Deterrence

 

Both the United Kingdom and France began exploring leads for an independent nuclear programme just after the Second World War. The United Kingdom’s efforts produced results on 3 October 1952 with the explosion of its first nuclear bomb. Its independence in terms of production capacity was, however, jeopardised following the shelving of the Skybolt programme by the United States. Britain also cancelled its Blue Streak medium-range ballistic missile project in favour of American Polaris rockets — a move which was enshrined in the Nassau Agreement of 21 December 1962.[1] France, meanwhile, launched its atomic programme for military purposes in 1952. General de Gaulle, who returned to power in June 1958, confirmed that the strike force would go ahead.[2] France’s concern to preserve its independence in the development and use of its nuclear arsenal was expressed in the memorandum of 17 September 1958 from de Gaulle to the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, and the United States President, General Eisenhower. In it, the French President proposed setting up a political and strategic directorate to link the three countries. The first French atomic explosion took place on 13 February 1960.

 

At the beginning of the 1960s, France and the United Kingdom were running their nuclear policies for military purposes with similar aims in view: to preserve their deterrent capacity and constitute a ‘second decision-making centre’ in the West which could take the place of United States intervention in the event of a Soviet attack, but with a different approach.[3]

 

Three principal factors affected the course of France and Britain’s nuclear policies over time. Firstly, there was the internal political support each had for the formulation of nuclear policies. In France, successive governments backed the setting up of a ‘strike force’ and opposition was not effective, despite motions of no confidence.[4] In the United Kingdom, although the Labour Party (in power from 1947 to 1951, 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1979) initiated and developed nuclear programmes, the statements issued about the activities were carefully worded to avoid conflict within the party and with other parties, not to mention discrepancies between NATO’s nuclear strategy and that of the country. When it found itself back in opposition, the Labour Party adopted a sceptical stance and particularly opposed the decisions to acquire Polaris rockets in 1962 and Trident missiles in 1980.[5] French military policy, conversely, was formulated consistently over time, and was based on the principles of independent decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons and the assertion of solidarity with its allies and NATO.[6]

 

The part played by the two countries in the integrated military structure was another factor of importance in understanding their national policies. As soon as they were first deployed, Britain’s nuclear forces were integrated into NATO, and the United Kingdom’s nuclear policy developed along two lines of reasoning: the possession of nuclear weapons at national level and the Alliance’s nuclear strategy.[7] The development of the massive retaliation doctrine in 1954 was, for the United Kingdom and the allies in general, an opportunity to equip NATO with American tactical nuclear weapons and thereby make up for the lack of conventional forces with atomic weapons.[8] Although it favoured the use of nuclear weapons under NATO supervision, London was, nevertheless, opposed to the establishment of mechanisms for consultation on the use of such weapons, in particular because of a fear that, in the event of a swift nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, the effectiveness of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent would be affected by it.[9]

 

French deterrence policy, known as the strategy of ‘weak to strong’, relied for its doctrinal aspects on the contributions by Generals Beaufre, Gallois and Poirieri,[10] who developed the theory of the Gaullist desire ‘for a seat at the top table’.[11] The point, in fact, was to guarantee independence through the development, deployment and potential use of nuclear weapons and to possess a deterrent arsenal, without, however, advocating parity or quantitative superiority. While the ‘strike force’ was seen by the Americans as a threat to the implementation of the ‘graduated response’ strategy, the political rejection of that strategy by de Gaulle heralded the uncoupling of the American and European nuclear deterrents. It was not until 1967 and France’s actual departure from NATO’s integrated military command that the ‘graduated response’ strategy was officially adopted by the Atlantic Alliance.[12] Even so, France remained a loyal member of the Atlantic Alliance. On 22 August 1967, France and NATO signed the Ailleret–Lemnitzer agreement to allow SACEUR to provide American nuclear support for France’s air and land forces in Germany in the event of a nuclear war.[13] This left France facing a dilemma as between independence or cooperation with its allies, particularly the United States.[14] The arrival of Georges Pompidou in power in June 1969 did not alter the situation as regards nuclear cooperation, with the Gaullist doctrine of independence being reaffirmed. The relative deterioration in Franco-German relations following the launching of the Ostpolitik by Willy Brandt and France’s rapprochement with the United Kingdom after Pompidou’s approval for British membership of the EEC had no effect on France’s policy towards NATO.[15]

 

Meanwhile the United Kingdom continued to defend the principle of a second nuclear decision-making centre in Western Europe: in the event of a Soviet attack, the decision to use nuclear weapons could not rest solely with Washington. This concern, which France also shared, was heeded by the North Atlantic Council at its ministerial meeting in Ottawa on 19 June 1974. The final declaration reaffirmed ‘the contribution to the security of the entire Alliance provided by the nuclear forces of the United States based in the United States as well as in Europe’. For the first time, however, the Allies also recognised that the nuclear forces of France and Britain were ‘capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.’[16]

 

As regards the strategy to be adopted in the face of an enemy nuclear attack, the British position was consistent over time, both at home and in its relations with NATO. London stood by the principle of the ‘flexible response’.[17] London also advocated interdependence within the Alliance and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), a high-level NATO body set up in 1966 to which France did not belong. This proved to be a way of creating perceived solidarity through consultations and consensus-building.[18]

 

Lastly, there was a third factor, technical cooperation in the nuclear field. The United Kingdom had never ceased calling for a resumption of nuclear cooperation with the United States throughout the 1950s. This had been broken off from 1946 onwards, following the adoption by the US Congress of the McMahon Act prohibiting the divulging of any nuclear information, even to the allies. It was allowed again in 1958 after the Act had been amended.[19] France saw this as a favour to the United Kingdom, and as evidence of the United States’ concern to avoid any nuclear proliferation. Paris was to develop its nuclear programme for military purposes within a strictly national framework.[20] Furthermore, at his press conference on 14 January 1963, General de Gaulle turned down Kennedy’s offer on the Polaris missiles as well as the proposal to establish a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, though it accepted the missiles, turned down the American proposal for this multilateral force and the Labour government tabled a counter-proposal, the ‘Thorneycroft proposal’, which was for an Atlantic nuclear force.[21] For Germany, however, this was not an attractive proposal, as it perpetuated nuclear inequality. In the end, the appeasing of Germany’s ‘nuclear anxiety’ and the prospect of a non-proliferation treaty helped to result in these initiatives being shelved.[22]

 

Under Pompidou (June 1969 to April 1974), development of the tactical nuclear programme and the use of such weapons continued under tight national control and, although aware of the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons, France maintained its capacity for independent action in the event of nuclear war.[23] Its first ground-to-ground tactical missiles with nuclear capacity, christened Pluton, starting being delivered to the Army in 1974.[24] Some proposals for cooperation in exchanges on nuclear matters were put forward by President Nixon in 1973, in accordance with the terms of the McMahon Act, which authorised the setting up of ‘nuclear assistance programs’.[25] The Ottawa Declaration also showed there had been a change of view by the US Administration, with the recognition of the usefulness of the French and British ‘strike force’.

 

In the 1970s, British Conservative then Labour governments decided to develop ‘Chevaline’ nuclear warheads to guarantee the credibility of Polaris missiles against Soviet anti-ballistic-missile defences.[26] The British government once again argued for the establishment of a second decision-making centre when it brought up the issue of the credibility of the United States’ nuclear commitment to Europe.[27] This argument was also used in 1980 at the time of the acquisition of the Trident C-4 missiles,[28] the cost of which, although not exorbitant, upset the delicate balance of the British budget.

 

The nuclear component seriously affected not only Franco-British relations but also the countries’ participation in the work of WEU. In a Cold War context, the questions of deterrence and nuclear proliferation were at the heart of the concerns felt by the interparliamentary Assembly of WEU and its members, who drew up many reports and recommendations on, among other matters, the use and control of atomic energy in the WEU framework, nuclear testing, the establishment of a NATO nuclear force and its deterrent capacities, and Europe’s relations with the United States in this area.[29] The responses to these recommendations were a way for the national delegations — among whom the French and the British played a conspicuously proactive part[30]to state their views and objections both by submitting draft replies and during the debates in the WEU Council.


Consequently, the Assembly took on the role of a driving force in the debate on nuclear deterrence, despite WEU’s having no powers in the nuclear field except with respect to monitoring the non-manufacture of atomic weapons by the FRG[31] and supervision by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.[32] Thus, in October 1958, in the replies drafted by the British delegation to the Assembly’s questions on the possibility of establishing arrangements for joint control of the use of strategic nuclear weapons, the Council said that tactical nuclear weapons were subject to the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and that the North Atlantic Council had no plans for making such arrangements.[33]

 

As for the Council of WEU, it was still a forum for exchanges of information about national policies and helped to encourage cooperation between Europeans, as can be seen from the declaration made in February 1958 on behalf of the French, German and Italian delegations about their cooperation on arms, including nuclear arms.[34]

 

Over the years, the Assembly tried to ‘nudge’ the WEU Member States and proposed, for example, the adoption of a regional policy on European security with a common European strategic nuclear force. This policy was hammered out in opposition to the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ and very often to that of the ‘graduated response’. It was rejected by the Council, which firmly believed that responsibility for the collective defence of Europe and North America lay with NATO.[35] The Assembly of WEU eventually came out against the proliferation of national nuclear forces, while saying it was in favour of establishing a nuclear strike force belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).[36]

 

The attention which the Assembly of WEU devoted to the nuclear question and the effects of nuclear deterrence on European security was a major part of its activities, especially during the Cuban crisis. The parliamentarians also paid a great deal of attention to the question of the spread of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.[37] On this specific subject, the Council and the Member States emphasised the fact that the primary responsibility for discussing it lay with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[38]

 

During the debates in WEU, the differences of opinion between France and the United Kingdom on nuclear strategy and the role of NATO in protecting Europe in the event of nuclear attack often came to the surface. Nevertheless, the two states were also able to put up a joint front to defend their deterrent capacity and their nuclear programmes, particularly as regarded the question of nuclear tests, independence in terms of monitoring and the role of their deterrent forces.[39]

 

 

[1] The programme, which was cancelled in February 1960, had already been in difficulties in the 1950s owing to its high cost. It was replaced by an agreement with the Americans for the purchase of their Skybolt missiles. The National Archives. Skybolt and Polaris missiles. Available at: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/skybolt-polaris-missiles.htm [consulted on 10 April 2015]; PIERRE, Andrew J. Nuclear Politics. The British experience with an independent strategic force 1939–1970. London: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 217–272.

[2] General de Gaulle, however, had set up the French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l’énergie atomique — CEA) in 1945, by the ruling of the Council of Ministers of 18 October 1945.

[3] BOYER, Yves. The legacy of history finally overcome. In: BOYER, Yves, LELLOUCHE, Pierre and ROPER, John (eds). Franco-British defence co-operation: a new entente cordiale. London: Routledge for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 1988, Chapter II.

[4] KOLODZIEJ, Edward A. French international policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou. The politics of grandeur. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974, pp. 120–122.

[5] There was also opposition to an independent nuclear force from a broad swathe of public opinion which was sceptical about the wisdom of investing in it, given the limited resources available. ROPER, John. Nuclear policies: different approaches to similar objectives. In: BOYER, Yves, LELLOUCHE, Pierre and ROPER, John (eds). Franco-British defence co-operation: a new entente cordiale. London: Routledge for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 1988, Chapter I, esp. pp. 3–4; BOYER, Yves. The legacy of history finally overcome. Op. cit. p. 17.

[6] BOYER, Yves. The legacy of history finally overcome. Op. cit. p. 18.

[7] ROPER, John. Nuclear policies: different approaches to similar objectives. In: BOYER, Yves, LELLOUCHE, Pierre and ROPER, John (eds). Franco-British defence co-operation: a new entente cordiale. London: Routledge for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 1988, Chapter I., esp. p. 3.

[8] PIERRE, Andrew. Nuclear Politics. The British experience with an independent strategic force 1939-1970. Op. cit. p. 89.

[9] Brief to the Minister of Defence for a meeting with Sir James Hutchison on the control of nuclear weapons (London, 27 March 1958). The National Archives of the UK (TNA). Foreign Office, Political Departments, General Correspondence from 1906–1966. WESTERN ORGANISATIONS (WU): Western European Union–WEU (WUW). Control of nuclear weapons. 01/01/1958-31/12/1958, FO 371/137932 (Former Reference Dep: File 1241).

[10] Institut des hautes études de défense nationale. Comprendre la défense. Paris: Économica, 1999. p. 82; The ‘founding’ texts of these three strategies can be found in DAVID, Dominique. La politique de défense de la France: textes et documents. Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1989, pp. 79–111.

[11] DUVAL, Marcel and MONGIN, Dominique. Histoire des forces nucléaires françaises depuis 1945. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993, p. 55. ISBN 2130460097.

[12] In practice, General de Gaulle’s pragmatism gave grounds for authorising the French forces in Germany, equipped with nuclear facilities after the delivery of Polaris rockets, to implement the ‘graduated response’ strategy. DUVAL, Marcel and MONGIN, Dominique. Histoire des forces nucléaires françaises depuis 1945. Op. cit. pp. 57–58.

[13] DUVAL, Marcel and MONGIN, Dominique. Histoire des forces nucléaires françaises depuis 1945. Op. cit. pp. 58–59; GUTMANN, Francis. Interview. Excerpt: Disagreements between France and the United States on the role of NATO and on the French nuclear deterrent force. [Interviewed by: MARTINS, Véronica; camera: GERMAIN, Alexandre.] Paris: CVCE [prod.], 10.09.2014. CVCE, Sanem. Video (00:05:29, Colour, Original sound).

[14] DUVAL, Marcel and MONGIN, Dominique. Histoire des forces nucléaires françaises depuis 1945. Op. cit. pp. 80–97.

[15] DUVAL, Marcel and MONGIN, Dominique. Histoire des forces nucléaires françaises depuis 1945. Op. cit. p. 91.

[16] Council of Western European Union. Secretariat-General note. Written question 160 put to the Council by a member of the Assembly. London: 10.07.1975. WPM(75)24. Copy No 54. 2 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1975, 01/05/1975-30/04/1976. File 202.413.22. Volume 1/1; Council of Western European Union. Extract from minutes of 498th meeting of WEU Council held on 17th September 1975. IV. Question concerning the Assembly. Draft replies to written questions 156 and 160. 17.09.1975. CR(75)11. pp. 7–12. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1975, 01/05/1975-30/04/1976. File 202.413.22. Volume 1/1.

[17] ROPER, John. Nuclear policies: different approaches to similar objectives. Op. cit. p. 14.

[18] HEUSER, Beatrice. NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000. Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1998. p. 90, ISBN 0312174985.

[19] For the text of the Act, see the website of the Council on Foreign Relations at http://www.cfr.org/world/atomic-energy-act-1946-mcmahon-act-pl-585/p21415

[20] PIERRE, Andrew J. Nuclear Politics. The British experience with an independent strategic force 1939–1970. Op. cit. p. 127; The nuclear aspect of France’s military policy was apparent from the Fifth Republic’s first Programme Act for the period from 1960 to 1964. Funding for the development of the various nuclear components — air-, land- and sea-based — continued to be earmarked in the second Programme Law (1965–1970) and the third and fourth Planning Laws (1971–1975 and 1977–1982) and DUVAL, Marcel and MONGIN, Dominique. Histoire des forces nucléaires françaises depuis 1945. Op. cit. pp. 56, 62.

[21] Submitted to the NATO Council in December 1963. In contrast to the MLF, the British proposal called for the multilateralisation of weapons already in existence or which it was planned to bring into service. The Polaris submarines were by and large left out; there would not be any sharing of ‘the independent deterrent’. Washington agreed to the proposal’s being considered as an addition to, not a substitute for, the MLF. Labour were even more opposed to the MLF than the Conservatives, especially as they regarded the MLF as a provocation to the Russians. The ‘Atlantic nuclear force’ would be close to NATO but would not be subject to its ‘heavy decision-making process’. All the countries represented would have decision-making rights; PIERRE, Andrew J. Nuclear Politics. The British experience with an independent strategic force 1939–1970. Op. cit. pp. 250, 276–278.

[22] PIERRE, Andrew. Nuclear Politics. The British experience with an independent strategic force 1939–1970. Op. cit. pp. 281, 282.

[23] Interview with Mr Debré, Minister for National Defence, to the German daily newspaper Die Welt: 23 April 1970: In: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Secretariat-General of the Government. La politique étrangère de la France: Textes et Documents, 1er semestre 1970. Paris: La Documentation française, 1970. pp. 135–138; KOLODZIEJ, Edward A. French international policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou. The politics of grandeur. Op. cit. pp. 146–157.

[24] DUVAL, Marcel and MONGIN, Dominique. Histoire des forces nucléaires françaises depuis 1945. Op. cit. p. 69.

[25] See: ULLMAN, Richard. The Covert French Connection. In: Foreign Policy [online]. No 75 [consulted on 27 June 2014]. Summer, 1989, pp. 3–33. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148862.

[26] ROPER, John. Nuclear policies: different approaches to similar objectives. Op. cit. p. 14.

[27] Ibid.

[28] It was decided to change and take Trident D-5 in 1982.

[29] See the recommendations summarising the conclusions of the reports and the steps to be taken. Assembly of Western European Union. Recommendation No. 23 on the present state of European security (Strasbourg, fourth session, 4 July 1958). In: Proceedings: Fourth Ordinary Session, First Part, Volume II: Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU, July 1958, p. 26; Assembly of Western European Union. Recommendation 235 on nuclear policies in Europe (Paris, second session, 19 June 1973). In: Proceedings: Nineteenth Ordinary Session, First Part, Volume II: Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU, July 1973, p. 26; Assembly of Western European Union. Recommendation 264 on nuclear weapons proliferation (Bonn, fourth sitting, 27 May 1975). In: Proceedings: Twenty-first Ordinary Session, First Part, Volume II: Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU, May 1975, pp. 38–39.

[30] Council of Western European Union. Secretary-General’s note. Draft replies to the Assembly’s questions on defence matters. London: 22.10.1958. WPM(120). Copy No 55. 3 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1956, 01/10/1956-30/11/1958. File 202.413.41. Volume 1/1; Council of Western European Union. Secretariat-General note. Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. London: 30.09.1975. WPM(75)35/A. 3 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1969, 01/12/1969-16/10/1985. File 202.413.999.06. Volume 1/1; Council of Western European Union. Draft reply to recommendation 264. 11.11.1975. 1 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1969, 01/12/1969-16/10/1985. File 202.413.999.06. Volume 1/1; Council of Western European Union. Secretary-General’s note. Recommendation 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems. London: 20.01.1978. WPM(78)7. 5 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1977, 28/11/1977-22/04/1985. File 202.415.32. Volume 1/1. Furthermore, the survey of reports (and associated recommendations and resolutions) shows that the Assembly members from both countries were very active in drafting these reports.

[31] Protocol No III, Article I — The FRG undertook not to produce atomic, biological or chemical weapons.

[32] Protocol No III, Article III.

[33] WPM(120). Op. cit.

[34] Mr Chauvel, Ambassador of France in London, to Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs: London, 12 February 1958, T. Nos 621 to 627. Reserved. In: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Committee for the Publication of French diplomatic documents. Documents diplomatiques français: 1958, Volume I, 1 January–30 June. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1992. Document No 86. pp. 155–156; Council of Western European Union. Extract from minutes of 108th meeting of WEU Council held on 12th February 1958. Co-operation between France, Germany and Italy in the production of armaments. CR(58)6, pp. 4–7. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Subjects dealt with by various WEU organs. Year: 1958, 01/06/1957-30/04/1958. File 442.00. Volume 1/4.

[35] Assembly of Western European Union. Recommendation No. 40 on the state of European security (Paris, twelfth sitting, 3 December 1959). In: Proceedings: Fifth Ordinary Session, Second Part, Volume IV: Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU, December 1959, p. 36; Council of Western European Union. Secretary-General’s note. Recommendation No. 40 on the state of European security. London: 14.07.1960. C(60)108. 4 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1959, 28/11/1959-30/09/1960. File 202.413.05. Volume 1/1.

[36] Minutes. Talks between General de Gaulle and Mr Macmillan at Rambouillet (15–16 December 1962): I, 15 December 1962, from 15:45 to 18:15, minutes. Top secret. In: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Committee for the Publication of French diplomatic documents. Documents diplomatiques français: 1962, Volume II, 1 July–31 December. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1999. Document No 200. pp. 535–544, esp. page 535.

[37] Assembly of WEU, European Interparliamentary Security and Defence Assembly, Le débat sur la défense européenne 1955–2005, Paris: Assembly of WEU, April 2005, pp. 21–22; Assembly of Western European Union. Recommendation 253 on a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Paris, third sitting, 19 June 1974). In: Proceedings: Twentieth Ordinary Session, First Part, Volume II: Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU, June 1974, p. 37; Assembly of Western European Union. Recommendation 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems (Paris, eleventh sitting, 30 November 1977). In: Proceedings: Twenty-third Ordinary Session, Second Part, Volume IV: Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU, November 1977, p. 34.

[38] Council of Western European Union. Secretary-General’s note. Recommendation 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems. London: 20.01.1978. WPM(78)7. 5 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1977, 28/11/1977-22/04/1985. File 202.415.32. Volume 1/1.

[39] Council of Western European Union. Secretary-General’s note. Written question 143 put to the Council by a member of the Assembly. London: 17.09.1974. C(74)144. 3 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1974, 01/06/1974-20/09/1974. File 202.415.21. Volume 1/1; CR(75)11. Op. cit.; Council of Western European Union. Extract from minutes of 501st meeting of WEU Council held on 17th December 1975. 17.12.1975. CR(75)14. 1 p. National Archives of Luxembourg (ANLux). http://www.anlux.lu. Western European Union Archives. Secretariat-General/Council’s Archives. 1954–1987. Organs of the Western European Union. Year: 1975, 01/05/1975-30/04/1976. File 202.413.22. Volume 1/1.

 


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