we will not vote against the monarchy.' That was in 1962 in Munich. It was an emotional moment for us. And it was the solution, we were on the way. Then we were suppressed, some went into exile, others went to the islands, it was nothing short of a miracle that I escaped, I spent two years without a passport and with a huge fine, and months and months without being able to work in my profession as a notary, suffering major economic hardship, etc.; in short, we had a really hard time, but it was an example for Europe. And Europe said more than ever: 'Either the Franco regime changes, or you will never join.' So then even the regime realised that what the ambiguous expression 'making provision for the likely outcome of succession' actually meant was that we would be able to join Europe when Franco died. We couldn't picture a military solution or a rebellion, and a revolution or military coup was not on the agenda. And what's more, in light of what was being said, we Spanish democrats — whether socialists, liberals or Christian democrats — were against any violence, so we were totally against ETA, which doesn't mean that we were in favour of repression, because we were against the violent repression meted out in that respect, we were against the violence of rebellion and we were against the violence of repression. But we saw and worked towards that European integration, it was in the offing as the years went by, I don't know if I'm ...

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] I'd like to ask you a question in that respect: once the Franco regime began to express an interest in joining the European Communities, with Minister Castiella's letter as the watershed, for example, the attempt to establish a trade agreement — which subsequently came about —, what was the regime's attitude towards the European Movement or towards those cultural associations?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] These schemes were political in a way, because the time was right with Ambassador Castiella, he saw the possibility of a political understanding and he said: 'Well, we might have to join that Council of Europe thing and that European Communities thing, etc.'; but they immediately realised that it was doomed to failure because of the Birkelbach Report, the Council of Europe's Reale Report and the European Parliament's Faure Report, etc.; they realised, with the huge error they'd made with the Munich episode, calling it a 'conspiracy', something a journalist in the pay of Franco invented, they latched on to that word that really means something like uncomfortable relations between people who shouldn't get along with each other. What Franco felt was the worst thing — and it was said to European Movement representatives, led by Maurice

Faure, who came to intercede on our behalf — what Franco felt was the worst thing was that those of us who had attended from within Spain and those from outside Spain had an understanding between each other. He said — he didn't feel it, because he was anti-democratic: 'Well, political parties, etc. may be valid in the future in Spain, but I won't allow those people to agree with each other. That is treason.' Totally opposed to Madariaga's position of the two halves of the orange and something he also said in Munich: 'At the moment we are meeting with and we love the Spaniards who have lost their homeland but who have their freedom (those in exile), and the Spaniards who have their homeland but who have lost their freedom (those in Spain).' What Franco considered to be the worst thing was that we should understand each other, so he forbade Castiella from coming to the slightest political understanding, which, as it happens, was pointless, because Spain had to become democratic. So then they saw an association as a solution. There's no denying that Castiella and the Minister for Economic Affairs at the time did a good job, I mean, they were from Opus Dei, they didn't do badly in terms of free trade: they tried to expand free trade and that effectively contributed to an improvement at social and economic level, but things didn't change. That began in 1957, and in 1962, well, it blew up again with the 'Munich conspiracy', the Munich episode, and afterwards the attempts were constant until Franco died, because until he died there was no solution, because he insisted that the regime had to stay exactly as it was. There were a few pointless cosmetic reforms, but while Franco was alive there was no possibility of joining Europe, yet we pro-Europeans were already in Europe, we were already in European seats of learning, we were in the Council of Europe on a personal and individual basis to prepare studies. There was a very important committee, a Committee of Unrepresented Nations, which was specific to the Council of Europe, because obviously there were not only the Western dictatorships, Spain and Portugal, there were also the Soviet bloc dictatorships. So we Spaniards went to the Committee of Unrepresented Nations, and those of us who were in exile and the Francoists both made representations. The person now acknowledged as the man of the transition, Fraga Iribarne, went with another Franco minister to make a representation to the Committee of Unrepresented Nations and said that Spain was perfect, that it was another type of democracy — organic democracy — but that the Council of Europe was wrong not to accept us, because we were just as if not more democratic than they were, etc. They didn't believe them. And those of us in exile were also very intransigent, or at least rather intransigent, and a few of us went as representatives, I think I remember the name Íñigo Cabero, and the name Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, and I went with them. Ruiz Navarro and I made representations to the Committee of Unrepresented Nations, and we said: 'There's a third way, and that third way is the coming of democracy to Spain through the monarchy, the restoration of the monarchy.' And they understood — it was chaired by Mr Montini, brother of Pope Montini — and they understood that the path we were promoting was the right one.

2. The transition to democracy and Spain's accession to the European Communities

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] Once the transition came about, do you think people clearly saw the correspondence between the transition to democracy and integration into Europe, and in that sense, from exile, did the different political groups with their different orientations see that correspondence between Europe and democracy? How did the situation develop from the preceding period?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Yes, exactly, and precisely because the origin lies in the 'Munich conspiracy'. It was a pact, and that pact meant that the leaders in exile, who were the socialists in particular, led by Rodolfo Llopis, as well as republicans and Catalan nationalists like the one who subsequently went on to become the first president of the Generalitat [Autonomous Government of Cataluña], and Basques, etc. We had that 'Munich conspiracy' pact, and they knew that when democracy was established we would all have to agree to join Europe, but to join Europe not only

as a surgical solution for a past trauma we suffered from — the Civil War — which tried to sustain Franco's regime and keep some extremists in exile, but also to ensure Spanish prosperity and to nurture what is a universal, federal and democratic ambition for Spanish democrats. That pact bound us all, and so at the time of the transition there was no reluctance at all if the path were to be communism, no reluctance at all, because communism had veered towards Eurocommunism. I also have to tell you a personal anecdote. In 1962, during the 'Munich conspiracy', I had a private interview in Munich with two representatives of the Spanish Communist Party, who said to me: 'Tell the Spaniards who are at this meeting that officially we can't yet...' (because at the time they were discussing, you'll remember, in Prague, the possible development towards Eurocommunism) '... the issue has still not been resolved, but we, led by Carrillo, we're in favour of Eurocommunism, together with Berlinger, etc. So while officially we're not here today, because our presence would cause problems, take note that we're in favour of it'. And then afterwards in the transition, that support was declared openly. So then all the democratic political parties followed suit, including the more or less new democrats, but with a genuinely democratic vocation, coming out of Francoism, an example of which, a unique example in particular, is Adolfo Suárez, since people truly realised that the first and immediate priority was to join Europe.

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] And how has the European Movement's work been used? How have you supported the new parties that emerged out of the transition?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Yes, they were supported in the sense that they found out through us what the procedures of European integration were. It's not that we knew better than anyone else, we just had more information, we had more opportunities, and the reports we received from the European Movement International, from the European Parliament, from the Council of Europe Assembly... In that respect I'd like to point out that we attended Council of Europe Assembly sessions on more than one occasion, which at the time of the Reale Report, what's more, also caused us considerable difficulty: the transition was in full swing, Franco had died, but when I and a few other AECE representatives went to the Assembly in Strasbourg and had a seat there — not to speak, just to listen — and then there was a very important private meeting with the President of the then Council of Europe Assembly, who was German, I mean we had many difficulties again and it was unfortunately 1945 — I'm sorry, Franco had died, I mean 1975–1976 — we still suffered some repression by a government minister, who is now an admired friend, but who was very repressive at the time, Mr Fraga Iribarne, who said that we were more or less traitors to Spain, well, something unacceptable. But whatever the case, we had that information and we knew that European integration consisted firstly of an economic system. That economic system was the one that had already been initiated modestly during the development plan governments, etc., the Opus Dei governments and the opening-up governments of López Rodó, López-Amor, etc. Meanwhile, we had certain political prerogatives, which involved persuading Spanish public opinion that the aim of Spanish integration into Europe was not only to secure advantages, but also to take part in a common project. I think that's something we understood. So much so that I remember when I was a member of parliament, once Spain had become a democracy, but still in 1982–1983, when entry was very difficult for economic reasons and because of the opposition of some governments, such as the French at the time, we, with European Parliament representation, understood that we'd have to have a single currency one day. I'm talking about 1983, and we members of the European Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, who had still not joined Europe in 1983, said: 'Not only will we come in on the political aspects, but also on the day we join, we will be in favour of that objective,' which was called the ECU at that time and which is now the euro. I remember it perfectly with a representation of the European Parliament Economic Affairs Committee in 1983. Then we had the difficulties that you're aware of, opposition from some French agricultural sectors in particular, and the good use governments made of that, first the Suárez UCD government and then the government of Felipe González, which went flat-out for accession. There were many difficulties. I remember that one day a few of us, members of the Spanish Parliament who were

visiting Brussels, were waiting for Minister Morán at the airport to sign things off, and he told us that he'd just heard that it wasn't going to be possible. Then afterwards there was a very important meeting between Fernando Morán and the then French Minister for Foreign Affairs,^[2] whose name I don't remember, very important, in the house in Biarritz. And the two married couples, Fernando and his wife and that Minister — whose name I don't remember — with his wife, were locked in there for three days, working to ensure accession. And as you know, in 1985 — June 1985 — Spain and Portugal signed up at the same time.

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] How did external support from the European Movement in other European countries help Spain to become a member of the European Communities? Did you feel there was a commitment and constant support? Did it depend on what countries the European Movement representatives were from? What was your view of the situation?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] No, support from the European Movement International and the then Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement in exile was absolute. From pro-European civil society organisations, such as the Union of European Federalists, the Young European Federalists, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, the ELEC (European League for Economic Cooperation), we received total support from all these civil society organisations. Governments were tied to some extent by their domestic policies, and in particular by the economic aspect. I have to say something very important: Italian support was extraordinary. In the negotiations on accession, the support of the Italian Christian democrat government was extraordinary, and there was an Italian Commissioner in what was then the Commission of the Communities with whom we had a very direct relationship, and I also have to mention the name of the person who represented the European Commission in Spain at the time, Gianpaolo Papa, who did his utmost for us to join, and then the 100 % federalist pro-Europeans, an outstanding representative of whom was Altiero Spinelli, were also waiting, because they thought that we, with our name of Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, were going to be outright federalists, as indeed we were. I have to say that with the arrival of democracy, the former Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies at the time, Fernando Álvarez de Miranda Torres, who used to chair the AECE, was the one who asked for the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement to be legalised in Spain, and also to receive support from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which continues to this day. And the other pro-European civil society partners were 100 % in favour, some governments were reluctant on purely economic grounds, but that was resolved, in 1985 we signed up and a little later came the famous Milan Congress — the Milan Summit, where there was a European Movement demonstration. This was when Felipe González was Head of Government, we'd signed up but we hadn't officially joined at the time, since as you know, every country begins at the start of the year, so we were due to join on 1 January 1986; in the meantime the Milan Summit took place, when the entire European Movement demonstrated with the federalists, together with a range of pro-European civil society organisations, there was a momentous demonstration in Milan, and as you'll recall, this obliged the then leader of the Italian Government, Mr Craxi, to ensure that decisions taken at the meeting that was to discuss the future Single Act would not be taken by unanimity but by reinforced majority, thereby preventing the veto that Mrs Thatcher — who I remember we all jeered loudly as she passed through the streets of Milan — wanted to impose. It was very important because the country that was going to be a member, Spain, nevertheless took part in the talks, so the Head of the Spanish Government was there. And on 1 January 1986 we joined the Community and therefore all its bodies: the Commission, Parliament, the Council, the Court, etc.

3. Experience as a Member of the European Parliament

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] In that respect, I'd like to ask you how your interest in becoming an MEP arose and what it involved.

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Yes, it was logical. I'd been known for being very pro-European since my Christian democrat days, then Christian democracy failed in the first elections (1977), so some of them joined the government from the party, let's say, and a few regime reformists, with liberals and Christian democrats, formed the Unión del Centro Democrático [Union of the Democratic Centre], while some of us opted to take the socialist path. At that time I opted for the socialist path, so I didn't want to take part in the first elections. In 1979 they asked me to stand as a candidate but I didn't want to, because I didn't think it looked very good immediately after joining a party, so I waited for the following elections; then they put so much pressure on me that I felt I had to agree, and I became member of parliament for Madrid in 1982. So since I'd become a member, naturally there was a Committee for the European Union and a Foreign Affairs Committee, which of course I joined because of my legal profession and also because of my background in Spanish private law, but I was prominent on the Foreign Affairs Committee in particular. And when Spain and Portugal joined, they had to take some representatives to the European Parliament. Some members and senators were automatically co-opted to go; it was a bad system, because we obviously had a dual mandate, but there was no other option. So for a few months, around a year, we were members of parliament or senators in Spain and Portugal and MEPs at the same time. It was rather ridiculous, and what's more we had to work like mad, because in the morning we'd have to vote in Strasbourg while in the afternoon we'd have to fly back to vote in Madrid, it was madness. I remember once being in my seat in Parliament in Madrid and I went as if to fasten my seatbelt because I thought I was on a plane, it was madness. And what's more it wasn't democratic. So not long after, in 1987, elections were arranged just for Spanish and Portuguese MEPs. And of course they got me to stand again. The time came and I naturally joined the Institutional Committee, now the Constitutional Affairs Committee, and I fitted in immediately. I was welcomed by the then President, Altiero Spinelli, chair of the committee, with whom we'd had very close relations, because when the draft constitution was being prepared $\frac{3}{4}$ you'll remember the European Parliament's draft constitution drawn up by Spinelli and his colleagues $\frac{3}{4}$ we representatives of the Spanish European Movement had taken part in the work in a European Movement International building very close to Parliament (which was then an old house next to Parliament rather than its headquarters), but we'd worked on it. And then when we got to the committee the draft constitution was dead, it had been passed by Parliament but not by the Council: it had been sidelined to some extent. Then the Single European Act emerged. After overcoming the difficulty in Milan, the governments then passed the Single European Act with a reinforced majority, according to Delors's principles for all the 300 measures that combined to make a genuine internal market, besides other elements of another kind that were also political, etc. The Single European Act was when I joined the Constitutional Affairs Committee, and my very dear and respected Altiero Spinelli, who I will always revere, an extreme maximalist, decided that we should oppose the Act because of that policy that he felt was too pragmatic, involving small steps, while he wanted to take the big step — forgetting Schuman, who said that Europe would be built step by step. He greeted me, took me aside in a corridor and said: 'My dear Bru, you're going to vote against the Single Act now.' And I said to him: 'No, I'm going to vote for it.' 'Oh dear, well in that case I won't greet you for some time'. It only lasted a fortnight, but he was very annoyed, because it was Spinelli's particular maximalism, and it's good for there to be maximalists, for there to be utopias so that other people such as myself can work with that idea of utopia, but step by step. The Single Act was approved. I think that the Single Act was the great lever of European integration. And in that respect I have to say that there was a moment when Spain joined, after the Single European Act, when discussions began on a future treaty and Spain, led by Felipe González, raised two very specific questions: one, social cohesion, and the other, European

citizenship. Those were the Spanish contributions between the Single Act and Maastricht.

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] I'd now like to mention an initiative of yours when you were an MEP. You proposed that genuine European parties should be set up so that elections were not decided at internal level, and you've supported that point of view since 1989. Could you tell us something about that?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Yes. The parties, the political groups, exist in theory. And some exist as a party, though I think more in name than in reality. For me, the centre of operations is the European Parliament itself. There's no place for political parties if they don't have a parliamentary influence; there may be extra-parliamentary parties, but that gets confused with our function of associations and foundations, i.e. civil society. When a political party goes from civil society to political society, it has to have parliamentary influence. So my idea of the parties (well, many other people have worked on it too), the idea of some real — rather than fictitious — European political parties, arose out of the idea of voting, if you'll excuse my use of colloquial Spanish, '*a la europea*', which means that rather than being Spanish, French, Italian, Luxembourgish, etc., voting is European. For this, utopia would be a single European constituency. That's unlikely nowadays, but there was a specific project that some of us pro-Europeans did a great deal of work on, such as Enrique Barón, Spanish pro-Europeans, and others from other countries, but of the Spanish pro-Europeans I'd like to recall Enrique Barón, Marcelino Oreja and myself so that there would be at least 20 %, if not 30 %, at least 20 % of a single constituency in the European Parliament, in which there would be a single list for Europe as a whole. That is what would create some genuine political parties, because liberals, Christian democrats, socialists, communists — either United Left or New Left — would be working to win the candidacy for their representatives in that partial constituency in Parliament. This has been in all authors' pro-European literature, no one doubts it, but no one takes the step to carry it through: governments won't take the step. And it naturally entails the political parties being European parties. I've proposed several times that if someone wants to be in the European liberal party without being in their own country's liberal party, then they should be able to do so, i.e. there can be direct European militancy, without having to go through internal militancy, since if there's a dual militancy the commitment is linked, so you can't say what Europe requires you to say in the European Parliament and then say the opposite here, but rather there's discipline in both arenas. And even the somewhat sordid yet undeniable aspect of funding, money, is also useful for internal activity and European activity. And then it seems sad that not even in the Treaty of Lisbon, or its appended protocols, has a balance been struck on the conditions for active and passive suffrage in Europe. At the moment, to mention something extraordinary that I've worked a great deal for, which is the European citizens' initiative of one million signatures, 26 Member States allow people to vote at 18 years of age and one at 16 years of age, so put them all at 17, or all at 18, or all at 16, but conditions have to be equal so that an Austrian voter is not worth more or less than a Luxembourg voter. And passive suffrage, meanwhile, is much more important: let everyone who stands for the European elections, even if there are national lists, have the same conditions for compatibility, age, education and non-incompatibilities above all; but it's an issue that hasn't been addressed yet. So, identification of the conditions for active and passive suffrage, a partial constituency under a single European list for the European Parliament and, naturally, a certain organisation of political parties at European level.

4. The development of pro-European sentiment in Spain

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] A topic we've talked about quite a lot in this conversation is Europeanism. How do you perceive the development of pro-European sentiment in Spain, from exile and Francoism to the present day?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Well look, I think the good thing about Spain is that we don't go in for gratuitous gratitude, or resentment or anecdotal annoyance. Gratitude there should be, but it doesn't have to be a merely gratuitous submissiveness, along the lines of 'You've given us everything.' No, we've all done our bit. The rise from 62.5 % of GDP — no, Spanish per capita product — to just over 92 with respect to the European per capita GDP that we have today, rising from just over 62 to around 92, is something that's actually due to the Structural Funds, but it's also due to our work. It's due in particular to Felipe González's idea of including cohesion in the Maastricht Treaty, partly in the Single Act, but also in particular in the Maastricht Treaty. But it's a reciprocal task that we've all worked on, so if there are difficulties now, if pro-European sentiment in certain sectors has declined in Spain because of the difficulties we're experiencing now, perhaps it's because there's been no implementation of European fiscal policy, European social policy... It's been done, but under the principle of unanimity, not under the principle of the reinforced majority and the co-decision procedure with Parliament; that doesn't annoy us, what it requires us to do is to work: to work for what I believe is the future objective in the treaties. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — there's no need for it to go into the Treaty on European Union, which is more generalist — what we have to do in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU is to achieve a certain cohesion in the area of taxation, we can't ... The only tax we have that appears to be European is VAT, though there are some very significant differences between applying it in the country of origin or the country of destination. Let alone the enormous difference between corporation tax and income tax. In that respect I think we have to move closer together, we need a certain 'proximity by majority', and that undoubtedly applies to social policy too. But we'll continue working, and now, with the crisis, the proposed European Union representation within G20 seems to involve a commitment that the European Union will take financial discipline forward, in a certain governance of the financial system, in adhering to a Basel Convention of real supervision in the financial field, and, something which is important: the ability to use legal banking secrecy in some ways in some countries, including within the European Union, to offer protection against tax fraud must be eliminated, i.e. banking secrecy must be respectable, but not tax fraud. That's something we all have to learn.

5. The Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement and the challenges of contemporary Europe

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] At the moment, what are the European Movement's priorities, initiatives and proposals in the light of the challenges of contemporary Europe?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] In the light of the challenges of contemporary Europe, well, in foreign policy most of all. We're delighted that there's a Foreign Policy Representative. Unfortunately, we would have liked the title to have been Minister for Foreign Affairs, as set out in the draft constitution, but maintaining the practice — the practice rather than the idea — of the previous representative, Mr Solana, but whose powers were limited; they shouldn't be as limited now, they should be much greater, and we hope that Mrs Ashton will carry out her truly painstaking and extremely important task. A European foreign policy with the European foreign service is also an objective for us, but I think we'll have to wait for now, not only wait, we'll have to work in each

country's diplomatic schools — I don't know what it's called in Luxembourg — but in our diplomatic school, the ENA in France, the school in England, etc., in which students begin to prepare to join the European foreign service. We have to have a real European diplomatic corps: that's an objective of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which has to be taken forward immediately. And then I think it's very important and very urgent for us to promote European Union commitment to the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights, since, as the charter is unfortunately not in the text of the treaty, there's a protocol that we've signed up to instead, but there are three very important exceptions: the United Kingdom, Poland and recently the Czech Republic, which raises the absurd paradox that these countries don't realise that declaring the charter ensures protection not only against infringements that occur in their country but also against infringements arising in the European Union institutions, so that their nationals — a UK citizen — won't be able to refer to the Court of Justice on the basis of the charter: it's absurd, but anyway, since that shortcoming exists, I believe it's essential for the Union, as such, the European Union, as a supranational political entity, to sign up as a matter of urgency to the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights, the text of which is truly very close to the subsequent protocols that have covered what could be called 'third and fourth generation human rights', such as environmental rights, biological rights, etc. All these rights are also now in the Council of Europe, and I think signing up to it is an extremely urgent priority. And naturally we also have to implement the proposed European initiative of one million signatures, because that's what will inspire civil society to adhere to European integration.

6. European Union enlargement towards the East and future enlargements

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] You've just referred to some new European Union Member States. I think I recall that you mentioned a concept of minimum loyalty of countries that join the European Union. Could you expand on that a little?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Look, I'll give you an example. The Catholic Church, many of whose positions I disagree with, has a principle which appears to be very logical: if someone who gets married under the Catholic rite, in the Catholic Church, subsequently divorces under civil law, they can't remarry in the Catholic Church. Imagine you have a civil wedding, and you've used the civil procedure to divorce, what we consider to be a permanent marriage you have terminated by means of a civil procedure, and afterwards you don't want to get married under the Catholic rite, since you've already married under the civil procedure. There must be some coherence. If you, the applicant country, don't believe that we're going to build something better jointly, it would be better not to join. If you join and then say on the following day: 'My sovereignty comes before everything,' then you're the one who doesn't realise that joining the European Union means transferring sovereignty; it's a constructive transfer, naturally, because you get to have more sovereignty, a collective sovereignty. But you as an individual have to lose a little. And obviously it's better for those who can't accept that not to join, though I'm not saying that we're going to set an exam, but clearly their constitution, their political practice, the resolutions of the respective parliaments, their governments, have to adopt a pro-European stance. If that's not the case, it's better not to join. Those who don't agree naturally might think the door is open. And the right to withdraw is acknowledged for the first time in the Treaty of Lisbon. The fact remains that we should all be pragmatic, and the system of opting in/opting out seems very good to me, i.e. the ones who want to go forward can do so, and let the ones that don't want to go forward wait, though provided the ones that remain behind allow us others to go ahead. That's been achieved with enhanced cooperation, significant progress has been made in political, foreign and security policy, and it's very positive in terms of 'structured cooperation', which is recognised in the Treaty of

Lisbon. And then for the revision, which is very important. No democratic country in the world has a definitive and settled constitution. A constitution can't be forever. And for it not to be forever, there must be certain ways to amend it. And for there to be ways to amend it, total unanimity cannot be demanded, because someone will always be dissatisfied. So the amendments brought to the draft European constitution, which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union now has in its final articles, 440 and something — I don't remember which articles they are — anyway, provision is made for four-fifths of the countries which are in favour of slightly amending the current treaty, which is a constitutional treaty, basically it's constitutional, though the Treaty on European Union isn't called that, because it's established, it's created a number of institutions, because it's created political conduct, that's constitution-building, but anyway we don't call it a constitution because it seems that some people don't like it, so let's say that it has to be possible to amend the Treaties on European Union and on the Functioning of the European Union, and if there's a country that resists, they're not going to impose a veto on all the others. So there's some procedure for partial amendments by means of 'passerelles', i.e. so that a few go forward with the consent of the others, but it's also necessary, should total reform really be necessary, when four-fifths of the states agree, the treaty will have to be reviewed and a convention drawn up — which was the great invention for the draft constitution, a convention and a review. And I think that would mean that a reinforced majority would amend the treaties, just as in Spain we can amend our Constitution, albeit with difficulty, but it is possible.

7. The boundaries of European integration

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] Since we're talking about enlargements, what do you believe the boundaries of integration are?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] This has always been a talking point. I think there are certain cultural boundaries, but in cultural terms, Russia isn't Europe. At the same time though, do you think Europe can reach as far as Vladivostok and meet the United States there? That's impossible, because there's a geography, there's a culture that's effectively broader, because the European model (we won't say we're dominated by a model), but the prevalence of freedoms, or the model of the freedoms of the Enlightenment, the freedoms of democracy, etc., with the United States as pioneers, since it really is a model that's being adopted in many regions of the world, but what happens is that geography is also a factor. I think it's fundamental, not because of an egocentric European vision, but because of a global vision. Globalism, cosmopolitan democracy — which some people have talked about — planetary democracy has to be within the United Nations, but as the difficulties of the Security Council, etc. have shown, this isn't possible without a certain world regionalisation. So if there is a certain world regionalisation, a pioneer of which is the European Union, but which is also emerging in other parts of the world, we won't deny it: ASEAN, Mercosur, etc., which are now world region projects, since if those world regions exist, the European Union has to be geographically determined by what Europe is. I don't know whether what de Gaulle used to say: 'From the Atlantic to the Urals' — and clearly the Atlantic encompasses Iceland — I think that Iceland should join soon. I think that strange phenomena such as Greenland not being in the European Union is an oddity that would be remedied, but the boundaries towards the East clearly reach at least as far as the Black Sea. That's a phenomenon that you're going to ask me about and I have no difficulty responding: I think that Turkey, whose European territory is 4.5 % of its total territory, while the other 95 % is in the Middle East, would no longer fulfil its great function of being a moderator and a democratising model — with all its minor defects, but more democratising than many other Middle Eastern countries — Turkey would no longer fulfil its function of being a pioneer, a standard-bearer for democracy in the Middle East, if it joined Europe. I also think that at

the moment all this, as it does for Turkey, also raises difficulties for Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc., because I think they are major difficulties. I think that the neighbourhood policy, a major innovation of the draft constitution, and which is now in the Treaty of Lisbon, a neighbourhood policy in which it's possible to achieve a very important osmosis, an osmosis of course of certain total economic and trade relations, etc., but also certain political and social agreements, and even immigration aspects: certain common policies by means of the neighbourhood policy, that would be enough. I don't think Europe can be amoebic, like those amoebas that increase and decrease with the climate; no, Europe has to have boundaries. Certain boundaries because of how it works, to be able to work; and also, so that it is and continues to be the model for other regions in the world that have to form, because in the IMF (the International Monetary Fund), in the World Bank, in the Security Council itself, in Ecosoc (the Economic and Social Council), the financial crisis has shown that if a certain regionalisation does not exist, then real aberrations will arise, such as the predominance of one country's vote — I won't say which one — in the International Monetary Fund. That's unacceptable. And the selective and not very democratic system applied by means of a de facto body that really has functioned in the crisis, but which is not a permanent solution: the G20. So the idea of regionalisation is what would bring democracy in political terms (in the Security Council) and in economic terms (in the Economic and Social Council); it has to be given greater prominence in the United Nations and in the two specialised bodies, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

8. Federalism and the Spanish autonomous model

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] I'd like to go back to the concept of the federal, present in the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement. How is this concept interwoven in the current Spanish autonomous model, and how do you analyse the future of such an autonomous model from a European perspective?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Well look, I'm very straightforward, I learn something, and if it convinces me and continues to convince me throughout my life, I continue to support it. I learnt that federalism is composed of three elements: autonomy, participation and solidarity. Autonomy, so that whoever is capable of doing something can do it, and can do it in complete freedom. The territorial organisation that can function as such can do so in total freedom, but since it is subject to a higher hierarchical order, it participates in a way that says: 'I'm doing this not only because it suits me, but because it may also suit everybody, and that's why I have the voice and the vote of a higher tier, which is participation.' And these two in turn are steeped in a spirit of solidarity, i.e. whoever has more helps whoever has less. This is a fundamental aspect of federalism: without solidarity, there is no federalism. So everything that constitutes bilateralism that we look for in a European system, in a system of countries that have recently joined or that wish to join the European Union, or in countries whose internal situation — e.g. Belgium — really does constitute a major bi-regional problem, or a country with such problems, such as Spain with its Autonomous Communities (largely resolved, though still with difficulties, because some wish to be more differentiated by their identity and historical roots, which I don't question). All this, provided it doesn't lead to a bilateralism exploited by those who not only seek autonomy, but who also want to be economically independent so that they can take everything for themselves. I think solidarity is fundamental. They don't practise the doctrine, well, they do in the United States, they haven't put it in place completely, a little bit with Scotland and the United Kingdom, but they've got a very clear view of this federal idea, they don't accept the word, yet nevertheless they have two mechanisms that lead to the same thing, which is multilevel ... — I don't remember the expression now — multilevel decision, or decisions at various levels and compounded representation ...

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] Multilevel governance

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Multilevel governance, exactly. We can say multilevel decision or multilevel governance, well, at various levels, or in other words, I am, but I am from the local level; people have also talked about going from the local to the global, local authorities are very important and the Spanish European Movement is working in favour of the European network of local authorities; it's something people don't know a lot about, but it's important. There are — I think there are — 130 000 European local authorities, nowadays they have to be based on technologies, the new information and communication technologies form a platform for a network of local authorities. And in my local authority I decide this for my neighbours, because it's good, but in matters that exceed my powers I'll have my representation in the region I belong to; and that in its turn will decide the matter, because, for example, we talk about very specific policies: health, teaching policies, welfare policies, etc., but where it exceeds my powers and requires a higher tier, I go to the higher tier, where I have to have my compounded representation, which can't only be representation — and this is very interesting — based on the number of inhabitants of the component, but it must also represent units. This is what is reflected in what we seek to have applied. Unfortunately, it still won't be applied in Europe by the reinforced majority. The reinforced majority of 65 %, 55 % of states and 65 % of the European population, i.e. the idea that it's necessary to unify, it's necessary to reconcile the identity unit in itself with the number of citizens, because the protagonists — and by that I perhaps want to give you my fundamental idea of where we'll get to — the protagonists are citizens. But why are they citizens? The way the Greeks saw it, they weren't all citizens: slaves weren't, women weren't; but those who took part, however, those who felt that they could be citizens, why were they? Because they took part in conceiving the laws, because they belonged to an entity that was the *civitas*, which was each city of the Greek amphictyonies, because they belonged to the citizenry, and because they belonged to the *civitas* they were *cives*. So I believe there are no *cives* without the *civitas*. There is no European citizen without the European Union, but there is no European Union without *cives*, without citizens. That is what has to be brought together and that is what we can achieve by federalism.

9. New technologies and participatory democracy in Europe

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] To arrive at that model of participatory democracy that you've spoken of, what in your opinion are the possibilities offered by new technologies, in combination with civil society, to achieve that development?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Yes, yes, clearly. I think you've read the research by Manuel Castells, a Spanish sociologist, who was one of the first to point out that we were living in a networked world. So for a political creation that has to be realised by means of political parties, by means of elections, by means of election systems, by means of decision-making systems, of which, I repeat, fortunately in the Treaty of Lisbon the decision-making system is put into effect by the European Parliament in a vast array of subjects with the Council of the European Union, the Council of Ministers, which is very good, and also by means of the voting we referred to previously. And in its turn, with the Commission as the government in office, that political presence becomes a vacuous and simultaneously dangerous superstructure if it's remote from citizens. And nowadays citizens have computers, they're talking every day on Facebook, Twitter, etc. Citizens are chatting every day, so if we don't bear in mind that we're networked, that we can communicate with each other in a world that I would call 'multi-you' and multimedia... And there are many of us: 7 billion people in the

world. And I hope we can remain as many, and that climate change won't stop us; but at the same time, with multimedia, we can communicate with each other; if you want to get to know a New Zealander or a New Guinean who has the same tastes in music, art, etc., you can get to know them. In such a world, how are we not going to get closer to civil society by means of the network to make ourselves Europeans? How is this not going to happen? What we will never build is a vacuous or even dangerous structure, what has been called the Brussels technocracy, but which I also don't consider to be fair, because the European Union has done a great deal and the 'technocracy' has done an extraordinary amount for Europe, but if it's remote from the inspiration, conscience and will of Europeans, it will achieve little. And this is manifested nowadays: physical rapprochement, understanding, speaking, but also speaking by computer, so I think it's fundamental for the future of Europe, for the future of world understanding, to be networked.

10. Spain's contribution to the European integration process

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] To bring this interview to a close, I'd like to ask you perhaps the most important question of all, given your broad experience as Chairman of the European Movement in Spain: what are the major contributions Spain as a country has made to the process of European integration?

[Carlos María Bru Purón] Well, I don't think we should be egotistic. I've sometimes written against 'ego-Europeanism', i.e. that Europe in turn should also avoid the risk of egotism, of regarding itself as superior. But I do think that Europe, through phenomena originating not only in European territory but also coming from the Arab countries — let's bear in mind what this meant for the Renaissance, what Maimonides meant and what Averroes meant, for example; in other words, we shouldn't attribute it strictly to European territory, but clearly there's a history of the Renaissance, of consideration of spiritual freedom with Pico della Mirandola and with the Renaissance, etc., then recognition of conscience with Spinoza, etc., and then what Lutheranism means, and what the Reformation means, and what the Enlightenment in particular means, by way of certain elements that could also have been seen as positive in the Counter-Reformation when states were being formed. So clearly the Enlightenment arose out of that idea, which I think has been the most cohesive ever — Kant's idea — that not only do you not want for another person what you do not want for yourself, but that also — the aspect of Kant which is forgotten — you want for everyone else what you want for yourself (which is positive). Well, that spirit of the Enlightenment has clearly left us a legacy, a legacy that we Spanish have contributed a great deal to, and, what's more, with greater merit, because if the Counter-Reformation lasted longer, the battle was harder, i.e. the reaction in the 18th century to the Counter-Reformation, to the Inquisition and to a totally mistaken economic policy that was implemented, which involved bringing in all the wealth, thus ensuring that the Spanish were indolent and didn't work; and the reaction to this, the Spanish Enlightenment, and I have to mention the 'Gentlemen of Azkoitia', that is, a number of organisations that were set up by young gentlemen who began to fight (Floridablanca, etc.), who began to work to spread the ideas of the Enlightenment. It was a very difficult fight, but it was a fight that brought us closer to the practice of freedom. There have been many ups and downs, there have been major backward steps, both in the 19th and the 20th centuries, but the truth is that that merit of countering the backward step, always defending freedom, seeking a freedom rooted in social justice, well, I think it's something that Spain, because it's experienced the opposite, has been able to contribute a great deal of. And that's in general, so our pro-European spirit, whereby we now know that a Spain closed in on itself can lead to deterioration and aberrations such as a war between siblings, that sad, bitter experience, but a salutary experience for the future: that conflicts between siblings will only ever be resolved by negotiating and by giving way to a higher idea; it's something

that, I think, since we've had the terrible example of a Spanish Civil War — the bloody, disastrous Spanish Civil War — makes us realise that Europe must unite to ensure that there is no European Civil War. Yes, more specific advantages, which I think we've worked very well on — I think we referred to this earlier — we've had very positive ideas: cohesion, citizenship, the idea of political integration, etc. Now I think we offer certain formulae for a new economic governance, a change of model for climate change, such as renewable energies, in which Spain is a leading light, etc. I think we can and should offer something.

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] Thank you very much for giving us so much of your time and for allowing us to learn about your experiences.

[Carlos María Bru Purón] There's nothing to learn, on the contrary.

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] Thank you.

[Carlos María Bru Purón] I'm very grateful to the Centre. Thank you very much.

[Cristina Blanco Sío-López] It's been an honour.

[\[1\]](#) José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones de León was Chairman of the AECE from the end of the year 1960–1961. José María Gil-Robles y Gil-Delgado was Chairman of the European Movement from 1999 to 2005 and Chairman of the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement from 1996 to 2001.

[\[2\]](#) The French Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1981 to 1984 was Claude Cheysson, who was succeeded by Roland Dumas (1984–1986).