On 3 October 1952, the first British nuclear tests are conducted on the Montebello Islands off the west coast of Australia. The United Kingdom is the third country in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union, to develop nuclear weapons.
On 21 March 1958, an internal note from John Henry Gladstone Leahy, a British diplomat in the Foreign Office, to the Ministry of Defence addresses the question raised by Sir James Hutchison, a Conservative MP at the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly, on the machinery for controlling the use of the nuclear deterrent. The note presents the British position on this issue and states that the Chiefs of Staff hold strongly to the view that the control of the deterrent should remain exclusively in the hands of the United States and the United Kingdom. There would be no prospect of the British agreeing to discuss the matter in NATO or WEU until the situation has been clarified with the United States.
On 27 March 1958, the British Ministry of Defence issues a note for Frank William Mottershead, senior official in the Ministry of Defence, for the Minister’s meeting with the British Conservative MP Sir James Hutchinson on the control of nuclear weapons. The brief outlines the circumstances under which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would resort to nuclear war and who would decide when those circumstances arrive. Concerns are raised that a possible rapid Soviet attack of a NATO member would not leave enough time for proper consultation on a nuclear retaliation. The note summarises the issues surrounding the definition of guidelines for the possible use of nuclear weapons under NATO control and outlines the capabilities of US nuclear forces. The danger of establishing overly precise guidelines is that it would show any potential aggressor the limits within which it could operate before being threatened by a nuclear response from NATO and therefore reduce the effectiveness of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence. The brief concludes that, for the time being at least, there will be no changes to the existing doctrine prescribed after the NATO Ministerial Meeting of December 1954, which states that the military is responsible for drawing up plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons and the civilian authorities are responsible for deciding whether or not to put them into action.
On 22 October 1958, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates draft replies prepared by the British delegation to questions 1, 2 and 6 put by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly. On the matter of the withdrawal of the British army from the Rhine, the British Government states that it intends to maintain its current forces of 55 000 men until the end of 1959. The Council notes that it has received no request concerning a further reduction in the level of British forces or other forces stationed on the continent. On the question of tactical nuclear weapons, the Council explains that these questions are not within their remit but come under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, who acts under the direction of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The WEU Council also points out that the North Atlantic Council is not currently considering arrangements for the joint control of the use of strategic nuclear weapons. It believes that any attempt to reach agreement on this matter would end in failure.
On 13 February 1960, the first French atom bomb (code name Gerboise Bleue) is exploded at Reggane in the Algerian Sahara. An aircraft equipped to track the radioactive cloud.
On 28 March 1960, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates to the Council a summary report of the meeting between Harold Watkinson, British Minister of Defence, and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly, held on 21 March 1960. The report also gives details of the Committee’s visit to the RAF Bomber Command on 22 March. The British Minister of Defence recommends greater cooperation in arms production within NATO and emphasises the United Kingdom’s contribution to the Western deterrent, but he remains critical of the idea of joint control of the nuclear deterrent.
On 7 June 1960, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates to the Council a copy of the statement that Pierre Messmer, French Minister for the Armed Forces, made to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly in Paris on 30 May 1960. Pierre Messmer particularly informs the committee about France’s military policy and its participation in the defence of the Western world, emphasising its strategic force and its fighting forces. He discusses France’s nuclear strategy and its efforts to establish a deterrent force. Pierre Messmer also raises the problem of cooperation in the field of armaments, particularly the difficulty of reconciling the military policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with national defence policies and competition between industries and products on the various markets.
On 1 July 1960, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates to the Council a summary record of the meeting between the WEU Assembly’s Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Pierre Messmer, French Minister of the Armed Forces, in Paris on 30 May 1960. The questions put to Pierre Messmer cover France’s relations with the Atlantic Alliance, its contribution to the shield of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the strengthening of the shield, and the production, development and potential use of nuclear weapons.
In October 1960, the British diplomatic services issue an internal brief intended to guide ministers at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris (16–18 October 1960). The note focuses on the deployment and control of nuclear weapons in the Atlantic Alliance and sets out the position to be adopted on the issues of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), the stockpile of nuclear weapons and the strategic deterrent.
On 25 October 1960, the French daily newspaper Le Monde outlines the comments in the British press on Western European Union (WEU) controlling France’s future nuclear stockpiles, and raises the question of the situation facing the British nuclear force.
Photo taken on 27 December 1960, near Reggane in the southern Algerian Sahara, of the third French A-bomb explosion during the Gerboise Rouge operation, one in a series of French nuclear tests. The first French atomic bomb was tested in Reggane on 13 February 1960. Just after the bomb was detonated, a large team of technicians in anti-radiation gear had just 15–20 minutes before the radioactive fallout to recover the all-important measuring devices (seismographs) buried in the sand near the explosion site. Radioactive fallout was collected by specially equipped aircraft.
On 7 February 1962, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville sends a telegram to Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador to Washington, containing the text of the reply sent the previous day by French President Charles de Gaulle to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on the question of nuclear weapons. Following the recent Soviet explosions, the French President understands that the Western powers cannot allow themselves to fall behind in the arms race. General de Gaulle therefore approves of the British Government’s agreement in principle to allow the Americans to use its installations on Christmas Island to carry out a series of nuclear tests and notes that France also intends to conduct its own nuclear tests. Charles de Gaulle emphasises that France is in favour of any measure that would lead to disarmament, but only on condition that this would involve the organised destruction of all existing bombs and nuclear carriers.
On 4 December 1962, Peter Thorneycroft, British Minister of Defence, gives an address to the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU). He emphasises that the United Kingdom, as a European country, is deeply concerned with the defence of Europe, and emphasises the importance of establishing a common, effective instrument of defence for Europe. The minister discusses the need for European countries to work together on research and on the development of European armaments.
On 4 December 1962, on the margins of the opening of the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly meeting, the French daily newspaper Le Monde analyses the reactions from the British press and Government to the various plans under review for the establishment of a European nuclear force under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which would be politically controlled by the three Western nuclear powers (the United States, France and the United Kingdom).
On 5 December 1962, the British daily newspaper The Guardian analyses the reactions to the address given by British Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft to the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) and particularly focuses on the question of establishing a European nuclear force.
On 15 and 16 December 1962, French President Charles de Gaulle holds talks with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in Rambouillet on major international and European issues. The discussions also focus on the consequences of the meeting of the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) held from 3 to 7 December in Paris, at which the Assembly gave its views on the establishment of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nuclear strike force, which would put an end to the proliferation of national strike forces. General de Gaulle and Harold Macmillan both insist that their nuclear forces should remain under national control. While raising the possibility of Franco-British cooperation in the military field, General de Gaulle points out that on defence matters, the United Kingdom ‘does not seem to be truly European’. General de Gaulle also believes that the British nuclear force is not ‘purely British’ but ‘is closely linked to the United States’.
From 17 to 21 December 1962, the US President, John F. Kennedy, and the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, meet in Nassau, in the Bahamas, and conclude a special agreement in accordance with which the United States undertakes to supply Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom.
On 15 September 1966, the shipyards in Barrow-in-Furness launch HMS Resolution, the first British Polaris-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. After a period of sea trials, the submarine successfully fires its first Polaris missile on 15 February 1968. HMS Resolution has 16 tubes for multiple-warhead Polaris A3 nuclear missiles, which have an estimated range of 4 600 km.
In 1962, the purchase of US Polaris missiles by the United Kingdom provokes tensions between Britain and France, as the British decision clashes with France’s desire to establish an independent nuclear deterrent in Europe.
On 31 December 1962, Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador to Washington, informs Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, of the outcome of his meeting with the US President, John F. Kennedy, regarding the conclusions of the Nassau talks and the US initiative concerning the Polaris nuclear weapons system. The French Ambassador outlines the views of the US President, who sees the Nassau proposal as an ‘opening’, a kind of framework that he hopes France will be ready to consider and discuss, including the creation of a multilateral nuclear force.
On 6 February 1963, the British daily newspaper The Guardian analyses the question of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrence and speculates on both its independence and its future.
On 22 May 1963, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the reply from the WEU Council to question 56 put by Marius Moutet, a member of the Assembly Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, on nuclear weapons. The Council believes that the definition of nuclear weapons as provided in the annex to Protocol III of the Paris Agreements is valid for the types of armaments that should be controlled.
The 7 October 1963, following the adoption of the French programme for nuclear testing in the Pacific and after France’s refusal to accede to the Treaty of Moscow partially banning the testing of nuclear weapons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends a circular dispatch to all diplomatic posts concerning French policy on nuclear testing in anticipation of a campaign against its nuclear tests.
On 5 December 1963, General André Beaufre, former Chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and French representative to the permanent group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Washington until 1961, publishes an article in the French daily newspaper Le Monde in which he reflects on the concept of deterrence in nuclear strategy. In 1963, General Beaufre pens a work entitled ‘Introduction to strategy’, which offers a philosophical and overall view of military strategy in the 20th century.
On 23 October 1964, the British daily newspaper The Guardian comments on a resolution adopted the previous day by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of Western European Union (WEU), which urges France and the United Kingdom to support the creation of a multilateral force (MLF).
Following the French Government’s refusal to create a multilateral force (MLF), which would have provided the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with an integrated strategic nuclear force, the British weekly newspaper The Observer reports on the very serious Euro-Atlantic crisis surrounding the MLF in its issue of 1 November 1964.
On 16 and 17 November 1964, the Council of Ministers of Western European Union (WEU) meets in Bonn. On this photo taken on 17 November, Federal Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder (left) talks to Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns (centre) and British Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker (right). The plan for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) remains the focus of discussions between the delegations in Bonn.
On 23 May 1967, Denis Healy, British Secretary of State for Defence, issues an internal memorandum about the United Kingdom’s defence policy regarding the Far East. In paragraph 17 and in the annex, the memorandum examines the political and military implications of a possible deployment of British Polaris nuclear submarines, initially assigned to NATO, to the regions East of Suez. Such a decision would run the risk of damaging the UK’s military relations with its European and American allies.
HMS Resolution is the first British nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. On 15 February 1968, the submarine carries out its first test firing of a Polaris missile, and four months later, in June 1968, it begins conducting patrol missions for nuclear deterrence.
A British ballistic missile submarine launches a Polaris A3 missile. This sea-to-surface strategic ballistic missile becomes operational on the Royal Navy’s Resolution-class ballistic missile submarines in June 1968. The Polaris A3 is an improved Polaris with multiple nuclear warheads and a range of 4 631 km.
Ground teams prepare a Blue Steel short-range air-launched nuclear stand-off missile to be loaded on a Handley Page Victor British strategic bomber deployed at a Royal Air Force base in the United Kingdom. Blue Steel missiles became operational in 1963 and were an integral part of the British nuclear deterrent force before being retired from service at the end of 1970.
On 20 June 1969, the day after the meeting of the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) in Paris, the British daily newspaper The Guardian reports on the discussions on the possible establishment of a European nuclear force.
On 23 April 1970, Michel Debré, French Minister for National Defence, gives an interview to the German daily newspaper Die Welt in which he discusses France’s nuclear deterrence policy and its strategy for independence in the field of defence.
On 28 May 1973, the British daily newspaper The Guardian publishes an article by Julian Critchley, Conservative MP and Rapporteur for the Defence and Armaments Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU), in which he outlines the issues surrounding the deterrent force and speculates on the position of France and the United Kingdom on this matter.
On 5 November 1973, the Secretariat-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 235 on nuclear policies in Europe. The text includes a series of French amendments, most of which are subsequently adopted in the final version of the reply to the Recommendation, as well as a series of British amendments, all of which are adopted in the final version of the reply to the Recommendation.
The Declaration on Atlantic Relations, approved by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19 June 1974 and signed by the Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Brussels on 26 June 1974, recognises the contribution of the British and French nuclear forces to NATO’s global deterrence.
On 29 October 1974, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 253 on a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The text includes the original French proposal and a series of British amendments, all of which are subsequently adopted in the final version of the reply to the Recommendation (C (74) 195). The two delegations emphasise the fact that the main guarantee of European independence in the nuclear field lies not in reactors but in supplies of uranium and, as the British emphasise, in the means of enriching it.
On 20 February 1975, at the Mailly military camp, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac attends a presentation of French Pluton tactical nuclear missiles mounted on AMX tank chassis.
On 27 May 1975, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, urging the WEU Council to ask member countries to adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to accept the full application of the controls provided for under the treaty, and also to speak with one voice at the Geneva conference and to adopt joint positions at an international level.
On 10 July 1975, the Secretariat-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the draft reply prepared by the British and French delegations to question 160 put to the WEU Council by Mr Krieg, a member of the Assembly. The member had asked if the nuclear forces of two WEU member countries — France and the United Kingdom — are capable of playing a role in a western defence system based on selective nuclear retaliation. The two delegations reply that any nuclear force could be assigned to such a system, but they note that the assignment of forces is a matter for political decision. The United Kingdom’s nuclear forces are assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), while those of France are not. But the delegations emphasise the fact that the Declaration on Atlantic Relations signed in Ottawa explicitly recognises the deterrent role of France and the United Kingdom in the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.
On 30 September 1975, the Secretariat-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply from the WEU Council, prepared by the French delegation, to Assembly Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The document confirms that the Council is not in a position to express an opinion on the working of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), since not all WEU Member States are parties to the treaty. Given that access to nuclear techniques is important for the economic development of many countries, trade in this field is encouraged. With regard to arms control and disarmament, the balance of forces is the most important factor in maintaining peace. On the physical protection of nuclear material, a more in-depth examination of this question is being carried out by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
On 11 November 1975, the British delegation to the Council of Western European Union (WEU) proposes an alternative to the draft reply (WPM (75) 35/A) to Recommendation 264 by the WEU Assembly on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The British want to emphasise that France is the only one of the WEU Member States not to have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
On 18 November 1975, the Secretariat-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply from the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The proposed amendment from the French delegation concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) outlines that all the member countries of the Council, whether or not they have signed the treaty, hold firmly to the principle of non-proliferation. But the other delegations in the working group emphasise that France is the only WEU Member State not to have signed the NPT.
On 21 November 1975, five delegations in the working group of the Council of Western European Union (WEU) propose a draft reply to Assembly Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, adding various details to the version proposed by the French delegation. They are keen to emphasise the fact that the signatory states to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) attach great importance to the improvement of international relations, while bearing in mind that France is the only WEU Member State not to have signed the treaty.
On 26 November 1975, the Secretariat-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the final reply from the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Most of the draft reply by the French delegation has been included in the Council’s reply. The Council emphasises that all member countries of WEU, whether or not they are parties to the treaty, hold firmly to the principle of non-proliferation. Given that access to nuclear techniques is important for the economic development of many countries, it encourages exchanges in this field. With regard to arms control and disarmament, the Council notes that this is an important matter for WEU Member States but emphasises that the balance of forces is the most important factor in maintaining peace. On the physical protection of nuclear material, the Council points out that this problem concerns all countries and that a more in-depth examination of this question is being carried out by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
On 30 November 1977, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems, particularly encouraging the WEU Council to promote worldwide cooperation in monitoring the various activities in the field of nuclear energy.
On 20 January 1978, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply from the WEU Council, prepared by the French delegation, to Assembly Recommendation 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems. The document emphasizes that the member governments of the WEU Council are promoting cooperation on controlling the peaceful use of nuclear energy between nuclear technology-exporting countries, but also notes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for controlling all sensitive exports to non-nuclear weapon states. With regard to the protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, the French delegation points out that each state must make its own arrangements for the implementation of such protection, although studies on various international protection measures are also under examination within the IAEA. This French draft reply is taken up almost in its entirety in the final reply by the Council (C (78) 52).
On 24 January 1979, Colonel Hugo, from Division II (‘Inspections and controls’) of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) of Western European Union (WEU), sends a letter to the Director of the ACA in which he describes the situation with regard to the control of tactical nuclear forces. The letter particularly mentions France, which, if it continues to refuse controls, could end up not declaring elements of its tactical strike force and launch systems. This would represent a highly political decision with which the Council would have to deal appropriately.
In this interview excerpt, Francis Gutmann, an official in the French Foreign Ministry from 1951 to 1957 and Secretary-General of the External Relations Ministry from 1981 to 1985, discusses the nature of Franco-British relations in the field of defence from the establishment of Western European Union (WEU) in 1954 to the purchase of US Polaris missiles by the United Kingdom in 1962, a move which revealed fundamental differences between the two states and had an impact on discussions within WEU.
At a joint meeting held on 2 July 1957, the Council of Western European Union (WEU) replies to questions from the WEU Assembly’s Committee on Defence Questions. On the matter of the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA), particularly the question of nuclear testing, French ambassador Jean Chauvel repeatedly states that the Council is not in a position or is not authorised to give answers in this field since some points are already being examined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Sub-Committee on Disarmament.
At a joint meeting held on 16 April 1959, the Council of Western European Union (WEU) replies to questions from the WEU Assembly’s Committee on Defence Questions. The talks focus on the integration of European air defence within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the installation of IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) in Europe and equipping NATO forces with missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. On the Assembly’s questions concerning the reorganisation of national defence in France, the Chairman of the Council, Maurice Couve de Murville, who is also French Foreign Minister, indicates that the Council considers these questions to be outside its remit, but in his capacity as French representative he has no objection to outlining the main features of the reorganisation of national defence in his country.
On 3 December 1959, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 40 on the state of European security, in which it asks the WEU Council to base a regional policy for European security within the Atlantic Alliance on two factors: the creation of a Joint European Strategic Nuclear Force and the improvement of ground, naval, tactical air and air defence forces in Europe. The Assembly also makes recommendations on the standardisation and rational use of air defence forces.
On 14 July 1960, the Council of Western European Union (WEU) circulates its final reply to Assembly Recommendation 40 on the state of European security. The Council appreciates the attention that the Assembly Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has devoted to the analysis of defence issues in the WEU member countries. But the Council cannot accept the Assembly’s argument that nuclear parity is leading to the threat of a limited war in Europe, since NATO doctrine precludes such a possibility. This doctrine states that the NATO shield should be strong enough to form a deterrent to all kinds of minor aggression. Moreover, the Council cannot accept the premise in the Assembly’s Recommendation on the adoption of a regional policy for European security within the Atlantic Alliance, since it believes that the collective defence of Europe and North America should be based on this organisation. It cannot accept that in the event of an attack on a NATO member, the other states would not provide their full support. The Council also considers the creation of a joint European strategic nuclear force under WEU control to be unacceptable. On the matter of cooperation in the field of arms production, the Council explains that experience has shown that it is virtually impossible to develop an overall plan for the joint production of armaments.
At a joint meeting held on 25 October 1960 in Brussels, the Council of Western European Union (WEU) answers questions from the General Affairs Committee of the WEU Assembly. The committee speculates on the possible accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities (EC) and particularly its accession to the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Chairman of the Council affirms that as things stand, given that this matter is still under consideration, it is not really possible to comment on the final outcome. As well as the United Kingdom’s accession to Euratom, the committee raises various other questions on the functioning and activities of the Communities, some of which do not fall within the remit of the WEU, but the Chairman emphasises the importance of WEU as a forum for meetings and exchanges of ideas between the Six and the United Kingdom.
On 1 December 1960, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 57 on the state of European security — establishment of a NATO nuclear force. The Assembly, anxious that every effort should be made to ensure the defence of Europe and to avoid a dangerous and costly proliferation of atomic weapons, recommends to the WEU Council that the shortages in conventional defence should be remedied; that a permanent nuclear force should be established in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), placed under a single authority and embracing all the nuclear means present in Europe; and that the North Atlantic Council should establish joint procedures for the use of nuclear weapons. The Assembly also requests that these three proposals be communicated to the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Paris on 16 and 17 December 1960.
At the 168th meeting of the Council of Western European Union (WEU), held on 7 December 1960, the Council examines Recommendation 57 of the WEU Assembly on the state of European security — establishment of a NATO nuclear force. The Council decides to follow the Assembly’s request and communicate its proposals to the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on 16 and 17 December 1960 in Paris, but the Council does not intend to report to the Assembly on the progress made within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As regards the substance of the Recommendation, since the problems raised are to be discussed at the NATO ministerial meeting, the Council is of the view that no useful purpose would be served by examining it further at present.
On 16 and 17 November 1964, the Council of Ministers of Western European Union (WEU) meets for a two-day working session in Bonn, in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The meeting, chaired by Federal Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, particularly focuses on the difficult issue of the plan for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The photo shows the opening session in the ‘Europe’ room of the German Foreign Ministry on 16 November 1964.
On 3 December 1964, the British daily newspaper The Guardian comments on the decision taken by the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) in favour of the establishment of ‘an Atlantic nuclear force on a multilateral basis’, a formula resulting from an amendment by British Assembly member Lord Kennet, and outlines the main implications of such a force.
On 1 October 1970, Soviet tanks take part in joint Warsaw Pact manoeuvres. The military consolidation of the Warsaw Pact and its superiority over the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in terms of equipment and manpower raise doubts as to the Atlantic Alliance’s ability to implement a strong traditional defence and suggest the need for a reassessment of US nuclear involvement in Europe.
On 19 June 1973, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 235 on nuclear policies in Europe, encouraging the WEU Council to promote a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to investigate, with the United States, the possibility of adopting common Atlantic nuclear policies.
On 16 November 1973, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the final reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 235 on nuclear policies in Europe. The Council emphasises the various programmes that have already been set up within the nine-member European Communities and also in a wider framework, particularly in cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to promote a policy for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also welcomes the progress made in coordinating uranium enrichment and the extension of this cooperation to other Western European countries. With regard to the adoption of joint Atlantic nuclear policies, the Council believes it is too early to predict the lines along which cooperation with the United States will proceed.
On 17 September 1974, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the final reply by the WEU Council to question 143 put by a member of the Assembly on nuclear tests. The text is based largely on the draft reply (C (74) 134) prepared by the French and British delegations. Given that their countries are directly concerned by the question, the two delegations offered to draw up the reply. They emphasise that neither the Brussels Treaty of 1948 nor the Paris Agreements of 1954 require the signatory countries to inform the WEU Council of nuclear weapons tests. The French and British recognise that their governments have different approaches when it comes to the type of nuclear tests they carry out, but they affirm that this does not prevent the two countries from maintaining friendly relations as allies. Furthermore, with regard to underground nuclear tests, it is not within the remit of the Council to approach the US Government; only France can decide on its intentions in this area.
On 27 November 1974, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the final reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 253 on a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Council welcomes the efforts made to promote some convergence of national policies on the peaceful use of nuclear energy through regular meetings in European cooperation forums. But it also emphasises the fact that the main guarantee of European independence in the nuclear field lies not in reactors but in supplies of uranium and in the means of enriching it.
At the 498th meeting of the Council of Western European Union (WEU), held on 17 September 1975, the delegations discuss the draft replies to question 160 put to the WEU Council by Assembly member Mr Krieg. The member had asked if the nuclear forces of two WEU member countries (France and the United Kingdom) would be capable of playing a role in a western defence system based on selective nuclear retaliation. The Council notes that the delegations are finding it hard to reach agreement on a reply. Unlike the Dutch, the French and the British are keen to emphasise the fact that the Ottawa Declaration explicitly recognises the deterrent role of France and the United Kingdom in the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Atlantic Alliance.
On 18 September 1975, the Council of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply to question 160 put by Mr Krieg, a member of the Assembly. The member had asked if the nuclear forces of two WEU member countries — France and the United Kingdom — are capable of playing a role in a western defence system based on selective nuclear retaliation. The draft reply, drawn up following the discussions that took place at the Council meeting on 17 September 1975, includes the original proposal by Britain and France (WPM(75)24) as well as a series of amendments proposed by other delegations. Opinions differ on the paragraph concerning the Declaration on Atlantic Relations signed in Ottawa, which the French and British see as explicitly recognising the deterrent role played by the two countries in the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.
On 10 October 1975, the Council of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply to question 160 put by Mr Krieg, a member of the Assembly. The member had asked if the nuclear forces of two WEU member countries (France and the United Kingdom) are capable of playing a role in a western defence system based on selective nuclear retaliation. In the absence of an agreement on the full text, the German delegation suggests that the Council should limit its reply. Opinions differ between the Netherlands delegation and the French and British delegations on the paragraph concerning the Declaration on Atlantic Relations signed in Ottawa: the French and British explicitly recognise the deterrent role played by the two countries in the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.
At the 501st meeting of the Council of Western European Union (WEU), held on 17 December 1975, the delegations discuss question 160 put by Assembly member Mr Krieg. The member had asked if the nuclear forces of two WEU member countries (France and the United Kingdom) are capable of playing a role in a Western defence system based on selective nuclear retaliation. The Council admits that it is unable to reach agreement on a reply to this question.
On 21 March 1978, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the final reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems. The Council emphasises that the member governments of the WEU Council are promoting cooperation on controlling the peaceful use of nuclear energy between nuclear technology supplier countries, but it also notes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for controlling all sensitive exports to non-nuclear weapon states. With regard to the protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, the Council points out that each state must make its own arrangements for the implementation of such protection, although studies on various international protection measures are also under examination within the IAEA.