On 1 August 1975, in Helsinki, the Heads of State or Government of the 35 countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sign the Final Act, which, in particular, endorses the inviolability of existing frontiers, promotes economic cooperation and encourages the free movement of ideas and people.

On 9 April 1975, on the sidelines of the negotiations opened in July 1973 in Helsinki and continued in Geneva by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Parliament welcomes the process of international détente and calls for closer cooperation between East and West.

On 17 July 1975, following the Brussels European Council, the Nine reiterate their support for the Helsinki diplomatic process and encourage participants in the CSCE to put the new policy of East-West détente into practice.

On 25 July 1975, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German Foreign Minister, describes to the Bundestag the main decisions adopted in Helsinki by participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE).

On 30 July 1975, at the opening session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister, delivers a speech on East-West détente.

On 30 July 1975, at the opening, in Helsinki, of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, welcomes the outcomes of the meeting and calls for the implementation of the decisions adopted in support of the policy of East-West détente.

‘Helsinki - the summit of non-obligation.’ According to the German cartoonist Köhler, the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which took place in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975, was a farce and with no solider foundations than a castle of playing cards.

Le 31 juillet 1975, prenant part à Helsinki à la phase finale de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), Leonid Brejnev, premier secrétaire du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, se félicite des résultats obtenus sur le plan diplomatique.

On 1 August 1975, in Helsinki, the Heads of State or Government of the 35 countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sign the Final Act, which, in particular, endorses the inviolability of existing frontiers, promotes economic cooperation and encourages the free movement of ideas and people.

In Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975 for the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), US President Gerald R. Ford and Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, exchange views.

Gerald Rudolph Ford, Republican President of the United States from 1974 to 1977.

Present in Helsinki on 1 August 1975 for the signature of the final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), US President, Gerald R. Ford, defends democratic values and freedom, and calls for the process of East-West détente to be continued.

In March 1976, the German cartoonist, Horst Haitzinger, takes an ironic look at the ‘full application in the GDR' of the resolutions adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in particular Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act, whereby the Soviet Union and its satellite states commit to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

‘Birthday wishes.’ On 22 December 1976, more than a year after the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, Fritz Behrendt, a Dutch cartoonist originally from Berlin, paints an ironic picture of the real application of principle VII of the Final Act, which states that ‘The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.’ The Soviet Union, represented by the imposing features of its leader Leonid Brezhnev in a military uniform laden with medals, does not seem willing to commit to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the satellite states of the Eastern bloc (the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania) or to reply positively to any demands in this respect.

On 24 October 1974, German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung welcomes the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and points out the diplomatic mistakes made in Helsinki by the Soviet negotiators.

‘CSCE: the outcome.’ In March 1978, the German cartoonist, Walter Hanel, portrays the failure of the meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Belgrade.

In his memoirs, Leo Tindemans, former Belgian Prime Minister, explains the importance of the signing, on 1 August 1975, of the Helsinki Final Act establishing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In this interview, Leo Tindemans, former Belgian Prime Minister, refers to the implications of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Final Act of which was signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975.

On 16 February 1969, US troops take part in three days of military exercises in the region of Grunewald, the largest wooded area in West Berlin. Despite the climate of détente, the Western forces stationed in West Berlin remain on alert and continue to defend the Western sectors of the city.

On 17 March 1969, in a message to all the countries of Europe, the Member States of the Warsaw Pact declare support for the establishment of good relations with the West and call for a conference on security in Europe.

On 22 March 1972, the Italian daily newspaper Corriere della Sera describes the criticism of the European Economic Community (EEC), by Leonid Brejnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

On 13 November 1972, at a conference on Europe held at the Palais Pálffy in Vienna, Edmund P. Wellenstein, head of the European Commission delegation for negotiations on the enlargement of the European Communities, outlines the decisions taken during the Paris Summit of 19 and 21 October 1972 regarding economic cooperation between the Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Le 9 mars 1973, le quotidien belge La Libre Belgique s'interroge sur l'ouverture prochaine d'une véritable négociation entre la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) et le Conseil d'assistance économique mutuelle (COMECON) sur la question des échanges commerciaux.

In May 1973, the German daily newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung examines the attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union towards the European Economic Community (EEC).

Following his visit to the USSR in 1973, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Gaston Thorn, discusses possible relations between the EEC Member States and Comecon.

In January 1974, despite the seeming climate of détente between the two blocs, military exercises continue to be organised by the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. The photo shows Soviet troops from an anti-aircraft unit training for chemical warfare.

On 17 October 1974, prior to the forthcoming official visit to Moscow by François Ortoli, President of the European Commission, the Netherlands daily newspaper De Volkskrant comments on the attempts to establish closer relations between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).

In this interview, Jean-Jacques Kasel, Legation Attaché in the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry from 1973 to 1976, describes the nature of relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in the special context of the 1970s.

In September 1975, the Soviet satirical weekly magazine Krokodil portrays the actions of the Pentagon, headquarters of the United States Defence Department, as a stumbling block in the process of détente between the East and the West.

En novembre 1975, le mensuel français Le Monde diplomatique compare la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) avec le Conseil d'assistance économique mutuelle (COMECON) et analyse les possibilités d'une coopération éventuelle entre les deux organisations.

On 18 February 1976, daily newspaper La Libre Belgique considers the reasons which have inspired Comecon to seek rapprochement with the Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC).

'A year on from Helsinki - Cheers! Here's to more success'. One year after the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Fritz Behrendt is strongly critical of the easing of East-West hostilities.

In February 1977, German weekly publication Der Spiegel comments on the talks between the Soviet Union and the European Economic Community (EEC) on the issues of fishing zones.

In June 1978, the monthly publication Vision considers the prospect of commercial trade between the countries of the Eastern bloc and those of the European Economic Community (EEC).

On 3 July 1958, the US and British Governments sign an Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. The agreement particularly focuses on the exchange of classified information concerning the use and production of nuclear weapons. It comes into force on 4 August 1958.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty, which was signed on 5 August 1963 in Moscow by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States and came into force on 10 October 1963, prevents the signatory states from carrying out nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Underground explosions are not prohibited as long as they do not cause radioactive waste outside the territorial limits of the state responsible for the explosion.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was signed on 1 July 1968 in London, Moscow and Washington and came into force on 5 March 1970, is based on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It prohibits the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) — those who have exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967 (the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, China and France) — from delivering material or intelligence to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The non-nuclear weapon states undertake not to manufacture or seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to verify that each state party to the treaty honours its commitments.

On 30 September 1971, in Washington, the United States and the Soviet Union sign an agreement in an effort to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

On 18 June 1973, the US President, Richard Nixon (centre), welcomes Leonid Brezhnev (left), First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, to the White House.

On 19 June 1973, the US President, Richard Nixon (left), welcomes Leonid Brezhnev (right), First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, to Washington with a view to resolving the issue of nuclear weapons limitation.

On 22 June 1973, in Washington, US President Richard Nixon and his Soviet counterpart Leonid Brezhnev sign an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.

On 22 June 1973, the US President, Richard Nixon (right), and the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev (opposite at table), travel to California on board the ‘Spirit of 76’ Air Force One Presidential aircraft.

On 25 June 1973, at the end of the visit by the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, to the American President, Richard Nixon, the two Heads of State issue a Joint Communiqué which outlines the efforts made by the two countries to ease tensions between them.

In July 1973, the lead story in the Soviet satirical magazine Krokodil focuses on the efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of disarmament. On 22 June 1973 in Washington, these two countries signed an important agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, which symbolised the new climate of peaceful coexistence.

'And I'd planned to go and pick mushrooms!' The Moscow-based satirical magazine Krokodil is of the opinion that the signature of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War by the USA and the Soviet Union, on 21 June 1973 in Washington, dispels the spectre of nuclear war and death.

In April 1970, Kurt Waldheim (centre of podium), Austrian Foreign Minister, welcomes US and Soviet delegations to Vienna for disarmament talks.

On 20 April 1970, the US and Soviet delegations meet at Belvedere Palace in Vienna for negotiations on the SALT I agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On 20 July 1970, German daily newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung analyses the reasons for the deadlock in negotiations between the United States and the USSR on disarmament, and expresses concern over the risk of a renewed world arms race.

On 26 May 1972, in Moscow, the US President, Richard Nixon, and his Soviet counterpart, Leonid Brezhnev, sign an ABM agreement limiting anti-ballistic defense missiles with nuclear warheads.

On 28 and 29 May 1972, following the signing by the United States and the Soviet Union of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the French daily newspaper Le Monde describes the current situation regarding the ‘arms race’ and lists the measures announced to limit nuclear weapons.

In July 1972, the French monthly newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique analyses the scope of the SALT I Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972, which limits anti-ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

On 25 January 1973, despite the signing, in May 1972, of the SALT I agreement on the limitation of offensive nuclear weapons, the cartoonist, Lang, believes that the future of the disarmament process between the United States and the Soviet Union remains at risk.

On 23 September 1974, the German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung considers the true purpose of negotiations between the US and the USSR on disarmament and condemns the risked to the world posed by nuclear weapons.

Dans ses Mémoires, Henry Kissinger, ancien secrétaire d'État américain, rappelle la complexité des négociations entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique au sujet de la limitation des armes stratégiques et souligne l'impact de ces négociations sur le concept américain de défense nationale.

‘You can go first …’ On 26 February 1977, as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are held, Dutch-born cartoonist Fritz Behrendt paints an ironic picture of the continuing mistrust between the United States (on the left, President Carter) and the Soviet Union (on the right, Soviet leader Brezhnev) with regard to disarmament.

In June 1978, the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirm the importance of continuing the disarmament process in the area of strategic offensive weapons.

On 4 May 1979, in the German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the cartoonist, Behrendt, speculates on the genuine will of the US President, Jimmy Carter, and of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, to implement the SALT II disarmament agreement.

On 10 May 1979, the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung denounces the limited scope of the SALT II Treaty, signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979, and expresses its fears over how the nuclear arms race might end.

On 11 June 1979, for German weekly publication Der Spiegel, the signature, on 18 June 1979 in Vienna, of the SALT II agreements on the limitation of strategic arms paradoxically leads the United States and the Soviet Union to continue the arms race.

On 18 June 1979, US President, Jimmy Carter, and Leonid Brejnev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, sign the SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

On 18 June 1979, US President, Jimmy Carter, and Leonid Brejnev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, add an additional protocol to the SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty setting a series of precise ceilings for authorised weapons.

On 18 June 1978, as part of the disarmament negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union provide information on their respective strategic weapons.

On 18 June 1979, a few hours after having signed, in Vienna, the SALT II agreements on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, the US President, Jimmy Carter, describes to the US Congress the significance of this new disarmament agreement.

On 18 June 1979, US President Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, sign the SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in Vienna.

On 3 October 1979, the Belgian daily newspaper Le Soir describes the response of US President Jimmy Carter to the Soviet military presence in Cuba and the measures he intends to take in an endeavour to avoid the failure of the SALT II agreement on the limitation of strategic arms.