

Memorandum by Selwyn Lloyd on the Persian Gulf (London, 7 June 1957)

Caption: On 7 June 1957, in preparation for a Cabinet meeting, Selwyn Lloyd, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, issues a memorandum on the Persian Gulf in which he discusses the major question of the future of British policy in the region. The document explains the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf area for the UK and analyses the relations with the Gulf states, outlining future prospects.

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7th June, 1957

CABINET

PERSIAN GULF

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Recent despatches from Her Majesty's Representatives in Tehran, Bagdad and Bahrain have discussed the major question of future British policy in the Persian Gulf on which I should welcome my colleagues' views.

2. A summary and analysis of these despatches is at Annex 1. The basic facts about the Shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf form Annex 2. As regards the latter I would particularly draw my colleagues' attention to the great diversity of, among other things, revenue and development among the various Shaikhdoms. This sometimes makes generalisations about them misleading. I would also emphasise that these Shaikhdoms are not Colonies but British-protected States jealous of their internal independence and proud of being Arab.

3. Broadly speaking Her Majesty's Representatives advance two opposing views on the Gulf. In their extreme forms these are:—

(a) the present position is anachronistic or at least regarded as such by other interested countries, including some of our allies. We must either go forward or we shall be forced to quit. Federation of the Shaikhdoms or association with the Bagdad Pact, or both, offers a constructive policy. Anything other than a positive forward looking policy would be drift;

(b) there is no justification for the assumption that the Gulf States and their relationship with Her Majesty's Government cannot continue more or less as they are. Just because this relationship has existed for 100 years is no reason why it should now be wrong. Our position still accords with the general wishes of the legitimate Rulers of the Shaikhdoms and of most of the peoples in the area.

4. In my opinion the basis of the policy to be pursued by Her Majesty's Government must lie somewhere between these two extremes with a bias towards (b). I reject federation because the Rulers concerned do not want it and we dismiss association with the Bagdad Pact—at least in the immediate future—for the same reason and because we do not want in Kuwait a reaction like that in Jordan in 1955. On the other hand it is unrealistic not to recognise that the world is changing and that we must be prepared to make adjustments in our relations with the Gulf States to meet these changes. This does not mean that adjustments need to be drastic or fundamental. Indeed by taking too sudden or far-reaching initiatives we may well not forestall trouble but precipitate it.

The Importance of Our Stake

5. Our major interests in the Gulf are:—

(a) to ensure the supply of oil. Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in addition to the Shaikhdoms supply oil to the Western world and export all or some of their output through the Gulf. At present 50 per cent. of the United Kingdom consumption derives from Kuwait alone. Dependence of Western Europe's economy on oil will increase for many years to come;

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- (b) to strengthen our balance of payments to which the operations of British oil companies in the Middle East make an important contribution;
- (c) to bar the spread of Communism in the Middle East and subsequently beyond. This presupposes the defence of the Gulf against the Egyptian-led extreme Arab nationalism under cover of which the Soviet Government at present chooses to advance;
- (d) strategically the British position in the Gulf helps to assure communications of the Bagdad Pact countries in peace and war. The Gulf is on the natural air route between the United Kingdom and our interests East of Suez. Our friendly relations with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman ensure the line of communication from the Gulf of Aden. The Gulf is an area of the world where we may still hope to retain military control relying on our own resources alone.

6. It is common ground that our position in the Gulf has hitherto enabled us to secure our interests. Generally speaking we and the local Governments have co-operated well in maintaining stability and the flow of oil and we have always had in reserve superior physical force which can be effectively employed in the last resort.

New Factors

7. But the situation is continually developing and compared with even ten years ago new and important factors in the Middle East situation are at work against our position. The Soviet Union has intruded in the Arab world, and Egypt and Syria are openly antagonistic to the Western position there, pan-Arabism at present led by Egypt has spread to many parts of the Gulf and can hardly be prevented from eventually spreading to the whole, the Israeli issue has exacerbated and will continue to exacerbate Anglo-Arab relations, the Suez crisis has further shaken these relations, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have gained considerably in strength and confidence and Saudi Arabia and Iran in ambition, our position generally may become increasingly the target of an Afro-Asian attack pressing us to relinquish authority in the Gulf as we have done elsewhere, the United States and not Britain is now the predominant Western Power in the Middle East. On the other hand, we have succeeded in maintaining a fund of confidence among the Rulers of the Gulf. Our firm action at Buraimi and our willingness to send forces to Bahrain last year, their use in Bahrain and the belief elsewhere that we were prepared to use them have demonstrated and maintained confidence in our determination to fulfil our responsibilities. Even the future decline in our conventional military strength need not be locally reflected in the Gulf.

Arguments against the Need for Change

8. The Political Resident in Bahrain argues that there is no present reason to suppose either that we shall be unable to defend the Rulers against external attack or that they, with our assistance, will fail to deal with foreign subversion. Even if this were untrue, any move in the direction of alternative arrangements acceptable to ourselves would be self-denying because it would at once destroy the confidence of the Rulers and cause Kuwait and perhaps others to look for protection elsewhere.

Future Prospects

9. I agree with this assessment though we are not confident that the present state of affairs will necessarily last indefinitely. Apart from internal dynastic, constitutional, labour, or social upheavals which might threaten stability and the British connection the situation in the Gulf is to a significant extent at the mercy of external events. Collapse in Iraq (or Saudi Arabia) would of course at once create an extremely dangerous situation. The capture of Jordan by our enemies would also have its effect (though here we could point to the fact that this was due in fact to Jordan renouncing the British connection). Egyptian propaganda by radio, Press and agents will be intensified and may achieve an influence seriously threatening our position. Its effect is the greater because it uses the same language and idiom of thought as the inhabitants of the Persian Gulf States. I see no way of providing a sure shield for the Gulf against these external influences but something can be done to moderate the effect of hostile propaganda by counter-measures of our own.

10. We have no choice at the present time save to adopt a temporising policy. If change becomes inevitable we should endeavour to ensure that its purpose and the way it takes place should as far as possible be in accordance with our interests. It is particularly important that any liberalisation of the régimes designed to meet genuine grievances or to mollify reformist elements shall not go so far as to cripple the powers of the Ruling Families or compel them to bow to nationalist demands at the expense of their own attachment to us.

The United States

11. In seeking support for the maintenance of our position the attitude of the United States Government is of major importance. Discussion at the Bermuda Conference in March showed that the United States Government are conscious of the importance of the Western stake in the Gulf, though Mr. Dulles was imperfectly acquainted with the nature of our position. Although this is one of the questions which officials are now discussing with their opposite numbers in the United States Government in accordance with arrangements decided upon at Bermuda, we can hardly hope in any near future to obtain from the United States more than a general understanding of, and moral support for, our position in the Gulf as the chief guarantee of Western interests there. It must also be remembered that the United States are committed to support Saudi Arabia whose interests are in many cases in conflict with those of our protected Rulers, while any apparent increase in United States power in the Gulf would be interpreted locally as a diminution of our own and the net result might be the weakening of the Western position as a whole.

Future Policy

12. I propose to pursue the following policy in the immediate future:—

- (a) We should seek generally to maintain our position by political rather than military means. This connotes among other things the expansion of information and British Council work in the wealthier and more developed Shaikhdoms and of our economic and technical help for development in the backward and poorer Shaikhdoms where oil has not yet been found. It also involves the training of adequate numbers of Arabic-speaking officials. It means spending more money than heretofore but the increases required can be measured in tens rather than hundreds of thousands of pounds and nowhere in the world will they pay a better dividend.
- (b) We should eschew any "grand design" for the whole of the Persian Gulf and retain the maximum flexibility in order to deal effectively with the wide variety of problems in the different States.
- (c) At the same time we should continue to regard our position in the Persian Gulf as an integral whole, no part of which can be weakened or resigned without affecting the rest. It is of paramount importance to retain the confidence of the Rulers in our ability and determination to protect them. We should therefore as far as possible make no concessions which would jeopardise the territorial integrity of the Persian Gulf States and we should continue to protect them against any encroachment by their more powerful neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia. At the same time we should watch for an opportunity to improve relations with Saudi Arabia provided this can be done without paying a damaging price.
- (d) Some British troops should be retained in the Persian Gulf, together with aircraft and naval vessels, as an earnest of our determination and ability to deter or repel aggression. But these forces should not be used except in case of extremity without consent of the Rulers.
- (e) While carefully avoiding any open interference in internal affairs, we should encourage the Rulers to base their régimes on as broad a consent of their people as is practicable and as is consistent with the maintenance of stability. We should wait for opportunities to use our influence, provided this can be done unobtrusively, in the direction of more efficient government and of wider participation in the business of government, e.g., by including nominated or elected members from outside the Ruling Families in committees controlling Government Departments, as is the case in Bahrain.

- (f) Local Governments should be encouraged to take over from us any primarily internal functions which we exercise on their behalf such as postal services, &c., as they become capable of doing so.
- (g) We should seek to obtain American understanding of our position in the Gulf as the best guarantee of Western interests there including those of United States oil companies.
- (h) Closer co-operation between the Persian Gulf States and independent States friendly to the West, *e.g.*, Iraq and Pakistan, should be encouraged, for example by extending the existing arrangements for the secondment for service in the Persian Gulf States of teachers and other officials from Iraq and police and military personnel from Pakistan.
- (i) We should resist Iranian attempts at encroachment in the Gulf. We should seek to settle by appropriate means including arbitration ~~in~~ internal disputes between the Persian Gulf States, and disputes between these States and the neighbouring independent States, *e.g.*, on the division of the Persian Gulf sea-bed.
- (j) We should gradually inculcate the idea that the Arabs alone cannot protect themselves against Israel ~~and~~ ^{now} that the West are the only reliable guarantors of their independence.

S. L.

Foreign Office, S.W. 1.
5th June, 1957.

ANNEX I

A.—SUMMARY OF VIEWS OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES

Tehran despatch No. 140 of 8th December, 1956, and Bagdad despatch No. 5 of 4th January discussed various aspects of the United Kingdom's position in the Persian Gulf. The Political Resident, Persian Gulf, replied in Bahrain despatch No. 12 of 24th January and H.M. Ambassador at Tehran commented further in his despatch No. 37 of 28th March with particular reference to Saudi-Iranian relations.

2. H.M. Ambassador at Tehran argues that the traditional military reasons for the British position in the Persian Gulf have disappeared with the loss of the Indian Empire and of our traditional footholds in Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq. These changes, he says, have turned the Persian Gulf into a "double-ended cul-de-sac."

3. Secondly, Sir Roger Stevens says, the continuance of the British position in the Persian Gulf is an irritant to other States in the area, particularly Iran, who disapproves of what she regards as out-dated imperialism and British support for backward unenlightened Rulers against the "rising tide of popular discontent." Iran believes that British influence must eventually disappear and when that happens she fears that the Shaikhdoms will fall into "the Arab lap." She hopes, however, to secure windfalls for herself in the shape of expanded oil revenues, particularly from the Continental Shelf, a dominant naval and mercantile position and the general increase in prestige to be gained by asserting the Persian position in the "Persian" Gulf. For this reason Iran has maintained her absurd claim to Bahrain and seized the small island of Farsi which we regard as belonging to Kuwait.

4. Thirdly, Sir Roger Stevens doubts whether we are able to continue holding the present position. If Iran were to join forces with Saudi Arabia, who also has extensive claims in the area (possibly through the medium of a Saudi-Iranian defence Pact which the Shah is believed to have raised at his recent visit to Saudi Arabia), Her Majesty's Government's position might become difficult to hold.

Even now we do not find it easy to discharge our obligations except at great political cost, *e.g.*, over Buraimi, and in some cases, *e.g.*, over Farsi, we have been unwilling to enforce the claims of the Ruler of Kuwait against Iran. Do we not run the risk of being in the long run unable to fulfil our commitments to the States under our protection while at the same time by our very presence we alienate the sympathies of the larger neighbouring States, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and make it difficult for America, who has very friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, to support us?

5. Sir Roger Stevens sums up our remaining assets as:—

- (i) oil,
- (ii) Naval bases,
- (iii) sea communications.

He describes our liabilities as:—

- (a) our Treaties with the Rulers;
- (b) the threat to sterling if the Ruler of Kuwait switched from sterling to dollars;
- (c) “the outmoded 19th Century conception: prestige.”

6. H.M. Ambassador at Bagdad agrees broadly with Sir Roger Stevens' views. He adds:—

- (a) the Persian Gulf is Iraq's only access to the sea and is the outlet for oil not piped to the Mediterranean. It is Iraq's main trade route and a channel by which military aid against Russia would be supplied;
- (b) so long as Iraq remains friendly she would rather see the independent Shaikhdoms protected by the United Kingdom than falling under the influence of Saudi Arabia. If, however, Iraq became hostile, or if our ability to protect the Shaikhdoms declined, Iraq's attitude might change rapidly;
- (c) Iraq has not abandoned a shadowy claim to Kuwait and a more shadowy one to the Al Hasa province of Saudi Arabia.

7. The Political Resident considers that federation of the Gulf States into something resembling a viable unit should be dismissed as impracticable in the foreseeable future. Other possible solutions proposed by H.M. Ambassadors at Tehran and Bagdad are:—

- (a) association of these States strategically and politically with the Bagdad Pact. Such association, it is claimed, would be assisted by participation of America in the Pact and would eliminate the possibility of a clash between British and American interests in the area; or
- (b) a joint guarantee by Saudi Arabia and Iran, with possibly Iraqi and American support, to underwrite the independence and territorial integrity of the Persian Gulf States, in return for which the independent States concerned would be associated with our defence arrangements. As a variant of this Sir Michael Wright has mentioned a Persian Gulf Council composed of Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which might assume some responsibilities in the Gulf.

In support of (b) above Sir Roger Stevens says:—

“I am steadily coming round to the belief that in the long run the preservation of our vital economic interests in Kuwait, Iran and the Gulf Shaikhdoms and with them our strategic interests in the area, will depend on the progressive transfer of our direct political responsibilities for the small Gulf Shaikhdoms to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, with all due safeguards both for our own interests and those of the Shaikhdoms themselves. And the better we can make our relations with the three major Gulf Powers and the relations between these Powers themselves, the more effective these safeguards will be.”

Sir Michael Wright considers that it would be “to our advantage that the situation in the Persian Gulf should develop in a way which would be acceptable to the larger States with an interest there.”

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8. The Political Resident has replied as follows:—

- (a) the importance of our position in the Persian Gulf is axiomatic ;
- (b) there is no present need for the Gulf States and our relationships with them to undergo substantial change. Pressure for change in the Persian Gulf is largely due to external causes. So far such pressure has produced no effect in Muscat or the Trucial States. There is no cohesive political movement in Qatar. In Bahrain there is relief at the suppression of the Committee of National Union. Its failure has added to the confidence of the Ruling Family and paved the way for administrative reforms. The Ruling Family of Kuwait is virile and resilient but the situation there is potentially more dangerous than elsewhere because the politically conscious minority is better informed and includes a larger number of foreign Arabs. The intervention in Egypt has affected our position in Kuwait and Qatar, temporarily strengthened it in Bahrain and caused no essential change in the Trucial States and Muscat. We can recover lost ground in Kuwait. Qatar will remain unstable but manageable: in any case oil will probably be exhausted there within 20 years ;
- (c) association of the Persian Gulf States with other Powers, *e.g.*, the Bagdad Pact, would be distasteful to nearly all Rulers. Their view of the Pact is in any case coloured by Egyptian propaganda. If we suggested to the Persian Gulf States that they should associate themselves with other States in the outside world, Kuwait might tend to join the Egypt-Syria-Saudi axis; Qatar would tend to join Saudi Arabia; the Ruler of Bahrain would have to face growing popular discontent if he followed his own preference and relied only on his friendship with us ; while only if oil were found in Muscat might the Sultan in the long run wish to join the Pact though still probably preferring to rely only on the United Kingdom. Sir Bernard Burrows writes that his considered view is that "any attempt by us to associate the Persian Gulf States in any way with the Bagdad Pact (with the possible exception of Muscat in the distant future) would not only be doomed to failure but would be the step most calculated to destroy our position and to drive at least Kuwait into precisely the opposite camp";
- (d) since federation is a non-starter, the alternative to proposals for association with outside Powers is to leave the situation more or less as it is. But we should:
 - (i) strengthen ties between the Persian Gulf States and other neighbouring States friendly to the West, *e.g.*, Iraq and Pakistan (but not Iran);
 - (ii) settle disputes between British-Protected States and independent neighbouring States, *e.g.*, delimitation of the Persian Gulf sea bed and ownership of islands when the opportunity offered.
 Other States in the Persian Gulf, *e.g.*, Iran, will have to accept the continuance of Her Majesty's Government's special position and learn to live with it. But provided they do this they should be given ample opportunity to develop commercial, technical and other relationships with the Persian Gulf States;
- (e) Her Majesty's Government should allow the Persian Gulf States to develop internally in their own way and only normally give advice in extreme cases of maladministration or when there is danger of subversion.

B.—ANALYSIS OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES' VIEWS

9. The Political Resident's views agree generally with previous thinking on our policy in the Persian Gulf.

Stability in the Individual Gulf States

10. The Political Resident's analysis of the political situation in the various States indicates that the position is fairly satisfactory and that our relations are outwardly returning to normal after the strains imposed by the intervention in Egypt. The Ruler of Kuwait has recently given striking proof of his continued confidence in Her Majesty's Government by consulting the Political Resident for

the first time about the problem of the succession and asking his views about various candidates. He has also shown himself well satisfied with the arrangements for the investment of the Kuwait reserves in the United Kingdom. Sir Roger Stevens rightly points to the danger to sterling which would arise from a decision by the Kuwaitis to transfer their reserves to dollars, but he overlooks the fact that any alteration in the present status of Kuwait in the direction he suggests, *i.e.*, towards a Saudi-Iranian guarantee and/or the association of the Persian Gulf States with the Bagdad Pact would be likely to weaken the Ruler's confidence in Her Majesty's Government and *ipso facto* to give him doubts about the wisdom of holding his reserves in sterling.

11. Despite the fairly favourable picture of the present situation painted by the Political Resident it would be dangerously complacent to assume that the position can be maintained indefinitely. The Political Resident has argued that pressure for change in the Persian Gulf is largely external. This may be generally true in the case of the Trucial States and Muscat: so long as oil is not found, society remains primitive and the majority of the people illiterate. But the Trucial States at least cannot be insulated from outside influence. There are already signs of growing political awareness among certain sections of the population particularly in the towns; schoolchildren are coming under the influence of Palestinian and Egyptian teachers (who are often the only teachers available) while the whole population is subject to the influence of anti-Western Arab Nationalist propaganda from Cairo Radio.

12. In the other States there is much more internal pressure for change because prosperity and economic development resulting from discovery of oil have brought widespread education, facilitated the spread of foreign influence through the media of the press, the radio, and through foreigners particularly from Egypt and Palestine and allowed Arabs from the Persian Gulf States to travel abroad. Although at present political activity may have been scotched by the authorities in Bahrain, be under strict supervision in Kuwait and lack cohesion in Qatar, it is inconceivable that this situation should continue indefinitely. Sooner or later the demand for reform will become sufficiently strong and insistent to compel some change in the present patriarchal system of government. Much will depend on whether the Ruling families have the courage and wisdom to come to terms with moderate opinion in their States and thus prevent the potential forces of opposition from mobilising sufficient strength to be able to overthrow their régimes unless they are saved by outside, *i.e.*, British help which it might be difficult for us to give. The Political Resident has shown that such a situation might arise in Kuwait (paragraph 3 of Bahrain despatch No. 12). It is impossible to predict in what way the Persian Gulf States will develop, but it is fairly certain that in the oil-bearing States at least there may come a time in the foreseeable future when the Rulers will be forced to adjust their relations with this country in order to survive. We should be prepared to accept such an adjustment if to do so seems the best way to preserve our access to Persian Gulf oil.

Dangers of Initiating any Change

13. Our position in the Persian Gulf is probably the one remaining vital asset in the Middle East which we can at least come within measurable distance of protecting on our own. As long as this remains so any change in our relationship with the Persian Gulf States should only be made if it would improve our position or if our position could not be maintained without it, and not for the benefit of relations with neighbouring independent States, *e.g.*, Iran and Iraq. Sir Bernard Burrows considers, and I agree, that federation would be impracticable in the foreseeable future. Although our interests in the Gulf might be assisted by associating the Persian Gulf States with the Bagdad Pact if this were possible, an attempt to do so would carry the danger of a drastic political realignment which would not be to our advantage, and it is not certain that this danger would be averted even if we had the fullest United States support. The danger would be even greater if Saudi Arabia (whose interests at least in respect of the Arabian Peninsula are still allied to those of Egypt and the Yemen) was also included among the proposed legatees of British responsibility (Tehran despatch No. 37). Far from restraining each other Iran and Saudi Arabia might well combine against Her Majesty's Government's interest. Even if the interests of the Persian Gulf States could be guaranteed in some way, it would still be doubtful whether an arrangement on the lines contemplated in paragraph 7 (b) above would be acceptable either to the

protected or to the protectors. The Trucial States and Bahrain would hardly welcome Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively as protectors under any circumstances. Saudi Arabia and Iran themselves might be unwilling to accept new responsibilities which they might consider would hamper their future ambitions.

14. H.M. Ambassadors at Tehran and Bagdad base their arguments partly on the assumption that the maintenance of our position in the Persian Gulf depends on securing the agreement of the three major littoral Powers. But in fact for the immediate future stability in the Persian Gulf may depend not so much on this as upon the maintenance of the present delicate balance of forces. If that were to be disturbed by an attempt to carry out any of the proposals discussed above the consequences might well be as Her Majesty's Political Resident predicted in paragraph 8 (c) above. In addition the Trucial States and Central Oman would almost certainly be swallowed up by Saudi Arabia.

ANNEX 2

THE PERSIAN GULF

A.—THE NATURE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION

The States of the Persian Gulf—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial Shaikhdoms (of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ras-al-Khaimah and Fujairah)—differ in wealth, in degree of advancement, and in political characteristics; but the United Kingdom Government's constitutional relationship with them all is broadly the same. They are independent Arab Shaikhdoms, under United Kingdom protection, and linked to the United Kingdom Government by a number of treaties and undertakings given at various times since 1820 by and to their Rulers. The principal rights and responsibilities which make up the United Kingdom's special position are:—

(a) Defence

Assurances have been given to the Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar that the United Kingdom will protect them against external aggression. There is no specific obligation towards Kuwait or the Trucial States, though this obligation could be said to be implicit in the fact that these States are recognised to be under United Kingdom protection.

(b) *The exclusive agreements* with the Rulers whereby they have undertaken not to communicate with foreign Governments except through the United Kingdom Government. On the basis of these agreements—broadly the same for all the States—the United Kingdom conducts their foreign relations for them.

(c) *Extra-territorial jurisdiction*, which is exercised by agreement with the Rulers. This varies from State to State. In general it covers British subjects and most foreign nationals except Arabs, but it is much wider in the Trucial States.

(d) Oil agreements

The Rulers have undertaken not to grant oil concessions without the United Kingdom Government's approval. On the strength of these agreements the United Kingdom Government regard as subject to their approval the terms of oil agreements concluded by the Rulers. The United Kingdom also concludes Political Agreements with the oil companies concerned, which provide *inter alia* that the companies shall conduct their relations with the Rulers on policy matters through the United Kingdom Political Agents.

(e) Aviation

By special Air Navigation Agreements with each State having an airfield the United Kingdom Government have (a) control over traffic rights; (b) facilities for the R.A.F.; and (c), in Bahrain and Sharjah only, responsibility for the operation of the airfield.

(f) Other agreements with the Rulers provide for the prohibition of the import of arms and of the slave trade, and the operation of postal services by the General Post Office.

2. Except in one or two specific matters, such as arms and slavery, the United Kingdom Government have no right to intervene in the internal affairs of the States and can influence them only—

- (a) by proffering advice. The Political Agent in each territory sees the Ruler frequently, and this access is an important part of the United Kingdom's position; and
- (b) through the British Advisers and employees of the Rulers. (In Bahrain and Qatar, but not in Kuwait, the Administrations are headed by Advisers from the United Kingdom. In all three States numbers of officials and experts from the United Kingdom are employed.)

The United Kingdom Government's capacity to direct the internal Governments of the States is thus strictly limited. The United Kingdom can impose its wishes in internal matters only if it is prepared to resort to force. In that the territories are British Protected States (they are so designated by Order in Council) the United Kingdom is liable to be held generally responsible before world opinion for all that goes on in them. In a sense, the United Kingdom position is thus one of responsibility without authority. Moreover, military intervention by the United Kingdom, even at the request of the Ruler in order to assist him in restoring law and order, is liable to involve continuing commitments of an internal character. Intervention against the Ruler and in support of reform would probably involve the installation of a new Ruler and the establishment of his authority under United Kingdom control. This would create very great difficulties for the United Kingdom throughout the Arab world, and it would give a further propaganda handle to hostile outside influences.

B.—STATISTICS

<i>State</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Annual oil production (million tons)</i>	<i>Oil interests</i>	<i>State revenue (£ millions)</i>
Kuwait ...	250,000	54	50% British 50% American	109
Bahrain ...	120,000	1½	100% American	4.5
Qatar ...	40,000	5.5	23.75% British 23.75% American 23.75% Shell (Anglo-Dutch) 23.75% French	16
Trucial States ...	90,000	Nil	5% Gulbenkian As Qatar	0.5