

The Soviet presence

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The USSR started to become a political and military — and in particular naval — influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the 1950s, in response to NATO's large-scale naval manoeuvres (the *Grand Slam*, *Longstep* and *Mainbrace* operations in 1952 and the *Strikeback* exercise in 1957, the latter of which involved 200 ships, over 600 aircraft and 75 000 personnel in the North Atlantic, operating from Norway to south-western Turkey).^[1] Moscow's heightened presence in the Mediterranean also reflected its age-old concern of keeping open a passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean,^[2] and the Soviet Navy's Fifth Operational Squadron was officially formed on 14 July 1967^[3] with this aim in mind.^[4]

Political and geopolitical developments in the Mediterranean basin served only to boost Soviet involvement, as European countries withdrew from North Africa and the Middle East following the first wave of post-World War II decolonisation, setting the stage for a shift in the balance of power between the leading global players.^[5] The Soviet authorities' backing of *Arab nationalism* and the Arab regimes in conflict with the Western nations was motivated by their desire to reduce the influence and presence of the latter.^[6]

The West did not simply stand by and watch the USSR expand its presence in the Mediterranean. True to the strategy of containment espoused by the United States from 1947 onwards, a cooperation treaty between the Middle Eastern countries (the 'Baghdad Pact') was initiated by Washington in order to contain communist advances in the Middle East.^[7] Syria refused to sign the Pact and declared its neutrality,^[8] but later concluded an economic and technical assistance treaty with Moscow on 7 August 1957 after finding itself unable to purchase arms from the Western states.^[9]

The USSR nevertheless continued to strengthen its influence and gain ground against US positions, with Egypt and Syria aligning themselves with Moscow. Impending destabilisation of the pro-Western regimes of Lebanon and Jordan forced the USA, with the UK's backing, to take military action^[10] in July 1958 to support the struggling regimes, with US troops landing in Beirut on 15 July and UK parachutists touching ground in Amman on 17 July. London's support was motivated by the desire to repair relations with Washington and put right some of the damage caused by the Suez failure.^[11]

Stalin's death in March 1953 led to a realignment of Soviet diplomatic policy on the 'Southern' countries.^[12] Nikita Khrushchev, the new head of state, wanted the country to back the separatist movements which had emerged in the colonies and protectorates during the days of European rule, with a view to moving them into the Soviet orbit.^[13] Egypt was one of the first targets of this new strategy, and the Suez crisis (between 29 October and 24 December 1956) was among the first evidence of the power exerted by the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.^[14] According to comments made in 1957 by Maurice Dejean, the French Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the USSR 'has established strong positions in Egypt and gained even more ground in Syria, [acquiring] a prestige which is enhanced by its technical accomplishments and underlined by the corresponding

failures of the United States.’^[15] Dejean goes on to say that Moscow holds a key advantage over the Western nations, namely ‘complete indifference to Israel [...]’;^[16] the USSR is regarded as ‘the friend and protector of the “Arab nation”’,^[17] and its ongoing economic support, including the sale of arms,^[18] is perceived as a threat to the political and economic interests of both France and the UK.

In the mid-1960s, the UK’s interests in the Middle East extended over an area reaching from Libya to Iran and from Syria to Sudan. London was particularly keen to protect its energy supplies, which meant that its priorities included maintaining peace and stability in the region, blocking Soviet advances and preserving the East/West balance.^[19]

France’s position was less straightforward because of its close ties with Tunisia and Morocco; the governments of these countries had taken a very moderate stance on the Arab–Israeli conflict, which served as evidence of pro-Western tendencies despite their policy of non-alignment during the Cold War.^[20] This was out of step with France’s desire to act as the ‘champion of Arab nationalism’ and align itself with the USSR’s third-world policy while preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the Maghreb countries and the Middle East.^[21]

Meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers provided an opportunity for the UK and France to share their concerns and strategic visions for the Middle East. At the meeting held on 9 and 10 March 1965, London stressed the need to preserve an East/West balance in the arms race,^[22] particularly in the Middle East; since the Soviet Union was supplying arms to the United Arab Republic, Israel should continue to receive military support from the Western nations.^[23] The WEU Council of Ministers was the only European forum where the UK could debate matters of common interest given that its requests to join the EEC were turned down by France in 1962 and 1967, and so London pushed for quarterly WEU meetings as a good way for the Western countries to share information on developments in the Middle East region.^[24] The extremely fragile stability of this region and the need for coordinated positions was highlighted by the Six-Day War (5–10 June 1967). In response to a recommendation from the WEU Assembly, and on the basis of a response prepared by the British delegation, the Council agreed that discussions should be pursued at ministerial level, ‘with a view to identifying areas of common interest and ways in which consultation and coordination of approach between west European countries could help to promote these interests.’^[25] This coordination of positions between WEU Member States was considered all the more necessary because ‘four members of Western European Union are members of the Security Council.’^[26]

The conflict pitted Israel against a coalition of Arab states (Jordan and Syria) led by Egypt. While the United States backed Israel, the USSR supplied arms to the Arab camp and took a strong line against the Western nations, stopping just short of triggering an open crisis with Washington.^[27]

Neither Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War nor the death of the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, on 28 September 1970, and the appointment of his replacement, Anwar Sadat, calmed the waters between Tel Aviv and Cairo. Faced with growing protests from the Palestinian Resistance and the adverse impact of the war effort on Egypt’s economy, however, Sadat was intent on resolving the

Arab–Israeli conflict and restoring Arab unity at the same time.^[28] Soviet naval forces responded by stepping up their presence in the Mediterranean.

This situation worried the British authorities, which had believed that the normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab countries would bring about a de-escalation in tensions between West and East. During the WEU Council meeting of 11 January 1971, London set out its position as follows: ‘A settlement in the Middle East will help the Western countries to resist Soviet advances.’^[29] The British also made known their concerns about the death of the Egyptian President Nasser at this meeting, reasoning that the disappearance from the scene of the herald of pan-Arabism might make it easier for the USSR to gain influence in the United Arab Republic and in Libya.^[30] The French authorities did not entirely back this view, claiming that Soviet advances in North Africa had slowed and citing as evidence the fact that Soviet technical cooperation and military assistance had decreased in Algeria — the USSR’s gateway to the region — to the levels seen in Morocco and Tunisia (known for their reticent attitude towards Moscow).^[31] Paris therefore believed that the Soviet presence was ‘unlikely to pose as much of a threat as the West believes’.^[32] This position should be viewed in the context of France’s belief that the USSR should be considered ‘not as an adversary in North Africa, but rather as a competitor, seeking to supplant the West’s experts, products and technologies with its own.’^[33]

Faced with a struggling domestic economy, the new Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, began working towards a normalisation of relations — and potentially peace — with Israel. He asked the USSR to withdraw its military advisers in July 1972^[34] but — with Syria’s support — attacked the Israeli positions in Sinai and the Golan Heights on 6 October 1973 in order to retake the Golan Heights, seek revenge for the Arab defeat during the Six-Day War and restore Arab unity.^[35] A ceasefire was signed between the combatants on 25 October 1973.^[36] In order to demonstrate their solidarity for Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided, firstly, to cut petroleum production by 5 % and, secondly, to impose an embargo on petroleum exports to the United States and other countries backing Israel until the latter agreed to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from Egyptian and Syrian territories,^[37] turning the military crisis into a global energy crisis.^[38] The conflict exacerbated tensions between the two superpowers, but the USSR held back from military intervention for fear of causing a new world war and joined the United States in voting to adopt Security Council Resolution 338.^[39] This provided for a ceasefire within 12 hours of its adoption, the implementation of Resolution 242 on the situation in the Middle East^[40] and the opening of negotiations aimed at establishing a just and durable peace.^[41] Israel failed to observe the ceasefire and sought to gain ground against the Egyptian and Syrian forces, with the Israel Defence Forces (Tzahal) advancing to within 30 km of Damascus and 70 km of Cairo.^[42] Moscow threatened to intervene, and Washington went to maximum alert (DEFCON III)^[43].

The USSR suffered a key setback in its Mediterranean policy in 1974 when the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, realised that the partner most likely to bring about a settlement of the Egyptian–Israeli

conflict was not the Soviet Union but the United States. The efforts of the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, thereafter began to bear fruit in the shape of diplomatic cooperation between the two nations. [\[44\]](#)

A visit by the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, to Jerusalem in September 1978 laid the ground for peace negotiations in the Middle East. [\[45\]](#) The Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, was prepared to hand over the occupied territories in Sinai in exchange for peace with Egypt, [\[46\]](#) but the other Arab countries and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) refused to align themselves with Egypt or support the peace process, which culminated in the signing of the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978 [\[47\]](#) and the later signing of an Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on 26 March 1979.

Although relations between Israel and Egypt took a turn for the better over the course of 1978, the WEU Member States were still concerned. In response to Recommendation 313 by the WEU Assembly on security in the Mediterranean, [\[48\]](#) the Council welcomed the clearer demonstration of support by the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance for the military contingents stationed in the Mediterranean and their commitment to participating in exercises and emergency planning. The Council also believed that the increased presence of Soviet forces or the USSR's establishment of new bases in the Mediterranean would undermine peace efforts. [\[49\]](#) It should be noted in this respect that non-Mediterranean WEU Member States also sent troops to the Mediterranean; for example, the United Kingdom occasionally assigned a ship to the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean. Troops from all three branches of the armed services also took part in the exercises which were carried out in the region. [\[50\]](#) In the same vein, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Netherlands regularly took part in naval exercises, [\[51\]](#) and France also enlarged its Mediterranean naval fleet towards the end of the period in question. [\[52\]](#)

The WEU Assembly also showed a heightened interest in the upheavals in the region and the growth in Soviet influence, with a proliferation of reports and recommendations submitted by members of the parliamentary assembly and an attendant increase in debates within the Council. [\[53\]](#)

The fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the Islamic Republic in 1979 led to further destabilisation of the Gulf region, where the Shah of Iran had been the '*gendarme*' of the Americans. [\[54\]](#) The Iranian Revolution followed, triggering the second oil crisis as a result of the interruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to the West. These developments were of key importance for both Moscow and Washington; the first regarded Iran as a vital factor in the security of the USSR's southern flank, whereas the second saw it as an essential part of its 'containment' policy and its geopolitical domination of the oil-rich Middle East. [\[55\]](#)

Despite retaining interests in the Middle East which required permanent attention and management — resulting, in particular, in the sale of arms to the Shah of Iran and to Saudi Arabia [\[56\]](#) — the UK sought to reduce its involvement in the region's security. London therefore lent its backing to US efforts to turn Iran and Saudi Arabia into two 'pillars' of the region and potential allies for the Western states, a policy which was later defeated by the Iranian Revolution. [\[57\]](#)

The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the Iran–Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 served only to increase tensions between the Western and Eastern blocs. Afghanistan was one of the last countries where the USSR retained a significant political, economic and military presence, due in particular to Moscow's decision to support the new pro-Soviet Afghan Government led by Karmal.^[58] The USSR justified its invasion by claiming that it had sent a 'limited contingent' of Soviet troops as requested by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), in order to prevent its overthrow by counter-revolutionary forces. The Soviet authorities' strategy failed,^[59] however, and the Afghan population became increasingly hostile to their presence. The invasion was condemned by the Western nations, in particular by the détente-promoting US, but also by the United Nations and the Arab countries (in January 1980), which were suspicious of the USSR's long-term plans.^[60]

During the course of this conflict, the WEU Council again became an arena for the European countries to debate and share confidential information concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and also to state their position in response to the Assembly's recommendations.^[61] The British condemned the USSR's expansionist ambitions and advocated an energetic response as a sign that the Western countries would not tolerate any further steps in this direction,^[62] taking immediate action to back up their words by suspending all significant political and cultural contacts and ensuring that trade agreements did not unduly favour the Soviet Union.^[63] Like France, the United Kingdom supported the European Community's proposal of 19 February 1980 which pushed for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan^[64] while also condemning Russian diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at undermining a unified Western response.

Unlike the United Kingdom, France was not immediately affected by the situation in Afghanistan^[65] and did not therefore regard its occupation as a direct threat to the strategic balance in the Middle East region.^[66] On 7 January 1980, however, it adopted a draft resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops and for Afghanistan's independence to be respected by the UN Security Council.^[67] The disparate assessment of the security risk by Paris and London was also the reason behind France's more moderate response to the USSR. Unlike the United Kingdom, which regarded the invasion of Afghanistan as grounds for 'suspending' bilateral relations and the ongoing détente between West and East, France did not see any challenge to its preferred 'balance of power' theory or any reason to abandon the policy of détente.^[68]

In 1981, the WEU Council highlighted the USSR's responsibility for the Afghan crisis and the need to respond to the humanitarian crisis ravaging the country. The United Kingdom acknowledged that the Afghan resistance needed arms in a draft response to a question submitted by a member of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, but this acknowledgement was omitted from the final response and no specific reference was made to potential arms sales,^[69] following a secret meeting between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the FRG.^[70] Although Bonn was opposed to any sale of arms, the other three countries agreed to help the Mujahideen.^[71]

When war broke out between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq in September 1980, the United

Kingdom and the United States lent their backing to Baghdad in order to temper Iran's hegemonic ambitions.^[72] The Iran–Iraq conflict did not, however, heighten tensions between the West and the East; from 1982 onwards, the USSR abandoned its neutrality and allied itself with Iraq, not least because of growing hostility towards Moscow by the Iranian regime.^[73] Rapprochement with France was initiated in 1975, although French support for Baghdad was primarily motivated by economic considerations;^[74] Iraq owed significant sums of money to France which might be lost if the country was defeated by Iran.^[75]

The WEU Council did not ignore this series of crises in the Middle East and Afghanistan; during Council meetings, the WEU Member States outlined the consequences of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for security in Western Europe and North America and the need to settle the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Iran–Iraq conflict, highlighting the efforts of the Islamic Conference to resolve the latter. The WEU Member States also made known their commitment to maintaining and strengthening stability in the Gulf region.^[76] Finally, reference was frequently made to the efforts of the NATO member countries to strengthen their defence forces and find solutions to the new challenges outside the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty which threatened their strategic and economic interests.^[77]

[1] The ambitiously massive series of exercises and simulations stretched in an 8 000-kilometre arc and involved the USA, the UK, Canada, France, the Netherlands and Norway. For more details, see: HATTENDORF, John B. (ed.). *Naval Strategy and Power in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future*. Routledge, 2000, pp. 147–163 (ISBN 978-0714680545); SURHONE, Lambert M., TENNOE, Mariam T. and HENSSONOW, Susan F. (eds) *Operation Mainbrace*. Betascript Publishing, 2011; also: MONAGHAN, Rick. Langue et interopérabilité à l'OTAN: le bureau de coordination linguistique international (BCLI) [amended on 3 June 2011]. Available at: <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol13/no1/page23-fra.asp> [consulted on 9 March 2015].

[2] PERNOT, Maurice. L'Union soviétique et la Méditerranée. *Politique étrangère*, 1946, No 2. pp. 117–128; for a more recent perspective on the strategic challenge faced by Russia in the Mediterranean: DELANOË, Igor. Le retour de la Russie en Méditerranée. [Online.] *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 2014, No 89, pp. 23–35. Consulted on 21 April 2016. Available at: <http://cdlm.revues.org/7652>.

[3] Soviet ships were stationed in the Mediterranean from 1964 onwards, but became a semi-independent formation only in May 1966. The Soviet Navy's Fifth Operational Squadron became known as such only after the war in 1967. GINOR, Isabella and REMEZ, Gideon. *Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War*, First Edition, Yale University Press, 2007, Chapter 8 (p. 68).

[4] MCCGWIRE, Michael. Soviet Strategic Aims and Capabilities in the Mediterranean: Part I. *The Adelphi Papers*. Vol. 28, No 229, 1988, (p. 14) pp. 14–31. CHAUVEL, Jean. Les puissances et la Méditerranée. *Politique étrangère*, 1971, Vol. 36, No 5–6, (p. 464) pp. 463–471; United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. *Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman, National Ocean Policy Study for the use of the Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy Study, pursuant to S. Res. 222* [online], 1976, pp. 69–90, <https://archive.org/details/sovietoceansdeve00unit> [consulted on 18 March 2015].

[5] See BRADLEY, Mark Philip. Decolonization, the global South and the Cold War, 1919–1962. LEFFLER, Melwyn and WESTAD, Odd Arne (eds). *The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Volume II)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2012. pp. 464–485.

[6] GASTEYGER, Curt (coord.) *Forces militaires et conflits politiques en Méditerranée*. Paris: L’Institut atlantique, 1970, p. 19.

[7] The Pact was signed between Iraq and Turkey in Baghdad on 24 February 1955, then by the UK on 5 April 1955, by Pakistan on 23 September 1955 and by Iran on 23 October 1955. BERTIER, F. L’Égypte et le Pacte de Bagdad. *Politique étrangère* [online]. No 5. 1957, 22nd year [consulted on 20 March 2015], pp. 535–551. Available at: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/polit_0032-342x_1957_num_22_5_2474.

[8] CHARENTAIS, Daniel and HOURY, Yara. Syria. *Les clés du Moyen-Orient* [online], 1 February 2010. Available at: <http://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.fr/Syrie.html> [consulted on 15 March 2015].

[9] Ibid.

[10] LUCAS, Scott. *Britain and Suez. The lion’s last roar*. Op. cit. p. 113; HAZAN, Pierre. *1967, la guerre des six jours: la victoire empoisonnée*. Paris: Complexe Eds. 2001, p. 50.

[11] Ibid.

[12] In other words, the countries in the Mediterranean region (North Africa and the Middle East) and other ‘developing’ countries.

[13] BRADLEY, Mark Philip. Decolonization, the global South and the Cold War, 1919–1962. Op. cit., p. 475; *M. Couve de Murville, ambassadeur de France à Washington, à M. Pinay, ministre des Affaires étrangères: Washington, 2 octobre 1955, T. nos 5404 à 5414. Réservé*. In: Ministère des Affaires étrangères. Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français. *Documents diplomatiques français: 1955, Tome II, 1er juillet–31 décembre*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1988. Document number 263. pp. 596–599.

[14] For more details, see in particular: LITTLE, Douglas. The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords. In: LEFFLER, Melwyn and WESTAD, Odd Arne (eds). *The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Volume II)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. pp. 305–326.

[15] *M. Dejean, ambassadeur de France à Moscou, à M. Pineau, ministre des Affaires étrangères: Moscou, 14 décembre 1957, T. nos 4986 à 5002. Réservé*. In: Ministère des Affaires étrangères. Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français. *Documents diplomatiques français: 1957, Tome II, 1er juillet–31 décembre*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1991. Document number 445. pp. 903–906.

[16] Ibid., p. 904.

[17] Ibid., p. 906.

[18] Memorandum by Lord Dundee on the supply of defensive missiles to Israel and Arab countries (2 October 1962). The National Archives of the UK (TNA). Cabinet: Memoranda (CP and C Series). C Series. 101–150. Record Type: Memorandum. Former Reference: C (62) 150. Title: Supply of Defensive Missiles to Israel and Arab Countries. Author: Dundee. 02/10/1962, CAB 129/110/50.

[19] Memorandum by Michael Stewart on the Middle East (24 March 1965). The National Archives of the UK (TNA). Cabinet: Memoranda (CP and C Series). C Series. Papers: 1(65)–50(65). Record Type: Memorandum. Former Reference: C (65) 49. Title: The Middle East. Author: Michael Stewart. 24/03/1965, CAB 129/120/49.

[20] KOŁODZIEJ, Edward. *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou. The Politics of Grandeur*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974, p. 488.

[21] Ibid.

[22] 'WEU Ministerial Meeting Rome 9–10 March 1965 — Item II 4. The situation in the Middle East'. The National Archives of the UK (TNA). Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906–1966. WESTERN ORGANISATIONS & COORDINATION (W): Western European Union (WUW). Ministerial meetings. 01/01/1965–31/12/1965, FO 371/184485 (Former Reference Dep: 1073 (pp. 1 to 29)).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Council of Western European Union. *Note from the Secretary-General. Recommendations No 199, 201 and 202 by the Assembly*. London: 18.03.1971. C (71) 47, 3 pp. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). <http://www.anlux.lu>. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council's Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of Western European Union. Year: 1970, 01/12/1970-30/11/1971. File 202.424.09. Volume 1/1.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Council of Western European Union. *Joint Meeting of the Council and the General Affairs Committee by the Assembly*, Written questions submitted in advance by the Committee and responses from the Council. London: 13.11.1967. JM/51 (p. 10), 12 pp. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). <http://anlux.lu/>. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council's Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of Western European Union. Year: 1967, 01/11/1967-28/02/1968. File 202.32.10. Volume 2/2.

[28] Rondot, Philippe. Egyptianité et panarabisme. *Politique étrangère*, 1981, No 4. p. 819.

[29] Council of Western European Union. *Extract from the minutes of the 410th meeting of the Council held at ministerial level on 11 January 1971 in Luxembourg*. CR (71) 1. Copy No 8. 25.03.1971 (p. 87), [unknown] pp., pp. 85–90. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Centre of Diplomatic Archives in Nantes. Archives repatriated from the French Embassy in London. Series 'Western European Union (WEU)'. 1953–1992 (2002). 378PO/UEO/1-389. Number 34. Cote UEO.1.2.Luxembourg. Ministerial meeting 11 January 1971. 1970–1974.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., pp. 88–90.

[33] Ibid., p. 90.

[34] *Guerre israélo-arabes*. Available at http://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/groupe-homonymes/guerres_isra%C3%A9lo-arabes/125298 [consulted on 13 March 2015].

[35] Ibid.

[36] SCHUL, Audrey. La guerre du Kippour. Le conflit à l'origine du premier choc pétrolier. *Grandes Batailles*, July 2014, No 26.

[37] CHAIGNE-LOUDIN, Anne-Lucie. Guerre du Kippour (6 octobre-16 octobre 1973). *Les clés du Moyen-Orient*. 9 March 2010 [consulted on 24 March 2015]. Available at: <http://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Guerre-du-Kippour-6-octobre-16.htm>; LITTLE, Douglas. *The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords*. Op. cit. p. 320.

[38] Ibid.

[39] LITTLE, Douglas. *The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords*. Op. cit. p. 321.

[40] UN. Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 on the situation in the Middle East [consulted on 1 May 2016]. Available at: [http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/242\(1967\)&Lang=E&style=B](http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/242(1967)&Lang=E&style=B).

[41] UN. Security Council Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973 on the ceasefire in the Middle East [consulted on 1 May 2016]. Available at: <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SCR338%281973%29.pdf>.

[42] VAÏSSE, Maurice. *Les relations internationales depuis 1945*. 14th ed. Paris: Armand Colin, 2015.

[43] Alert level which suggests that armed force readiness has increased above normal levels, but (in 1973) stopping just short of a declaration of war. LITTLE, Douglas. *The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords*. Op. cit. p. 321.

[44] LITTLE, Douglas. *The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords*. Op. cit. p. 322.

[45] CVCE. Relations with the Middle East and the oil crises [consulted on 23 March 2015]. Available at: <http://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/en/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/548d2b44-a4f0-460e-a26d-999028832012>.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Assembly of Western European Union. 'Recommendation No 313 on security in the Mediterranean (Paris, Third Session, 20 June 1978)' in *Proceedings: Twenty-fourth Ordinary Session, First Part, Vol. II: Minutes: Official Report of Debates*. Paris: WEU Assembly. June 1978, p. 25.

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Western European Union. Year: 1977, 01/11/1977-30/10/1978. File 202.413.999.04. Volume 1/1.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Assembly of Western European Union. 'Recommendation No 160 on the defence of the Mediterranean and NATO southern flank (Paris, Eighth Session, 5 December 1967)' in *Proceedings: Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Second Part, Vol. IV: Minutes: Official Report of Debates*. Paris: WEU Assembly. December 1967, pp. 21–22; Assembly of Western European Union. 'Recommendation No 164 on political responsibilities of WEU countries outside Europe (Paris, 11th Session, 6 December 1967)' in *Proceedings: Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Second Part, Vol. IV: Minutes: Official Report of Debates*. Paris: WEU Assembly. December 1967, pp. 35; Assembly of Western European Union. 'Recommendation No 185 on the political implications of the Soviet intervention in the Mediterranean (Paris, Fourth Session, 18 June 1969)' in *Proceedings: Fifteenth Ordinary Session, First Part, Vol. II: Minutes: Official Report of Debates*. Paris: WEU Assembly. June 1969, p. 39. Western European Union. *Draft Minutes of the 361st meeting of the Council held at ministerial level on 6th and 7th February 1969 in Luxembourg*. CR (69) 3. Part I. Copy No 5. 12.02.1969 [unknown] pp., pp. 6065. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Centre of Diplomatic Archives in Nantes. Archives repatriated from the French Embassy in London. Series 'Western European Union (WEU)'. 1953–1992 (2002). 378PO/UEO/1-389. Number 18. Cote EU.40.1.3. Luxembourg (February 1969). 1960–1970.

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[57] Ibid., p. 7.

[58] SAIKAL, Amin. Islamism, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Op. cit. p. 128.

[59] Ibid.

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