

## Recommendation 313 of the WEU Assembly on security in the Mediterranean (Paris, 20 June 1978)

**Caption:** On 20 June 1978, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 313 on security in the Mediterranean. In view of the increasing Soviet presence in the region, the Assembly recommends to the WEU Council that it take concerted action in all appropriate international bodies to strengthen the collective presence of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean.

**Source:** Assembly of Western European Union. 'Recommendation No. 313 on security in the Mediterranean (Paris, third sitting, 20th June 1978)' in Proceedings: Twenty-fourth ordinary session: First Part, Vol. II, Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU. June 1978, p. 25.

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[http://www.cvce.eu/obj/recommendation\\_313\\_of\\_the\\_weu\\_assembly\\_on\\_security\\_in\\_the\\_mediterranean\\_paris\\_20\\_june\\_1978-en-2bf2f62d-64cb-4153-867d-72bbd9ff8869.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/recommendation_313_of_the_weu_assembly_on_security_in_the_mediterranean_paris_20_june_1978-en-2bf2f62d-64cb-4153-867d-72bbd9ff8869.html)



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**RECOMMENDATION 313**  
***on security in the Mediterranean***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling at the present time of economic difficulties that security will always be a condition of the political freedoms and economic well-being of the allied countries, and that accordingly an adequate defence effort must be maintained ;
- (ii) Believing that the Soviet Union through its continued quest for military bases in the Mediterranean, its interventionist policy in Africa and its reiteration of the dangerously ambiguous "Brezhnev doctrine" presents the greatest military threat in the region ;
- (iii) Aware that one of the greatest risks of major conflict through miscalculation arises in the Mediterranean area where the opposing interests of East and West merge with those of North and South ;
- (iv) Believing therefore that every effort should be made through diplomatic channels to foster : a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and the differences between allied countries in the area ; the continued independence and integrity of Yugoslavia and the continued denial of military bases to forces of the Soviet Union ;
- (v) Believing that NATO provides for the foreseeable future the principal credible basis for the security of its members in the Mediterranean area and that its effectiveness depends on the full support and participation of all member countries ;
- (vi) Believing in particular that the full and equal participation in NATO of both Greece and Turkey is vital to the security of each and to that of the Alliance as a whole ;
- (vii) Reiterating its view that security in the Mediterranean would be greatly enhanced by the accession of a democratic Spain to NATO, but stressing that such a decision is for a parliamentary majority in that country after the adoption of the new constitution ;
- (viii) Aware of the many conflicting considerations that must be reconciled in any policy on arms supply to non-NATO countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To strengthen the collective position of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean :
  - (a) by the more public identification of all member countries with NATO arrangements in the area ;
  - (b) through the participation of forces of as many member countries as possible in exercises and contingency planning ;
  - (c) by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect the reality of national contributions to NATO in the Mediterranean area ;
  - (d) by taking full account of the respective special requirements of Greece, Portugal and Turkey for the supply of necessary defence equipment and assistance, and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey ;
  - (e) by considering what joint armaments production projects can usefully be established in Greece and Turkey in the NATO framework ;
2.
  - (a) To encourage Greece and Turkey to continue negotiations to settle their remaining bilateral differences ;
  - (b) To urge the two Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General without further delay ;
3. To arrange closer links between the integrated military structure of NATO and the Spanish armed forces, and their participation in NATO exercises, while leaving a decision on the accession of Spain to NATO to democratic discussion in the Spanish parliament ;
4. To ensure that non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean continue to see their interests best served by denying base rights or facilities to the Soviet armed forces ;
5. To proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status ;
6. To ensure that all aspects of policy on arms exports by NATO countries to any non-NATO country are fully reviewed in the appropriate allied forum.